Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. speaker in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BEDFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (SUPERANNUATION) BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday, 18th March.

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next at Seven o'Clock.

KENT WATER BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time, and committed.

LUTON CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next at Seven o'Clock.

ILFORD CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next.

PETITIONS

British Museum

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe): I have been asked by the Trustees of the British Museum to present a Petition, which they have to submit to this House each year, explaining their financial position and praying for aid. The Petition recites the funded income of the Trustees,

and points out that the establishment is, necessarily, attended with an expense far beyond the annual production of the funds, and the Trust cannot, with benefit to the public, be carried on without the aid of Parliament. It concludes with this Prayer:
Your Petitioners therefore humbly pray your Honourable House to grant them such further support towards enabling them to carry on the execution of the Trust reposed in them by Parliament, for the general benefit of learning and useful knowledge, as to your House shall seem meet."—(Queen's Recommendation signified.)
Petition referred to the Committee of Supply.

Maternity Home, Slough

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: I have been asked to present a Petition by 6,588 residents of Slough, Eton and neighbouring towns and villages. It opens in the prescribed form and shows that a decision has been reached to close Colinswood Maternity Home, that this decision will mean that many expectant mothers will have no opportunity to enter a maternity home, that it will cause grievous suffering because of the overcrowded homes in Slough and the continued use of hutments for accommodation, that the need for provision for mothers will be greatly increased by the new population of 17,000 which is to be accommodated on two new London County Council housing estates, and that in the area of Eton and other neighbouring towns and villages there is no adequate maternity home accommodation and the need is specially great because of the considerable caravan population. The Prayer of the Petitioners is as follows
Wherefore your Petitioners pray that the Colinswood Maternity Home shall not be closed until adequate alternative provision has been made for the expectant mothers of Slough and neighbouring towns and villages, and your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
To lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions — CINEMATOGRAPH ACT, 1952 (OPERATION)

Mr. Dudley Williams: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he has yet made any decision on the date that the Cinematograph Act, 1952. will come into operation, in view of the fact that at the moment it is not possible to prevent children seeing undesirable programmes provided non-inflammable films are used.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I hope that it will be possible to bring the Act into operation on 1st July.

Mr. Williams: Will my right hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that this is a very urgent matter? I am very glad to hear that he will bring the Act into operation quickly. Is he aware that there is great concern among clergy and others associated with child welfare at the sordid nature of some films shown by mobile cinemas in Devonshire villages, which children cannot in law at the moment be prevented from attending?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will bear those facts in mind.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOUTH WALES PORTS (TRADE POSITION)

Mr. Gower: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will ask the Council of Wales to study the present position of trade at the South Wales ports of Barry, Cardiff, Newport and Swansea, and make a report.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The Council's Industrial Panel has been giving consideration to the situation in the South Wales ports and still has this matter under review. My colleagues and I will be glad to consider any advice or report on the position which the Council may decide to submit.

Mr. Gower: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his reply, but in his future consideration of the subject, with special reference to Barry, will he take into account the fact that in prewar years the trade of Barry was

peculiarly and particularly built up on coal exports? Will he also take account of the fact that many people have now been attracted from the work in the port of Barry into other industries and if they are ever required again it might be very difficult to get them back?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will certainly take those points into account.

Mr. G. Thomas: Is the Home Secretary in touch with the Cardiff Port Development Committee, where he will find all the necessary information without calling in agriculturists from the North?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will willingly keep in touch with anybody on this very difficult problem.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Visiting Forces Act, 1952

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he can now make a statement on the proposed operation of the Visiting Forces Act, 1952.

Mr. E. Fletcher: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he intends to bring into operation the Visiting Forces Act, 1952.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I am not yet in a position to make a statement, but I hope to be able to do so next week.

Mr. Fletcher: May we take it that pressure is being brought to bear on the American Government to introduce the necessary reciprocal legislation, so that the Act can be introduced in this country?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: It would be better to wait until next week, when I will try to deal with the point which the hon. Gentleman makes.

Mr. Ede: Seeing that Questions to the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be at the bottom of the list next week, will he make a statement rather than answer a Question?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will willingly consider that suggestion, if I may.

Dr. Smnmerskill: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that unless an arrangement is arrived at


very quickly with the American authorities these unmarried mothers and their children must secure assistance from the National Assistance Board, which will impose a burden upon the taxpayers of this country?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will bear that point in mind.

Homosexuality

Mr. G. Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, pending his consideration of the general question of the law relating to sexual offences, he will introduce temporary legislation to safeguard public morale by preventing the publication by the Press of gross and unnecessary details in cases of homosexuality.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will bear in mind the hon. Member's suggestion in my consideration of the general question, but I am not at present in a position to add anything to my reply to the Question which the hon. Member asked on 18th February.

Mr. Craddock: I should like to press this matter by asking the right hon. and learned Gentleman if he does not think that we should have without delay some public protection against dissemination in the newspapers of the innermost secrets of people, as suggested in the Question? Does he not think that this is a most urgent matter?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I agree that it is a matter of great importance, but there are always two aspects which have to be carefully considered. One is the rights of the persons concerned, and the other the due and public administration of the law.

Sir T. Moore: As this Question implies general criticism of the Press, could we have the names of these newspapers who reveal these gross details?

Mr. Speaker: That is a question that cannot be asked of the Minister.

Mr. Hastings: Does the Home Secretary realise how much we are all influenced by what we read in the papers, and that that specially affects people of slightly subnormal mental capacity, because what they read tends to influence their actions, not only for good but for evil?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Yes, I do realise that, and I should like the House to know that I realise its importance in relation to this subject matter; but the public administration of the courts of law is also one of the most important principles in our country, and I must have due regard to that.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the result of his consideration of the law relating to homosexuality; and what action he proposes to take.

Mr. Donnelly: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is now in a position to make a statement regarding his inquiry into the laws relating to homosexuality.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will make a statement when I am in a position to do so.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Is the Home Secretary aware that the Magistrates' Association, the British Medical Association and the Church of England Moral Welfare Council put forward well-considered and constructive proposals in this matter to help to remove some of the anomalies and irrational humbug which surround certain aspects of the law in this regard?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I have naturally considered the proposals. I am not going to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman into his adjectival denunciations on the subject.

Mr. Donnelly: Can the Home Secretary give us some idea of the nature and extent of his Departmental inquiry and why he has not gone into the matter further and recommended the setting up of a Royal Commission?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: It is difficult to give an answer to a general question like that. I prefer to ask the hon. Gentleman to wait a little longer. I assure him that I am considering the matter very carefully. It is not being pigeonholed.

Theatrical Work (Children)

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he will take to provide additional safeguards for children employed in pantomimes and other forms of theatrical entertainment.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Proposals for legislation on this subject are being worked out, taking into account the recommendations of the Bateson Committee on the employment of children as film actors, in theatrical work and in ballet; but I cannot yet say when it will be possible to introduce a Bill for this purpose.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Will the Home Secretary bear in mind that the committee to which he referred reported as long ago as 1950, and that some action in the matter is long overdue, especially in view of the recent complaints about working conditions during the last pantomime season, which led most education authorities to make strong representations in the matter?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I will certainly bear that in mind.

Lay Justices, Metropolitan Area

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will make more use of the services of lay magistrates in the Metropolitan area.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: There has not yet been sufficient experience to assess the effect of the Order I made last year under Section 11 (9) of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, specifying the classes of case which may be taken by lay justices in the County of London, but I shall continue to keep the matter under review. As the hon. and gallant Member is aware, there are practical difficulties in the way of making wider use of the services of lay justices in London, but arrangements have also been made for lay justices to sit in a spare court room at Bow Street to hear cases in relief of the Metropolitan magistrates, and a domestic proceedings court, with a bench consisting of a Metropolitan magistrate and two lay justices selected from a panel, has been set up with jurisdiction to deal with cases arising in any part of the Metropolitan courts area or in the City of London.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Home Secretary aware that many J.P.s in London feel that they are being treated as half-wits, incapable of dealing with minor cases which would help considerably to relieve the congestion and delay which prevails in so many magistrates' courts at the present time?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I hope that I may have relieved the troubled feelings of anyone who has that idea. There is no foundation for that view being held in responsible quarters. Apart from that, I will bear in mind what the hon. and gallant Gentleman says.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: Is the Home Secretary aware of the continued need to obviate the delays which result from successive remands? Has he forgotten that it is still possible for a case to be remanded from week to week, being heard perhaps for only a quarter of an hour each day? If justice is to be done, it should also be done speedily.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: If the hon. Gentleman can give me details of a case of that sort, I shall be very interested to look into it.

R.S.P.A. Home Safety Work (Grant)

Mrs. Mann: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assistance is now given to the Royal Society for Prevention of Accidents to pursue their work in connection with home safety.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: The grant made to this society for a period of five years to enable them to expand this branch of their work has now come to an end, but I am considering a request which I have recently received from the society for further financial assistance.

Mrs. Mann: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that his answer will give the society very great encouragement? Is he further aware that accidents in the home very greatly outnumber accidents on the road, and that many people feel that the propaganda against home accidents could be further extended?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: Yes, I have that point in mind. The hon. Lady will remember that I gave figures last week, I think, which underlined the point which she has just made.

Oral Answers to Questions — NEW BUILDINGS (AIR-RAID SHELTERS)

Mr. Albu: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has yet made any arrangements for the strengthening of basements in new buildings for the purpose of providing air-raid shelters.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: In the immediate future there are other projects to which priority must be given in the allocation of Civil Defence expenditure, hut this matter is under consideration.

Mr. Albu: Has not this matter been under consideration now for five years? The more building that is done the fewer basements will be strengthened. Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman think it is time for some serious consideration to be given to this problem?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I should be very happy if the hon. Gentleman would care to discuss with me any ideas that he has on this subject. I should like him to know that, among my many faults, resentment of public criticism is not one. I shall be very happy to co-operate with him on this subject.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult the Ministry of Transport about the desirability of using the basements of new buildings, both for shelter space and for parking space for automobiles in time of peace?

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I have, I am, and I shall.

Oral Answers to Questions — EMPLOYMENT

Hospital Attendance (Lost Working Hours)

Miss Ward: asked the Minister of Labour his assessment of the hours lost per week by workers having to attend hospitals for treatment and diagnosis.

The Minister of Labour and National Service (Sir Walter Monckton): I regret that data upon which to form such an assessment are not available.

Miss Ward: Would my right hon. and learned Friend consider having a conversation with the Minister of Health in order that that Minister may inform the regional hospital boards and the hospitals of the very serious loss of productive effort caused by people needing outpatient treatment having to wait so long? Does the Minister not think it part of his duty to see that we are not losing productive effort which could otherwise be used in the national interest?

Sir W. Monckton: It is always a pleasure to speak to my right hon. Friend, and I will take occasion to speak to him on this subject.

Apprentices (Entry Conditions)

Mr. Holt: asked the Minister of Labour what evidence he has of shortages of skilled workers caused by unnecessarily high entry conditions for apprentices being imposed by the union concerned.

Sir W. Monckton: I have no evidence directly associating shortages of skilled workers with unnecessarily high entry conditions for apprentices, but I am constantly urging upon the two sides of industry, who are, of course jointly responsible for the conditions of entry to apprenticeship, the need for greater flexibility in all aspects of this matter, including in particular the age of entry.

Mr. Holt: May I take it from that that the Minister of Labour has not received any evidence of unnecessarily high entry conditions, for instance, in the printing trade, so causing a lack of skilled workers?

Sir W. Monckton: An unnecessarily high condition of entry is, I think, something rather difficult to apprehend. I know that there are particular difficulties in the printing industry, but they are more in regard to numbers than to a high degree of skill on entry.

Mr. G. Thomas: Is the Minister aware that to lower the standard of entry would be a policy of despair, which is rejected both by the professions and by industry?

Sir W. Monckton: I am not yet despairing on this matter.

Mr. Holt: asked Minister of Labour how far he has had difficulty in establishing Government training courses for skilled workers in areas where there appears to be an industrial need for them.

Sir W. Monckton: In general, no difficulty is experienced in securing the support of both sides of the industry concerned to the setting up of training courses in trades where there is an established shortage of skilled labour which can be met by training in Government training centres.

Mr. Holt: May I ask if the Minister has not had any resistance from, for instance, the A.E.U., in some areas on this matter?

Sir W. Monckton: It is very difficult to particularise. All I can say is that, with the help of the National Joint Advisory Council, I have been putting this matter forward. It depends a great deal, in some industries, on the circumstances in particular areas, whereas in others the matter is dealt with on a national basis.

Factory Inspectorate (Equal Pay)

Miss Ward: asked the Minister of Labour under what agreement women grade II factory inspectors were granted equal pay; and when it is proposed to extend this to other grades in the inspectorate.

Sir W. Monckton: Women in class II of the inspectorate have always had the same pay as men, and this arrangement appears to rest on a long-standing practice in the recruitment grade rather than on any agreement. As to the second part of the Question, I would refer to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to a Question by the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) on 17th November last year.

Miss Ward: I am not really aware of the answer given on 17th November. As my right hon. and learned Friend has a well-deserved reputation for scrupulous fairness in human relationships, however, will he take immediate steps to eliminate this quite intolerable injustice in his own Department?

Sir W. Monckton: I hope that I rightly apprehend that the hon. Lady does not wish me to eliminate any disparity there is in a particular direction.

Miss Ward: Oh, no. That is quite correct.

Dr. Summerskill: Would the Minister of Labour tell me why, if a woman is sufficiently highly qualified and belongs to a well-organised group, the Government are always prepared to give her equal pay?

Sir W. Monckton: I was not aware of that matter, and I certainly cannot answer that question.

Oral Answers to Questions — CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS' TRIBUNALS

Mr. Yates: asked the Minister of Labour the purpose of his Department in circulating to local conscientious objectors' tribunals during the years 1940 to 1943 notes of cases determined by the appellate tribunals; why the practice was discontinued; and whether he will consider the advisability of informing such tribunals of established precedents.

Sir W. Monckton: Notes on a small number of such cases were circulated in the early stages of the war, but this was discontinued as being inconsistent with the statutory independence of local tribunals. The answer to the last part of the Question is, "No, Sir."

Mr. Yates: Does not the Minister think that if courts of law are able to have precedents before them it is rather unjust if these tribunals cannot be aware of the decisions of the appellate tribunals to guide them in future consideration of their cases? I should like to know what objection there really can be to this information being given.

Sir W. Monckton: There is, of course, always the right to appeal under the statute. I, in common with my predecessors from 1943, have, I think, regarded this matter in the following way. Conscientious objection is not defined in the Act. It is perfectly plain that there is involved not only what the tribunal apprehends to be conscientious objection, but an inquiry in the individual case as to the sincerity of the particular applicant. I do not think that precedents would assist, and certainly I ought not to issue instructions—by regulation or otherwise— where the burden has been put by the statute on someone else.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: Whilst I appreciate what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said, is it not the case that these were not instructions from the appellate tribunal to the local tribunals but merely typical cases which might offer some guidance to them? Surely, in such cases, there is no interference with the rights of the local tribunals?

Sir W. Monckton: As I said in my original answer, they were notes on cases. After some of them had been distributed during the first three years,


the then Minister thought that they were neither advisable nor helpful, and none of his successors, including myself, has thought it right to change that.

Mr. Yates: asked the Minister of Labour how many women are serving upon local conscientious objectors' tribunals.

Sir W. Monckton: Seven, Sir.

Mr. Yates: Surely that number is a very small proportion of those serving on these tribunals. As we are living in an age where we are demanding equality, why cannot women's voices be heard more on these tribunals?

Sir W. Monckton: The people who are coming before the tribunals now are, of course, men. Nevertheless, except in two cases there are women on all these boards. On two boards there are two women, and on the five boards there are, in all, seven women. If on the five boards there are seven women, I think that there is an adequate representation. Two boards, I agree, have no women members, but, after all, they are dealing with men's cases—and their voices can clearly be heard.

Mrs. Mann: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that in dealing with men the hardest-hearted people are women?

Sir W. Monckton: I think I could assume that that is not a plea for an increase in the number of lady members.

Miss Ward: Is not the Minister aware that women are sometimes more penetrating in knowing whether answers are good or bad?

Sir W. Monckton: As long as it can be said that men are the best judges as to what to answer, I can agree.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Old People's Home, Hereford (Grant)

Mr. Baldwin: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware of the delay in the payment of an Exchequer contribution to the Hampton House Home for Old People, Hereford; and whether, in view of the financial difficulty the society now find themselves in, he will expedite

the payment of this grant in view of the fact that application was first made to the county council under Section 28 of the National Assistance Act in June, 1951.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornshy-Smith): Yes, Sir. A provisional payment of grant was made on 22nd February to the county council for the society, pending determination of the basis of payment to be applied in the future. This has now been settled, and a further payment on account of grant will be paid in the course of the next few days.

Mr. Baldwin: Will the hon. Lady expedite a further grant, because the Committee of the Hampton House Home is now considering whether, unless it gets the full grant to which it is entitled, it will be possible to maintain the provision made for these old people?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I can assure my hon. Friend that the delay was due to a question of a legal ruling. The matter has been settled, and I think he will find it satisfactorily completed in the manner which he hopes.

Doctors (Prescriptions)

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Minister of Health (1) what action is taken against doctors who prescribe medical and surgical material under the National Health Service on request without inquiring for what purpose it is required;
(2) what instructions are given to doctors to ensure that they ascertain that medical supplies are necessary before they prescribe them;
(3) if he is aware that a doctor in the East Midlands, of whom he has been in formed, working in the National Health Service, has prescribed cotton wool in large quantities without satisfying herself of the purpose for which it was requested, and that it was afterwards used for stuffing cushions; and if he will instruct the appropriate executive committee to investigate and take action in the matter.

Mr. Norman Smith: asked the Minister of Health whether he has considered the case of a medical practitioner under the National Health Service in the East Midlands, details of which have been


brought to his attention; that this doctor twice prescribed cotton wool for a patient before she learned that it was being required for the stuffing of a sofa and cushions; and what further steps he will take to prevent laxity in the giving of prescriptions.

Dr. King: asked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been called to the fact that a medical practitioner under the National Health Service, whose name has been sent to him, has prescribed cotton wool for a patient which has been used for stuffing sofa cushions; and what steps he will take to prevent doctors from abusing the National Health Service.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Iain Macleod): A practitioner should prescribe only what is necessary for proper treatment, and if the cost of his prescribing is in excess of the amount necessary on this basis a sum may be withheld from his remuneration. I am sure that practitioners are co-operating in an endeavour to avoid excessive prescribing. I see no necessity for any special action in this case.

Mr. Jeger: Can the Minister say whether he has investigated the case, which was drawn to his attention, of a doctor—Lady Barnett, of television fame —who prescribed cotton wool in excess of the amount required, and whether any action is being taken, in view of the fact that she is a well-known Conservative worker in her constituency and that other doctors who have prescribed cod liver oil and malt have been fined for excessive prescribing?

Mr. Macleod: The hon. Member seeks to show on the basis of one reported case, that there is abuse in this matter and that there is a case for the Minister of Health taking action to avoid financial abuse. There is something to be said for the latter point of view. The only thing I would add to my first answer is that this occurrence took place in the autumn of 1948.

Mr. Norman Smith: Is the Minister aware that this story about cushions was made public by Lady Isobel Barnett, not in 1948 but a few weeks ago? Has he considered the possibility of the story being used by Lady Barnett in a purely allegorical sense, with a view to discrediting the Health Service in the minds of her

ignorant and credulous audience, and will he discourage the telling of flat-footed falsehoods by doctors who are on his pay roll?

Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that the Opposition have always held the view that abuses in the Health Service can take place only with the connivance of doctors, dentists or opticians; and does not he think it wrong that a Tory doctor should use her own professional shortcomings as an instrument of propaganda against the Health Service, when most professional people and thousands of voluntary workers of both political parties are giving admirable service?

Mr. Macleod: All I need to add to my previous answer is that I see nothing whatever in the report which I have read which affords any justification for any of the statements made from the Opposition benches.

Dr. Summerskill: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that it would be in the interests of the Health Service for him to say that this case is unique, and that no similar case has been brought to his attention?

Mr. Macleod: Certainly no similar case has been brought to my attention. I have told the House when this event took place and, quite frankly, I am quite certain that I and the executive council concerned have better things to do than to inquire whether or not, six years ago, a patient did or did not use an appliance correctly.

Hospitals, Dartford (Milk Supply)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Health the gallonage of fresh milk supplied to the Dartford group of hospitals in 1953; and the comparable figure for 1951.

Mr. Iain Macleod: The amounts were 115,218 and 124,113 gallons respectively.

Mr. Dodds: I appreciate the need for economy in any Government service, but will the Minister bear in mind that there is cause for some concern at the fact that in two years the use of skimmed milk powder has increased by 50 per cent, and the gallonage of fresh milk, of which there is plenty, has gone down? Will he see that this process is not overdone in the interests of economy?

Mr. Macleod: Of course I shall bear that in mind, but the figures I have for this particular group show that there has been an increase from 7,000 lb. to 9,300 lb. in the supply of powdered milk, which is clearly not of the order of 50 per cent. Powdered milk is used in these instances only in bulk cooking.

Mr. Dodds: In view of what the Minister has just said, will he refer to the answer he gave to a Question on 11th February, when he said that in 1951 the use of milk powder was 5.3 per cent, and in 1953 it was 7½per cent.? Is not that an increase of 50 per cent.? Will not he look at these figures again before he answers the next Question on this subject?

Mr. Macleod: I have given accurate figures. There is all the difference in the world between an increase in percentage and an increase in the amount used.

Invalid Tricycles (Representations)

Captain Ryder: asked the Minister of Health the correct procedure for appealing against decisions by his Department in respect of the award of invalid tricycles.

Mr. Iain Macleod: There is no formal procedure, but representations made to my local appliance centre or to the appliances division at Norcross are always fully and carefully considered.

Captain Ryder: Can my right hon. Friend say whether there has been any change in this system since his Department took over the administration of these cases? Does not he think it would be advisable to have some sort of system of appeals against decisions of his Department?

Mr. Macleod: There has been no change. The difficulty about having any formal system of appeals is that there is not statutory entitlement upon which we can base it. I should have thought that the present system was working pretty well. Representations can be made to the local appliance centres, and when Members of Parliament bring cases to the attention of the Parliamentary Secretary or myself, we look into them.

Consultant Medical Service

Dr. Stress: asked the Minister of Health how many of the regional boards allow transfer from whole-time to part-time consultant medical service.

Mr. Iain Macleod: All do in suitable cases, subject to the needs of the service.

Dr. Stross: Can the Minister say what is his view about the matter? Has he noted that the service is not normally well served, or best served, by men in full-time service transferring to part-time service? Would not the right hon. Gentleman consider giving some further thought to, or direction in, this matter?

Mr. Macleod: I do not think that any such generalisation can be drawn. The policy which I have indicated in my original answer, that all boards allow transfers, subject to the needs of the service, is based on the 1948 circular, and there has been no change in that. I believe that a part-time consultant service is a very good thing, and I have certainly no evidence to show that there is any deterioration in the service provided to the people.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the Minister aware that he is giving some encouragement to the transfer from full-time to part-time service? Is it not the case that some regional boards are offering the maximum number of part-time sessions, as an alternative to full-time sessions, to the great detriment of the service, and to its added cost?

Mr. Macleod: Boards may well interpret circulars—in particular the 1948 circular—in different ways. As the hon. Member knows very well, there are different trends in different regional boards. I have no reason to think, however, that the boards are not applying their general policy to individual cases—which is what matters—in a reasonable manner.

Mr. K. Robinson: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider asking regional boards to inform him of the number of these transfers which have been made during the last year or two, in view of the fact that he could not give this information to the House when I asked a Question some months ago?

Mr. Macleod: Speaking offhand, the reason I cannot give that information is the form in which the information


is at present collected. It may show the number of posts, but it does not necessarily follow that that is the number of persons in those posts, because people may hold more than one. If it is worth while, I shall see if I can get that information, but I am not anxious to put additional paper work on to the boards.

Dr. Stross: asked the Minister of Health whether he will give an estimate of the financial saving that would follow the abolition of the part-time consultant service and its replacement by a service employing only full-time specialists.

Mr. Iain Macleod: No, Sir. I do not think the financial effect of such a hypothetical circumstance can possibly be assessed.

Dr. Stross: None the less, is the Minister aware that some of us think that the saving would be very considerable? Is he further aware that men working full-time as consultants are not allowed any of the perquisites, such as expense allowances and so on, that follow service of a part-tune nature? If there could be a switch over to full-time service, would it not be possible to make that full-time service much more attractive, even financially?

Mr. Macleod: I am aware of the way in which remuneration of all forms is treated rather differently as between whole-time and part-time specialists. As the hon. Member knows perfectly well, that goes back to the Spens Report. The first half of his supplementary question —I do not know whether I am to take it as an expression of opinion from the Opposition benches—is in direct conflict with the 1949 amending Act. Any suggestion of part-time service being abolished would certainly be a breach of faith with the profession.

Mr. Hastings: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that great cost is in-flicted upon the service by the payment of travelling time and expenses? Would not the withdrawal of those facilities—which apply only to part-time officers—save him a lot of money and give him an opportunity to improve the service in other directions?

Mr. Macleod: I understand the point but I do not agree with it. I think the question is perhaps more appropriate to Question No. 44.

Mr. Blenkinsop: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware of the financial advantages enjoyed by part-time specialists employed by hospital authorities in comparison with those employed full time; and whether he will refer the matter to the Guillebaud Committee for their consideration in view of the heavy cost of payments for travelling time and domiciliary visits charged by part-time specialists.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I am aware of the arrangements which were agreed in 1949. In reply to the second part of the Question, it is open to the committee to consider the point made by the hon. Member, but I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to ask the Committee to inquire into particular topics.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that very heavy expenses are being involved in travelling time from a specialist's home to the hospital, and from hospital to hospital, and in the charges for domiciliary visits; and would it not be right that the Guillebaud Committee should consider this matter as one which concerns the economy of the service?

Mr. Macleod: These matters, as I indicated earlier, stem from the Spens Report on consultant specialists and its implementation by the late Government in the terms and conditions of service. I think that if there is to be any adjustment, whatever form that may take, in these terms and conditions of service, it is far better left in the ordinary way to the Whitley Council, where it can be fully discussed, and in part is being discussed in connection with the claim to which I referred earlier, before the medical Whitley Council. I think that is a better forum than the Guillebaud Committee.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that he cannot divest himself of some responsibility in this matter in view of the fact that it is bound up with the treatment of patients and the waiting time in hospitals?

Mr. Macleod: I am not suggesting that I should divest myself of responsibility. I merely say that I think the Whitley Council is the best forum to discuss it. There is no reason at all, as this clearly falls within the terms of


reference of the Guillebaud Committee, why that committee should not discuss it as well.

Haemophilics (Anti-Haemogloben Serum)

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Health if anti-haemogloben serum is available for emergency treatment to patients in hospitals who are haemophilics.

Mr. Iain Macleod: A limited supply is available on application by doctors, but its efficacy is still the subject of research and is not yet established.

Mrs. Mann: Is it not the case that in an emergency operation where a blood coagulant has been required, it has been necessary to send to the United States? While we much appreciate their help, is it not very important in the case of bleeders that doctors should know where to get an immediate supply of coagulant?

Mr. Macleod: If there is any doubt about it. I will see whether we can circulate the information more widely. Perhaps I can give the information now. Application should be made to the Lister Institute, Chelsea, or to the appropriate regional blood transfusion centre. I should be very happy to look at individual cases if any hon. Member likes to bring them to my attention. No doubt the reason that this serum is in limited supply is the reason which I gave—that it has not yet been accepted as fully efficacious in all circumstances.

Consultants and Registrars (Salary Claim)

Mrs. Mann: asked the Minister of Health what negotiations are in progress regarding salary scales to consultants, senior hospital medical officers and registrars; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Iain Macleod: A claim for higher salaries is before the Medical Whitley Council, and the hon. Member will not expect me to make a statement while it is under consideration.

Mrs. Mann: It has been under consideration since the Spens Report a number of years ago. General practitioners had their pay settled under the Danck-werts award more than a year ago. Cannot the Minister do something to speed

this matter up, or does he enjoy the delay?

Mr. Macleod: It has not been under consideration for quite as long as that, although it has been under consideration for a very long time—some 16 or 17 months, which is a very long time indeed. I had a meeting on this subject this morning. There will be no unnecessary delay, and I think we are now nearing conclusion on the matter. I am sure that the hon. Lady recognises that this is a matter of the most profound importance which will have repercussions in many other fields.

Out-Patients' Departments (Facilities)

Miss Ward: asked the Minister of Health whether he will request the regional hospital boards to make an inquiry into the facilities offered in outpatients' departments and the efficiency of the methods adopted for cutting out waiting time.

Mr. Iain Macleod: This is a matter which hospital boards and committees have constantly before them, and I myself make inquiries if information about unreasonable waiting comes to my notice. If my hon. Friend has particular instances in mind, I shall be happy to look into them.

Miss Ward: Is my hon. Friend aware that the problem is not necessarily just the waiting time but also concerns the variety of methods of handling outpatients, which are just as important, such as ensuring that there are plenty of seats and that tea or some other refreshment is available? Would not my right hon. Friend agree that to circulate the various arrangements, as between one hospital and another, might enable hospitals which are in a difficulty to tighten their procedure for the out-patients and improve it?

Mr. Macleod: It is my impression that information on these matters has been circulated to boards and committees, but if anything further can be done I am entirely in sympathy with my hon. Friend's suggestion, and I shall be glad to consider it.

Mr. Manuel: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the principal concern in this matter is that a great deal of time


is wasted in waiting in the out-patients' departments of many hospitals in the country? Has he any knowledge of the period waited on average, compared with that waited by private out-patients using the same hospitals? My experience is that they can walk through the department and receive almost immediate treatment, whereas in some cases other patients have to wait for many hours, with inadequate seating accommodation, in crowded ante-rooms.

Mr. Macleod: I think that all hospitals should have a block system, or something like it, of waiting appointments in the out-patients' departments. It is important to realise, however, that it is very difficult to be more precise than that. The examination of a patient which, it is thought, may take only a minute or two, may in fact uncover some disease which was unknown before, and the examination may take half an hour or more, upsetting the waiting times of all the other patients. It is very difficult to card-index patients and their diseases in this way, but I am most anxious to see that all hospitals have such facilities as are necessary. Perhaps the best way of doing it, apart from the general assurance which I have given to my hon. Friend, would be for any hon. Members to let me know when they think that the circumstances in their own area are unsatisfactory in this respect. I will look into hon. Members' comments.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Does not the Minister agree that some reduction in the number of part-time specialists and an increase in the number of full-time specialists might improve this position?

Mr. Gough: When my right hon. Friend is giving consideration to these matters, will he bear in mind the very bad conditions prevailing at the hospitals in both Horsham and Crawley, the details of which I have given him?

Mr. Macleod: I will take note of that.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Will not the Minister reply to my question?

Institutions (Bulk Baying)

Mr. Page: asked the Minister of Health what guidance he has given to local authorities concerning the policy of bulk buying for the requirements of

old people's hostels, day nurseries and other similar institutions.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: None, Sir. This is a matter for the local authority.

Hospitals and General Practitioners (Liaison)

Colonel Clarke: asked the Minister of Health what steps are being taken by his Department to ensure that in East Sussex the long-standing custom in private practice whereby the closest liaison possible is maintained between hospitals and general practitioners regarding patients sent to hospital by the latter is continued in the present set-up of the National Health Service.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Every opportunity is taken by circular and otherwise to impress on hospital boards and committees the desirability of close liaison with general practitioners about their patients, whether by personal discussion during treatment or by supplying information in writing both then and on discharge. If my hon. and gallant Friend has a particular case in mind, I shall be glad to make inquiries.

Fowl Pest (Human Infection)

Mr. Bullard: asked the Minister of Health if his attention has been drawn to the danger that four men in Norfolk may have contracted fowl pest after helping with the slaughter of chickens among which the disease had broken out; and if he will make a statement.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: My right hon. Friend is advised that this disease, although in a limited sense transmissible to man, is not readily passed on among human beings. The only known clinical form of the disease in man is a mild inflammation of the eyes without constitutional disturbance. In the instance referred to the men are now back at work.

Mr. Bullard: Does the Parliamentary Secretary appreciate that the policy of the Minister of Agriculture towards this disease is very drastic, being one of slaughter and compensation? I do not want her to pursue such a drastic policy towards human beings, but would she take an opportunity to make it quite clear to farmers and farmworkers how great or how small the risk may be?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I think it might reassure my hon. Friend if I told him that, while it is not unreasonable to attribute the eye condition in the two men concerned to contact at work with the diseased fowls, the laboratory tests which were made did not confirm this association.

Old Hospital Buildings (Running Costs)

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware of the increasing costs of administration and maintenance of old hospital buildings in the southwest region; and why, in view of this, he reduced the grants by nearly £1,000,000 below the estimated hospital board's requirements.

Mr. Iain Macleod: Old hospital buildings are not peculiar to this region, which has been allocated what is in my view a fair share of the total sum available for hospital running costs in 1954–55.

Mr. Awbery: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if he puts into effect the contemplated reduction, it will mean the closing of hospitals in the south-west region? Is he aware that a large number of these hospitals are very old and in a dilapidated condition and that they need more money, not less? Further, is he asking local authorities and local committees to estimate 7 per cent, to 10 per cent, above their requirements so that, when the estimate reaches him, his Department will have an opportunity of reducing the sum by that amount?

Mr. Macleod: I am sure that the hon. Member knows the way these things are done. I should not think any region in any year has ever got what it asked for. Indeed, as a matter of interest, I looked up what happened to the regions in the last year of the Socialist Government, and I found that the estimates for every region were reduced, some of them by a larger sum than is indicated in the Question. As compared with last year, the sum of money is not being reduced; it is being increased. Of course it is less than the regions requested but, as I have explained, as far as I know that has happened in every year and under every Government. The important figure, surely, from the summary of estimates this year is that, as the hon. Member

knows, £17 million more is being provided for the National Health Service. By no possible use of language can that be called a cut.

Mr. Foot: Is the Minister aware that for hospitals in the Plymouth area the same amount has been allocated as that for last year and that, as there has been a considerable increase in the salary payments which have to be made, as well as other considerations, in effect that means a cut?

Mr. Macleod: There is a later Question about Plymouth but, as a matter of fact, the hon. Member's assumptions are not accurate.

Maternity Beds, Blackburn

Mrs. Castle: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that a number of mothers in Blackburn are being refused the opportunity of having their babies in hospital or maternity homes; and whether he will instruct hospital management committees that maternity beds should be provided under the National Health Service for all mothers who prefer not to have their babies at home.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I have already written to the hon. Member enclosing a copy of a circular to hospitals which asks them to provide maternity beds for mothers who require them on medical or social grounds. It would not be practicable to provide beds for all mothers who prefer not to have their babies at home. In Blackburn the percentage of confinements in hospitals is much higher than in most other areas, and less than 2 per cent, of those who applied in 1953 were refused admission.

Mrs. Castle: Is the right hon. Gentle man aware that as a result of the recent closing of Springfield Maternity Home in Blackburn, mothers who want to have their second child in hospital or in a maternity home have been told that they cannot and must have it at home, although they have no one to look after them, as, for example, in the case which I have in my hands now? In this case, when the mother was referred to the Manchester Regional Hospital Board they told her they could not do anything be cause the right hon. Gentleman had in structed them to reduce the number of cases of mothers having their babies in hospital—

Mr. Speaker: With regard to Springfield hospital, I call the hon. Lady's attention to the fact that the hon. Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) has a Motion down on the Adjournment tonight for discussion of that matter. We cannot anticipate that Motion.

Mrs. Castle: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is that going to preclude me from raising the general principle, which I have just referred to, of an instruction by the Minister of Health to the regional hospital board in Manchester to reduce the number of maternity cases in Manchester?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Lady asked a Question on a general principle and then asked a supplementary question about the closing of Springfield hospital. I was pointing out to her that that would be anticipating the Motion of the hon. Member for Accrington tonight.

Mrs. Castle: This maternity home is in my constituency. I have no guarantee that I shall be able to speak tonight.

Mr. Speaker: I cannot help that. We cannot anticipate the Motion on the Adjournment.

Mr. G. Thomas: Are you now ruling, Mr. Speaker, that an hon. Member will not be allowed to ask a question about his own constituency if someone else happens to have given notice that at some time, if he is in the Chamber, he will raise that question on the Adjournment?

Mr. Speaker: The question as to one hon. Member asking a Question about another hon. Member's constituency is one between the Members involved. I am only concerned with the rules of order, which prohibit us from anticipating matters, notice of the raising of which on the Adjournment has been given.

Mrs. Castle: On a point of order—

Mr. Speaker: I cannot deal further with that point of order.

Blind and Partially-Sighted Patients (Mental Institutions)

Mr. Edward Evans: asked the Minister of Health how many registered blind persons and partially-sighted persons, respectively, are known to be

patients in mental hospitals and institutions; how many of these have been discharged during the past twelve months; and if he is satisfied that the fullest facilities for visits by welfare workers are available.

Mr. Iain Macleod: On 31st December, 1952, the last date for which complete figures are available, there were 1,158 registered blind persons in mental hospitals and 639 in mental deficiency hospitals in England and Wales. The number of partially-sighted patients is not known, nor the number of discharges during the past 12 months. I am not aware of any lack of facilities for visits by welfare workers, but if the hon. Member has particulars of any individual cases I shall be glad to look into them.

Mr. Evans: In view of the very alarming figures which the Minister has disclosed—1,800 blind people in mental hospitals and institutions—does he not feel anxiety that this number is increased by the possibility that old blind people may be taken to mental hospitals because they suffer from lack of attention at home or because there is not sufficient provision in homes for blind people, and that they therefore have to be taken to these mental hospitals which, I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, is a very serious position for them?

Mr. Macleod: I discussed this matter at a very helpful all-party meeting under the chairmanship of the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Marquand), and this was one of the matters which caused all of us a good deal of concern. I will try to look into this matter now to see whether there is anything that can be done, perhaps along the lines of the hon. Member's suggestion. If the hon. Member, who has particular experience in this field, would like to put some suggestions to me, I should be very grateful to him.

Hospitals, South-West Region (Capital Allocation)

Mr. Foot: asked the Minister of Health what cuts in services he expects the Plymouth, South Devon and East Cornwall Hospital Management Committee will have to make as a result of the money allocated for 1954–55 by the regional hospital board.

Mr. Iain Macleod: I understand that the board is considering with the committee the possibility of closing two units which are not fully used, but it does not at present appear that there need by any reduction in adequate services.

Mr. Foot: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that when he talks about two units not fully used, what he really means is that his policy is to compel the Plymouth board and the area management committee to close down two maternity hospitals and another hospital which have been part of the expansion campaign over the last few years? Indeed, he is compelling the management committee in this area to reverse the policy of previous years and to cut down the hospital services in the whole area?

Mr. Macleod: I do not accept that for one moment. The allocation to this hospital management committee, as I said before, has, in fact, gone up and not down. The first reaction of Mr. Medland, the chairman, was to say that he would be compelled to close two maternity homes, a training school and a hospital for the chronic sick. I fully agree with the hon. Member that if that is the reaction to an offer to increase moneys we must look very carefully into the administration there.

Brigadier Rayner: Will my right hon. Friend confirm once again that the money allotted to this hospital management committee for the present year is more, and not less, than the amount allotted last year? Does it not seem that our former, respected colleague, Mr. Medland, is trying to centralise activities in Plymouth, and will my right hon. Friend endeavour to discourage this centralisation?

Mr. Macleod: The answer to the first part of that Question is "Yes." In reply to the second part, these matters are at present under consideration between the South-West Regional Board, in which I have full confidence, and the hospital management committee. Indeed, I believe the board is meeting today. It is far wiser to leave that discussion to go through the usual channels and to see then whether a case has been made for or against the allocation.

Mr. Foot: Instead of making any reflection upon Mr. Medland, the chairman of the management committee, would

the Minister take into account that Mr. Medland has had the full support of his management committee in stating that the amount of money allocated was exactly the same as last year and took no account of the increase of £25,000 which had to go to meet extra charges, partly, as I have said, for salaries? Therefore, will not the right hon. Gentleman withdraw the reflection which he made on the management committee, who are trying to maintain the National Health Service instead of reducing it, as, apparently, is the purpose of the right hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Macleod: I have no intention of withdrawing anything that I said. This matter is one that should be discussed by the regional board and the management committee. It is far better that it should be done that way rather than to hold Press conferences or to make statements in "Tribune," as was done for another purpose.

HER MAJESTY'S RETURN (CHURCH BELLS)

Mr. Summers: asked the Prime Minister if he will convene a conference of the appropriate authorities to arrange for the bells of the churches throughout the United Kingdom to be rung at the moment when Her Majesty the Queen sets foot again in her native land.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I have been asked to reply.
My right hon. Friend has communicated with the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, both of whom welcome the suggestion. He is sure that the leaders of other Churches will be glad to consider it, and that so far as possible it will be put into effect.

Mr. Summers: Will the right hon. Gentleman convey to the Prime Minister that his answer will give widespread satisfaction to Her Majesty's loyal and admiring subjects who eagerly await the opportunity to greet her on her return home?

Mr. I. O. Thomas: What about the bats in the belfry?

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he will state the business for next week?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 8TH MARCH—Supply [7th Allotted Day]:
Report stage: Civil Vote on Account, 1954–55.
A debate will take place on Civil Aviation.
TUESDAY, 9TH MARCH—Supply [8th Allotted Day]:
It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on Navy Estimates, 1954–55, and to consider Votes A, 1,2, 6, 9, 10, 13 and 15 in Committee.
WEDNESDAY, 10TH MARCH—Second Reading: Pensions (Increase) Bill.
Committee stage: Money Resolution.
Second Readings: Post Office (Site and Railway) Bill.
Charitable Trusts (Validation) Bill [Lords].
Committee stage: Money Resolution relating to the Atomic Energy Authority Bill.
THURSDAY, 11TH MARCH—Supply [9th Allotted Day]:
It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on Army Estimates, 1954–55, and to consider Votes A, 1, 2, 5, 8, 10 and 11 in Committee.
FRIDAY, 12TH MARCH—Private Members' Bills.
It may be convenient for me to inform the House that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget on 6th April.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Boyd-Carpenter.

Mr. Rankin: On business—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is too late. I did give an opportunity for questions.

Mr. Crookshank: The hon. Member can ask me afterwards.

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order.

Mr. Speaker: What is the point of order?

Mr. Rankin: I understood it was customary for my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition usually to put a question, and I waited for a second or two to permit him to do so. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that you might allow a question.

Mr. Speaker: I also waited to see whether there were any questions, and as nobody rose I passed on to the next business. We cannot go back. We have now started public business.

BILLS PRESENTED

PENSIONS (INCREASE)BILL

"to amend section two of the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1944, by abolishing the limit of pension up to which increases may be made under that section and substituting ten per cent, for the scale of increases authorised by that section," presented by Mr. Boyd-Carpenter; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 75.]

Television bill

to make provision for television broadcasting services in addition to those provided by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and to set up a special authority for that purpose; to make provision as to the constitution, powers, duties and financial resources of that authority and as to the position and obligations of persons contracting with that authority for the provision of programmes and parts of programmes; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid," presented by Mr. Gammans; supported by Mr. Crook-shank, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and Mr. Boyd-Carpenter; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 76.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[ Mr. Crookshank.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[6TH allotted day]

Order for Committee read.

Air Estimates, 1954–55, and Air Supplementary Estimate, 1953–54

MR. GEORGE WARD'S STATEMENT

3.36 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The Air Estimates for 1954–55 are for a net total of £491,640,000, which is £6,360,000 less than the net total approved for the current year.
In 1954–55, provision has been made for mutual defence assistance by the United States of £45,360,000, as compared with £50 million in 1953–54. The decrease in the total provision without allowing for aid is, therefore, £11 million. The comparison between the two years is a very difficult one, and it is dealt with fully in my noble Friend's Memorandum which accompanies the Air Estimates, and, of course, in the Estimates themselves. The main point is that we expect to spend more on aircraft, armament and fuel in 1954–55 than in the previous year, but there are large decreases in the provision for other types of equipment and stores and for works services.
The slight dip in our total estimate is likely to be followed by a rise in 1955 and in 1956. Since the war, the proportion of the defence budget spent on the Royal Air Force has risen steadily, and, as the White Paper on Defence explains, still greater emphasis will be placed on the Royal Air Force in future. This opinion of the importance of air power is shared by our American friends, who have decided to buy a substantial number of British aircraft for the Royal Air Force, as an addition to what we ourselves can afford during the next few years. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence has already expressed Her Majesty's Government's appreciation of this generous decision, which will result in a very welcome addition to N.A.T.O. strength in the air.
The pre-eminent place of the Royal Air Force in our defence programme is now well established. My noble Friend and I and our colleagues on the Air Council are very conscious of the responsibilities which, with the Ministry of Supply, we now bear for making our programme a success. We have, I know, the support of this House and of the country in our efforts.
The House will wish to note that these Estimates include, for the first time, provision for the atomic weapons which are now being delivered to the Royal Air Force. None of us is under any illusion about what the advent of atomic warfare means to this country. The threat to which we are exposed is appalling. But we shall not reduce this threat by abstaining from arming ourselves with atomic weapons and the means of delivering them. On the contrary, to arm ourselves with these weapons is our best chance of safety, because they are the best way of preventing another war happening.
In a world in which atomic weapons exist, conventional weapons, important though they are, cannot have the same influence on the decision between peace and war. It would be as if a man tried to protect himself against a pistol attack by arming himself with a life-preserver. Only a powerful force of atom bombers can sufficiently impress on a potential enemy the suicidal folly of aggression. Of course, we have the might of the United States Air Force behind us and until now they have provided the deterrent. Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong for the Royal Air Force to stand aside and contribute nothing to the offensive and really decisive part of allied air power. The Air Force has unrivalled experience and its contribution can be of unmatched quality.
The first of our four-engined jet bombers is, as the House knows, the Valiant and the first production Valiant has already flown. All our preliminary preparations for this new force are now well on the way to completion. They have necessarily covered a long period. As ever, they started with Air Staff studies supplemented by the work of scientists and technicians in research and design. Then there has been all the work entailed in adapting and improving airfields and in preparing the crews who will fly the V-class bombers in squadron service.
We have now made financial provision for some of the aircraft to be delivered during the coming year. No doubt there will still be some technical difficulties to overcome. In an undertaking of such magnitude, that is only to be expected, but I can assure the House that there will be no delay which we ourselves can foresee or prevent.
The development of the Vulcan and the Victor is going well and we hope that they will not be far behind the Valiant. These, of course, are more advanced conceptions than the Valiant and they should reflect in their operational performance the results of even further technical progress. The increased height, range and speed at which they can fly should add a great deal to our striking power and to the difficulties of the defence. The long-range medium bombers shortly coming into service will be two and a half to three tunes more effective than their 1945 counterpart in altitude, speed and range. Moreover, for short range they will be able to carry a very heavy bomb load, and even without atomic bombs they will be able to inflict heavy damage on communications, dumps and concentrations.
As the V-class bombers come into service most of the Canberra squadrons will be converted to the heavier type. Meanwhile, the Canberra, which is already proving a first-class aircraft in squadron service, is most important to us for two reasons. First, it makes a valuable contribution to the strength of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, so V-bombers will not entirely displace the Canberras of Bomber Command. The Canberra squadrons will continue to give direct support to S.A.C.E.U.R., and will also be employed on reconnaissance.
Secondly, the Canberra is providing Bomber Command with essential experience in the handling of high flying jet aircraft and is giving bomber crews the confidence which comes from early conversion to modern types. This means that first-class crews will have been specially trained to take over the medium bombers as they come in. We shall have saved time in converting pilots to jet bomber operations and in training navigators to find their way over great distances at heights previously unknown to them.
I must not leave the subject of Bomber Command without a brief reference to the Washingtons. The loan of these aircraft by the United States filled a serious gap in our striking power at a time when the Lincoln force was small and our jet bombers not yet available We shall always be grateful for this help, though the last squadron of Washingtons has now been converted to Canberras and the aircraft themselves are being flown back to the United States.
On the defensive side of our preparations, a most important step has been taken by the re-equipment of the first squadron in Fighter Command with Swifts. There has been much natural and understandable impatience about the time taken to introduce these modern aircraft into the service. I can assure the House that we at the Air Ministry have been no less anxious to receive them. Indeed, my noble Friend has kept a most careful and continuous watch on their progress and development. But there have been setbacks which could not have been foreseen, and they have served as a continuous reminder to us all of the immense number of new and difficult problems which these fast aeroplanes have brought with them.
The House already knows that not only are prototypes of a new supersonic fighter under construction, but that 20 pre-production aircraft have now been ordered. My noble Friend considers it most important that this aircraft should reach the Royal Air Force at the earliest possible date, and that the disappointment and delays that have hitherto been liable to beset us should, so far as possible, be avoided.
Accordingly, we have arranged with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply for this pre-production order, which we all agree is the method most likely to achieve the result which we want. These pre-production aircraft will serve the interests of our two Departments, and their cost will be shared in agreed proportions between the different Departments. They should speed up development work and save the Royal Air Force time in test flying.
To return to the immediate future, the Hunter is due to take its place alongside the Swift in Fighter Command this year, and the development of the Javelin is going well. It would be difficult to


exaggerate the importance of the all-weather Javelin. Modern bombers and their equipment have much increased the advantages enjoyed by the attacker. We therefore need for our defence, aircraft capable of operating with high performance in all weathers. The Javelin should be able to fly and fight at a height of over 50,000 feet and to have a speed of between 600 and 700 miles an hour; and at these great heights and speeds it will be a fighting weapon equipped with modern armament and modern radar capable of finding and attacking the enemy in all conditions.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does it work at night?

Mr. Ward: Yes, indeed. An aircraft of this kind has the great advantage of flexibility. When the Javelin is in service many new tactical opportunities will be opened to us which should greatly improve the quality of our defence by day and by night.
During the coming financial year we shall nearly double the size of our existing night fighter force and we shall bring in a new mark of Venom. Moreover, more than half this Force will be fitted with a new form of search radar which will enable our fighters to detect enemy bombers in an air space more than three times greater than at present.
In the day fighter rôle we now have in Fighter Command a number of Sabres given to us as military aid by the United States, and they will do much to improve the quality of our strength while we are re-equipping with our own British swept-wing fighters. More than half our regular day fighter force will consist of British swept-wing fighters by this time next year.
But the effectiveness of the re-equipment of Fighter Command would be much reduced if the country's radar system did not advance with tihe performance of modern aircraft. The modern bomber has been increasing its performance relative to the fighter since 1940. This means that the fighter has less time to intercept before the bomber reaches our coast, and such a disadvantage can only be offset by the very rapid recognition of the bomber by radar. And, of course, we must remember the weapon which the bomber may be carrying.
Fighter control is equally important. In 1940, enemy bombers had an operational

ceiling of only about 20,000 feet and we could put our fighter pilots within sight of their targets with a comparatively simple form of radar, but now the immense operational ceiling of modern bombers makes it imperative that control radars should not only be able to look much higher, but should be able to assess height and position more accurately because there will be so little time in which to make an interception.
Ground control of formations and of individual aircraft must be more and more flexible. Scientists are continually working on improvements, and as these are discovered and developed we are bringing them into operational use. Indeed, by the end of the next financial year we shall be able to direct about twice as many formations of fighters against enemy bombers as we can now.
The first command to complete its expansion and re-equipment, both of which are virtually finished, will be Coastal Command. We have ordered some more Shackletons of an improved design and performance and these will increase even more the range and endurance of our shore-based aircraft.
To sum up the first part of my speech, the recent development of the Air Force has been on two main fronts: the expansion of the front line and the preparation for new and more advanced aircraft coming in. It is true that expansion is not yet wholly complete, but we are concentrating already more and more on quality. The history of air warfare has shown very clearly the advantage which quality has over mere numbers. Within our financial limitations we shall continue our policy of strength through quality and hitting power, rather than sacrifice this in an attempt to achieve weight of numbers. For example, because of the immensely improved cannon which the Hunter and the Swift will carry, the rate at which the day fighter force as a whole will be able to hurl high explosive against the enemy will be increased by more than nine times in the coming year.
Moreover, the quality and the hitting power we aim at must be instantly available if war comes. Traditionally, this country has depended on time to bring its industrial strength to bear in war, but it would be vain indeed to delude ourselves that in a future war we could buy time. Right from the outset


our survival would depend on our readiness during the first days of war. The Prime Minister has already said that in a future war the main decisions might come within the first month, or even within the first few days.
I think we must be careful not to misunderstand what has been said about the possibility of a period of "broken-backed war." We could only play our part in such a war provided we had surmounted the first shock successfully, so we first have to do everything possible to prevent a war happening and to prepare to take the shock of it if it comes. That is the urgent and the essential thing and it must be our No. 1 priority.
We must also plan for the state of affairs which might arise if war is prolonged beyond the intense opening phase, but our needs for these two possibilities are by no means mutually exclusive. Indeed, preparation for the first phase includes a great deal vital to the second —it is a question of priorities and putting first things first.
But quality and readiness are expensive in money and in skilled manpower and we have to make sacrifices to achieve them. We must concentrate on what will be of immediate use to us on the outbreak of war, and do without a lot of things which are not. For example, we are having to reduce the number of reserve aircrew we keep under training and to give up the attempt to train in peace-time those who cannot be brought up to operational standard until well after the war has started. This helps us to pay for providing, in the squadrons and outside them, larger numbers of aircrew who will be fully trained and ready to take their part in the battle.
That brings me to the subject of regular aircrew and to the personnel side of the picture which is every bit as important as the equipment side. By the end of the present financial year, we shall have trained 2,800 pilots, navigators and air signallers compared with 2,900 during the previous year. Once more, we are most grateful to the Canadian Government, who will have trained about 260 pilots and 600 navigators out of this total.
However, we are still having great difficulty in finding enough aircrew of the

high quality we need. Unfortunately, the rate at which candidates for aircrew training have been coming forward during the past year has dropped from 14,000 in 1952 to 7,000 in 1953. It has halved. This is a serious position and, unless there is a considerable improvement, we shall not have the numbers of trained aircrew that we need in two years' time.
It is difficult to say with absolute certainty whether one factor more than another is responsible for this decline. It may be that the attractions and the opportunities in the Royal Air Force are still not well enough appreciated, or perhaps there is a mistaken view that manned aircraft are already on their way out, which is certainly not true. The guided weapon will supplement the piloted aircraft, but it is unlikely that it will ever supplant it.
I think the main reason may be that the Royal Air Force, in common with the other Services, is in keen competition with industry, commerce and the professions for the young men of the very high quality that it needs today, and this is the problem to which we must direct our energies.
It would be no answer to relax our standards. Four or five men in a V-class bomber will be in control of one of the most intricate, powerful and expensive products of the aircraft industry and might, in war, have the opportunity to turn the tide of events within a few hours by their ability, courage, fitness and resource.
One of the chief problems my noble Friend and I face today, therefore, is to get enough of the young men who are blessed with these qualities into the Royal Air Force. We have taken several definite steps to try to persuade them to come in. First of all, we have introduced the Cranwell Scholarship Scheme, which I told the House about last November. The first response to the scheme has been good but it is too early to make a final judgment. For the first competition we had over 300 applications and these came from 216 different schools of all types and from all over Great Britain. We are planning for 40 per cent, of the future vacancies at Cranwell each year to be filled by these boys.
Secondly, we have revised our old short service commissioning policy. For a start, we intend to change the name "short


service commission," which is now a misnomer. It immediately suggests a temporary job for a few years, after which one has to start looking round for something else. This is not true now, and under our revised policy will be even less true in future years. Before the war, when the needs of the R.A.F. were much smaller and economic conditions in this country were different, the short service commissioning scheme served us exceedingly well and produced valuable officers many of whom are still serving.
Today, however, things are different. The youth of today, and his parents, rightly take the long view. If he knows that he has ability and the other qualities I mentioned he expects a worthwhile career and he wants to start on it as soon as possible. The Royal Air Force has such a career to offer, and we have now modified our plans to ensure that any young officer joining the Service can take the fullest possible advantage of it.
In future, all officers coming into the General Duties Branch, except through Cranwell or the universities, will come in initially on a 12-year direct entry commission. That is what we shall call it in future. They can, if they want to, leave the service any time after eight years, but most of those who want to transfer to a permanent commission will be able to do so, either in the General Duties Branch or in one of the other branches, and they will have excellent opportunities to make a good and a useful career.
Exactly how good a career will depend, as in any other profession, on their ability, but they will all get retired pay at the end of it. Those who want to go out after their 12th year will get a £3,000 tax-free gratuity to help them resettle in civil life. In this way, we hope to attract more high quality officers while, at the same time, raising the general level of experience, and making a considerable saving in training costs. Thirdly, as the House knows, increases in pay are being given to the middle rank officers who are likely to be the hardest pressed by family responsibilities.
Turning now to ground personnel, our total numbers are just about equal to establishment, but there is still a lack of balance between the various trades and a general lack of experience

amongst our advanced tradesmen. I am glad to say that during the past year, we have managed to improve the balance a little, but we still have a long way to go.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: Would the hon. Gentleman clear up the point whether this £3,000 is to include the amount that was payable under the arrangement for short-term commissions?

Mr. Ward: If a man goes out after eight years he receives £1,500. If he goes out after 12 years he gets £3,000 and the amount is graded in between.

Mr. M. Follick: How old will he be then?

Mr. Ward: I was saying that we have managed to improve the balance a little, but we still have a long way to go. We have, therefore, considered most carefully how to persuade the Regulars we have, and particularly the apprentice-trained men on 12-year engagements, to extend their service or to re-engage.
Under the measures announced in the White Paper on Service Emoluments, we shall now be able to offer our N. C. Os. and technicians greater inducements to prolong their service and to give greater recognition to long service, skill and experience. These new measures will, I hope, help to counter the pull of civil life and not only persuade more of our Regular tradesmen to stay on, but encourage some of the experienced Regulars who have gone out to come back to a worthwhile career in the Royal Air Force.
There will be increases in pay ranging from 3s. 6d. to 5s. 6d. a day for advanced tradesmen—technicians, N.C. Os. and warrant officers—engaged in the servicing of aircraft and air equipment; and increases ranging from 2s. and 4s. a day for other advanced tradesmen and for N.C. Os. for lesser trade skill. Furthermore, so that all ranks will receive some tangible benefit to encourage them to remain on in the Service, the existing increments of 6d. a day paid after five and 10 years' service will be increased to 1s. a day in each case.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: Has the hon. Gentleman examined how these improvements compare with improvements that have been


introduced in the other Services? I understand that they are supposed to be on all fours, but close examination reveals that one Service appears to come out of it rather better than the Royal Air Force. The hon. Gentleman can guess which one.

Mr. Ward: Our attention has been drawn to what I understand is an error in the White Paper which shows that an Army warrant officer receives a good deal more than a Royal Air Force warrant officer. In fact, that is not so. It only appears to be so because the Army have added something which we also give, but which we have not shown in the figures. I assure the hon. Member that it is only an error in the White Paper.

Mr. E. Shinwell: Ought we not to have another White Paper?

Mr. Ward: There is not much time before five o'clock.
In addition to these pay increases, four new measures are being introduced which will improve the career of technicians within the 1950 trades structure. First, a new rank of master technician has been approved and these master technicians will be employed in selected posts which need a high degree of technical ability and experience. Secondly, there will be more rapid promotion in the lower technician ranks. Until now it has taken a junior technician 15 years to reach the rank of chief technician. Now he ought to be able to do it in 12.
Thirdly, an airman who can qualify for the rank of junior technician on entering the Service will be eligible for promotion to corporal technician after two years. Finally, a small number of specially selected aircraft apprentices will be trained to corporal technician standard and may be promoted to that rank after one year's productive service at a unit.
The present schemes for re-enlistment, extension and re-engagement bounties are being continued until further notice and, in addition, we shall give a new bounty of £100, also tax free, to certain specially valuable men who undertake to serve on after the 22-year point until the age of 55. A re-engagement bounty of £75 will also be given to airwomen with effect from 1st April next.
The number of women joining the Women's Royal Air Force is still top low. It is difficult to understand why this should be, because the R.A.F. offers such a wide variety of interesting jobs for women. We should like to double our present intake. We have done our best and we hope that the pay increases, which will, of course, apply proportionately to the Women's Service while the re-engagement bounty of £75 applies, and the new Victor Stiebel uniform will attract some more recruits.

Mr. Shinwell: Why not make men more interesting?

Mr. Ward: I am sorry that this is rather like an Air Ministry order, but it is important.
I have already touched on Reserve aircrew. As the House knows, the new concept of the probable nature of a future war and our need to concentrate our resources mainly on the things which will be of immediate use to us on the outbreak of war, means that we can only afford to give refresher training to those aircrew reservists who have qualified operationally and who have not been long off operational flying and, also, that means that this training must be done at Service units.
For ground reservists we are about to introduce a scheme of Reserve flights under which officers and airmen will be allotted to specific R.A.F. stations at home, which will generally be their wartime stations and at which they will do their training in peace-time. The merits of this scheme are that we shall be able to call up reservists more quickly in an emergency, that the stations concerned will be able to operate on a full war footing during major exercises and that reservists will get to know their war stations under conditions which they will find on mobilisation.
It will also mean that we shall call up and give useful training to perhaps twice as many reservists as we trained this year. Each of these Reserve flights will include all classes of the reserve, volunteers, ex-Regulars and National Service men, and it will be identified by name with its war station. As far as possible, members of these flights will be drawn from reservists living reasonably near their war station.
We hope, by this scheme, to build up an esprit de corps among reservists and to increase their interest in the work and social activities of the station to which they will belong. But, to ensure the complete success of the scheme, we shall need a number of skilled reservists who no longer have any training liability—for example, Class G reservists—and we shall make a special appeal to them to join the R.A.F.V.R. and do some continuous training with Reserve flights.
Plans are also being made, as my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence told the House, on Tuesday, for a number of reservists who will not be needed for Royal Air Force duties immediately on mobilisation, to be trained in Civil Defence duties and to be mobilised for Civil Defence duties in an emergency.

Mr. Stephen Swingler (Newcastle-under-Lyme): What is to happen to the other National Service reservists who have a Reserve liability and are not to be called up for Civil Defence training? Do we understand that only 30,000 at a maximum are to be called on for Reserve training and the rest escape their Reserve liability?

Mr. Ward: I have just announced this new Reserve flight scheme. I do not want to mislead the hon. Member by saying that we shall be able to call up 100 per cent. Class H reservists. As far as I can see, it will be 70 per cent, more Class H and 30 per cent, more Class E reservists. The other point to remember is that this Reserve flight scheme is being introduced in four phases. I am talking now only about phases 1 and 2. There will be phases 3 and 4 coming after, with which I am not concerned for the purposes of the coming year. I am not quite sure what it will add up to. The hon. Member is quite right in saying that there will be a substantial number of Class H reservists still left and not called up, but that is a matter which I hope we can debate separately and not now.
To sum up the second part of my speech, we have still got our difficulties both in aircrew and long-term Regular airmen, but we hope that the measures which I have described will go a long way towards improving the position in the future. In these manning problems it is vital to anticipate events and to see

the dangers ahead and this we have tried to do. Meanwhile, we are by no means despondent. The work of the Royal Air Force has not suffered unduly up to date and the hours flown by all operational squadrons have increased during the year toy 20 per cent. Taking jet aircraft alone, the flying hours have increased by 40 per cent, and the fatal jet accident rate has decreased by 26 per cent. This continues a satisfactory trend: the jet accident rate has been steadily decreasing since jet aircraft came into service and the decrease between 1947 and 1953 has been 58 per cent.
Never in military history can there have been a situation in which the pace of the technical development of weapons has placed so great a premium upon judgment and imagination than is the case in air power today. To be prepared over a long period means that much money and effort must be devoted to research and development. It is imperative that we should retain a strong technical lead at all costs. Only in this way can we offset our smaller numbers.
We must look ahead as far as possible when we are planning our requirements. Naturally, the further we look the greater must be the element of conjecture, but already we can see a pattern of requirements for the next 10 years or so taking shape. Developments in both aerodynamics and engine design on which we are now working give promise of advances in performance far beyond those which we thought likely even a year ago.
We intend to take the fullest advantage of these developments to plan our defences along the right lines. They are essentially based on the fact that with the achievement of supersonic flight, performance can be increased so much that the kinetic heat generated at these high speeds can become a dominating factor. Beyond the sound barrier one can already see the heat barrier.
We shall soon have a glimpse of the next generation of fighters and be able to demonstrate an aircraft capable of supersonic speed in level flight. As I have already told the House, the 20 pre-production aircraft we have ordered should help us to perfect this new fighter as quickly as possible and to develop all the ancillary and electronic equipment necessary to make it into an effective fighting weapon.
The development of supersonic flight will, in due course, bring with it the problems of metallurgy and kinetic heating which I have mentioned, and it is only by studying these that we can get a clearer picture of the ultimate limits of manned aircraft. We may well find that these limits are very high and that in the same way as the sound barrier has been overcome so we can overcome the problems of the heat barrier.
The introduction of guided weapons. both offensive and defensive, will obviously be affected by what we think are the ultimate limits of manned flight but we shall certainly need weapons to meet the diverse problems of protecting the United Kingdom against a supersonic attack in whatever way it might be launched. We want ground-to-air weapons which will not need a lot of expensive sites all over the country and which will have all the flexibility of the fighter. Indeed, the performance and rate of climb of future fighters with their new equipment will be such that they will be virtually piloted, guided weapons and we hope to devise a system of defence capable of handling both types.
The House will have noticed that throughout my speech I have returned over and over again to the importance of quality. I have done so deliberately because I think quality must be the key-note of any general summary of the Royal Air Force today. The front line strength is still increasing, but it is now generally true that the main emphasis is on rearming with the most up-to-date aircraft and their associated equipment. The various types of aircraft which have come into our squadrons over the last year or so have paved the way for building up a well-found modern Air Force. Now we are reaching the stage when, by the highest technical standards and within our economic ability, we can look forward to seeing the results of our longer range plans.
There will still be difficulties to be overcome, but not greater than those which we have successfully overcome before. The Royal Air Force has lived a life of continual change since it was formed in 1918, and succeeding generations have bred flexibly-minded officers, well able to handle both the operational and Air Staff problems of the

Service. They are quite used to new obstacles.
I have touched briefly on some of the main problems both human and technical, which face us at the present time. We set our sights high and we insist on bringing the latest results of research and development into use wherever they can improve the effectiveness of our defence. We ask for officers and men of a quality which matches the best of our equipment. Thus, in a way, we set ourselves some of our most difficult problems.
But I do not think that the House would have it otherwise, for if we accepted lower standards we should be failing to recognise the part which air power can play in world affairs and failing in our duty to provide, within our resources, an Air Force which is not only worthy of the men and women who serve in it but a powerful influence for peace and freedom.

Mr. Shackleton: I thought the hon. Gentleman was proposing to refer again to a particular point which he had said he did not wish to debate fully now. I do not think that the House is clear about the facts that he gave them. Can he tell us what percentage or what numbers of Class H Reserve are to be employed on Reserve duties; in other words, how many will be called up each year? We gather that there is some increase. The hon. Gentleman referred to Class G, which is not the point at issue; it is Class H.

Mr. Ward: I did not refer to Class G but to Class E. I was referring to the Reserve flight scheme and I said that phases 1 and 2 of that scheme would enable us to call up about 70 per cent, more Class H men and 30 per cent, more Class E men than were called up this year. Hon. Members can work it out for themselves. If we called up 8,000 this year, I think the figure was 8,000—

Mr. George Wigg: It was 8,500.

Mr. Ward: Then we should call up 70 per cent. more. Then there are phases 3 and 4 to come and Civil Defence in addition to that.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does the Minister accept any responsibility at all for guided missiles?

Mr. Ward: Of course I do, but at present they are at a stage where they are still the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply.

4.28 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: I should like, first, to congratulate the Under-Secretary on making a safe landing, because I happen to know that he is having trouble with his vocal engine. He has certainly carried through his task with his usual grace and courtesy.
Since we debated the Air Estimates last year the Government, for the first time, have faced the country clearly and unequivocally with the fact that another world war would involve the use of atomic weapons of all kinds. In the terms of the White Paper atomic attacks would be made, lasting a relatively short time, but inflicting great destruction and damage. In these circumstances the White Paper rightly stresses the vital rôle of the Royal Air Force in national defence. It also rightly stresses that our defence policy is based on the prevention rather than the waging of war and that in the task of preventing war the Air Force has the major deterrent rôle.
If the Royal Air Force is to carry out its responsibility fully and effectively I suggest that the country must face up to the following essential conditions. First, the springboard for enemy attack must be kept as far as possible from the shores of this country. Secondly, we must have a powerful bomber force. Thirdly, we must have powerful fighter forces available both in the United Kingdom and in Western Europe. Fourthly, there must be effective and comprehensive radar cover both across Western Europe and round our own shores so that we can get the maximum warning of enemy approach. Fifthly, we must not lag behind in the design, development and provision of guided missiles for defensive purposes.
On the first condition, looking at it from the point of view of air defence, the N.A.T.O. active forces in Western Europe are a vital factor. They constitute not only a barrier, but provide that additional degree of early warning which is most important to our air defence. On the second condition, I agree that a strong and efficient force of medium jet bombers, as the White Paper says, is of the greatest

importance both for our own security and for the defence of Western Europe.
In this connection I cannot understand the phraseology used in paragraph 11 of the Defence White Paper. It says:
The primary deterrent, however, remains the atomic bomb and the ability of the highly organised and trained United States strategic air power to use it.
Then come the words which I find it difficult to comprehend:
From our past experience and current knowledge we have a significant contribution to make both to the technical and to the tactical development of strategic air power.
If it were only a question of our past experience and current knowledge, surely, that could have been placed at the disposal of N.A.T.O. without our having to build up a separate and very expensive medium bomber force of our own. The real reason why a bomber force is an essential element in our national defence is much more cogent and substantial than the one indicated in the White Paper.
While the fullest co-operation of the United States Air Strategic Command is essential to N.A.T.O. air strategy, there must be targets such as V1 and V2 sites which we might consider to be of the highest priority—especially if from those sites VIs and V2s are being hurled on our cities—but those targets might not have the same priority in the overall air strategic plan.
During the last war there were legitimate differences between us and our American allies both about bombing priorities and strategic concept. There was the difference between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt and between British and American war leaders about whether we should strike at what was called, in the graphic words of the Prime Minister, the "underbelly of the Axis." They were legitimate differences, and we must face the fact that, if ever the catastrophe occurred again, those differences might recur.
Moreover, the United States Strategic Air Force may well have become so deeply involved elsewhere that it could not afford to take on targets which it would be vital, in the interests of our national security at any rate, to attack from the air. I do not think that we should put all our bombing eggs into the copious American basket. But while I consider that we must build up our own


strong and efficient medium bomber force, equally I consider that its number should be related to our economic capacity and to the fact that there will be alongside it this powerful strategic United States bomber force.
In any event, the days when we saw the skies filled with 1,000 bombers from Bomber Command are past. It may be that in the atomic age they are unnecessary. The Under-Secretary referred to the expensive V bombers which cost about £500,000 each—perhaps a little less or more, according to the fluctuation of prices. These bombers, even if relatively small in number—perhaps 100 or 200—would have a much greater weight of attack than 1,000 bombers had in the last war. Even if this were not so, in assessing the numbers of medium jet bombers that we require we must take into account the numbers which will be available in the United States Strategic Air Command.
I should like to refer to the decision to return the Washington. I am not happy about it. I have never been happy about it. I do not disagree with the reason given by the Under-Secretary why we returned these bombers. It was intended that we should have this mixed force of Lincolns and Washingtons, which would begin to drop in numbers as we received the V bombers.
We have not yet received the V bombers and we have got rid of a fair number of squadrons—a substantial number, to use the jargon which I used in my time and which the hon. Gentleman insists on using today—of Washington bombers. It is true that they are obsolescent B29s, but they are just as good as the T.U.4 which the Russians possess and which is merely a copy of the B.29, perhaps with some improvement. The hon. Gentleman knows my views. Even though we are glad to know that the international tension is lessening, I think it was a great mistake for us at this time to weaken our bomber force before we had received our V bombers.
I know that we have a strong force of Canberras, but they are light bombers which have not the performance even though they have greater speed. I can only hope that the optimism shown by the Minister of Supply is justified. I wel-

come the statement he made recently and I hope that we can reduce the period by what I understood to be about 12 months. I hope he is right. He knows more about recent developments than I do, but I was a little surprised to hear that statement. If we have to build up this primary deterrent as our contribution to the medium jet bomber forces of N.A.T.O., the sooner we get the V bombers into squadron service the better. On the other hand—

The Minister of Supply (Mr. Duncan Sandys): I just want to make it clear that in the statement that I made a few days ago, I was not talking about the V bombers. The V bombers are already in production, so there is no question of cutting short their development period. That is very largely past. I was talking about supersonic fighters, and the fighters of the future.

Mr. Henderson: I accept that, of course, but it does not affect my point that during this interregnum the V bombers are not likely to be in service in any numbers for some little time, and that, in the meantime, we have got rid of our Washingtons.
On the other hand, I am doubtful whether a powerful bomber force is likely, necessarily, to have an increasing effect on the cold war by making less likely events such as Korea, as stated in paragraph 12 of the White Paper.
I hope it will be so, but it must be remembered that the American superiority in atomic weapons did not stop the Korean war. Indeed, atomic bombing would have been opposed by most of America's allies on the ground that it would have resulted in an extension of the war. In my view, it is one thing to have the power to launch the massive, retaliatory attacks referred to by Mr. Foster Dulles, and quite another to take the decision to use them, especially in connection with a local conflict.
I now pass to the third point, the need for a powerful modern and efficient fighter force based partly in Europe under N.A.T.O., and partly in the United Kingdom. Just as our ground forces are our first line of defence in Western Europe so, I suggest, from the point of view of air defence, is the existence of the allied air forces in the northern, central


and southern sections, and the more effective its co-operation with the fighter forces of our allies, the greater will be the security of our own country.
None the less, it is vital that our home-based fighter strength shall have the numbers and the quality of machines to which the hon. Gentleman referred in order to constitute an effective shield against enemy bombers. There, again, N.A.T.O. plays an important part in our national security. Many people who are supposed to be experts make the mistake, when writing in magazines and newspapers, of assessing the potential strength of the air forces of this country, and, indeed, of the land and sea forces of this country, without having regard to the overall pattern of N.A.T.O. defence, of which we form a part.
It is no secret, for example, that American fighter squadrons, equipped with the latest fighters, are stationed in this country today and form part of its air defences. There is no doubt that in an emergency their numbers will be considerably increased. Therefore, in dealing with fighters and bombers, we must constantly bear in mind the contribution being made in these respects by our American allies. If it were ever proposed to withdraw these squadrons, then, in my view—and as I have said on previous occasions—this country would be faced either with inadequate defence forces or with even greater expenditure than it faces today.
We have been told by the Undersecretary that this year will see a steady increase in the rate of re-equipment with Swifts and Hunters. I understood him to say—and I hope he will not mind my saying that this was the only piece of information in the whole of his speech— that the night fighter strength would be doubled. This is most disappointing. It is three years since they were ordered, and it is evident that the policy of super-priority has not been as effective as the Government expected.
Another matter which has received a great deal of publicity in recent months— I am not interested in a particular type of plane or in those responsible for it— and in which our European allies are taking a great deal of interest, is the question of a light fighter.

Mr. Sandys: Light fighter?

Mr. Henderson: Yes, sometimes described as a light fighter-bomber. N.A.T.O.'s interest, I believe, is due to the fact that this year there will be two British types flying.

Mr. Shackleton: Will my right hon. and learned Friend tell the Minister of Supply what a light fighter is? Obviously, he has not the faintest idea.

Mr. Sandys: I do not think it is necessary for the hon. Gentleman to interrupt in that way. I was not quite sure whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman said "light" or "night" fighter. That was the only difficulty.

Mr. Henderson: If we are all agreed about it, perhaps we can now get on.
N.A.T.O.'s interest in a small jet fighter, smaller, lighter, cheaper and faster than the heavier modern jet fighter, is due, I understand, to the fact that its principal role would be ground attack, although its projected performance would seem to indicate that it might well be a formidable weapon against bombers.

Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne): If we have any.

Mr. Henderson: I express no view as to what would happen in combat with heavier fighters like the MIGs, but, obviously, in a mixed fighter force, we should have to have heavier fighter types as well. The great advantage of this fighter is that its cost is only about one-third that of the Hunter. I understand that its landing run would be about one-third of that required for a heavy jet fighter, about 1,000 yards, or less, as against 3,000 yards required for the heavier type, and that whereas the heavier fighter requires a concrete runway costing hundreds of thounsands of pounds, such a light fighter could be flown from temporary landing grounds using, perhaps, the P.S.P. type of wire matting which was so successfully used during the Berlin airlift.
Another great advantage is that it takes only about one-third of the time to produce. According to the information given by those responsible for these two designs, I understand that delivery could be made in large quantities in a much shorter time than that required for heavier types. It has been suggested that they could be produced by 1956 at the rate of 50 a month.
Could not some of this £80 million, which the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence told us the other day is to be received from America, be earmarked for the provision of this light type of fighter? I am not expecting the Under-Secretary to commit the Government today on matters of this sort, but I would earnestly impress upon him the desirability and the importance of the Air Ministry, in association with our other allies of N.A.T.O. and with our American friends, considering the merits or otherwise of this light fighter. As I say, there can be no question of it superseding the heavy fighter, but it is certainly a proposition worthy of the most serious consideration.
During the defence debate, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence said that the United States Government were placing orders to the value of £40 million for aircraft and ammunition during the current financial year. This, he said, would enable us to increase the front line of the Royal Air Force beyond what we could have managed out of our own resources. In particular, we shall be able to impose materially our support for General Gruenther and our contribution to the air forces under his command.
Does this mean that orders will now be placed to the value of £196 million as against the £156 million set out in Vote 7 of the Estimates? Are the aircraft provided by the Americans to go to the 2nd Tactical Air Force or are they to be reserved for building up Fighter Command? Will the Under-Secretary undertake to give consideration to using a proportion of this money to order the light fighter if it is considered a good proposition?
The fourth condition to which I referred was the need for effective radar cover to provide ample warning. It is a trite saying that radar constitutes the eyes of any air force, and it is of the greatest importance that we should be satisfied that there is effective radar cover right across from the Baltic down to the Mediterranean. I know that this is a national responsibility, that our own responsibility is restricted to the radar cover that we consider essential in Western Germany, which I imagine is mostly therefore of a mobile character.

Is the Under-Secretary satisfied that good progress is being made in the provision of static radar stations which are essential if we are to have this effective cover right across Europe? In other words, is there any air defence at all that is of any practical value?
Speaking of the United Kingdom, is any progress being made in finding a counter to low flying? We know that the equipment that was in use during the last war was not able to counter low flying. We also know that it was possible for enemy aircraft to come in from the north and the west across the sea. Are any steps being taken to establish an effective radar cover on the sea? Has consideration been given to the provision of radar ships? These are vital matters which can only be dealt with on occasions like this, and I should like the Under-Secretary to make a statement. I do not want merely a general statement that everything is going along very nicely; I should like him to deal with some of these specific points. Is the Department considering measures for covering the sea approaches to this country, as well as the approaches across Europe itself? I suggest that radar ships might be well worth considering.
The fifth condition to which I referred was the need for guided missiles. The importance of electronics has been stressed before, and I do not wish to stress it again. We are told that guided weapons have reached an advanced stage of development, that our air-to-air weapons will be first to come into service, and that the ground-to-air weapons will follow. But it is also said that they will not arrive in numbers for some years. Can we be told something about the position of the supply of rockets and pilot-less planes? We are told that the American Air Force has several squadrons of what they call Matadors—V.1s or pilot-less planes—and presumably the Russian Air Force also has a supply of them.
Are we working on an antidote? I imagine that we have not one as yet, but I should like to know whether we are working on an antidote to the V.1 and the V.2. We must all accept the fact that there is no absolute defence against some of these modern forms of attack, but what is expected of this or any other Government is the assurance


that everything possible is being done to develop as great a degree of defence as possible.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I have been following my right hon. and learned Friend's argument very closely. He has listed five conditions, and in each case he has referred to deficiencies and asked for increases in expenditure. Is he in favour of increases or decreases in this Estimate?

Mr. Henderson: I have not said anything about increases or decreases. What I have postulated are the essential basic conditions for building up an adequate system of air defence, both active and passive. I have not sought to translate it into terms of finance, and I cannot understand why the hon. Gentleman should go out of his way to try to put me in a position of taking a line which he knows I do not intend to take.

Mr. S. Silverman: rose—

Mr. Henderson: The veil of secrecy which I was accused of putting up in 1951 has, I am afraid, become an iron curtain, solid and impenetrable, because there has been nothing in the Under-Secretary's speech this afternoon which has given us any indication of the front line strength of the Royal Air Force, except his statement that the night fighter force has been doubled.
The Memorandum states:
During the coming year there will again be an increase in the size and effectiveness of the front line of the Royal Air Force… The re-equipment and expansion of Bomber Command will continue during the next 12 months… Coastal Command's re-equipment and expansion has continued. Further expansion will take place in the coming year… The 2nd Tactical Air Force on the Continent … is completing its re-equipment with Venom fighter/ground attack aircraft in place of Vampires. … Transport Command is carrying on its diverse tasks.
Last year, when I referred to the Under-Secretary's failure to be more forthcoming, the hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), who I am sorry to see is not in his place—[hon. members: "He is ill."] I am sorry; I did not know that. He interrupted me on the ground that the Under-Secretary had been in office for only 18 months. He and his colleagues have now been in office for 30 months. Surely the time has now

come when they should give the House and the country some indication of the build-up of the Royal Air Force.
Will the hon. Gentleman not follow the example that I set in my last Estimates speech, in 1951? True, I dealt with percentages, but this is an example which could be followed by the Under-Secretary. I said:
…it may be of some assistance to the House if I relate the present fighter strength to the fighter strength of the Royal Air Force in 1939. On this basis I can say that its world-wide fighter strength is already today greater than it was in September, 1939….
I do not see that there is anything funny about this. The Secretary of State for War seems to think it is a joke. He should wait until I say a few more words, and then he will see whether it is a joke. I also said:
I would say that the present front-line strength of the Royal Air Force is more than half as great again than it was when I first presented my Air Estimates in March, 1948."—[official report, 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 243.]
I am putting forward a serious argument. I know the figures, the right hon. Gentleman knows the figures, and he knows that what I am saying is correct. I said that the front line strength of the Royal Air Force in 1951 was half as great again as it was in 1948 when I first went to the Air Ministry. Surely the Minister could work out a percentage and tell us how much greater it is in 1954 than it was in 1951.

Mr. Ward: It would be very misleading if we did that. I tried to make it clear in my speech that we were concentrating on what I called strength through hitting power and quality, rather than strength through mere numbers. Numbers today as compared with numbers in 1939 would be meaningless, and hitting power could not be shown in that way.

Mr. Henderson: I am prepared to agree, having regard to the greater performance and speed of the Hunter or the Swift as against the Vampire or the Meteor, that the odds are very much in favour of the Hunter or the Swift. I think, however, that it would be some advantage to us to know.
The Under-Secretary of State has been quite frank about the fact that some of the bombers and fighters that were ordered in the time of the Labour Government are only now just coming to the


squadrons. In the four years since the rearmament programme started the country has provided something like £500 million for the production of aircraft. In spite of the slow delivery of Hunters, Swifts and Valiants this is a vast expenditure even allowing for under-spending, and I should have thought that it must have produced considerable numbers of aircraft of one kind or another, even allowing for the slowing down for the reasons stated by the Under-Secretary of State.

Mr. S. Silverman: Would my right hon. and learned Friend allow me to put a question to him? I assure him that I ask it in all friendliness, and with no desire to embarrass. He and I the day before yesterday, and all of us on this side, voted against the Government's Statement on Defence on an Amendment which said in express terms that the Government were spending too much. It is not an unfair thing to ask my right hon. and learned Friend to say, before be concludes his speech, whether the Air Estimates ought to make a contribution to any reduction, and, if they ought to make such a contribution, what the contribution ought to be.

Mr. Henderson: The hon. Gentleman can draw his own conclusion from this statement: whatever may be the position with regard to the total of all the Service Estimates I am not satisfied that we have yet reached the peak point of expenditure if we wish to have an adequate Air Force and adequate air defence. It is possible to say that without contradiction of that Amendment. The Army Estimates and the Navy Estimates can be reduced, perhaps, but I am speaking now from the air point of view. I said last year that sooner or later some Government in this country would have to grasp the nettle of the allocation of finance between the three Services. It does not means that because we have not reached the ceiling of expenditure on the Royal Air Force we necesarily want to raise the sum total of all defence expenditure. There must be an allocation within what the sum total is.

Mr. Silverman: I am quite content. We can wait for a contribution from my right hon. and learned Friend or others of my right hon. Friends when we come to the Estimates for the other two Services.

Mr. Henderson: Fair enough, and the hon. Gentleman can put the same question to them.
I was interested in the statement of the Under-Secretary of State about the provision of the £3,000 bounty for aircrew. Pilots and navigators, I take it. And after 12 years' service. Here, again, I must be critical. It was a great mistake to stop the training of National Service men as pilots and navigators. In 1950 to 1951 we were working on the assumption that, broadly speaking, the training of National Service men would give us the requisite number of aircrews, pilots and navigators. Those I came across were extremely good, compared very favourably, except in experience, of course, with their Regular counterparts. One of the difficulties that the Royal Air Force has today is the shortage of pilots and navigators because it ceased to train those young National Service men, and that was a great mistake.
I very much welcome the increases in pay for tradesmen that were announced in the White Paper issued by the Minister of Defence, but I am quite sure that the Under-Secretary of State would be the first to agree that even increases of pay are not in themselves the solution to the problem of ensuring a happy and contented Service. We have to consider not only increases of pay but also the problems arising out of too many postings, and the failure to get married quarters, and all those troubles and worries of many serving men, officers and other ranks, about securing adequate education of their children. All these problems are of equal importance with the problem of pay, and should be so treated if we are seeking to build up the Regular content of the Royal Air Force, or indeed, of the other two Services.
As to the reservists, the impression I got from the Under-Secretary was that in addition to the 30,000 to be employed by the mobile columns of Civil Defence the best part of another 20,000 would be called up for training in these special training flights. If my arithmetic is correct it rather looks to me as if out of 140,000 National Service reservists in the G and H Reserves the Air Ministry is catering for only about 50,000.

Mr. Ward: I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not want to get it wrong. His figure of 140,000 includes, I think, Class G men, and so on.
but his figure of the best half of 20,000 is only of H Class men, so he is not comparing like with like.

Mr. Henderson: The H Class men, the National Service two-year men, who have served two years and passed into the H Reserve, have been coming in for what is now the fourth year. Surely the hon. Gentleman would agree with me that the number of reservists in the H Class must be well over 100,000?

Mr. Ward: Yes.

Mr. Henderson: Well over 100,000.

Mr. Swingler: It is 124,000.

Mr. Henderson: Yes. I said, well over 100,000.
I am suggesting that even if one is generous in one's computation the mobile columns and the special training flights cater for not more than 50,000. Indeed, some of those going into the training flights, as I said, were volunteers from the D Reserve, which has nothing to do with National Service. I ask the Undersecretary of State to correct me if I am wrong, but I am suggesting that with the various proposals the Air Ministry is catering for, roughly, and at the most, 50,000, including those in the mobile columns, out of, roughly, 130,000. Is that right?

Mr. Ward: If we are talking only about the H Class and nobody else, that is probably about right.

Mr. Henderson: Yes. It is a very important point because it is quite impossible, in my view, to justify a situation in which Army reservists are compelled to do their part-time training while those who are fortunate enough to be put into the Royal Air Force do no training at all, and I think the Government will have to face up to this problem. I know it is no use calling people up just to kick their heels about on a station, but there is this problem that in the National Service Act, 1948, we imposed a liability for call up to the Armed Forces of the Crown.
Section 1 lays it down that that includes service in an auxiliary force. In Section 34 is the definition of "auxiliary force." I do not think that this ought to be settled merely on legal grounds, but I imagine that the Government are going to bring

in amending legislation, are they not? I can find nothing in the 1948 Act or any subsequent Act that justifies the transfer of these National Service men to the mobile columns of Civil Defence.

Mr. Wigg: About the 30,000, when they have been called up for mobile training, are they to be called up every year afterwards—the same 30,000? Are the H Class men to be called up every year, and the same 30,000 to get training, and then 17,000 or 20,000 more of the Class H men?

Mr. Ward: I can certainly answer for the Class H men in the Reserve flights. I am not quite sure about the Civil Defence point. Perhaps hon. Members will leave the matter there for the moment and allow it to be dealt with at the end of the debate.

Mr. Henderson: Is a firm undertaking being given on behalf of the Government —I hope there will be no dubiety on this point—that it is intended to introduce legislation to amend the National Service Acts?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (Mr. Nigel Birch): There will be amending legislation.

Mr. Henderson: When?

Mr. Birch: During the present Session, I hope.

Mr. Henderson: Finally, I wish to express a personal view. I am extremely doubtful whether another world war would be restricted to conventional weapons. I do not believe that either side would accept defeat by conventional weapons and not use any atomic weapons that might be in their possession. In my view, therefore, there will either be atomic war or no war at all.
If there is atomic war, then, as is stated in the White Paper, the backs of both sides will be broken in a relatively short time, and it is difficult to see how any nation with its back broken could carry on any war, conventional or otherwise. It is of the highest importance, therefore, that the West should develop, within its economic capacity, its deterrent force to the point at which it will really be an effective deterrent. We can then hope that no nation will contemplate or undertake aggression that will lead to a world war in which its back will be


broken, that all Governments will be prepared to settle their disputes peaceably and that an international, all-in system of security will be established which will speedily get rid of the crippling burden of armaments.
Meanwhile, in building up the Royal Air Force, we are forging a vital contribution to Western defence, an instrument—this is agreed and accepted by both sides of the House—not to make war but to prevent war. While I agree with the Prime Minister in seeking peace through strength, in my view world peace will be built on surer and more enduring foundations if it rests on the pillars of mutual confidence, friendship and cooperation rather than on amassing weapons of destruction and threatening the very foundations of our world society.

5.12 p.m.

Mr. W. J. Taylor: I am very glad to have been called so early in the debate. It gives me the opportunity of paying my tribute to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air for the most competent and lucid way in which he presented his statement. The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) said that it was time the House had a statement about the progress of the Royal Air Force. We have had a very fine statement this afternoon, and, on behalf of my hon. Friends as well as myself, I thank the Under-Secretary for it.
In the first part of his speech, the Under-Secretary dealt with what might be described as the material side of the Royal Air Force, that dealing with equipment and technical and scientific development. In the second part he passed to the personnel side and the difficulties there.
I was very surprised and not a little shocked when I heard my hon. Friend refer to the tremendous drop which has taken place in the numbers entering the Royal Air Force as aircrew during the last 12 months. If I noted his figures correctly, in 1952 14,000 entered the Service for aircrew duties and in 1953 7,000. The Under-Secretary went on to say that, unless there was an improvement, there would not be sufficient aircrew two years from now.

Mr. Ward: Might I get the records straight? I said that candidates coming forward for aircrew duties have dropped from 14,000 to 7,000. That is slightly different from referring to them as those who are entering. The proportions are not the same.

Mr. Taylor: I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for that explanation. Apparently, the position is not quite so bad as I imagined it was.

Mr. Shackleton: Would the hon. Member for Bradford, North be kind enough to repeat what his hon. Friend has said, because the Under-Secretary directed his remarks towards him and I did not hear what he said?

Mr. Ward: I beg the hon. Member's pardon. I will say it again. I merely pointed out that what I said was that the candidates coming forward for aircrew duties had dropped from 14,000 to 7,000 and that that was slightly different from saying that they were the ones who had been accepted.

Mr. Taylor: We were thrilled to hear about the tremendous progress that is being made in the supply of equipment and aircraft. The story that we heard made us feel more secure than we have felt in that direction for some time. [Interruption ] The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) may have his reservations, but, if I remember rightly, he was not in the House when the statement was made by my hon. Friend. If he had been here, it might have changed his point of view.

Mr. S. Silvennan: The hon. Member is right. I did not hear the statement. However, I have read the papers and the Estimates very carefully, and I am bound to say that the more I hear about modern air warfare, especially after hearing my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) say that there will either be no war or an atomic war, the more I feel that the last thing in the world which is increased by such statements is the feeling of security.

Mr. Taylor: "Security" is a very wide term. I am sure that defence is the first consideration of Her Majesty's Government in that connection.
One is tempted to make a comment about the tremendous achievements which have been made in the scientific and mechanical field, but I propose to deal only with one specific difficulty that is apparent in the Service in relation to the education of children of officers, warrant officers and senior N.C. Os., and, indeed, of other ranks, who are subject to frequent postings.
The Education Act, 1944, contained provisions enabling local education authorities to make grants for the education at boarding schools or other schools where fees are paid of children whose parents are in the Services. I have examined the Regulations made under the Act and I find them comprehensive and clear, but there is one word in the Regulations—"may"—which affects their whole interpretation. The Regulations dealing with the payment of grants by local education authorities for the education of children whose parents are in the Services are permissive and not mandatory upon local authorities. Consequently, in practice very few authorities have done anything about it. I believe that the only authorities who have yet made grants of this character are the Surrey County Council and the London County Council.
This difficulty is far-reaching. It applies to all the three Services in a greater or less degree, but to the Royal Air Force in a greater degree than to the other two Services, because officers and senior N.C. Os. are more liable to frequent postings in the Royal Air Force than they are in the other two Services. The situation has, in fact, now become most acute, and is one of the main contributory reasons for the lack of suitable people entering the Service, particularly for the commissioned ranks.
This problem is having a serious effect —and evidence can be produced to show it—on the morale and efficiency of officers who have children and who are placed in this difficulty. Comparing the situation of a Service parent with a civilian parent, we find that the anomaly becomes most marked. The ordinary private citizen is entitled under the various Education Acts to free State education for his children. He can demand it. He is usually living in one place for long periods and can assert his right with the local authority. In the case of the

Royal Air Force, there is a larger proportion of officers serving overseas than in the Army.
It might be of interest to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for me to remind him of the number of children involved in this connection. The total number of officers' children between the ages of five and 15 in the Royal Air Force is 13,000. If we add to that number the airmen's children, the number becomes 120,000. Efforts have been made to solve this problem over a very long period. There have been many Service and inter-Service committees sitting on the problem, but no solution has yet been found.
The strength of my case lies in the fact that the machinery exists to solve the problem, if it is applied. The State has assumed the obligation of providing free primary and secondary education for all children, according to their needs, but in practice and because the peculiar difficulties in which the officer, warrant officer, or senior N.C.O. in the Royal Air Force is placed by having frequently to change his station, he is denied his rights under the law.
It may be said that the children could be sent to a day school, but in practice that does not work out. There are difficulties, in the first place, in getting a child into a day school at short notice. The effect on that child's education of constant moves is serious indeed. I believe the cases are common of children of 14 years of age who have been to six or eight different day schools. I should like to read to the House an extract from a letter which was sent by a Service wife to a retired Air-Marshal. She said:
I am the wife of a Royal Air Force officer and am at present taking a course which will enable me to get a job so that I may supplement my husband's meagre income and meet the costs of our children's education. After 15 years of marriage and 'following the flag' I do not think I can be blamed if I occasionally indulge in a little self-pity and ask myself whether our sacrifices have been worth it. We have no money to speak of, after setting up over 16 homes and paying out over £2,000 in furnished rents. We have no settled home of our own and have never even unpacked our wedding presents. Our children stand no chance of passing State scholarships after being in eight schools in less than five years and losing the grounding in arithmetic which only a continued education can give. Constant moves, including living abroad, has been attractive, but where are our friends? We have even lost touch with our ain folk.


That letter is typical of many which have been written on this subject. The whole matter transcends the question of whether the State does it or the Air Ministry does it, because the harm done to children's characters and temperament by this restless sort of life is very considerable indeed.
The Service parent can send his child to a day school and move him from school to school as he moves from post to post. He can split up his home and leave his family in one place while he lives on the station in mess, and so on, for years, over the whole of his Service. He can send his children to boarding school at crippling expense. But there is only one effective way of dealing with the matter; that is, by seeing that the intentions of the law, in the shape of the Education Act, 1944, are carried out and that his child is sent to a boarding school.
The Surrey County Council, which I mentioned earlier in my address, finances 600 pupils at the present time at board ing school, and out of that number 22 have parents in the Services, I am told. The Middlesex authority sends 620 children to boarding schools, and out of them 15 have Service parents. It is impossible for the Royal Air Force to provide boarding schools in sufficient numbers to deal with this problem. I would ask the Under-Secretary of State and his noble Friend to consult the Minister of Education to see whether means can be devised of persuading local authorities to take a more realistic view of this matter and to bring into effect those Sections of the 1944 Act, and Statu tory Rule and Order No. 666 made under the Act, enabling them to make grants for this purpose—

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and,40 Member being present—

Mr. Taylor: I have outlined the educational difficulties facing Service parents. Their difficulties are not the easier to bear when one remembers that such provision is made in the Civil Service. There the principle recognised is that financial assistance should be given for the education of children of officers posted abroad. The 1949 Report of the Joint Committee of the Civil Service National Whitley

Council was accepted and put into practice by the Treasury.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: If the hon. Gentleman would allow me. I also was told about this, and I am most interested in it. I am not in any way opposing the hon. Member's suggestion, but can he tell the House whether or not those who joined the Civil Service did so under the impression that they would never be sent abroad? That would make a difference, because the Air Force Service man enlists for service anywhere. I intervene in the friendliest possible way, but I wonder if he has that information?

Mr. Taylor: That is rather a question of detail, and I cannot answer. I know that the principle that educational grants should be made to servants of the Foreign Office who serve abroad was accepted by the Treasury, but I am very sorry that I cannot answer the detailed point put to me.
Under the Civil Service arrangements, £75 a year is paid for the second and each subsequent child put to boarding school; £25 a year in respect of children living with a guardian, and £50 for the first child where no other arrangements are practicable. If those allowances are justified for the Civil Service, they ought to be justified for the Royal Air Force and the other Armed Forces of the Crown.
Another anomaly—which is rather amusing—is that when members of the Works Department of the Air Ministry itself are posted abroad they also receive the educational allowance. If that section can receive the privilege, surely the fighting part of the Service should also receive it.
The noble Lord the Minister of Defence, speaking in another place on 3rd February, 1954, said:
With regard to the expenses to which officers with children of school age are put in connection with educational costs, we realise only too well that if the education of children is not to suffer by reason of the frequent moves to which the head of the family is liable in the course of his Service career, provision must be made for the boarding education of the children. We are most anxious to help in this matter, but I can assure noble Lords who have studied the problem that it is not at all an easy one to solve. It is a complicated problem, and I will not go into it now.
There are, however, many citizens of like standing in civil life who find themselves in exactly the same position, although not always


to the same extent as the married Service man, who, owing to frequent changes of station, and what is called displacement or movement, finds himself in rather more difficult circumstances in regard to the education of his children. Many of the Service man's difficulties stem from the fact that nearly all the Services are overseas and are committed to various obligations in different theatres of war. One really cannot believe that those conditions will exist for ever, or for very long; and when we can secure an easing of tension, and an easing of some of our world-wide commitments, which we never had before, and can bring some of our Service people home then many of these difficulties with which we are now faced will disappear.
If I may borrow an old saying from Scandinavia, "While the grass is growing the cow is dying." This House should really do something to relieve the difficulties of these officers. We cannot wait for an easing of our world commitments. I am sure that for many years to come we shall have to maintain the Royal Air Force. If we wait for an easing of our world commitments, we shall continue to lose valuable men from the Service and discourage those who might come into it, because of this difficulty, which, as family men, they have to face.

5.36 p.m.

Group Captain C. A. B. Wilcock: I will not follow the arguments of the hon. Member for Bradford, North (Mr. W. J. Taylor), interesting though they are, and new, I think to the House. I will support him by saying that the education of Service men's children has always been a very great problem but I think that the solution may be by increasing the pay and the emoluments of personnel as referred to by the Under-Secretary of State today. They will then be brought more or less into line with their contemporaries in civil life.
The Air Estimates must of course, be considered against the 'background of the Government White Paper on Defence. I must say that, in general, I found that a very readable document. I agree with much that it contains, and particularly paragraph 16, which states:
Still greater emphasis will have to be placed on the Royal Air Force because of the need to build up a strategic bomber force and because of the importance of guided missiles in air defence.
I am in the fortunate and pleasant position of having pleaded with this Government, and previously with the Labour Government, to build up our strategic bombing force. The necessity of that

seems to be now agreed, but I want, if I can, to persuade the Government to go even further along this road of offence.
The building up of Fighter Command, the emphasis on new fighters, fighter aerodromes and radar screens is all for defence. Offence, in the past has been left in the main to the United States of America. To get the problem in its proper perspective we must acknowledge that there is today no adequate defence against supersonic aircraft, and certainly no defence at all against the guided missile. There may be some defence in 10 years' time, but today there is none. I am sorry if I appear to be contradicting the Under-Seoretary of State for Air in what I thought were his slightly optimistic comments on the possible success of fighters.
If we do not plan on that assumption, we shall be wasting money; worse still, we shall not be using our manpower to the best possible advantage. We have had to play for safety during the last eight years. War has been close —uncomfortably so. We have now to build up our defence against this new type of war about which hon. and right hon. Members have today been speaking. Only by doing so can we possibly avoid the very war we are planning to fight. Defence is no deterrent to modern war. Only the power of retaliation can be that, and neither the Army nor the Navy have that power.
The most important factor of this problem is the provision of the right kind of manpower for the Royal Air Force. The question is how we are to attract that manpower into the Royal Air Force and keep it there. I agree that the Government have gone some way by increasing pay. I never thought that more comfortable quarters or kinder sergeant-majors were the right answer. They never began to touch the problem. But there is an even more important problem than that of pay, and that is overseas service. I speak with a certain amount of knowledge, having served and held commands overseas.
The officer and airman we want in the Service today is of marriageable age, and he wants to enjoy a normal married life. Sufficient married quarters overseas have never been provided for all the married officers and men of any Service. That applies especially to the Royal Air


Force. I stand to be corrected by the Under-Secretary, but I should say that not more than 20 per cent, of married officers and 10 per cent, of married men can ever live in married quarters overseas at one time, and even that percentage is possible only in places such as Gibraltar and Malta.
I would ask the Minister to consider a proposal which I put to the previous Under-Secretary of State for Air in the Labour Government, whom I am very pleased to see in his place. I suggest that we should finish with married quarters overseas for the Royal Air Force. If that is accepted there will be, firstly, a considerable economy in the manpower now required for the transportation of families, the hospitals and schools overseas, the construction of houses and bungalows, and the embarkation staffs at the Air Ministry and ports. All that work will be finished.

Mr. de Freitas: My hon. and gallant Friend has been kind enough to refer to me. It should be known that he is in a minority of one on this point. Newspaper reports became a little confused, owing to pressure of space, and it was reported that I, as Under-Secretary of State for Air, had advocated that there should be no married quarters overseas and that no families should follow their men out. I received a mass of very abusive letters after that, and we did not feel that that report contributed in any way towards the solving of our recruiting problem.

Group Captain Wilcock: I am very surprised to hear that; but it is time that this married quarters question was cleared up. It is a "phoney" business. Only a small number of families can be accommodated in married quarters overseas.
I have a counter-proposal. I am not against families being together; far from it. I deplore the separation of families. But the provision of married quarters overseas is not the solution. Instead of married quarters overseas, it would be better if every married man were sent back to the United Kingdom within 12 months of leaving it. It is not necessary to extend this proposal to single men. They do not suffer any hardship from being overseas for two years; indeed many of them want to extend their overseas service. My proposal deals with quite a small category of men, who are

now being dealt with in quite the wrong way. Moreover, good would result from a policy such as I have suggested, because we should then have to introduce a really efficient air trooping system.

Mr. Entrys Hughes: Would my hon. and gallant Friend carry the argument further and say that he is in favour of all American married men going home?

Group Captain Wilcock: I cannot speak for the American Air Force. I should prefer to speak privately to my hon. Friend on that subject. I was making the point that the military and civil transport aircraft that will be necessary will be the very same aircraft— manned by the same crews—that we shall require in order to move our troops in time of war and, perhaps, to bring freight and food into this country, which may make all the difference to success or failure in a future war. Let us bring the married people home. Let us not pretend that we can provide married quarters for all the married men who go overseas, rather let us build up air fleets to transport them home after 12 months service apart from their families.
In considering this question of manpower, the technical aspect of the Estimates will be dealt with by other hon. Members. One reason we are not getting sufficient recruits may be the absence of reasonable prospects of a career. Pay has been low compared with civilian standards, but the Government have dealt with that; the separation of married men from their families has been a deterrent to recruiting, but I have made my suggestions to remedy that. And now we must try to provide a career which is not a succession of sharp curves.
In the years between the wars it was quite common for an officer or an N.C.O. to hold his rank for up to eight years, and that is becoming the tendency in relation to officers in the Air Force today. It is very difficult to avoid, when we have so many changes of policy, the re-armament of aircraft, changes in types of aircraft, and alterations in commitments. It is difficult to work within proper establishments, and quite impossible to plan a reasonable career for either an officer or a man.
There is also a solution to this problem. I am sorry that the Secretary of State for War has left the Chamber. I


hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Air will not be startled at my suggestion for overcoming the problem. It is a very simple solution. It is amalgamation, fusion or merging of the Army and the Air Force. That is a thing which must come. It is now being studied in the United States, and I should like to see it studied here. I am not suggesting that it should be introduced immediately, but we should start giving some thought to the matter.
Our manpower is not used in the tanks or as pilots, but in the hundreds of thousands of people behind the tanks and behind the pilots. It we want economies, that is where we must look for them.
Incidentally, I should have fought this proposal tooth and nail in the past, because the Air Force was then considered the junior Service and such a proposal would have retarded its growth and development. But that is not so today.
Today we see money being allocated very fairly between the three Services. It is true that money is allocated to the Royal Navy for such senseless purposes as large aircraft carriers which are destined, during a war, to be camouflaged and placed somewhere in a northern port out of the way of air bombing. Equally, a lot of money is being spent on heavy armaments for the Army, and in my view that defeats the role of the modern Army which above all should be mobile.
I turn now to the question of Reserves. Previously I have joined issue with the Under-Secretary of State on this matter. Briefly, I believe that the entire policy of the Air Ministry or the Government, or both, on Reserves has been not only wrong but tragically wrong. We had a well-trained and relatively economical Reserve oraginsation up to 18 months ago, and then the Government, presumably on the advice of the Air Council, decided to break it up. They broke up the Reserve flying training schools—30 of them— through which the Volunteer Reservists of the Air Force at least met together, talked aviation and did a little flying.
As a result of the Government's policy, we now have excellent pilots and navigators on the Reserve who have nowhere to go for training, apart from their annual training, and who never see each other or an Air Force unit unless or until they are called up for annual training. I do

not think that has been a very clever policy. Furthermore, it has taken away from the Government and the Air Ministry the training facilities which existed previously. The Under-Secretary told us that Canada had provided 200 trained pilots this year.

Mr. Ward: Two hundred and sixty.

Group Captain Wilcock: The Reserve flying schools could have provided 500 or 1,000 in one year, as they did before, and they could have provided jet training. There is nothing at all startling in the Canadian contribution. I am sure it is very useful, and we should be thankful to the Canadian Government for giving these facilities, but this training has been accepted by the Government at the expense of a training organisation which has now been lost to this country.

Mr. Ward: I am sure the hon. and gallant Gentleman will not overlook the strategic advantages of training pilots in Canada.

Group Captain Wilcock: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. There are, of course, strategic advantages, but let us then carry the policy through to the logical conclusion and put all our training in Canada or Australia, not just the training of a few pilots.

Mr. de Freitas: Or Southern Rhodesia.

Group Captain Wiloock: We have heard that a considerable number of Royal Air Force Reservists are to go to Civil Defence. Better they should go there than do no training at all, but it is very sad if we are planning a Royal Air Force for this country which does not require Reserves in the case of war, apart from a very few. Who has suggested that everything will be over in a few months if another war takes place? If that is thought to be so, surely we do not need an Air Force at all.
In fact, the White Paper categorically says the contrary. It says that we must make preparations for both types of warfare, and if that is the case we must have adequate and well-trained Reserves. The Royal Air Force Reservists in the last war were the pilots who filled the gaps in the Battle of Britain. In the last war they were needed before 1941. By 1944 every available pilot had been used and we were trying to get material from the


Colonies and from India. The barrel had been scraped clean. This question of Reserves is therefore very important indeed and it would not be right for the Government to say that no provision need be made for calling up Reserves beyond those needed for manning the squadrons immediately war is declared.
In conclusion, I want to ask some questions about the rearmament of Germany. What is the position to be in the air? Are we and our allies to say to Germany, "You may form 12 divisions but you may not have your own air support"? If so, can we enforce such a decision? I suppose there is no graver problem today than that of German rearmament and its consequences. We all need to give it very great thought. Has sufficient thought been given to the air side of the problem? Are the Germans to be allowed to build jet engines? Are they to be allowed to develop their civil air fleet? Are they to be allowed to develop flying clubs and aerodromes? Will the divisions which we believe they will build up have the air support of German squadrons?
These questions must be answered, for they are very important to the future peace of Europe and, possibly, the world. I agree that they are embarrassing questions, but it is better that they should be answered now and that there should be an agreed policy on these matters rather than that every time we hear that the Germans have built an aircraft there should be a crisis, or every time we hear that they are operating squadrons there should be another crisis. Can the Undersecretary of State find time in his reply to deal with this vital question?

5.59 p.m.

Wing Commander N. J. Hulbert: I must, in accordance with the custom of the House, declare my interest as an aircraft constructor.
May I congratulate my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State on the way in which he presented the Estimates today? It is always a great pleasure if a Minister who introduces the Estimates can claim to have served in the Service about which he is speaking, and my hon. Friend, in particular, has that advantage, because he served not only as a Regular officer but also in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force with great distinction.
The Estimates that we are considering today total some £500 million. That is a remarkable figure. When I first entered the House of Commons about 18 years ago the total Budget for that year was less than half as much again, only about £800 million, whereas we are spending today five-eighths of that on one branch of the Services. It therefore seems all the more remarkable that on this occasion there are so few hon. Members present in the Chamber. It is not a question of there being less than 40, apart from those who adorn the Front Benches, it is merely about a dozen.

Mr. Shackleton: There are more on this side.

Wing Commander Hulbert: This appalling figure of our Estimates today not only reflects the great increase in the cost of raw materials, in wages, in payment for men and women in the Services, but also high-lights the complexity of modern aircraft and all fighting weapons. I believe that the cost of the electronics in a modern aircraft today exceeds the total cost of a complete aeroplane 15 or more years ago.
The Royal Air Force is today organised as our first striking unit. It was improved in the last war and it is going to be improved again if, as we all hope will not happen, another war should come upon us. Apart from being our first striking unit, it is also the most necessary adjunct to our other lines of defence or attack. Army-air co-operation reached its zenith from 1940 to 1945. The advancing armies of Lord Montgomery were covered and prepared for in advance by what became known as the "Tedder carpet." Therefore, in the opinion of the vast majority of people of this country, money spent on the Air Force today is money well spent.
I should now like to turn to one or two of the statements in the White Paper and to some of the observations of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary. The hon. and gallant Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) referred to training overseas. I should like to ask the Under-Secretary why it has been decided to stop training in Rhodesia. Is it owing to the cost, lack of suitable aircraft, transport of aircraft, or what other reasons, because we all have the most happy recollections of R.A.F. pilots in the Dominions throughout the war?


We all deplore the closing of the Reserve training schools, because, although most of us agree that that was inevitable, these schools have in the past made a great contribution to flying training command. It may well be that as a result of the technical advance in training and the complexity of modern aircraft they cannot now fulfil a useful purpose. In the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates, reference is made to the various exercises which have taken place during the last year or two —R.A.F. exercises in conjunction not only with the Army and the Royal Navy, but with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers. Many have taken part in those exercises, and I should like to testify to their usefulness and effectiveness.
I was only able to take part in them through the assistance of what is known in this House as the usual channels and the co-operation of the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton). These exercises have, in my opinion, been extremely useful to reservists. They have enabled many officers and men to keep in touch, even if remote, with developments in the Service, although, inevitably, the few days we are able to spend with these units have some disadvantages. I was very pleased to hear the Under-Secretary inform the House of the Air Ministry's proposals to form more or less homogeneous units of either squadron or flight strength to keep the reservists together.
Following our training of reservists, there is the continuing problem of the National Service man who is called up into the Air Force, and the job that he has to do. All hon. Members have had letters, and will continue to get them, of men in the Service who have riot been put in what they consider to be the job commensurate with their merits. I agree that in a technical service like the Royal Air Force that is a very difficult thing to avoid. But I think that possibly more could be done by way of selective boards or individual interviews for some of these men to ensure that during their two years' training they are doing something akin to what they have been trained for in civil life, or akin to the career which they hope to follow when they leave the Royal Air Force. I think that if more could be done to bring about that happy

state, our correspondence would be reduced.
As regards the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, that is to some extent regarded as the little Cinderella. Thus the Auxiliary Air Force has comparatively few squadrons and is comparatively few in numbers, and in some ways is not getting a fair crack of the whip, although, in the last year or two, much has been done by way of encouragement in certain aspects, particularly by using overseas squadrons for annual training, which has been a very wise and far-seeing policy that has done a great deal to help.
I do not think that this is the occasion to go too much into the grievances of individual squadrons. My hon. Friend knows that the County of Middlesex Squadron, which had a very good reputation throughout the war, has through bureaucratic red tape and the dead hand of the Treasury not had any town headquarters since its original headquarters were bombed in 1941 and 1942. Many senior officers in the Air Ministry and my hon. Friend have for long past hoped that that Squadron's housing problem would be dealt with, and I trust that what I have said this afternoon will be a little encouragement to them and a further push to the Air Ministry.
My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary referred in his speech to the accident rate with jet aircraft. Whenever a jet aircraft crashes, be it with fatal or other results, it gets the headlines in the newspapers. Little or nothing is done by the Air Ministry to counteract these statements. We welcome what the Under-Secretary said today, but I hope we shall not have to wait until next year's Air Estimates before something else is done. I know all the difficulties about security and the unwisdom of disclosing the number of accidents, their ratio to the number of hours flown, and so on, but the Air Ministry could do a great deal to allay anxiety in the public mind if more frequent statements rebutting some of the statements that are made on the accident rate could be made either in this House or by other means.
What is the attitude of my hon. Friend's Department and of the Services to the further development of helicopters? Since the war, the attitude of the Air Staff has been, quite properly, to push


ahead with all speed the production of bomber and fighter aircraft. By doing this, however, work on the ancillaries of these necessary instruments of war has to some extent been neglected. Possibly recent thought has changed somewhat, because Coastal Command have made use of helicopters, although I do not know their numbers. More recently, operations in Malaya and other parts of the world have put the helicopter in a different and more useful light.
When operations started in Malaya, I believe that the Air Force could produce only four Dragonflies. Shortly afterwards the number had trebled, and in due course the Royal Navy stepped in with its helicopter squadrons, to the envy of the R.A.F. I think it can be said that the Service is being forced to become more helicopter-minded, not necessarily by its own desire, but by the march of events. The Army is certainly more helicopter-minded than the Air Force. I should be out of order in discussing today the activities of the Army in that way, but aircraft—

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: Is it not a fact that the Army has no helicopters and has none on order? I am not saying that that makes the Army any better than the Air Force, but is that not the fact?

Wing Commander Hulbert: I could not tell my hon. Friend what helicopters the Army has on order, even if I knew, but it is the policy of the Army to think more on the lines of helicopters than it has been the policy of the Air Ministry.
The time has come when the Air Ministry or its suppliers, the Ministry of Supply, must decide whether the Service is to be helicopter-minded. They have to decide whether we are to develop helicopters or will depend on American helicopters and buy them when necessary and devote our resources to other types of aircraft. All I hope is that very shortly the Service Staffs will crystallise their ideas and raise their operational requirements, so that those firms which are interested in helicopter development will be able to forge ahead and count on the co-operation and the real willingness of the Royal Air Force, and thus ensure that Great Britain takes the lead in this new and latest development in airmanship.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler (Newcastle-under-Lyme): The hon. and gallant Member for Stockport, North (Wing Commander Hulbert) began by reminding us that we were discussing a bill for more than £490 million. I wholeheartedly agree that this is an appalling burden on the citizens of the country and is something which the few Members present in the House ought to subject to prolonged and searching scrutiny. Last year we were presented with a bill of £500 million for the Air Force and, as is usual, we were told that it was the absolute minimum of expenditure for the Service, and that it was vital that that figure should be voted.
To me, the first striking feature of the White Paper is to find that the sum of money which was voted last year has not been spent. The first striking phrase of the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates is that once again "production has not come up to expectations." We are told that the sights were set too high, and therefore, although we cannot yet be told how much of the money that was voted has been spent, we know that both for defence as a whole and for the Air Force in particular, not all the money which Parliament voted will have been spent.
That is referred to in paragraph 20 of the White Paper on Defence, which says:
This underspending is due to a variety of reasons which have affected the Royal Air Force in particular. One of the major causes was the considerable adjustment, by way of rephasing or elimination, which had to be made in the production and works programmes as a result of the review foreshadowed in last year's Statement on Defence.
To describe the 50 per cent, cut which has actually been imposed on defence production as a whole in the last three years as an
adjustment, by way of rephasing or elimination,
is a masterpiece of understatement.
Three years ago, there was projected the great rearmament programme, for the Air Force in particular. Great emphasis was laid upon the need for a huge arms production programme and very expensive weapons in order to build up the stockpiles as a deterrent against foreign aggressors. The defence programme for the three years from 1951 to 1954 was a programme of production


worth £2,800 million, calculated at 1950 prices. It was projected that £2,800 million would be spent on production as a whole, and a substantial proportion of it was intended for the Royal Air Force.
How much money has actually been spent? We do not know precisely, because we have not the figure to the end of the financial year 1953–54, but we know from Ministry of Defence figures that less than £2,000 million of the projected £2,800 million production programme has been spent. If this calculation is translated into 1950 prices, which ruled when the programme was planned, in terms of numbers of aircraft and quantities of equipment, we find— again, I quote from official Ministry of Defence figures—that the programme is worth £1,480 million.
So it will be seen, taking the proper comparison of £2,800 million worth of equipment at 1950 prices, that what has actually been spent from 1951 to 1954 on production represents practically a 50 per cent. cut. The Under-Secretary of State for Air can tell us to what extent the Royal Air Force has been cut back, but I do not call that a
considerable adjustment, by way of rephasing or elimination …

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: I want to follow the hon. Gentleman's argument. Is he advocating that we should continue to produce obsolete equipment even if new designs and new equipment are coming forward? Does he suggest that we should have continued with all the orders which the Labour Government placed in the emergency of 1950?

Mr. Swingler: At the moment I am not advocating anything. I am giving facts, and I think that the facts, when analysed, and showing what happened in the past, are the most important starting point for considering the level of expenditure in the Royal Air Force in the future. If we go on year by year without analysing what has happened in the past, we see that each year production has not come up to expectations and that we are setting the sights too high. Then we set them a little bit higher for the next year so that we are not getting anywhere, nor are we getting value for money, nor are we getting defence equipment; but we are aiding and

abetting the disorganisation of the economy of the country.
There was an attempt to spend £2,800 million, which could not be done, just as there has presumably been an attempt to spend what Parliament voted last year for the Royal Air Force. The Minister found it was impossible to spend that amount, so "production has not come up to expectations." The sights were set too high, so that there has to be a readjustment of the production programme "by way of rephasing or elimination."
The first conclusion which I draw from this analysis is that, whereas it is true that over this period the production programme in real terms has been cut by nearly one-half, the total expenditure in real terms has not been cut by anything like one-half. It has, in fact, according to the analysis by the Ministry of Defence been cut by about one-quarter. When we bring down what has been spent of the original £4,700 million of the total defence programme at the beginning of 1951, it turns out that in terms of 1950 prices, about £3.400 million has been spent. So the scaling down has been of the order of 25 per cent.
The production part of the programme for all three Services—and this is particularly important to the R.A.F.—has been, in fact, scaled down proportionately very much more than the expenditure upon manpower and other things. Therefore, one of the first things that has got to be considered is either that the plans that were made then were extremely incompetent and the balance between what was planned for production and what was planned for manpower was incorrect; or else there is something wrong with the balance now, because production has been scaled down simply because that production could not be achieved. It was not up to expectations inasmuch as the economic capacity of the country would not stand the production of that much equipment. While that expenditure has had to be scaled down, the expenditure on pay, administration and manpower under the National Service scheme has not been scaled down.

Mr. Shackleton: I am very interested in the figures which have been given by my hon. Friend, but I wonder whether


he can relate them specifically to the Royal Air Force? He has been giving them generally, but I should like to have them for the R.A.F.

Mr. Swingler: I am sorry that I have not got an actual figure for the Royal Air Force.
The figures I am giving the House come from an answer given by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) on 2nd March, 1953. They were for the total defence expenditure analysed in two parts. On the one side there was the expenditure on personnel and on the other side the expenditure on production. But I am asserting, considering the substantial proportion of the production programme which was for the Air Ministry, that it must be quite obvious that the general proportions in the scaling down of total defence production and manpower must apply to the Royal Air Force.

Mr. John Sfrachey: These figures are very interesting, but I believe that my hon. Friend is actually under-stating his case. I should like the Government to correct him if he is wrong, because it would be useful to get the matter right. As I see it, the figures actually show a total cut in real terms of the Defence Estimates as a whole, when we have allowed for the difference in prices of about £1,270 million, but the cut on the arms production side was no less than £1,320 million, so there was actually an increase of about £70 million on the personnel side. There was no cut at all on personnel but an actual increase. Of course, I may be wrong in my figures, but that is how I read it.

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has said some extremely misleading things, especially when he talks about scaling down and a cut starting from the figure of £4,700 million. He takes that to be a correct estimate of what was possible, and then he assumes that any expenditure which has not taken place up to that full amount, which was the figure which the former Government thought of in rather a hurry, as some right hon. Gentlemen opposite who were Members of that Government

know, is a cut or scaling down by the present Government. In point of fact, I think that the hon. Member put his finger on the answer to some extent when he said that it was possibly caused by in competent planning. There is no doubt the original figure—I am not blaming the Government which fixed it in rather a hurry, and I myself would not have used the word "incompetent" but I am quoting the hon. Member—that was chosen was wholly unrealistic, and it was quite impossible—

Dr. H. Morgan: What a confession.

Mr. Crossman: My hon. Friend supported it.

Mr. Sandys: —to step up production at a rate at which the money could be spent in that time. Therefore, it is not fair to say that the whole difference between the £4,700 million and what has; actually been spent represents a deliberate decision of policy to cut or scale down our defence expenditure.

Mr. Swingler: I am naturally extremely grateful, both to the Minister of Supply and to my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) for their assistance in elucidating the facts.

Mr. Speaker: I have been a little puzzled by these recent exchanges. It seems to me that the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) is talking about the whole rearmament programme and contrasting the production of munitions and the use of manpower over the whole programme. I think that is much too wide on the Air Estimates, and he must come to grips with the Estimates before the House.

Mr. Swingler: I am sorry if I have transgressed, Mr. Speaker, but I was simply using the figures as an illustration, and I started with a paragraph from the Defence White Paper of this year, which refers specifically to underspending by the Air Ministry, and the fact that the Royal Air Force production programme has had to be scaled down this year. I was using as an illustration in support of that the general figures in regard to the total defence programme, which, of course, includes the Estimates for the Royal Air Force, which have been affected part passu.


The Minister of Supply ought to be careful about what he now says, because at the time the original expenditure was planned in 1951 for the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, those who said it was too much and ought to be scaled down were called some nasty names. If the Minister of Supply says that it was incompetent planning and that there was an attempt to purchase too much for the Air Force, he indicts his hon. Friends of incompetent planning now, because they have done just the same thing.
In the White Paper they admit that in 1953–54 we shall be spending less than we estimated because production has not come up to expectation. The White Paper says:
Although our sights last year were thus set too high, we have in fact made good progress…
etc. So here is the same kind of planning as we had under the £4,700 million programme; the sights were set too high and production had only come up to half the expectation in terms of planes and equipment.
There ought to be some inquiry into the planning of the Air Ministry so far as this production programme is concerned. Here is not a case of hon. Members on this side of the House saying, "You should take steps to cut the level of arms expenditure," because the facts are constantly cutting the level of arms expenditure. We are saying that the Government ought to reconsider the whole situation in order to relate what is being spent on aircraft to the productive capacity of the country, realistically to the economic needs of the country, and to what the engineering industry can do for exports as well as for the Royal Air Force.
That is what must be done to get a production programme that is sensible, properly adjusted, and that can be carried out and so that we can see that the money provided by Parliament will be spent without overstraining the economy of the country all the time. In fact, proportionately more and more money is being spent on manpower and proportionately less and less on production, as my right hon. Friend has pointed out. Therefore, the case obviously made out in this, the first Service Estimate which we are considering this year, is that the balance between production

expenditure and manpower expenditure has been completely altered in the past three years from what was planned, and that there ought to be a stringent inquiry into that side of the picture.
At the same time we are told that we are planning for an atomic war, and these bills for larger arms expenditure are sold to the country on the basis of sensational phrases about the prime deterrent of the atomic bomb. Again, I must point the contrast, which some of my hon. Friends pointed out in the debate on defence, that whilst this is being done in the sphere of offensive in the Royal Air Force, those charged with the Civil Defence of this country have been deliberately instructed not to provide for atomic warfare. Evidence recently given on Civil Defence before the Select Committee on Estimates was that those charged with Civil Defence against atomic air attack have been told not to prepare for war but "to prepare to prepare for war," which is very different from what we are told in these Estimates and White Papers.
I am surprised at the complacency of the Under-Secretary of State for Air about Regular recruitment for the Air Force. Last year the Royal Air Force estimated that there would be 39,000 Regular recruits in 1953 but the result of Regular recruitment was to get 31,600, and we are now told that the Estimate for this year is down to 31,000.
I want to ask the Under-Secretary a number of questions about this matter, which is of vital importance. It is clear that the Service Ministers have overestimated the attraction of 'the three-year engagement and have under-estimated its disadvantage, namely, the swiftness with which it is over. If anything proves the case for establishing a thorough inquiry into the National Service scheme, and manpower in the Forces as a whole, it is the drop in Regular recruitment last year and the fact that the Services generally, and the Air Force in particular, have been compelled to lower their estimates of regular recruitment.
My first question is, how many Regular recruits does the Air Force really want, in view of the undertakings of leaders of both Front Benches that two years' National Service would be a temporary measure, assurances that were given as much by the present Home Secretary as


by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) in 1950? My second question is, how far does the hon. Gentleman think that the new pay increases will achieve those extra Regular recruits who could contribute towards reducing the National Service period?
The story of the pay increase is a very curious one. The Retail Price Index has risen from 114 to 140 points since the last Forces' pay increase in 1950. It seems to me that there is a strong case for an all-round increase in pay in the Air Force. The Minister and the Undersecretary have not been able to get that, and their pressure on the Government for higher pay for some sections of men in the Air Force has been delayed because the Chancellor of the Exchequer was out of the country. We can see clearly why these pay codes could not be included in the Defence White Paper, it was because the head of the Treasury was out of the country and was resisting the granting of these increases.
Is the Under-Secretary of State for Air in favour of this multiplication of pay codes? As we look through the history of pay codes in the Forces, as much in the Air Force as in any Service, we see that all the time we have been trying to move towards their simplication and intelligibility. Now, however, as the result of a series of moves made in recent years, we are getting a multiplication of pay codes once again, which makes it more difficult for any man, N.C.O. or officer to understand where he stands in relation to the code. Therefore, we should like from the Under-Secretary some comments upon the application of these pay increases and an idea of how far he thinks they will stimulate Regular recruitment in order to enable the Air Force to meet the position about which the White Paper seems to be doubtful, namely, where the proportion of National Service men greatly decreases.
I also want to call attention to the question of Reserves, to which many hon. Members have referred. The handling of National Service Reserves in the Royal Air Force amounts to a grave scandal. One of the things required by those who have voted for National Service since the war—and I have voted on occasions for its continuance—is that it should be of universal application and applied equally to all. It is a very grave thing

that certain sections of young men who are called up and who do their two years' service in the R.A.F. will escape further liability altogether when they complete those two years. Large numbers have done so already. Last year it was found that out of 100,000 National Service R.A.F. Reserves only 8,500 had been called up for any Reserve training.
The Under-Secretary has given us certain important information today about additional measures that are being taken to use the Reserves, but at most those measures will only employ 50 per cent, of the Class H reservists of the R.A.F.; the other half will escape liability altogether. That is a serious matter because it will lead, and is leading now, to great bitterness between National Service men, for it makes a great difference whether a man is called up for the Army, which employs 100 per cent, of its reservists, or is called up for the R.A.F., in which case he will probably escape the 15 days' annual camp and further training.
The Government must either face the task of revising the whole scheme for the training of National Service reservists so that it applies equally to all, or they must take steps to find employment for all the Class H reservists of the R.A.F. It is proved that there is actually a surplus of manpower at the disposal of the R.A.F. The fact that that Service does not want, cannot train and does not call up these men shows quite clearly what we have been saying—that there are surpluses of manpower at the disposal of the Armed Forces to which the Services cling, and that if the situation were properly inquired into the case for an immediate reduction of the period of National Service would be made out.
It is becoming clearer and clearer that this costly National Service scheme hangs like a millstone round the necks of the Services, just as much as it does round the neck of the nation. It prevents expenditure on other items on which expenditure is planned, the expenditure itself gets out of control, and there is no competent planning of how the amounts that are voted are to be spent. If a tithe of this money were spent in other directions so as to prevent military commitments instead of multiplying commitments for the R.A.F. and the other Services, we should be able to reduce the


defence burden on the nation immediately. I hope that these points will be seriously investigated in Committee with a view to considering how we can reduce the burden.

6.44 p.m.

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: I am very glad to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler). He kept saying, "This is becoming clearer and clearer" and I found it getting foggier and foggier the longer he went on. He appears to be so wedded to the idea of planning that he wants to make sure that we produce all the equipment that was ordered in an emergency, and he also wants to make sure that all the reservists are called up even though they are not required and there is nothing for them to do.

Mr. Swingler: This is fantastic. The equipment was not ordered at all but the House of Commons was told by the military planners that that amount was the minimum that ought to be spent on arms production for the defence of the country.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: At that time we were deprived of the honour of having the hon. Member in the House of Commons. He was temporarily outside. Large numbers of Meteors and Canberras were ordered because, at that time, they were the only types that were ready to go into production.

Mr. A. Henderson: The hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) apparently has inside information and he ought to complete the story, because if he knows part of it he should know the rest. He knows that in the early days of the three-year programme orders were placed for Canberras—which I did not appreciate were obsolescent—and for Hunters, Swifts and Valiants. Therefore, let us not have any suggestion made that the only orders that were placed in the early days of the three-year programme were for obsolescent machines.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am on the right hon. and learned Member's side. I am sorry if I did not make that clear.
I said that the right hon. and learned Member and his Government ordered large numbers of Meteor aircraft and some of those orders had to be cancelled subsequently. Equally he ordered Can-berras, which were not obsolescent. I did

not say that they were. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right. The Canberra was a new aircraft and was the only light jet bomber which was at that time of a proven design, but later on, in the light of the whole programme, it became necessary to cut back the Canberra order somewhat. That was perfectly logical. The Prime Minister was right when he said, and I am sorry that the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme did not take it to heart, that it is quite clear that one does not get arms if one never orders them. It was better to place these orders even though some had to be cancelled subsequently.
At our debates on the Air Estimates we generally see the same faces year after year on both sides of the House. On this side we miss that of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey), who is ill in hospital. On the other side of the House we have today seen some new faces, generally closely associated with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), and naturally our debate is by that much enlivened. The same arguments are trotted out at these debates, though not always by the same people. On thumbing through the debates on the Air Estimates for the last four years, I wondered whether it would be necessary to think up a new speech or whether I could rehash one of my old ones, or one delivered by some other hon. Member.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Take mine for instance.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The hon. Member is quite secure. His is one speech which I should not plagiarise.
In 1951, I tried to draw attention to the need for the co-ordination of Western European defence, particularly radar, with our own as a means of prior warning of attack on this country. I said how important it was that we should have a closely co-ordinated scheme if we were to have an effective defence of our metropolitan area. I also asked that high priority should be given to air-to-air guided missiles.
The next year I dealt with the need for the guided bomb in order to economise on the number of aircraft required by increasing the accuracy with which we could place the bomb on the target. I


also asked (hat the supersonic fighter should not be forgotten and I said that we should be very unwise if we missed the intermediate stage between the ordinary sonic fighter and the guided missile. I also remember arguing that light fighters should not be neglected, because they were cheap and we might have to have them in certain areas. They should be considered—particularly the rocket fighter.
Last year I mentioned the questions of air transportation and helicopters. It was in my mind whether I should start at the end and work backwards, or start at the beginning and work forwards, but I think that the last two points are as germane today, if not more so, as they were last year. If I devote part of my speech to them, I hope that the House will forgive me.
I wish first to attend to the good news we received from the Under-Secretary of State about the extra incentives which are to be given to Royal Air Force personnel to sign on for Regular engagements. I am sure that will be welcomed in almost all parts of the House. If I devote my words on this topic to the officer problem, I hope that it will not be thought that I am understressing and am not aware of the problem as it concerns senior N.C. Os. I do so only because one has to concentrate on one section. Perhaps the point about N.C. Os. might be taken up by someone else.
As our Air Force gets more and more technical there may be a tendency to feel that we do not need high-calibre leadership, but nothing could be further from the truth. The more technicians we have in the Air Force the more desperately do we need vital and wise leadership. As was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. W. J. Taylor), Air Force officers may suffer somewhat more than other officers in view of the fact that they are moved about all over the world on somewhat shorter postings.
Service life is a corporate existence, and we must make sure that not only the Service officer but his family are able to live at the same standard that he has to maintain. At this time, particularly if they have families and children of school age, officers are faced with an enormous problem in regard to the education of

their children. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North has made this point, but I do not feel that it can be too heavily underlined.
Such officers have three choices before them when posted overseas. Either they may send their children to boarding school, which is horribly expensive and for which local authorities up to now have not been able to cater, or their children may travel around with them to overseas posts. In that case the continuity of the education is seriously disrupted and the children may have difficulty in getting through examinations and in getting good jobs later. Alternatively, they leave their wives and families behind and lead a bachelor existence for a large section of their lives.
We cannot neglect this problem. We shall never recruit the right chaps to lead the Air Force of the future unless we tackle it with courage. I should like the Treasury Bench to consider whether we ought to introduce some educational allowance to help officers serving overseas when their children are between the ages of, say, 10 and 17. I welcome the news that increased bounties are to be given when they leave the Service, but I hope very much that we shall not overlook their problems whilst in the Service. If we do so we shall not be able to recruit to the R.A.F.
I want to turn to the question of "selling" the Air Force to young people. I am well aware that the A.T.C. and other organisations are making an effort to interest young people in Air Force matters. The best regiments have for a long time sent talent spotters round the grammar schools, public schools and universities to try to persuade people whose minds are not definitely made up to enter their regiment. I hope that the Air Force will not neglect similar procedure because the Air Force cannot afford to neglect it. If it worked through the masters in charge of the A.T.C. and housemasters of public schools it could find friends who might be able to put the opportunities which exist before pupils who have not yet made up their minds.
It should be remembered that particularly in the scientific grade there is enormous competition for the services of good young men. The Air Force needs them,


industry needs them and the Civil Service needs them. If one goes to one of the universities about this time of the year one finds very large numbers of industrial firms trying to interview and offer jobs to people who will get their science degrees in June. When I was at Oxford last week I met an undergraduate who is about to take his finals. He expected to be interviewed by more than 20 firms and said he would not make up his mind until he saw what sort of jobs they were going to offer him. In this rush for the cream of scientific and other personnel the Air Force cannot afford to be left behind. I hope that it will do like these firms, otherwise it will be forgotten.
On the question of transport aircraft, it was good to read in the Defence White Paper that we are to form a strategic reserve in this country. This force, this pool, this mass of manoeuvre will not be in the centre of the area where it will be required. It will be on the western lip, on the western perimeter of the place where it is most likely to be needed. Therefore, it will be absolutely useless unless we have the transport aircraft to carry it to the parts of the world where it would be needed, and needed quickly.
As has been said in the While Paper, there are three tasks which the Armed Forces have to perform—defence in the cold war, discharge of peace-time obligations, and acting as a deterrent to and making preparation for a hot war. Those three tasks have two common factors. One is the need for adequate manpower to carry out all three. The other is the need for mobility so that that manpower can be carried to the part of the world where it is needed. One may economise in certain things but we cannot economise on transport aircraft. It is the one thing in which we cannot afford to economise, particularly in a country such as ours, which is short of manpower.
I see that some progress has been made in allowing the charter firms to grow in strength and have extra aircraft. The fact that they have carried no fewer than 100,000 troops to various parts of the world in the last year, particularly to the Middle East, is encouraging. I believe this is the sort of way in which the Air Force can most economically have a reserve of transport aircraft in the background. They can be kept there for use

when required, and it does not mean that we have to man them up and pay for them all the time.
I also see that the Ministry of Supply has placed an order for 20 Beverleys—large transport aircraft—which, no doubt, will be very useful, but it is not a large number. I wonder why that order was not placed more quickly. I wonder whether it was shortage of money or whether, perhaps, no Service was anxious to carry it on its Vote. If the latter were the reason I wonder if the Ministry of Defence could carry the financial responsibility for transport aircraft. We cannot do without them. They are badly needed, not only for the Air Force, but for all three Services.
If that is so, surely the right Vote to carry the expenditure is not the Air Force Vote, but the Ministry of Defence Vote. I see that that Ministry has £24 million, much of which is devoted at the moment to the construction of airfields in Western Europe under the infrastructure plan. But that plan must be reaching its peak and perhaps next year expenditure on it will begin to fall. Perhaps next year the Ministry of Defence would find that the right time to do its proper co-ordinating job and to order equipment which is of common use and absolutely essential to all three Services.

Mr. Shackleton: The hon. Member is not suggesting that these aircraft should not be under R.A.F. control, but merely that there should be a bookkeeping arrangement?

Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am very glad that the hon. Member raised that query. I meant to imply that, of course. I am merely saying that the Ministry of Defence should carry this expenditure on their Vote, otherwise there may be a reluctance by the Air Ministry to order transport aircraft when hard pressed for money. I am absolutely certain of one thing. Our deterrent crust of ground troops in Western Europe is brittle and thin, and under those circumstances we must be able to reinforce them. We cannot do that in any other way than by transport aircraft.
I come to my last point—the use of helicopters. These are such useful craft that I am surprised that so little has been said about them in any of the Service Estimates or White Papers. They


are needed to carry goods from the railhead, or straight from this country to a possible battlefront in Western Europe. They are needed to help to reinforce a fortress defence system which might be necessary at any time in Western Europe. They may be needed to carry troops across radioactive ground following an atomic bomb attack—such ground may be impassable for hours.
I suggest that they are needed to make our road convoys less vulnerable. A stream of lorries proceeding up a road is extremely vulnerable to air attack, but helicopters are much less vulnerable as they need not keep to the same route. They can operate in extremely bad weather and in darkness. I do not subscribe to the argument that they are so vulnerable that they could not be used.
Helicopters are needed, and have been used, in colonial wars, such as the war in Malaya, where they have proved their usefulness. It is astonishing to me that we have not taken that lesson to heart. I understand that the R.A.F. has a dozen or two on order. The Royal Navy, with that foresight which is sometimes shown by the Senior Service, jumped in first and ordered a dozen or two, which have been of tremendous value in Malaya. They proved themselves also in flood rescue operations in Holland.

Mr. Shackleton: That is only because they are the slowest aircraft that the Navy can get.

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The Army, on the other hand, does not appear to have ordered any at all, in great contrast to the United States Army, which has more than 1,000 S.55 helicopters, each of which carry from six to eight armed troops. Yet in this country there is not one on order, although my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Wing Commander Hulbert) said that the Army is thinking about it.
It may be said that the Services are waiting until the twin-engined helicopter is developed. That is a valid argument in the sphere of civil aviation where supreme safety is needed, but it is not valid in the sphere of military aviation. If the United States can use a thousand helicopters and find them of tremendous value under operational conditions we certainly ought to have a few, and I am

sure they would prove invaluable. I am glad that the Ministry of Supply report that it is carrying on with the twin-engined Pioneer, because we cannot afford to back only one horse in this matter of slow transport aircraft, whether it be a helicopter or a fixed-wing type.
Another point, which has also been mentioned by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) is the question of radar stations in Western Europe. He asked whether they are of an efficient and modern type. I would ask my hon. Friend if modern radar will be provided, not only in Western Europe, but also at our bases overseas. Is there modern radar equipment at Gibraltar and Malta, and at Cyprus, which is becoming increasingly important? Has such provision for all these places been allowed for in our plans for the future? It is no use thinking that we can fly fighter aircraft and a fighter defence system into that area unless we have previously laid the foundations and provided signal and radar services which can be used by the aircraft when they arrive.
To sum up the points I have made, I ask that the Government have another look at the difficulties which officers are meeting over the education of their children. I ask that the Air Force shall not neglect the time-honoured methods of recruiting personnel from the grammar schools and the universities, and that it shall try to attract some of the best people. I draw attention to the desperate need for transport aircraft so that our slender Forces may be carried quickly to the parts of the world where they are most needed. I ask that we should not neglect the helicopter or the twin-engined Scottish Pioneer, because I believe that there is a tremendous need for these transport equipments.

7.5 p.m.

Mr. W. R. Williams (Droylsden): I shall not detain the House for long, although I should have liked to pursue some of the interesting points raised by the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing). It was rather unfortunate that, with his knowledge, the hon. Member confined his comments on education to the education of the children of officers. I should have thought he would have made a wider approach to the question and related it not to the circumstances of the parents, whether they


be officers in the Air Force or anywhere else, but to the ability of the children and their potentiality. I would go further and say to the hon. Member that had I succeeded in moving a Motion recently on the expansion of technical education, I should have made the point that it might have been of great advantage to the Royal Air Force had we adopted a wider approach to technical education. The use of the helicopter in the Royal Air Force is an interesting subject. I thought the only people who were slow in making use of helicopters were the Post Office, but it seems that the Royal Air Force is slower in that regard. However, as I have promised not to occupy too much time, I will get to the particular point I wish to make.
Everyone to his trade, and as an old telegraphist I am especially keen on telecommunications. I wish to draw attention to Vote 9, Subhead A—Telecommunications. I notice that there is a net overall decrease of £840,000. There has been an increase in the telecommunications subhead of £582,000, and I take it that the full explanation of that is contained in the Explanatory Note on page 143:
The decrease on this account is partly offset by the provision for the cost of telephone services in the United Kingdom for a full year, as compared with a period of approximately eight months …
That explanation satisfies me.
On page 144 of the Estimates, we are dealing with more of that subhead. Item 1 refers to
Telephone services in the United Kingdom other than special circuits and defence teleprinter network.
I notice in this connection that there is a proposed increase in the Estimate of £345,000. There is nothing in the Explanatory Notes that satisfies me that there should be that increase. As far as I can see, this covers rentals charged by the Post Office for exchange lines, extension lines and private branch exchanges, telephone calls and so on. Although the Assistant Postmaster-General came to the House yesterday to convey one of the most unsocial decisions made even by this Government, that they intend to increase telegram charges, as far as I know nothing has been said about an increase in telephone charges.
The House is entitled to have some explanation about the £345,000 increase. Under Item 2 there appears to be an increase of £250,000 under "Special operational and administrative telephone circuits." The Explanatory Notes say that in the main that covers rentals and telephone and maintenance charges for the telephone networks, including cables and so on. It might be useful for the House, and certainly it would be for me, to know why the Minister wants £250,000 more as no increases are, proposed in telephone charges.
The most amazing feature, however, is that under Items 3 and 4 there is no increase and under Item 5, which deals with telegrams, cablegrams and radio services, there is actually shown a decrease of £13,000. We ought to have an explanation. I have already referred to the notification in the House yesterday that it was proposed to increase the charge for telegrams by no less than 100 per cent. This applies to commercial telegrams, Press telegrams, ordinary social telegrams, and life and death telegrams. Yet when I look at this Vote, which deals with telegrams and telegraph equipment, apparatus and so on, which is in daily use in the R.A.F., this is what I find. The Explanatory Notes say:
''The Post Office provides and maintains a teleprinter network connecting the defence Department and the formations and units of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom. Rental and maintenance charges for the network are shared by the three Services. The provision covers the Air Ministry share of the charges."
Those charges to the Air Ministry and the other Service Departments have not been increased. There is no suggestion in the Estimate that the Postmaster-General intends to charge the R.A.F., the Army or the Navy any more for the services which are rendered to them.
I know something about those services. Believe me, the Armed Forces could not function for five minutes without the efficient services provided to them by the Post Office in this country. Had I caught your eye yesterday, Mr. Speaker—and unfortunately I did not—I might have been able to put the security aspect consideration to the Assistant Postmaster-General.
I do not know anything at all about the R.A.F. I am not knowledgeable, like my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), but


I have examined the Vote, and what it reveals is scandalous. We have a Government Department coming here and admitting that they have to rely upon the Post Office for their day-to-day communication services—the best services they can get—and they are undercutting on their prices.
The Postmaster-General and the Assistant Postmaster-General have been working in a corner somewhere so that nobody knew what they were doing whilst they were plotting this attack on the users of the telegraph service. They dare not tell the R.A.F., the Army or the Navy that, as from 1st June, 1954, they would expect them to provide in their Estimates for another 100 per cent, on their telegraph and teleprinter services. They have been working behind the scenes and misleading the Services, misleading the Secretary of State for Air, the Under-Secretary and the Department as a whole and allowing them to estimate that their costs for teleprinter and telegraph services would be less by £13,000 next year than last year.
If I were the Minister I should almost be inclined to resign because of the way in which I had been treated. The R.A.F. have allowed the Postmaster-General to twist them all ends up on their Estimates. When I was in the Post Office many years ago I used to be concerned with Estimates. I know the care and attention which is required. I remember the time when if you were about 1 per cent, out in an Estimate you would be called to account. You, with your experience, Mr. Speaker, will know that what I am saying is true —

Mr. Speaker: It may be perfectly true, but I have had one or two doubts whether or not it is in order.

Mr. Williams: I shall not trespass upon your generosity any further. The Minister has been misled, and I hope that he will take it from this House to his noble Friend a message that in future when he is having Estimates prepared he should know not only about the larger elements that go into the Air Force, but also such elements as telecommunications and so on. Not only has the Assistant Postmaster-General misled the Service Departments in this matter, but in essence he has told the ordinary users

of telegrams that they must subsidise the Armed Forces.
In other words, the ordinary men and women will have to pay a higher price for telegrams so that the Services can be catered for cheaply. This is essentially unfair. The only reason I spoke was to protest, in fairness to the R.A.F., on their behalf, against the conduct of the Post Office and the Postmaster-General in misleading them and allowing them to make a statement which is not true and which possibly they will have to cover by coming to the House with a Supplementary Estimate to overcome the deficiency. Above all, I spoke to challenge the Post Office that they are placing the burden of subsidies on the shoulders of people who cannot carry them. There is talk that the Government do not believe in subsidies. They take subsidies off food and other commodities in order to place them here, and let the little man carry the burden of the R.A.F.

Mr. Graham Page (Crosby): I think that the hon. Member was quoting from the first paragraph of page 145 of the Air Estimates. May I refer him to the charges for telephone calls and for telegrams originated by telephone? Is there not, in fact, an increase of £350,000 in the Estimate under that item?

Mr. Williams: No. We are talking about an entirely different thing, and if the hon. Gentleman had a little more knowledge of the internal side of the industry he would never ask a question like that, which seems to show his elementary ignorance of the actual circumstances.

AIRFIELDS (FOOD PRODUCTIONS)

7.20 p.m.

Mr. Gerald Williams (Tonbridge): I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House, recognising the urgent need to expand home food production, urges Her Majesty's Government to make Royal Air Force airfields available for agricultural use to a greater extent than at present, subject to reasonable limits to preserve the safety of aircraft.
It has been said that the farmer likes the flat, well-drained sites, and so does the builder. I would add, so does the Royal Air Force and the Secretary of


State for Air. There is always keen competition for the flat, level land which is well drained and which happens to produce the best crops, particularly arable crops, and such land is found in the Eastern Counties. The Air Force find that the best strategic sites for their airfields are also in the Eastern Counties, and so we always get these two interests pulling against one another.
I believe that every hon. Member, knowing how we are threatened from overseas, would agree that we should put defence before everything else. But I would remind hon. Members that though aircraft are perhaps our first line of defence, running a very close race with them in order of importance is the food production which we must have in case of war. We know that we cannot build airfields on swamps, sand and hilltops, but for every acre of agricultural land that is taken for them about a ton of foodstuffs is lost to this country, and will probably have to be brought from overseas, and even paid for with valuable dollars.
If so much agricultural land is taken in this way, it is all the more vital to produce more crops on airfields wherever that can possibly be done. That is why I am drawing the attention of the House to this subject today. Agricultural production under the present Minister of Agriculture has vastly improved in recent years. Only the other day we were told that we now have 400,000 more cattle than a year ago, more sheep, 11 per cent, more pigs, and that our cereal production is greater than ever before.
All that is going along very nicely, but we cannot be content. On many occasions I have said that there is so much capital in the farming industry that we must make every possible use of it that we can. We cannot just let it lie idle. Not only must we make use of it, but we must keep it there in case of war, when, more than ever, we shall want homegrown foodstuffs because of the difficulty of getting supplies from overseas.
I have always been in favour of no-waste campaigns, and I have advocated in this House the better use of our common land. But we have, as well as common land, our airfields, and I think that we could do a good deal in the way of producing a little more on them than

we are doing at the moment. It is difficult to get exact figures concerning the acreage taken for airfields, but I do not think that the Under-Secretary of State for Air will contradict me when I say that it is about 170,000 acres. It is also difficult to get exact figures about how much of the land used for airfields is under cultivation. I understand that the figure is about 80,000 acres, or, roughly, 50 per cent. That is the figure which the Under-Secretary of State gave in reply to a Question last year.
A 50 per cent, use of our airfields for production is not enough, and I ask my hon. Friend to look into this. Not only should more of this land be under agricultural production, but that which is already under production should be made to produce more. In reply to a Parliamentary Question just over a year ago, the Under-Secretary of State for Air said that this subject was being examined very carefully, that the President of the Airfield Board and the Ministry of Agriculture were getting together in an endeavour to solve this problem. I have never seen any report on this matter, and I do not suppose that any has ever been produced. If possible, I should like my hon. Friend to say whether this body is functioning. Is it a committee or just the Minister of Agriculture, or who is it? What have they done, because there seems to be much to be discussed between the two Ministries?
I wish to make some suggestions which might be useful to that committee. First, with reference to airfields that are in everyday use. I think all hon. Members will agree that for obvious reasons it is very difficult to have arable crops growing on airfields, and to have cattle or sheep grazing on them owing to the danger to landing aircraft. It is even difficult to have hay crops on them. But I am not quite certain that all those reasons are completely obvious, because aircraft are much heavier than they used to be.
They are meant to land on concrete runways, and, provided a margin of error is allowed for on each side, I am not sure that the Under-Secretary could not have more crops of wheat and oats growing on airfields. I do not think it would be so seriously dangerous to any aircraft that did not happen to land exactly on the runway. Indeed, such a crop might act as a buffer. I am not technically


expert on that point, never having flown an aeroplane, but it is a matter which might be considered.
For the purpose of my argument, I am going to suppose that these arable crops are not very suitable for planting on airfields. That being so, the obvious solution, is, of course, grass drying. Short young grass is the kind that is liked for airfields, and it is also liked by the grass driers. Hon. Members will realise that grass drying requires a lot of expensive machinery. That machinery includes cutters, carriers, and the actual machinery for drying the grass.
It is very difficult to get farmers to spend the necessary money at the moment because they are not given long enough leases. They are told that they can have the crop for a few months ahead. If they were given a long lease—for several years —they would then be far more inclined to put up the money for the necessary equipment.
I understand that some airfields cannot get rid of their grass. I urge my hon. Friend to see whether he cannot give the farmers in the neighbourhood longer leases in order to encourage them to supply the equipment. I am distressed at the prospect this year, because the situation regarding grass drying has changed rather drastically. Since the Government have managed to import more and varied foodstuffs, it is exceedingly difficult to sell grass cubes or grass meal for the simple reason that they have so much to compete with. I read in my farming papers only this week that there are 30,000 tons of last year's crop remaining unsold at the present time.
What is the Air Force going to do about that situation? It must get its fields cleared, and I suggest that this year it may have to lower the rent or the charge which it makes to farmers for the privilege of clearing the grass. The R.A.F. may even have to give them the grass free of charge, or even pay them to take it away. One other suggestion is that it might pay the Air Ministry to fertilise the fields. Basic slag or some other phosphatic fertiliser could be put down and would perhaps produce a better and more valuable crop, thus encouraging the farmer to get his crops from there.
If nothing is done, the situation will become serious. We shall not only have

a loss of food but the airfields themselves will suffer. The Secretary of State for Air could do quite a lot to solve this problem. He could go to the Minister of Agriculture and say, "I anticipate that we are going to have great difficulty in selling our grass for grass drying this year. Would it not be possible to add grass-drying products to the First Schedule of the Agriculture Act, 1947; in other words, to give guaranteed prices for grass products?"
I should like this to be done to help the farmers, because I know that some farmers in my constituency have set up grass-drying plants and are going to find the situation very difficult in the future. The Air Minister will want to get rid of his grass, and if he can persuade the Minister of Agriculture to give a guaranteed price he will be half way to achieving what I want him to do.
The alternative, as some Socialists would suggest, would be for the Air Ministry to spend the money and do the work itself. I do not believe in that. The result probably would be a large loss, and the taxpayer would have to pay. It would be much better to guarantee the price and let the farmers do the work. This is a big problem, which concerns 20,000 acres: that is the estimate of the area used for grass drying at the moment.
To summarise, more than 50 per cent, of the land used for airfields must be cultivated. Longer contracts must be given to farmers to encourage them to undertake grass drying, and the Minister of Agriculture must enable grass drying to become a paying proposition.

Sir Richard Acland (Gravesend): Why does the hon. Gentleman object to Government money being used to make good a possible loss if it is handled by the R.A.F., while agreeing to Government money being used to give a guaranteed price in order to guarantee the farmer against any loss?

Mr. Williams: There are two different ways of doing this work, and I do not like to see Government Departments running these things. I would much rather see them encourage the farmer to do it in an efficient way by ensuring that he does not make a loss.
I want to pass on to the subject of airfields which are not used for regular flying. Some of them are only used for


week-end flying, and some are only used for exercises, chiefly in the summer months. If we are going to get the best production out of these airfields, cattle should be grazed on them when they are not in use. The arranging of this should be left to the commanding officer of the airfield, the man on the spot. This cannot be done from Whitehall. If the commanding officer were a farmer or the son of a farmer keen on farming, he would soon get the local farmers to bring their cattle on to the airfield during the week and take them back to their own holdings during the week-ends. He might make a charge of so much a beast. I believe that if some trouble were taken, farmers would use these airfields when they were short of grass.
In the case of airfields which are used for exercises, arrangements could be made for the farmers to have an early crop if the airfields are used late in the summer; and if they are used early in the spring the farmer could arrange for a late crop. This is essentially a job for the man on the spot, and I suggest that the Undersecretary should give instructions to commanding officers of airfields to see what they can do in this direction, to plan ahead and, wherever possible, to fit in grazing whenever these airfields which are not used regularly can be used for this purpose.
Then there are airfields which are not used at all for flying, and there is a considerable number of these. These airfields are really in reserve in case of war, and we must have a full-blooded farming policy with no restrictions whatsoever. Here again, it is essential that long leases are given to the farmers. Of course, there might have to be a proviso that the airfields should be returned at once in the event of war, but I do not think any farmer would object to that because he would receive suitable compensation.
If the Air Ministry finds that it is unable to let its land, I suggest—and here I am going a little near a method that I was not very keen on just now—that in this case the Air Ministry might become landlord. A very good job was done at a place called Overton Heath near Marl-borough. There was a former aerodrome of 238 acres. The agricultural executive committee and the Commissioners of Crown Lands got together and spent £5,000 on it, which worked out at about

£21 an acre, and they converted all the huts, hangars and other places on the airfield into good farm buildings and cottages. I feel that was a job well done.
Where the Air Ministry is unable to let its own airfields, it might consider spending a little money on converting them. Some of them are used for storage. In that case the Air Ministry might be able to find somewhere else to store the contents so that the hangars can be converted into farm buildings.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton (Brix-tori): Has the hon. Gentleman any figures to show how many of these disused airfields or hangars are already choc-a-bloc with grain which the Ministry cannot sell?

Mr. Williams: I said "if possible." If storage can be found somewhere else, so much the better. There are many instances where that cannot be done, and in that case the Air Ministry should try to let out the land as best it can without the buildings.
To sum up, I want the Under-Secretary to look into this problem of airfields which are used only occasionally, to give instructions that these arrangements should be made locally and that wherever possible stocks should be grazed there when the airfields are not being used for flying. The airfields never used for flying should be let out on long leases to encourage good farming. They should be converted for farming and the stores removed where possible.
I want to make one last plea to the Under-Secretary to see the Minister of Agriculture and discuss the matter of a guaranteed price with him. Since the Conservative Government came into office, the Government Departments have worked with a far better team spirit than before. There is not the jealousy in the Departments that there used to be. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will persuade the Minister of Agriculture to give a guaranteed price for dry grass cubes and meals. He will thus be helping not only the farmer but himself as well.

7.39 p.m.

Sir John Barlow: I beg to second the Amendment.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ton-bridge (Mr. G. Williams) has pointed out the necessity for increasing agricultural


production, especially from airfields. We are all familiar with the necessity of increasing exports from this country to buy the food and raw materials we have not here and cannot produce here. We have to buy a large quantity of wheat and meat abroad, quite apart from other things; also animal feedingstuffs. If by producing more animal feedingstuffs in this country we can reduce the amount we have to import, or produce more cattle and especially more wheat, that will be of real help towards our balance of payments problem. During the war we were only too familiar with the necessity for increasing agricultural production, but I sometimes think that in these days of peace we rather forget the urgency with which we grew food of every kind during the war.
Probably this country enjoys the best grazing in the world, with the possible exception of New Zealand. In the summer most farmers are embarrassed by the vast amount of grass available in the lowlands and on the marginal land, and on the hill farms as well. Our great problem is to produce winter feed for the cattle when there is little or nothing outside for them, and here the airfields can make a very valuable contribution.
As my hon. Friend said, the R.A.F. fields probably amount to about 170,000 acres, of which, I imagine, about half are let to farming of one kind or another. I believe that the Under-Secretary of State realises the importance of this, because I learn from reports I have had from many quarters that the co-operation between station commanders and farmers is very great. However, we must remember that the supervision of production of food is only a small sideline of the station commander. It is not his main purpose, and we wish tonight to emphasise that side of his duties.
It is difficult to get accurate information about the amounts of crops produced on the different airfields. The only figure I have been able to find is that about 20,000 acres are let for grass drying and that they produce some 35,000 tons of grassmeal or grass nuts a year. Some people may say we ought to have more information about other crops, but I would emphasise the fact that the farmers have suffered for many years from the enormous number of forms they have had

to fill up, and I would assure the House that they do not wish for any more.
It is because grass drying is so important and offers such immense possibilities that I would say a few words about it now. About 35,000 tons of grassmeal are produced on the airfields of the R.A.F. That is a very important contribution, as will be better understood when it is realised that the production in the whole country is probably only 224,000 tons. This industry has grown very rapidly. Its output amounted to only 60,000 tons in 1947, produced by 250 units. That has grown to 224,000 tons in 1952, produced by 800 units.
Airfields are particularly suited to grass drying because they usually have fairly large expanses of grass altogether, and the grass can be collected and dried very near to the site of production, which is a very important consideration. There are, generally speaking, three alternatives in the conservation of grass. My hon. Friend mentioned the possibility of hay, but that is not applicable to airfields. There is the possibility of silage making, but that is too heavy, too bulky and too costly to move after it has been made.
Dried grass, however, does offer very great possibilities. It retains about 80 per cent, of the nutriment it had in its grass form, which compares with only about 20 per cent, retained by hay. That gives some idea of the immense food value of this feedingstuff. Probably the normal output of fairly good grass would be at the rate of about 50 cwt. an acre with 17 per cent, protein content. That would give about 8 cwt. crude protein per acre, which is very high indeed. Wheat, barley and oats, with their straw, give about 3 cwt. or 4 cwt. crude protein per acre. It will be seen that dried grass gives more than twice the crude protein per acre compared with other crops.
There are three types of airfield the R.A.F. have at the present time. The first category is fully operational, where it is obvious that only a comparatively small acreage could be let off for grass drying. Then there is the third category of satellite airfields which are used at weekends or for occasional landings. Of those, probably a fairly substantial amount of land could be let. Then there is the fifth category, of airfields which, I am told, are entirely let off for agriculture at the present time. It is the


second and third categories that undoubtedly offer great possibilities.
As regards the value of this land, I am told that the R.A.F. lets the operational airports at the rate of about £1 per acre and the non-operational airports, that can be farmed in a more general way, at the rate of £2 an acre. If the R.A.F. does not let the grass for cutting, the stations have to do it themselves, and instead of receiving £1 an acre rent they are put, I am told, to a cost of about £6 an acre to cut it themselves; and, of course, the grass is not saved, so there is no set-off against the expense. I am also told that on airfields from which jet planes are flown there is a danger of fire if the grass is cut and left on the ground. It may be that in the future land unlet, and cut at the expense of the station, will cost very much more than £6 an acre, if the station cuts the grass itself.
I hope that, if it is difficult to get people to take this land for grass drying, the Under-Secretary will see that by some means it is put to a productive purpose. It is most essential that we should have food from these airfields. I suggest that the Minister considers giving longer leases. In some cases this would lead to the provision by the farming community of fencing, water supplies and equipment which it is not worth while doing at present.
I urge the Under-Secretary to take a personal interest in this matter, because I feel that the Royal Air Force can make a big contribution towards increasing the supply of feedingstuffs for our livestock. If he could instil into the minds of station commanders a personal interest, it would be most helpful, and he would be doing a national service.

7.51 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire): I am sure that all hon. Members who represent big agricultural constituencies are very much indebted to the hon. Members for Tonbridge (Mr. G. Williams) and Middleton and Prestwich (Sir J. Barlow) for having moved the Amendment. Hon. Members who represent agricultural constituencies can be very formidable on matters of agricultural policy, but they are apt to forget that they must keep a very vigilant eye on other legislation as well.
I am disappointed that neither the Minister of Agriculture nor his Parliamentary Secretary is here to support us in what must be a challenge to the Service Ministries. I do not know about England, but certainly in the case of Scotland I have a feeling that the responsible Minister is far too weak, timorous and hesitant in defending farming interests against the Service Ministries. This applies especially to the Army, not so much to the Navy, but certainly to the Royal Air Force.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): The hon. Member will be in order so long as he limits his remarks to the Royal Air Force.

Mr. Hughes: I shall certainly do so, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I shall deal with the agricultural position in the case of the other Services on the appropriate Estimates.
This is a very important matter as it affects the farming community, especially in Scotland, where we have a very large acreage of agricultural land which, from the point of view of agriculture, has become sterilised because of the extortionate demands of the Service Ministries. The Service Ministries have enormous powers and can grab land. It is true that there is the formality of some kind of inquiry, but the farmers and the agricultural community know that when they are up against the Service Ministries they are up against all-powerful people who have the final say.
The two hon. Gentlemen opposite have performed a very useful service in stating the claims of agriculture and farming as against the demands of the Air Ministry. The hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich described most authoritatively how land could be better used.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must point out to the hon. Member that the Amendment does not deal with the claims of agriculture as against the Air Ministry. It is concerned with better use being made of airfields for agricultural purposes.

Mr. Hughes: I humbly accept your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was merely following what I thought had been the argument of the two hon. Gentlemen who have spoken. I certainly believe that these airfields could be more usefully employed in the interests of the nation by growing more food, even if for the time


being they are in the hands of the Air Ministry.
I wondered just where the two hon. Gentlemen were getting to when they were advocating that the Air Ministry should use the land for the purpose of growing more crops. I am not so sure that the development of airfields for agricultural purposes is the best method of bringing about nationalisation of the land. However, I certainly agree with the argument that the land would be better used in the interests of the nation if it were employed in growing more food instead of being used for the various activities of the Royal Air Force.
The farmers in my constituency are very anxious that this land should be developed. We have in Ayrshire three examples of land under the auspices of the Air Ministry which is not being properly developed.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If the land about which the hon. Gentleman is talking is under the auspices of the Air Ministry, that is all right, but I am afraid that the hon. Member is straying rather far afield.

Mr. Hughes: I am still dealing with the airfields, and I presume that, having heard the point of view of agriculturists on the other side of the House, I am entitled to put the point of view of the farmers of Ayrshire. The debate can, of course, be circumscribed within very narrow limits, and if I am to be circumscribed within the narrowest of narrow limits, I shall not be able to put the point of view of my constituents.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman certainly is circumscribed by the terms of the Amendment. He cannot, therefore, put the general point of view of his constituents about agriculture in this debate but must await another debate.

Mr. Hughes: I was not developing the sort of argument that I should develop in the course of an agricultural debate. I was leading up to the view which prevails in the farming communities of Ayrshire about three very important airfields, Prestwick, Heathfield and Turnberry.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. John Profumo): The hon. Gentleman put down a Question the other day to my hon. Friend about Prestwick.
I presume that he did so without realising that it comes under the Ministry of Civil Aviation and not under the Air Ministry. It is not a Royal Air Force airfield. The Amendment deals with the Royal Air Force and not with civil aviation.

Mr. Hughes: That has absolutely nothing to do with the matter. The Question about Prestwick dealt with the—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If Prestwick comes under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, it does not come under the Air Ministry.

Mr. Hughes: If everybody were not so anxious to interrupt me, I should probably be able to explain. Hon. Members seem to feel that I am marshalling some kind of formidable argument behind an argumentative smoke-screen. My Question about Prestwick Airport had nothing at all to do with the point. This is a diversion on the part of the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. I do not know whether he realises—he ought to know it—that at the present time Prestwick Airport is a base at which American Air Force personnel operate, presumably under the auspices of the Air Ministry. Does the Minister challenge my statement that there are American Air Force personnel at Prestwick?

Mr. Profumo: I merely thought, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you might wish me to point out to the hon. Member that the Amendment deals with the Royal Air Force and the Air Estimates and that Prestwick Aerodrome comes under the Ministry of Civil Aviation. I was waiting to see whether the hon. Member developed his argument within the realms of the Royal Air Force and not within the realms of civil aviation.

Mr. Hughes: I presume the Minister knows that the American Air Force personnel are there. If the Minister does not know they are there, I can assure him that they are there.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It does not appear to me to matter whether they are there or not. We are concerned here with the agricultural use of airfields which are under the jurisdiction of the Air Ministry.

Mr. Hughes: I am painfully and tortuously trying to get to the point,


which is that the R.A.F. have control of a certain part of Prestwick Airport which is being used for American military operations when it could be more advantageously used for the benefit of agriculture in Scotland. Will you tell me, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether I have reached the right spot now?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: As I understand it, and as I pointed out to the hon. Member, Prestwick comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Therefore we are not concerned with it on this Vote. We are concerned with those airfields which come under the jurisdiction of the Air Ministry, and with the agricultural use of the airfields, and with no other agricultural purpose.

Mr. Hughes: It remains a mystery to me. Are the American personnel there under the auspices of the Ministry of Civil Aviation or of the Air Ministry? We have a Minister who should know something about it.

Mr. Ward: The small American detachment there come under the Air Ministry—[hon. members: "Hear, hear."]—but the Ministry of Civil Aviation is responsible for the maintenance of the airfield.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If it is true that the airfield comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, it clearly cannot be dealt with under this Vote and under this Amendment.

Mr. David Renton: If the airfield is under the control of the Air Ministry but is occupied by the United States forces, may we assume that it is within the terms of this Amendment?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Yes, if it is controlled by them. I rely for my information upon what the Minister said, and if the fact is that the airfield is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, then it does not arise on this Amendment. If it is under the jurisdiction of the Air Ministry, it does arise on this Amendment.

Mr. Hughes: The strategic operations involved in speaking on this Amendment are infinitely complex. I have the assurance that I am accurate in thinking that the personnel of the American Air Force are within a certain number of

square miles of Prestwick Airport. If we have now reached the stage at which the Ministry of Civil Aviation appears to be responsible, I can only deploy my arguments about the airport later in the debate.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will my hon. Friend allow me to tell him that there are British Royal Air Force officers at Prestwick engaged in meteorological work?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That has nothing whatever to do with the Amendment.

Mr. Hughes: I want to voice the apprehensions of my agricultural constituents against the encroachment of the Royal Air Force upon agricultural land, and to argue that my constituents would be infinitely relieved if the Royal Air Force evacuated these airfields and if ordinary agricultural activity were carried on in the area.
I want to move from Prestwick and to consider the possibilities of Turnberry and Heathfield, where the same controversy has arisen. Agriculture should, in the broad sense, have priority over the Royal Air Force because it is in the interests of food production in this country that airfields, or parts of airfields, should be relinquished by the Royal Air Force. That is my view, not only from the agricultural point of view but from the broad national standpoint. The R.A.F. should be ejected from the airfield, and the people who should decide whether any particular airfield is to be used in the interests of the nation and of agriculture should not be the Air Ministry but the agricultural executive committees in the counties.
I am in difficulty in putting what I thought to be a perfectly simple point before the House. If this discussion is to be narrow and circumscribed, I am sure that hon. Members did not know that when they drafted the Amendment. I am handicapped, but I can show resentment on the part of my constituents by voting for the Amendment in the Division Lobby.

8.7 p.m.

Mr. David Renton: If I were to follow closely the speech of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), I might find myself adding an epitaph to the "Comedy of


Errors"; I would be out of order and would fail. It is a little easier for me to keep in order than perhaps it was for him, because in my constituency there are a Royal Air Force command headquarters, two permanent operational R.A.F. stations, and two aerodromes under the control of the Air Ministry, which are being occupied by the United States Air Force. I hope that I shall have a little easier passage than did the hon. Member.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: We shall see.

Mr. Renton: During the war, and as a mere soldier—a somewhat flatfooted soldier—I had a very great admiration for the Royal Air Force, especially when they were in the air. It always seemed to me that, when they were on the ground, they were a little bit at sea.
I desire to place on record, from experience in my constituency in the last eight years, the fact that the position is now quite different. I would pay my tribute to the high standards of administration, as well as of efficiency and morale, of the R.A.F. personnel in my constituency from the commander-in-chief downwards. Station commanders and all ranks under them have excellent relations with my constituents. That has been largely due to the fact that station commanders have had some security of tenure in their appointments. They have been allowed to remain there a reasonable time, at least 18 months as a rule. It is very important that, as tactfully as possible, we should suggest to the United States Air Force that, if they wish to maintain the same reputation for good relations with local people, they should keep their station commanders there for a reasonable period as well.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That point seems a little too remote from the terms of the Amendment.

Mr. Renton: Like the hon. Member for South Ayrshire, I hope—it is nothing more than a hope—that I am leading up to an argument which is relevant to the Amendment. My argument is this: R.A.F. personnel are splendid at flying, but may not make good farmers. Therefore, I agree entirely with my hon. Friends' proposal, and with the methods which they have suggested should be
followed, for carrying out greater food production on R.A.F. aerodromes. A colossal acreage is concerned in this matter.
In answer to a Question which I put last May, the Under-Secretary of State for Air said that there were then 170,000 acres occupied by aerodromes in this country, and that about half of that acreage was available for cropping. That was last May. Since then the number and size of aerodromes have very considerably increased. Therefore, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Mr. G. Williams) pointed out, this is a very big problem, a large amount of land is involved and should not be wasted. It must be cropped somehow.
R.A.F. personnel cannot be expected to do this job themselves, but in the neighbourhood of most aerodromes there is no dearth of farmers to do it for them. But farmers cannot be expected to do the job with the sort of contracts which many of them have so far been given by the R.A.F. One farmer in the neighbourhood of an aerodrome in my constituency was expected to take what is, admittedly, only a few acres under an agreement by which he was subject to one month's notice. Whoever heard of trying to farm under those circumstances?
I suggest that at least one year's security of tenure is necessary, and preferably longer. If there is that degree of security of tenure, and, if it is perfectly plain—and here I differ slightly from the hon. Member for Tonbridge—that it is the farmer's responsibility, not only to crop the land, if it is a grass crop, but to do everything necessary, including the application of fertilisers, and if the county agricultural executive committee keeps an eye on the position, the R.A.F. can be left out of it. I suggest that is the best way.
If we are to have a R.A.F. organisation set up, even for distributing fertilisers, one can well imagine what will happen. Somebody will be appointed at the Air Ministry specially to supervise the job; there will be a fertiliser officer or agricultural officer in every command and group headquarters—all with their clerks, cars and telephones. Finally, at the station, some "Pilot Officer Prune," the chap who is always given the odd jobs, will be expected to see that the job is done. We must avoid that.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: There will also be a very large fertiliser department at the Air Ministry to supervise this.

Mr. Renton: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman had paid the attention to my words which I had hoped they might deserve, he would realise that I mentioned that earlier. But I have no doubt that his conversation with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire was much more engaging.
It is clear that something must be done, not only so that we may have the extra food, but also because it is very disheartening to farmers in the neighbourhood of aerodromes to see land—and land sometimes which has been taken from them—utterly neglected.
There are two types of lands which could be cultivated or cropped; and we want to keep those two types distinctly in mind. First, there is that land close to the runways which, from the technical flying point of view, has to be carefully considered, so that nothing is done on it which would endanger aircraft. The limitations on the cultivation or cropping of that land are rather severe; and it may be that, as often as not, it is a question merely of cutting the grass in due season.
But there is a great deal of land away from the runways—tucked away in corners of aerodromes, and sometimes quite close to buildings. For defensive reasons, the Royal Air Force rightly disperses its buildings; and that in itself involves waste of land. Sometimes the land is used quite rightly for playing fields, but not all of it; and land not so used could and should be cropped.
Assuming that we get plenty of land being actually cropped on R.A.F. stations, what is to be done with the crops? I would suggest something which may prove a measure of economy, especially in the first year or two of any more intensive cultivation than goes on at present. It is that crops taken from that land should be as far as possible consumed on the station itself. Like all the Services, the R.A.F. is very fond of bulk purchase contracts. That involves waste and results in the food not being so fresh when it reaches the station. I should have thought that every crop of potatoes taken from a station should be used, first and foremost, on that station. I have great pleasure in adding to the thanks already

expressed to my hon. Friends. I hope that they have sown seed on fertile ground.

8.16 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Renton) ended on a note to which I shall refer in a moment—the production of food for use on the station itself. I think we all agree that the hon. Member for Tonbridge (Mr. G. Williams) should be thanked for tabling this Amendment. I agree with most of what he has said, but I ask him to reflect for a moment on his conversion from doctrinaire Conservatism and freedom from controls to the guaranteed price of the controlled economy. To my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), I would say that if I do not follow him in and out of Prestwick it is because I am not so clever as he is. and I should get out of order.
We should examine this matter in the light of the fact that, although the Service will be 14,000 smaller in the coming year, the food bill is almost exactly the same. The way to get the maximum use of an airfield is by cultivation for the station itself. I shall deal with the other point in a moment, but that I believe to be the more important one. I have always found it a grand sight at the R.A.F. annual agricultural show to see the vegetables, fruit, etc., produced at stations all over the country and at those in the Far and Middle East.
At home and abroad some units make good use of the land and others do not. Perhaps the most remarkable farm in the Royal Air Force is at Habbaniya, in Iraq, where the desert, through irrigation and hard work, has been turned into a cool, green, lush and highly productive oasis. As the hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned in another connection, the key is the continuity of the station commander, officers and N.C. Os. interest in food production.
When I was Under-Secretary of State at the Air Ministry I used to preside at regular food production committee meetings to discuss this matter. Let us be frank about it. At first some of the air marshals were not too keen to come and discuss the problem, but gradually their view changed as it became clear that the food drive was good for morale, good for public relations in an agricultural area


to see the land being well used and was also good business. Between 1947 and 1950 the value of food produced, and sold at R.A.F. stations rose three fold—from £90.000 to nearly £250,000. I hope that the Under-Secretary can give us the latest figures, because, with a more stable Air Force than we were able to have in those years, the figures should be much better. I assume that the profits still go towards the Royal Air Force amenities on the stations.
I agree that we could use these airfields for grass drying, to a less extent for silage, and to a still less extent for cereals. They are also of some use for grazing. Grass drying is the most productive use, and the waste food of the station can be used in pig breeding and keeping. I have seen prize-winning pigs bred at Royal Air Force stations. Only a few years ago— I am not sure whether it was at the Royal Show—the Royal Air Force won a major award with, I think, a Large White.
R.A.F. stations are isolated communities of hundreds or sometimes thousands of people, and every day there is a production of swill which is admirably suited for pigs. There are so many agriculturists in the Chamber that it is not necessary for me to remind the House that a pig consumes human food, and, since all Royal Air Force cooks have not had the good fortune to be trained at Halton, some unpalatable rock cake and watery cabbage may well find its way into the pigs on the stations.
Pig breeding could be increased, and if the Royal Air Force applied to litter testing and recording one-tenth of the ingenuity which it applies to aircraft testing and instrument development it would shortly develop a true Air Force type of pig. It would not be blue, or anything like that, but it would certainly be aero-dynamic. The whole trend of production in bacon pigs is towards the long, lean and streamlined type of animal, as beautiful as the fuselage of a Comet. We should have an aero-dynamic animal, with the one difficulty that the undercarriage could never be retractable. The livestock profits go to the amenities of the station, including such things as new television sets, pianos, swimming baths and squash courts. The road to these lies through the pig sty, rather than through

any other factor in food production on R.A.F. stations.

Mr. Renton: Would the hon. Member agree that there is frequently a magnificent pig production but a complete neglect of the land on Royal Air Force stations?

Mr. de Freitas: That can be so.
I was asking the Under-Secretary if he could give figures showing whether or not the increase which occurred between 1947 and 1950 had been continued. Those figures referred not so much to pigs as to fruit and vegetables. I also said that I thought that the best possibility of food production was in pigs, and I still think so. I do not say that it should be the only activity, but it seems to afford the best opportunity for future development and for providing increased amenities for the men on these stations.

8.25 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: I wish to draw the attention of the Under-Secretary to one or two brief points. I do not suggest that officers on air stations, with their many other onerous and technical duties, should be sidetracked on to duties which are not entirely necessary, but it might be worth while drawing the attention of station commanders to the fact that where station officers have an agricultural interest or background it might be as well to appoint them, in a semi-official rôle, as agricultural liaison officers, to meet and discuss problems with neighbouring farmers and to see whether the needs of the station could be dovetailed into those of the surrounding agricultural community.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Mr. G. Williams) that it is impracticable to use the land at air stations for agriculture, but I suggest that, with an intelligent use of electric fences, quite large areas could be put to strip grazing. I would also suggest —and here I differ from my hon. Friend the Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Sir J. Barlow)—that silage could usefully be made on air stations. My hon. Friend mentioned it only very briefly. His complaint was that silage is bulky. Of course it is, but if we consider the process from the very start, the grass is cut, and it has to be carried to the pit or silo, and the problem of its carriage there is no


greater or less than that of its carriage to a grass drier, and I cannot see where the disadvantage of bulk arises.

Mr. R. T. Paget: The real difficulty is that the grass which is used on aerodromes is not juicy enough. When it is in the silo it is too dry and it does not ferment properly.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: That difficulty could probably be overcome by watering it at reasonable periods. It has also been suggested that the grass could be fertilised, which might be conducive to a growth which is more suitable for silage, but I do not want to get into highly technical arguments on that point.
Some years ago I had an interesting experience, the details of which I should like to pass on to the Under-Secretary, although it may be a little impracticable as a suggestion. On one air station that I visited there was a rich growth of grass, well cut and short, and in patches, usually along the edges of the concrete strips, there was a most remarkable crop of wild mushrooms. I was told that one of the reasons these mushrooms grew so profusely was (that foam had been used on aircraft fires and that it was rich in nitrogen. The resultant crop of mushrooms was very rich indeed. I believe that mushroom growing, although profitable, is a very chancy business, and I therefore do not suggest that the R.A.F. should go in for mushroom growing on a large scale.
Air stations are not necessarily permanent. The needs of defence and the strategic and tactical requirements alter, the types of aircraft in use alter, and in consequence one often finds that what was in full use as an air station a year or two ago may be out of use tomorrow. Where this occurs, one of the greatest difficulties for farmers is the rehabilitation of the land.
Naturally, there must be concrete strips and concrete bases for the hangars, and no doubt other large areas have to be concreted for large buildings where heavy weights are carried on the ground, but there are a great many ancillary buildings which have these massive concrete bases but which I am quite sure do not need them. Someone in the Air Ministry responsible for the design of these air stations could consider this aspect of the matter, which is only a small

aspect. I am sure that many of the smaller buildings could be made with a more portable form of flooring which could easily be removed when the need for the buildings comes to an end.
Those are the only points which I wanted to cover, apart from the fact that the Air Ministry is getting into great difficulties over the length of the leases offered to farmers for the land on air stations. I should like to underline that point, which has been mentioned by other hon. Members.

8.32 p.m.

Mr. Archer Baldwin: I want briefly to call my hon. Friend's attention to the great need of storage for grain. We want an immense storage capacity ready to take the grain with which the combines are flooding the market, and in almost all corn-growing areas there are large hangars which are entirely disused, which have good concrete foundations and which could be converted into storage at very little cost.
I have already had correspondence with my hon. Friend about an airfield in my part of the world. A neighbouring farmer, a former colleague in the House, wants to buy one or two of the hangars to convert into grain silos. I am sorry to say that from the answer I have had so far it appears that these hangars will be sold away from the aerodrome. I suggest to the Under-Secretary of State that he should give further thought to this matter and see whether he cannot respond to the application which my former colleague has made to me, asking me what I can do to help him to get one or two of the hangars.
Such hangars would certainly be of great use to the agricultural community. They would also help the Chancellor of the Exchequer considerably, because if he has to make deficiency payments for grain, based on the price which it will realise when grain is poured on lo the market in the autumn, then the claim on the Exchequer will be very large. If the grain could be stored in hangars on these aerodromes, it could be held off the market, not only at a profit to the farmer using the hangars, who will get a difference of £5 a ton from harvest to harvest, making it worth while to store the grain, but also at a profit to the Exchequer, for the higher the price the farmer gets the lower will be the


demand on the Exchequer. I hope the Under-Secretary of State will give this matter consideration.

8.34 p.m.

Mr. Ward: My hon. Friends the Members for Tonbridge (Mr. G. Williams) and Middle ton and Prestwick (Sir J. Barlow) have raised a matter of interest to every hon. Member, but particularly of interest to those with agricultural constituencies and interests and those who have airfields in their divisions. Before I deal with the detailed points which have been raised in the debate, perhaps I may be allowed to speak generally for a moment or two. There appears to be two quite separate propositions to consider. First, that the Air Ministry should keep to the minimum the amount of good agricultural land which we take for airfields, and, secondly, having taken such land, we should make the best possible agricultural use of it.
I can assure the House that we take the greatest possible care when planning the development of an airfield or the extension of an airfield to keep our demands as low as we can. To ensure this, we work all the time very closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, the county agricultural executive committees and all the national and local agricultural interests.
During the war, when most of our airfields were developed, we had a liaison officer from the Ministry of Agriculture permanently attached to the airfields board to ensure that, in so far as Service needs allowed we did not put airfields m areas of special agricultural value. Of course, we are not entirely free to go where we like. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge pointed out that the deployment of our airfields is based very largely on strategic and tactical considerations, and many of them are centred in the Eastern counties, which contain much of the best agricultural and arable land in the country.
After the war, when we were sorting out the airfields, we gave up those of most value to agriculture, and the officer from the Ministry of Agriculture, to whom I have referred, was still available to us. Now, although we have not a full-time liaison officer, the Ministry of Agriculture has appointed a member of its

Department to whom all new airfield projects are referred in the very earliest stages of planning so that the agricultural interests, including any disturbance of the established agricultural pattern, can be fully covered from the start. To go a stage further, as soon as it becomes clear that we no longer need an airfield which we are using, we dispose of it, and those grass airfields which are not State owned are derequisitioned. We make a point of taking as little land as we possibly can and of holding on to it only as long as we really must.
At this point, it may be as well to have a look at exactly how much agricultural land we control. The latest figures, up to the end of 1953, show that about 176,000 acres of airfield land are still in the use of the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force. These figures exclude land which is not strictly airfield land but which is used for some other purpose, such as ranges. This land is generally not very good agricultural land, and most of it is only useful for sheep-running.
Turning to the second proposition-that having taken the land we should make as much agricultural use of it as possible—of these 176,000 acres about 93,000 acres, or rather more than half, are available for agricultural use. Forty-one thousand five hundred acres are available for unrestricted agricultural use, 26,000 for grass farming, 23,000 for grass drying only and 2,500 for unit farms and gardens. The balance of 83,000 acres cannot be used for one reason or another. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge did, I think, feel that this acreage was rather too high and that we might be able to make better use of it.
Most of the 83,000 acres is not used for very good reasons. For instance, the land may be paved for runways, taxi tracks or hardstandings. It may be covered with buildings or hangars, or it may lie in positions which it is impossible to farm regularly without danger to aircraft or interruption to the flying programme; or it might be the sort of land which is unsuitable for agriculture- for example, heathland.
For airfields in full flying use, the Ministry of Agriculture, as several hon. Members have mentioned, regards grass drying as the most practicable agricultural


proposition. My hon. Friend the Member for Middleton and Prestwich mentioned the figure of 35,000 tons of dried grass a year. I do not recognise this figure, and I do not know where my hon. Friend got it from. The 1953 production of dried grass from Royal Air Force airfields was a little over 17,000 tons.
From the Air Ministry point of view, grass drying is most suitable, because in any case we should have to keep the grass cut ourselves. As the cutting is done under the direction of the air traffic controller, the interference with flying is very little, if at all, greater than it would be if we did the job ourselves by normal maintenance of the airfield surface.
We would, therefore, like very much to extend the amount of grass drying which is done on airfields, and we would like also to help the grass drying industry, which, as my hon. Friend pointed out, is passing through a difficult period. The plant, however, is expensive and the demand uncertain. It has been very poor lately because of the long spell of mild weather up to Christmas, which prolonged the normal grazing season. Therefore, it is not easy to extend grass drying at airfields or even to let the land which was can make available for this purpose.
We let the land at low rates varying between £1 and £3 an acre, according to the quality, and we have tried to give operators a better security of tenure by giving fairly long contracts of up to five years. Hon. Members have talked about leases. Of course, there is no question of a lease. All that the dryer needs is a contract allowing him to come on to Air Ministry land to fertilise the grass and to cut it. We have now tried to extend the contracts for this to at least five years.
There is not much more that we can do to help, because, as has been pointed out, grass drying on airfields is only part of the grass drying as a whole, and any help which would be given to the industry would be done on a national basis. For example, guaranteed prices would not be a matter for the Air Ministry. But I give my hon. Friend the assurance that I shall discuss this matter with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture and get his views on it.
Ever since 1941, all station commanders have had instructions to make available for agriculture all their land which

is outside the area covered by paving or buildings or which, possibly, is sterilised by flying or other operational needs. Both ourselves and the Ministry of Agriculture keep a close watch to see that these instructions are complied with.
In case there was any doubt, in 1952 and again in 1953 a special survey was made by my Department in collaboration with the Agriculture Departments. The survey that we carried out covered two aspects: first of all, the general principles governing the agricultural use of airfields; and, secondly, it examined in great detail the agricultural use made of each airfield under the Ministry. It was agreed at that time that ploughing, which until then had been forbidden within the perimeter of an airfield used for flying, could be allowed within a limited number of selected areas.
It was also found that by some modifications to flying instructions we could reduce in some places the width of the grass safety margin to runways and perimeter tracks. Safety margins differ with commands, and I will not weary the House with them, but we have been able to achieve some modification, although that has been in special cases. In this way we did achieve slightly fuller use of land, but in spite of this exhaustive survey only a few hundred acres more were found available for agricultural use, showing, I think, that we were not wasting farm land.
So far I have dealt with airfields in flying use and only land within the perimeter track of such airfields. That leads me to consider airfields which are not in regular flying use and land outside the perimeter tracks. Airfields not in regular use are mainly used for storage purposes, and we have allowed unrestricted cultivation on all but paved areas except where the stores are explosive. Clearly we must have consideration for the regulations dealing with these stores. We cannot remove the paved areas; it is precisely because they are there that they are useful to us for storage, and also the cost of moving them would be out of all proportion to the value of the land that would be restored to agriculture by so doing.
We have removed all the restrictions possible on land outside perimeter tracks, and they are now limited only to restrictions needed to guard against fire risk


from the blast of jet engines, which are as much in the interests of the farmer himself as of the Royal Air Force. But there are inevitably bits and pieces of awkwardly shaped land outside the perimeter tracks but within the unpaved area which would be quite uneconomical for ordinary commercial farming. This land we use for the unit farming and gardening scheme. I was glad to hear the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas), who took a close personal interest in it when he was at the Air Ministry, mention this scheme.
Although the acreage used in this way is small compared with the total area used for agriculture, it is intensively cultivated and produces fine results. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Renton) said that although the Royal Air Force were splendid flyers they were not good farmers, but when I have given him the figures of what we produce he may be induced to change his view. There are now about 150 farms covering 2,500 acres in all, and the latest figures for a full year are as follows: in 1952 12,600 pigs, 6,700 tons of vegetables, 25,000 dozen eggs, 4,800 head of poultry and 530 tons of grain were produced. Really I do not think the Air Force are such bad farmers.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: That is the best they have done yet.

Mr. Ward: In 1953 we expect to do even better.

Mr. de Freitas: Could the hon. Gentleman give a figure of the approximate value?

Mr. Ward: No, I do not think I can, but a Question on that could be put down on the Order Paper, of course.
We do not use land for unit farms which can be let to farmers. Units pay rent for their land to the Air Ministry and, as the hon. Member for Lincoln said, they finance their farms from non-public funds. Labour is provided either by civilians who are paid from non-public funds, or by airmen employed outside their normal working hours. Some units may employ an airman as a supervisor, in which case non-public funds bear the extra cost of his paid acting rank or they may employ a special civilian.
Apart from their contribution to home food production, unit farms and gardens contribute largely to the welfare of the Royal Air Force. They provide fresh food for the station, and the proceeds of the produce sold off the station help considerably with the financing of station activities. As the hon. Gentleman said, the Royal Air Force Horticultural Show and the Annual Competition show that these unit farms and gardens reach a high standard.
Finally, I was asked to see what could be done to bring into cultivation some marginal land on airfields such as scrub and heathland. I am afraid that there is no money available from Air Votes purely for agricultural improvements, and all we can do is to make the land available to anyone who cares to improve it.
One hon. Member raised the question of safety and the use of land for wheat near runways. Unfortunately, corn crops grow too high for safety, and even grass must be kept down to four inches. Corn crops would grow over two feet in height and that would constitute a hazard to flying. In addition, land for cereals must be ploughed and this would be unacceptable; and there is a fire risk when the straw is drying.
My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon said that although the R.A.F. were splendid in the air, they were a bit at sea on the ground—

Mr. Renton: That was the impression they gave during the war, but I added that they seem to be much better now.

Mr. Ward: It surprised me a little to hear that the Royal Air Force had flying boats as far inland as Huntingdon.
My hon. Friend raised the question of long leases for farmers. Of course they would like a tenancy rather than a licence for less than a year. We give some tenancies and if possible we shall give more, but we cannot do that where we are not the freeholders. There are other difficulties. If a farmer has a tenancy we cannot control his tenancy as we may need to, and he would acquire rights to compensation if we took back possession. We are, however, looking into the matter. If we can give more tenancies we shall do so.

Mr. Renton: The point is not only the length of the agreement or the tenancy.
but the length of the notice to quit. I mentioned that there are some contracts under which the notice to quit is only one month and that is quite hopeless from the fanning point of view. I asked my hon. Friend to see to it that the notice to quit should always be a much longer one.

Mr. Ward: I will look into that point. I have not had a chance to look at it yet, but I think that my hon. Friend was right and that we do give short notice.
The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) spoke about an airfield. I am sorry that I cannot answer for Prestwick, because the maintenance of it is a matter for the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, but I assure him that my right hon. Friend takes as much interest in that matter as we do and is just as keen on it.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Will the hon. Gentleman clear up one point? The American Air Force is presumably at Prestwick. Is it there under the auspices of the Minister of Civil Aviation? Where does his Ministry come in?

Mr. Ward: The point is which Minister is responsible for the maintenance of the airfield, and this case is not one for my Department. It does not mailer whether we have a detachment on the airfield or not. We are not responsible for its maintenance. The hon. Member did not name a Royal Air Force airfield in Scotland in the course of his speech, and therefore I have difficulty in answering him, but I do not think that Scotland is as badly off as England in the matter of land taken for airfields. Certainly Ayrshire is not as badly off as Kent, for example, and Turnberry, which the hon. Member mentioned, has been de-requisitioned.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) spoke of liaison between commanding officers and local farmers. Whenever I have visited airfields I have always found that the relations between the commanding officers and the farmers have been excellent. The commanding officers have gone out of their way to establish liaison with the local farmers and indeed they have been encouraged to make the best possible agricultural use of a station. The best way to do that is to keep on friendly terms with the farmers and therefore I think that my hon. and gallant Friend can be reassured on that point.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leo-minster (Mr. Baldwin) spoke of the storage of grain and referred to a hangar which an ex-colleague of ours wanted. Although we could not make that particular hangar available, we gave him Information from which he should be able to obtain another.
I have now been able to arm myself with the value of agricultural produce for which the hon. Member for Lincoln asked. The value of the food grown in 1952 on farms and gardens was £403,000.
I very much welcome this debate, and I assure the House that my noble Friend is as keen as any hon. Member that the Royal Air Force should take as little and as possible from agriculture and should make the best possible use of it.

9.0 p.m.

Sir Richard Acland: It is the greatest impertinence on my part to rise at all, as I have not been in the Chamber during the greater part of the discussion, but, just as I was coming in a few moments ago, I heard the Minister making a statement which was so contrary to the actual experience I have had in my constituency that I felt moved to rise to make a few points in contradiction of what he said.
The point which the hon. Gentleman was making, if I understood him correctly, was that whenever the Air Ministry finds that it has a little land which is requisitioned and of which it is no longer in need, no one could be in a bigger hurry and scurry to get rid of it and derequisition it. In relation to that claim, my experience with regard to Gravesend airfield is a little interesting and, I think, instructive. I understand that the airfield at Gravesend performed a very useful service during the war. An aeroplane or two may have landed some time between the middle of 1945 and the present day, but for all practical purposes, it is true to say that it is unused.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not know whether the hon. Baronet has looked at the terms of the Amendment. They deal with the use made by the Air Ministry for agricultural purposes of land which it holds.

Sir R. Acland: That is the very point I am making. Sir Rhys.
All the time, because of the failure to derequisition land so promptly as the


Minister has been suggesting, this land. or such parts of it as were not derequisitioned earlier than when I became the Member for Gravesend, has been put to use which has been much less than its agricultural value. I hope that my story is not irrelevant to this subject. The land was completely useless as an airfield for two and a half years. Yet, in the very first "surgery hours" which I attended in my constituency in 1947, two brothers came to see me to ask if I could get a bit of the land back from the Ministry for them to farm it. I said that of course I would write the letter, although honestly I could not expect results.
I shall paraphrase the reply, but I think I could find the actual letter and it would be found that I am not distorting it at all. I got a letter from the Air Ministry saying, "Tut, tut, we never knew that we had this piece of land. We will derequisition it." That was done in about two weeks' time. That bit of land, I am glad to say, has been producing marvellous crops ever since.

Mr. Ward: It has been pointed out that this Amendment deals with the agricultural use of airfields. The hon. Member has just admitted that we derequisitioned all the agricultural part of Gravesend airfield some time ago. The on'y part that is not derequisitioned, I think he will agree, is covered by buildings and could not be cultivated.

Sir R. Acland: The Minister has only heard the first part of the story.
The next part of the story was in 1949, or it may have been in 1950. Two boys came to see me because they wanted to fly model aeroplanes and had found a nice big empty space where they thought they could fly them. But they were turned off because this land was requisitioned by the Air Ministry. Some officials told them to get off. They asked me to write a letter to get this land derequisitioned. I wrote the letter and, lo and behold, the Ministry came back with the same reply, "Oh dear me, we have still some of this requisitioned land. We will get it derequisitioned as quickly as possible." It was derequisitioned in about four or five weeks.
I consider these to be perfectly proper activities of mine. After all, when asked

by a Constituent to see if some land can be derequisitioned which could quite usefully be derequisitioned, one ought to try to do something for the constituent. It so happened that both these actions on my part, and the consequent actions of the Ministry, were to the detriment of an engineering firm with premises in the near neighbourhood. So here is the curious ending of the story. This very firm came to me only a fortnight ago and asked if I would help them by writing a letter to the Ministry to ask for the derequisitioning of the last little bit of the land which has not been used for Air Force purposes for nearly nine years.
It is true that a great part of this land is covered by buildings which would have to be sold, demolished or taken away before it could be again used for agricultural purposes. But again I received the same reply from the Ministry—"Oh dear me. We did not know we had this land under requisition. We are so glad that you have brought it to our notice, and now that you have done so, we shall be glad to derequisition it."

Mr. Ward: I really cannot allow the hon. Baronet to get away with that one. He knows very well that we have been negotiating with the owners for some time. The difficulty is that we cannot agree upon a price. That is all.

Sir R. Acland: If serious negotiations have been going on for nine years, I suggest it is a little strange that, only three weeks after the Air Ministry receives my letter, it takes the obvious step of putting up the buildings for auction to see what price they will fetch. I cannot accept the story that the Ministry has been negotiating for nine years and then, by a coincidence, has reached this decision within three weeks after the factory owner asked me to take steps to get the last bit of land derequisitioned.
I would invite the Minister to get some ferret to go through his files to see if there are any other similar cases where land is still requisitioned because no one has taken the trouble to write to his Member of Parliament asking him to investigate the matter and to get it put right.

Mr. G. Williams: In view of the very great care with which my hon. Friend has gone into the whole question, and the consideration which he has given to it,


for which we are extremely grateful, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Hon. Members: No.

Amendment negatived.

Main Question again proposed.

9.8 p.m.

Wing Commander Eric Bullus: I am glad that there is no necessity for me to follow the remarks of the hon. Baronet the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) particularly as I am anxious to present my own arguments, and, if possible, to beat the time of the previous eight speakers on the Estimates, who each spoke for more than 11 minutes.
At the outset I should like to congratulate my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State on the way in which he has introduced the Estimates and for the attention which he gives to the many points put to him by right hon. and hon. Members. It is no easy matter to sit alone, without the assistance of the senior Air Minister, to make three speeches in a single debate on these Estimates and to pilot them through the House. I was impressed by the fact that last year, after making a detailed winding-up speech, he wrote to me, and no doubt to other hon. Members, to clarify and give further information about matters referred to during the debate.
It is paradoxical that, despite the rapid advancement and changes in the scientific implements for our Air Force, and despite a change in the conception of air power and methods of defence, so many of the speeches made in recent debates on the Estimates remain apposite today. I welcome the interest and emphasis now placed on the value of air power as the major force in any build-up for defence. The Statement on Defence indicated that we have a significant contribution to make to both the technical and the tactical development of strategic air power, and it also spoke of the build-up by the Royal Air Force of a force of modern bombers capable of using the atomic weapon to the fullest effect. This shift of emphasis, and the now accepted recognition of the truth of attack being the best method of defence will be applauded by all of us who have always believed in the vital necessity of building up an attacking

force capable of destroying at the source the enemy's means of offence.
Though our progress in the development of guided missiles continues, I think that for some years their necessity will be to supplement and not to supersede the piloted plane. Consequently, our system of full training of pilots is as essential as ever. In this respect I would make a passing reference to the closing of the Air Training Group in Southern Rhodesia and to the last of the civil-operated reserve flying schools. Both groups have been of inestimable value in the training of pilots, and they will be remembered with gratitude and with affection. Southern Rhodesia was for seven years a home from home for many of our pilots, and the reserve schools operated for a longer period.
Despite our shortage of pilots, we must not relax our standards. I remarked the reassuring note that the higher standard of selection has resulted in a lessening of aircraft wastage rates; and the Undersecretary of State spoke today of the necessity to maintain quality. I also welcome the recent decision to order as many as 20 of the latest supersonic fighters instead of the usual two. This will be welcomed, particularly by many of us who have been concerned at the previously slow rate of development of new types.
The Estimates as a whole this year are reassuring, with the emphasis in the right place. If they are not completely satisfying it is because it is not physically possible to go any faster. Nevertheless, I suggest that my hon. Friend and the Secretary of State have a serious responsibility to see that they secure full value for the considerable amount of money to be spent in the coming year, not only in construction and production but in the spheres of maintenance and personnel.
It is not always easy at once to secure the maximum use of new entrants to the Service, but there have been many cases in which much time has been wasted by National Service men and those called up for refresher training. There has been quite a number of cases—too many cases, indeed—of square pegs in round holes. I know only too well the difficulties. I know, too, that many allegations cannot always be confirmed, but this is a matter to which my hon. Friend must give special attention.
I am sure he will forgive me if I refer to one case which I reported to him. One of my constituents, a young man training for secretarial duties and doing a certain amount of typing, was very anxious to continue that type of work in the Service. My hon. Friend informed me that as my young constituent had not passed the necessary examination he would have to become a cook. My hon. Friend did satisfy me to the extent of saying that if this young man would, some time in the future, take another examination and was successful, he would allow him to re-muster. But the significant part of the story is that in less than a month, and before the young man could take the examination, I had a letter from my hon. Friend to say that he had already re-mustered him and allowed him to do his ordinary work because as a cook he was no good at all.
Will the Minister also consider taking as many A.T.C. cadets as possible into the Royal Air Force for their National Service? Many cadets who have not obtained their proficiency certificate by the time of their call-up have been refused by the Royal Air Force. This rejection can have an adverse effect on recruiting for the Air Training Corps, and can be discouraging to those who are doing excellent work in the movement.
I should like, in passing, to mention that No. 78 Squadron, the Wembley Borough Squadron, was founded 15 years ago yesterday—on 3rd March, 1939—and is one of the founder-squadrons. Since then more than 750 young men from Wembley and district have passed through the squadron, and another 750 have been absorbed in two other Wembley squadrons. It is interesting to note that the first squadron register includes the name of a cadet who on that first day in 1939 began an unbroken record of service which continues today. That is only one example of the value of the movement to the Royal Air Force.
Those of us who have for many years pressed for increased progress in the Royal Air Force will derive some comfort from this year's Estimates, the review in the White Paper accompanying the Estimates and the comprehensive review given by my hon. Friend May we continue on these lines, increasing the tempo of development all the time until

with the undoubted assurance of world peace, we can devote all our energies to the peaceful pursuit of modern flying and to reducing the distance of all outposts of the world to the hourly hop.

9.17 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I observe that the Under-Secretary of State for Air has gone for very well earned refreshment. I hope I may be permitted in his absence to express my thanks for the most human and most flexible way in which he has dealt with individual problems, not one but many, throughout the year. We may have—indeed, I shall have—some criticisms directed at the manner in which Royal Air Force policy has been carried out, but we can congratulate the R.A.F. upon having the good fortune to have such a competent and painstaking Under-Secretary. Indeed, it is a matter of happiness to be able to congratulate it upon its good fortune when we consider the array of Ministerial misfortunes upon the Government Front Bench at Question time.
I was very glad to hear about the £3,000 bonus scheme for officers of the R.A.F. After all, what is the national investment in a pilot officer? What sum do we arrive at by dividing the cost of Flying Training Command and its material by the number of trained pilots turned out? My guess is that the investment in each pilot is not much less than £100.000. It must be a figure of that order. Thus, we invest £100,000 in a man, and we then put him in charge of a machine which is worth at the minimum £50,000 and at the maximum several hundred thousands of pounds up to nearly the million mark. It is ludicrous to economise in getting the best material, when we are going to spend so much on it and put it in charge of vast sums. Any economy there is misplaced.
What has happened to the heavy Lincoln bombers that went to bomb Mau Mau in the Aberdare Mountains? Have they killed the Mau Mau yet? Have they killed some cows? Have they killed some monkeys? Have they killed—what? To bomb savages dispersed in mountains and forests must be the most friovolous use that has ever been made of a major heavy bomber effort.

Dr. Reginald Bennett: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. I can assure


him from recent experience that one of the main facts, a fact that is very widely recognised, is that the Lincoln bomber has chased them out of that forest, which is the primary reason for bombing them.

Mr. Paget: The Lincoln bombers?

Dr. Bennett: Yes.

Mr. Paget: It must seem one of the most staggering things. I should have thought that the competence that the Mau Mau have shown in avoiding the ground forces should have been evidence of better intelligence than to be frightened at bombs in a forest area of that sort, which must be among the minor risks of every-day life. I find it impossible to conceive that it was the heavy bombers that moved them out of those thousands of square miles of mountain and forest. It is a ridiculous suggestion, and I hope that that sort of frivolous use of air power will not be tolerated.
I come to the reference in the Defence White Paper to broken-back war. It said that we must contemplate a war which starts off with vast destruction by exchange of atomic weapons and then continues on a "broken-back scale" between devastated combatants. If I believed that, I would be with my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). He is the only man who has a sensible policy. If this is the real prognosis, no Government have the right to commit a nation to a war, the inevitable result of which, win, lose or draw, is the total destruction of the nation. Let us get this point perfectly clear. A man with a broken back cannot go on fighting, nor can a nation. Nor can this nation.
At the present moment the estimate is that the Americans certainly have not fewer than 5,000 atomic bombs vastly more powerful than those which were dropped over Hiroshima. The Russians may have anything from 150 to 1,000, and within a few years they will reach the 5,000 mark. That sort of armament means that the means of living, of importing, of moving, and feeding this country cease. Possibly the country may be recolonised, but as a continuing civilisation it ceases to exist. That is the very sort of thing which this defence policy is designed to prevent. Atomic war is its own answer.
Once both sides have an atomic power it really does not matter in the least if one is larger than the other, because each possesses a deterrent which makes it absurd for the other to invite its use. I hope, as everyone else does, that we do not come to war. If we do, I am perfectly confident that the Americans and ourselves will not be lunatic enough to invite atomic bombs to be dropped on us and that the Russians will not be lunatic enough to invite atomic bombs to be dropped on them. The protection—and the only protection—which each side will enjoy will be the capacity to retaliate— a retaliation so dreadful that neither side will dream of inviting it.
The other consequence of the atomic age seems to be that never again can we have the lunacy of total war. We cannot again talk about terms of unconditional surrender or nonsense of that sort, because neither side in an atomic war dare drive the enemy to that point of desperation at which they throw all caution to the wind and start atomic retaliation. Every war must remain limited by that tremendous threat. Future war objectives can only be limited objectives.
When I say that atomic retaliation is the only defence to atomic attack, that is surely true. Russian bombers would have to go vastly further to America, where they have, and always can have, radar screens much further out than we can. I have seen the American's assessment of the danger, and the most optimistic estimate they make is that they might be able to stop 15 per cent, of Russian bombers coming over the Pole in daylight. That is their best estimate.
I say that no realistic estimate would suggest that we could stop anything like 15 per cent, of Russian bombers coming in daylight to any target they choose in this country, and that we are not in the least likely to improve on that. We talk about air-to-ground guided missiles. We may get there, but we are not there yet. When we are dealing in three dimensions I am confident that the one trying to get through will always have an enormous advantage over the one trying to intercept. The guided missile seeking to get through will always beat the guided missile which is merely attempting to intercept. This is a field in which the offence will always keep ahead of the defence—and the defence is retaliation, and nothing but retaliation.
Faced in the strategic bombing sphere with that situation, and retaliation being the defence, a defence which is almost certain to be efficient because no one would invite retaliation upon these terms—unless a complete lunatic gets in charge somewhere, what are we really doing with these £50,000, or £60,000, supersonic jet fighters with their vast electronics and so on? No one seriously suggests they could intercept the bomber, even if it were to come. The bomber will come through.
What is the point of these fantastic machines—which, as they become faster and more efficient, become more and more useless for intervention in ground fighting—except perhaps, if they can see each other passing at that speed, to fight other and equally absurd fighters devised by the other side? These fantastic weapons are useful only against each other and, if unopposed, are able to do nothing at all.
This fighter race which is going on, with the production of faster and faster, more expensive and more electronic machines, has reached a degree of absurdity which makes it necessary for us to drop out of it and try to conceive the kind of war which alone we can prepare for. The only sort of war in which we can survive is one which is kept to tactical dimensions, and in which the atomic deterrent to the strategic use of the atomic bomb is efficient. If an atomic war arrives we are out of it; it does not matter much what we do.
What sort of weapon do we require for the ground war, fought, presumably, in Europe and Germany? In that war the atomic weapon will be used tactically. We, as a civilised nation, are bound to rely upon the superiority of our armaments if we are to survive. When I hear some of my hon. Friends talk about the desirability of universal disarmament, I always remember that if we had it the Russians would have far too many clubs. If we all disarm, the country with the most men is the one which will win a war. An industrially developed and civilised power can only survive against a more barbaric power by means of the superiority of its armaments.
Our superiority in armaments lies in the atomic field. As a tactical weapon.
the atomic bomb must be used by us in the battlefield and not in the obliteration of cities behind the lines. Many years ago a conception was included in the Geneva Convention that bombardment should be confined to a battlefield and not directed towards cities which were not under immediate assault by ground troops. It is a perfectly we'l-established distinction, and one which I have not the smallest doubt would be drawn in practice, because of the dreadful consequences to both sides, if the contrary conception were adopted.
How is the Air Force going to intervene most effectively in that sort of fighting? It will certainly not do so by having a very few prodigiously fast planes which cannot do anything on the battlefie'd. We require a vastly greater number of planes which can co-operate and fight with the Army. In the progress of a war there always comes a phase in which weapons are developed to the point where practically nobody is fighting. At that point somebody produces a new and simple weapon which enables far more people to fight. That phase has occurred in wars right through history.
In the Air Force we have developed our weapons to the point where it takes about 600 men to enable one man to fly. That is the limit of absurdity. What we ought to develop is a much cheaper and simpler aircraft—an aircraft designed not to fly up into the stratosphere, but which is highly manoeuvre-able, perhaps with some armour, and really efficient at low levels.
What we need is an Army co-operation aeroplane to act as the artillery of the Army, perhaps to act as the atomic artillery upon the battlefield, and to act as the tank breaker, too. That is the sort of 'plane which we shall need in great quantities. We shall need to be able to operate it on simple airfields and to operate it fairly close up. We shall need it to be fairly simply replaceable. That is the sort of 'plane we should be developing instead of going in for the production of so few vastly expensive 'planes which will mean that when it comes to the land battle there will be no ah- arm which can effectively intervene at all. I suggest that it is along those more realistic lines that the Royal Air Force should think rather than along


the lines of the "broken-backed" war in which we can have no interest whatever because we should not be there to take part in it.

9.36 p.m.

Mr. P. B. Lucas: I am always glad to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), whose contributions to these debates, however much I may disagree with some of them, are helpful and constructive. The speech which he has made tonight is no exception. I am also glad to be able to follow him because some of the remarks which he made are relevant to certain of the points which I want to make.
It is clear from the admirable statement with which the Under-Secretary of State opened the debate today that the factor which now dominates our defence policy is the Government's decision to build as soon as possible a force of V-class bombers. For those who, for some years now, have been advocating, both in the House and outside, the need for the establishment of a long-range strategic striking force as a prime deterrent to war, these Estimates are, I think, particularly satisfactory.
Indeed, judging from my hon. Friend's remarks this afternoon, we have come some distance, certainly on the grounds of policy, since that summer evening nearly three years ago when the then Under-Secretary of State for Air, Mr. Aidan Crawley, who is no longer in the House, told us:
The fact is that in one very large sphere— that of strategic bombing—we have planned that, for the present, the Americans should undertake almost the whole of it."—[official report, 1st August, 1951; Vol. 491, c. 1523.]
There is, I think, a little doubt that the Americans' decision after the last war to build up a strategic bomber force has been a most potent and stabilising factor in the world's balance of power. Perhaps at this point I might remind the House of some words spoken by a former United States Chief of Air Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, on 28th May, 1951:
The British Navy, which was superior at one time to all the combined navies of the world, kept the peace for a long period. It kept the United States safe, as a matter of fact, for a long time. My hope is that the United States Air Force can be built up to a point where it can do a similar job for the free nations of the world.

In view of the co-operation and association which exists between the Air Ministry in London and its counterpart in Washington, it was not particularly surprising, two days after this utterance, to find these words of wisdom re-echoed in more detail in London by General Vandenberg's opposite number at that time, Sir John Slessor. This is what he said:
I believe that British and American air power can ensure the peace of the world for another hundred years as British sea power secured it for a hundred years after Trafalgar.
It is only now, as we look back, that we can truly appreciate the effect which the United States Strategic Air Command in the hands of General Curtis Le May has had upon the world scene as a deterrent to major aggression. I am not speaking of campaigns such as Korea, but major acts of aggression.
Now that we have ourselves determined to build up a comparable, if smaller, force, it is, I think, appropriate that we should tonight remember the foresight of the one man who has never ceased to advance and advocate the principle of the establishment of a strategic arm. Three years ago I had occasion to quote to the House a letter which Lord Trenchard had quite recently written to "The Times," and I feel that, in view of what has since happened in the way of development of aircraft policy, I should trouble the House with a very short extract from it.
This is what he wrote:
The vital, over-riding defensive measure to prevent war and in the event of war, to win it, is an overwhelming, unchallengeable air force of long-range machines.
I feel that now that Her Majesty's Government have wisely and sensibly accepted the principle of this policy it is only right that we should tonight express our acknowledgments to one of the leading authors of that policy.
I have only two other brief points to make. The first concerns the presentation of the Air Force; and here I should like to say to my hon. Friend that I have been much impressed during recent months by the improvement which has taken place in the appearance and general bearing of all ranks in the Service. A few years ago—and I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr A. Henderson) will not think I am making


political capital out of this, because I assure him I am not—we used to see some officers and airmen, off duty, walking about London and looking, if I may say so, anything but a credit to the Service.
There was, I think, some excuse for that then for it was at a time when there were large numbers of personnel awaiting their release, which is always unsettling; but it was a bad and unfortunate period for the Service and, I think, did it no good. Now, I am glad to say things are much better, and I think it is only right that we should say so and that the Service should know that we think so.
Anyone who saw the rifle drill and marching at Her Majesty's Coronation Review at Odiham last summer will not deny that this was, by any standard, quite outstanding. I think that the same can be said of the squad from the R.A.F. Regiment which performed at the Searchlight Tattoo at the White City last July. This question of discipline and bearing may seem insignificant by comparison with the expenditure of millions of pounds on swept-wing fighters and V-class bombers and all the other things which the hon. and learned Member for Northampton spoke about tonight, but its importance to the Service is paramount. I have always thought that the performance and capabilities of a squadron in the air were no better and no worse than its discipline and smartness on the ground.
Secondly, with the presentation of the Air Force is linked the question of Service publicity. I had occasion to refer to this matter a year ago, and I am afraid that I had some hard things to say then. I said that I thought the Service was not putting its case, which is an excellent one, across in the way, for instance, that the Royal Navy was doing with such commendable skill.
I always admire the manner in which the Admiralty presents the Royal Navy to the British nation. It is an object lesson for the other two Services. But things are better with the R.A.F. than they were in this respect, although this question of publicity is one which my hon. Friend should watch closely in the future. It is not the amount of space which is gathered in the national Press which matters; it is the positioning of that space and its content.
I have been much interested in the photographs which have appeared in the daily Press and in the periodicals of this wonderful Royal tour of Australia and New Zealand. I have been looking at the pictures from day to day, and I have seen Army uniforms and naval uniforms. I have seen admirals and generals, soldiers and naval ratings, but I have seen very little of the Air Forces.
This may be outside my hon. Friend's province, and I do not press him for an answer tonight, but I wonder whether there was any prior consultation with the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force to see what photographic coverage could be obtained for home consumption of the Air Force representation at all these events which we have been following with so much interest. This question of publicity and representation is of great importance, particularly to the question of recruiting, which all of us have in mind, and especially for the recruiting of aircrew.
I end with a suggestion. When Her Majesty returns on 15th May, I hope that suitable arrangements will be made for the Royal Air Force and, if they are available, squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force, to stage a full-scale fly-past over London on that Saturday afternoon. If it is done, I hope the names of the formation leaders, the squadron commanders and the wing leaders will be given. This would be a mark of respect to Her Majesty which we all should welcome, and I believe that London would like to see it done.

9.47 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: I have never before sought to speak in a debate on the Air Estimates, but those who have listened to the speeches today will know that anyone in the House has a right to join in the debate whether he has technical knowledge on the subject or not, since we have been discussing matters which may affect the whole future of the human race. It may be a novelty in these debates, but it should not become a strange feature, that although we are discussing something which is obviously of supreme importance to this nation and to the whole world, it is quite possible for one hon. Member, like my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), to


make a speech and to propose one theory to deal with the situation, and then for the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas), who spoke after my hon. and learned Friend, to give a totally contradictory theory of the situation, and nobody, apparently, can notice the clash of argument that was taking place.
Although the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick said that he was intending to follow the speech of my hon. and learned Friend, he proposed that we should concentrate our efforts on a strategic bomber force and he welcomed the fact that the Government, apparently, were doing this; whereas the speech of my hon. and learned Friend revealed that this strategic bomber force was never going to be used and, in fact, we would use different kinds of weapons in a different kind of war.
I propose to come back to that main aspect of the matter presently, because I believe it is the main subject which we have the right to discuss in this debate. But there is another reason—

Mr. Paget: One way of not getting strategically bombed is to be able to bomb strategically.

Mr. Foot: Yes. There is, however, a contradiction between my hon. and learned Friend's argument and that put forward by the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick. My hon. and learned Friend then went on to argue that we must concentrate—he was not saying that we should do so entirely and spend any amount of money—on a strategic bomber force; but he said, as the main part of his speech, that we must spend a great part of our resources on the other kind of weapons which would be involved in a different kind of war.
The hon Member for Brentford and Chiswick, who followed my hon. and learned Friend, posed a quite different theory. He said that the peace of the world could be kept for 100 years by building up a superior strategic bomber force, but he did not make any reference to the other element involved. I propose to come back to that, because it is obviously the biggest argument of all with which we must be concerned in this debate.
There is a second reason why every Member of this House, whether he has

technical knowledge of the Air Force or not, has the right to take part, and that is because of the financial implication of the proposition which the Government are putting before us. One hon. Gentleman opposite said that today we are spending on the Royal Air Force a sum which is not much less than the total Government expenditure on Great Britain some 18 years ago. That is one of the dramatic illustrations of the vast sums we are discussing in these Estimates, and it certainly gives us the right to examine them in the greatest detail.
The evidence presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) of what happened in the past three years surely gives us all the greater right to scrutinise very carefully the figures which the Government put before us. My hon. Friend proved conclusively that those who made the calculation three years ago were something over £1,000 million out in the total amount which was to be spent on the armed forces. They were also many millions of pounds out in the amount which they thought at that time was required to be spent on the Royal Air Force, but which they were not able to spend during the past three years.
When we see such an enormous miscalculation which can be made in the money that is asked for and the money that is spent, we have a right to look at these figures very carefully and to protest about what I would describe as the theory of "Give them the money, Barney" in dealing with defence expenditure, because that is really what those who have defended the position of the Government have, in some respect, argued. They have said that this is a figure which has been worked out by the military chiefs, and they argue in this way: "We must accept what they have done and, of course, the Government always tell us that they have scrutinised the figures with the greatest possible care. This is the absolute minimum which is required. It is, of course, much less than the military chiefs asked for in the first place, and, therefore, we should all be satisfied." The experience of the past three years gives us the right to examine these matters in much greater detail
We have also the right to examine the general strategy which underlies the Government's policy, and we have all the


more right to do so because it is pretty evident from the debate which has taken place today and the debate which took place on the Defence White Paper that there is a big contract between the theory and the practice of the Government in this matter. The theory of the Government is concentrated on the building up of a large strategic bomber force as a great deterrent power. But even if we examine these Estimates I do not believe that that is the practice of the Government.
The hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick seems very satisfied that the Government have come down on the side of the theory which apparently he has been advocating for some years, namely, concentrating altogether on the deterrent power of the strategic bomber force. Of course, the Government have not changed the figures so much in order to carry that put, and the theory of the Government in the matter is different from the practice. It may be some years hence they will be carrying out the theory.
What I want to examine, first of all, is whether that theory is correct and where it comes from. Of course, we all know where it comes from. There has been a much greater discussion about this matter in the United States of America than there has been in this country. The first official declaration of the new theory, which is supposed to underlie the whole defence programme of this country and of the Western Powers, was made by Mr. John Foster Dulles a month or two ago in what was described in the United States as "The new look defence policy." In other words, in some places they call it "a bigger bang for the buck "—more bombs and bigger bombs for less money. The hon. Gentleman was describing exactly the same theory when he said that the peace of the world could be maintained for 100 years if only we built up sufficient offensive power in the Anglo-American Air Forces.
As I have said, this theory was expressed officially by Mr. John Foster Dulles in a speech at the beginning of the year, when he said:
The idea is to place more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local defensive power.
He went on to say:
To prevent Communist aggression we will henceforth depend primarly upon a greater

capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.
That is the theory. It may sound impertinent for me to ask it, because I am not an expert on these matters, but I want to ask whether it makes sense, because this policy is questioned not only by some of us in this House, but also by a large number of people in the United States.
Following the statement made by Mr. John Foster Dulles, when he announced this policy, opinion in the United States seemed for a few weeks at any rate to be numbed; people did not seem to realise what had been said officially on their behalf. Since then, however, anyone who has followed the debates closely will see that a considerable debate has been taking place in the United States as to whether his theory makes any sense. So before we start following this theory we should try to discover whether it makes any sense.
As some evidence of what has been said against his theory in the United States of America. I would quote first the well-known correspondent of the "New York Times," Mr. James Reston, who perhaps started the controversy on Mr. Dulles's statement in the United States by saying that it was a strategy which was potentially graver than anything ever proposed by any United States Government. He went on to argue that first it raises an important constitutional question because, if it is the policy of the United States to retort instantly with atomic power in places of the choosing of the American Government, it follows that either the President has to break the Constitution or has to go to Congress and ask whether he may have the right to drop the atomic bomb on the Kremlin. And if he did that, it might put the Kremlin on their guard and they might drop the bomb on Washington first.
It raises a considerable constitutional problem for us as well, because although in this country we give the Government power to act and have a discussion afterwards, we would keep the Government up very late at night, I hope, if they dropped the bomb and had the argument with us afterwards. Therefore, it raises a considerable issue about our control over the Government here and the control of the Americans over their Government if we


adopt Mr. Dulles's theory on the literal statement of what he said.
There has also been a considerable debate in the United States Senate on the question of Mr. Dulles's theory. A large number of senators, many of them the senators who are most friendly to this country, if I may put it that way; or the senators who are most strongly opposed to Senator McCarthy, to put it another way; at any rate, many of the most eminent senators in the United States Senate have been attacking strongly a theory which has apparently been accepted with very little criticism by Her Majesty's Government. Let me give a few examples of what has been said in the American Senate on this theory.
Senator Henry Jackson recalls that in 1949 the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, told Congress:
I do not believe the threat of the atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to war or that it will win that war … in such a way that it can be followed by a stable, livable peace.
Senator Jackson goes on to argue:
If this was true in 1949, what about massive atomic retaliation at a time when we no longer have a monopoly of nuclear weapons?
Senator Gore of Tennessee gives a concrete example of how impossible in practice it would be to apply the Dulles theory. He says:
Let us suppose, for instance, that the Communist Party in Iran, through its native Iranian leaders, suddenly attempted to seize control of the Iranian Government with an armed movement‥ Do we start dropping atomic bombs on Moscow?… Would the Administration order atomic bombs dropped on Moscow in a case of a border clash between Bulgarian and Greek troops? … If so, World War III, the very thing which we have hoped to avoid, would be upon us. If we fail to retaliate would not this big new strategy be revealed as a big bluff?
Senator Jackson asks a pertinent question about what is the attitude of America's allies towards this new Dulles theory of atomic deterrents. He asks if America's allies have been consulted on this new declaration of policy by Dulles. When the Minister comes to reply to this debate perhaps he will tell us what consultations took place prior to the declaration made by Mr. Dulles, which is accepted through the United States as being a statement of strategy of first-class importance.
American senators are asking if we have been consulted and therefore I think that we have the right in this House to ask whether Her Majesty's Government were consulted before Mr. Dulles made this new declaration of strategy, which is so obviously the reason for the Government drawing up their White Paper on Defence. I could go on quoting several Senators who took part in that debate. Senator Kennedy described the new doctrine as
A unilateral, world-wide Monroe doctrine for the atomic age.
He went on to describe how impracticable he thought the whole theory was for dealing with the real situation which faces us.
In that debate in the American Senate there was only one spokesman, so far as I could discover, who got up to defend the Dulles theory. That was Senator Knowland. His main argument was that all the difficulties into which we got in the Korean war resulted from our not being able to bomb on the other side of the Yalu River and that that was the kind of difficulty we might get into in future. He claimed that the new theory is obviously designed to deal with that situation. I am not quoting his actual words but he said we had better trust President Eisenhower, because he believed in this new theory. But it was pointed out in the debate that three years ago President Eisenhower believed in quite a different theory.
To read that debate is to have great doubts about the Dulles theory, which has been adopted so uncritically by the Government in their White Paper. Suppose that after the war we had retained the greater deterrent power which we possessed for a period during the last war, backed by the possession of the atomic bomb. Suppose we had more atomic power at our disposal, would it have enabled us to deal with any of the post-war crises with which we had to deal, for example with the situation in Persia in 1946—

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Can we take it, Mr. Speaker, that all hon. Members will be able to make the speeches on defence which they were unable to make on Wednesday, and can you tell us under which Vote this subject appears?

Mr. Speaker: I have listened to the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot),


and I thought his argument, so far as I heard it, was relevant to the question of Air Force policy and the provision of bombing aircraft, but he will understand that there are limits beyond which he is not permitted to stray in developing his argument.

Mr. Foot: I thought I was following very strictly the case which was put by the Under-Secretary when he opened the debate. The Under-Secretary referred directly to the parts in the Government White Paper which talk of "a broken-backed war"; and the broken-backed war would immediately follow, I should expect, on the application of this enormous deterrent power.
Therefore, it is really impossible to have a debate on these Air Estimates unless we are able to discuss whether it would be right for this country to adopt and to apply a new theory of the overwhelming necessity for deterrent air power, a new theory which has been discussed widely in the United States and which, from the White Paper and the Air Estimates, appears to have been adopted by this Government. I was saying in illustration that if in any of the post-war crises—Persia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Indo-China, or Korea—even if we had possessed far greater deterrent power than we did possess—we did possess during part of that period the deterrent of atomic power not possessed at that time by the Russians—and if the Air Ministry had doubled the amount of money it expended, it would not have enabled us to deal with any of those situations.
If we had dealt with any of those situations by the application of overwhelming deterrent atomic power we should have started a third world war, and in none of those cases should we have been prepared to start a third world war by launching atomic attack. Therefore, if we assume the possibility that the kind of dangers with which we shall have to deal in the next five or nine years may at any rate be similar to the kind of dangers we have had to face in the last nine years, the change of strategy and the new proposals by the Government for concentrating on atomic deterrent power are irrelevant to the situation.

Group Captain Wilcock: I think my hon. Friend is spoiling a rather good

argument by bringing in the fact that we did not or could never have used the atomic bomb to deal with incidents. The whole argument against the use of deterrent force is not to use it in incidents which occur in the world but as a deterrent against a global war.

Mr. Foot: I think that my hon. and gallant Friend has made the point that I was trying to make, so I shall go on to the next.
I do not believe that the building up of a huge atomic deterrent power is relevant to the kind of situation which we have had to face in the last five years and, to put it no higher, may not be relevant to the kind of situation we may have in the future. The question is whether we should concentrate so much on the strategic bomber force as the Government and the strategists of the Western Powers have been suggesting.
There is a different deduction to be drawn from this situation, and there are some people who are drawing it. I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton, because he asked some very pertinent questions about the relationship between our Air Force and air strategy and the air force soon to be established in Germany. It is relevant to the argument I have been putting forward, because I want to make a further comment about the deductions made by some others who look at this strategy.
There are some people who carry the argument thus far, and it is different from the argument of my hon. and learned Friend. Some people say, "If you place so much reliance on deterrent air power and discover that because of what the other side is doing you will be losing a part of that deterrent air power because they may be catching you up, there is a very powerful argument on the grounds of sheer strategy, for a preventive war." I am not saying that that is the argument of my hon. and learned Friend; I know it is not. He says that once both sides have atom bombs they cancel each other out. But, unfortunately, everyone may not be so wise and cautious in these matters as my hon. and learned Friend. There are some whose opinions he may respect. I know his opinion about German generals and he must not think that all German generals think as he does.
I would prefer his views to those of some of the German generals, and particularly the one whom I now' propose to quote, Herr Balder Zimmerman, who made a statement only a few days ago. Herr Zimmerman, who was General Zimmerman, and was chiefly associated with General von Rundstedt in the West, now has an official position in the Adenauer Government in Bonn. He has been appointed the publicist of the military manuals to be issued to the new German Army.
He held a responsible position in the last war and now he holds a responsible position in the Adenauer defence Administration. This is what he says about this problem of deterrent air power and how it may be used:
As I see it, war is inevitable and the side which strikes first with all the force of atomic weapons will win. The future lies with whoever wages a preventive war.
He goes on:
The tension between East and West will continue indefinitely and will be broken only by war It would be foolish for the West to sit idly by until Russia has accumulated the strength to defeat the West by striking first. That is why the West, if it is to defeat Russia, ought to launch a preventive war, using all the atomic weapons at its disposal.
That is a statement made by a person on Dr. Adenauer's staff who occupies an important and responsible position. He is openly advocating a preventive war.

Mr. Paget: Will my hon. Friend say where that statement was made?

Mr. Foot: The statement was made to a reporter of the "Sunday Express," a most eminent reporter.
It was printed in an article by an eminent journalist, Mr. Milton Shulman, who has written one of the best books about the Second World War and who is an expert on the subject. He quoted this sentence in an article he wrote in the "Sunday Express" last Sunday and it has not been denied. Indeed, there is some grisly logic in it—

Mr. Paget: rose—

Mr. Foot: I know that my hon. and learned Friend does not believe in it. But the argument he advances is not only in direct contradiction to the argument put forward by General Zimmerman but is directly contradictory to the argument

of Mr. Dulles and of Her Majesty's Government, because in the White Paper the Government take quite a different view from that expresed by my hon. and learned Friend. He does not believe that in a Third World War atomic bombs would be used, but General Zimmerman and Dr. Adenauer and the Government believe that atomic bombs would be used. General Zimmerman goes further and says, "Let us use ours."

Mr. Paget: I do not think it matters in the least whether General Zimmerman agrees with me or not. The question is whether he agrees with Dr. Adenauer. I am certain that what he has said is opposite to the view of the Adenauer Government, as constantly expressed.

Mr. Foot: My hon. and learned Friend can quote what the Adenauer Government believe and I can go on making quotations—

Dr. Bennett: Do I see that the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) is carrying a copy of the "Sunday Express" in his hand and quoting from it?

Mr. Foot: If that was the purpose of the hon. Gentleman's intervention, I can tell him that it is not a copy of the "Sunday Express" which I am carrying in my hand—it is a copy of the "Tribune." It quotes from an article which appeared in the "Sunday Express" last Sunday.
I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not have an opportunity to read the article, but, for some unknown reason, the editor of the "Sunday Express" removed the article after the first edition. But the hon. Gentleman can read it in the first edition of the "Sunday Express" last Sunday. If my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton will do the same, he will not only discover a great deal about German generals that he did not know before, but also about Dr. Adenauer.
In the same article there are quotations from Dr. Adenauer revealing what he said in December, 1951:
However, our chief reason for wanting to enter the European Army is to be able to recover our Eastern territories.

Mr. Paget: I remember an article in this "Sunday Express" based on quotations of me, which had been so arranged


as to express the exact opposite of what I said. I do not believe one word that I read in the "Sunday Express." whether it is a quotation or not.

Mr. Foot: There are many things published in the "Sunday Express" and in the Express Newspapers that I would not ask anybody to believe.

Mr. Paget: Hear, hear.

Mr. Foot: The only things I normally trust are the football results and the broadcasting programme.

Mr. Paget: That is a quotation, and the only one to be believed.

Mr. Foot: However, when I read an article by one of the most responsible and brilliant journalists of this country. Mr. Milton Shulman, in which all these facts are revealed, then I think it is very foolish of my hon. and learned Friend to try to contravene them. As I said before, it is a fact that there is a grisly logic in it, because if we go on piling up deterrent power against deterrent power in an arms race, it is possible that someone on one side or the other may be mad enough to say, "Let us steal an advantage by dropping an atomic bomb first." It is no good my hon. and learned Friend's saying that that is an absurd notion of mine, because the Government are advancing the same view, and what I am trying to do is to consider whether the Government's view is wise.

Mr. Wigg: If it is disputed that this gospel has been advanced about dropping the bomb first, will my hon. Friend recollect that it was an hon. Gentleman opposite, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Heeley (Mr. P. Roberts) who advocated dropping an atomic bomb at the time of the Yalu crisis?

Mr. Peter Roberts: I have been listening to the hon. Gentleman with great interest. I am sure that it will be within his recollection that I said it was the United Nations who should have the power to do that, not any individual country.

Mr. Foot: We were discussing earlier the difficulty that might arise if the Dulles doctrine were to be put into operation, how it could be done under the provisions of the American Constitution. Now, apparently, it is to be decided by the United

Nations. This does not make sense. If anybody is to drop the atomic bomb it has to be done by one side or the other trying to steal a march, and that is the wretched, tragic logic of what that German general said. It may be that some people think in that way. Indeed, it has been proved that some people do think in that way.
Before I go on with what some Germans think about this situation, I must say that I think we ought to have had more information from the Government about their plans for building up an Air Force in this country to fit in with their plans for building up an air force in Germany. It is reckoned that, at any rate to start with, the Germans are to have 1,700 planes.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Does that include the MIG 15s the East Germans have had for some time?

Mr. Foot: No. I am perfectly prepared to go into an argument with the hon. Gentleman about that matter, but what I am arguing now is—

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The hon. Gentleman has not said whether he is speaking of the East Germans or the West Germans.

Mr. Foot: The West Germans. I am sorry I did not make that clear. The simple question is how to build up the German air force—

Mr. Orr-Ewing: The West German air force?

Mr. Foot: Yes, the West German air force. The simple question is how that is to be built up and fitted in with the various proposals of this Government, because we are left in some mystery about it all. Does the fact that we are to build up a German air force mean that we are to have more aeroplanes in this country or fewer in this country? Does the fact that we are to have a German air force as our ally mean that we have to spend more on building our Air Force in this country, or less?
We are in some doubt about this, because a week or so ago we were told by the Government that we must have a West German army to make ourselves feel safer. Presumably, if that applies to the 12 divisions, it also applies to the 1,700 aeroplanes that the Germans are to be allowed to have. Then we were


told by the Prime Minister only a day or two ago that we must have a counterpoise of strength against this new military power to be built up in West Germany. How does it affect the Royal Air Force? What type of extra aircraft shall we have to build here in order to provide a counterpoise of strength against the aircraft that we shall build in Germany?

Mr. Orr-Ewing: We are interested in the figure of 1,700 aircraft. Does that also come from the "Tribune," or is it from another source?

Mr. Foot: My previous quotation came from the "Sunday Express." The hon. Gentleman can look that up and check it. I cannot absolutely vouch for this without looking up the details, but I am almost certain that the figure for the number of aircraft was first given officially at the time of the Lisbon Conference. At the time when the 12 divisions were first mentioned, a figure for the number of aircraft was also mentioned. If the hon. Gentleman cares to take the trouble to examine all the statements which have been made by Herr Blanck of Bonn, he will discover that the figure was given by him.
If the hon. Member wants a further reference, there is a book in the Library on Germany by Mr. James P. Warburg, in which he will discover all the details, including the details of the discussions which took place between the American High Commissioner in Germany and the Bonn Government at which the figure for the number of aircraft to be allowed was fixed prior even to the Lisbon meeting.
The Government ought to know about it. If my figure of 1,700 as the number of aircraft that the West Germans are to be allowed under the original plan is wrong, we can be told so by the Minister. We ought in any case to be told, because it obviously affects our own military situation one way or the other.
We should also like to know from the Government whether the fact that we are to arm the West Germans with an air force as well means that we must have more bombers or fighters or whatever the Government work out to be the necessary counterpoise of strength to deal with the fact that we are to arm the West Germans. The deduction of the Prime Minister in the defence debate was that, if we are to arm the West Germans.
we have to arm ourselves a bit more. There is some grisly logic about that. I have heard that question asked elsewhere by some other people.
The real answer is not that it is paradoxical for some people to suggest that West Germany should be rearmed while we disarm; the way to deal with the problem is not to arm the Germans. I am against arming either side. There have, of course, been efforts by the Russians to arm the East Germans, but the Prime Minister said in a speech a few days ago that it was interesting to note that in recent months there had been a reduction in the air forces of the Russians in those areas. That may perhaps be taken as partially relevant to the situation.
What are the conclusions to be drawn from the appalling lunacy into which the world seems to be thrust by the idea of competing atomic deterrent powers, from the kind of conclusions drawn by the German generals who want a preventive war, or from the conclusions drawn by those in this country who say that we must first make ourselves safer by arming the Germans and then arm ourselves a bit more in order to keep the Germans in order?
I am not an expert on military affairs, but it is time that a few people with civilian sense looked at these matters. It is argued by some people that the only conclusion to be drawn is that we must now concentrate on conventional weapons. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton revealed some of the dilemmas which confront one if that is the only deduction that one makes from the situation. The other main deduction which must be made from the situation is that if one has a crazy foreign policy it is very difficult to have a sane military policy for carrying it out. If we have a policy that we are going to take on commitments all over the world far heavier than we can bear, we can hardly blame the Service Departments for producing Estimates that do not really make sense, and we can go through a whole host of dilemmas of that nature which are presented to us.
These Estimates, like all the others we have had over the last three or four years, are not planned Estimates of the needs of the country, based on what this country can really afford. They are the Government's working out how much


they think they can get away with, and coming along to the Committee and trying to push it through very quickly, hoping people will not examine it. Then, at the end of the year when they find that they have overspent the figure they put in, they will say, "That doesn't matter, because we shall probably be able to get a few more millions later on." There is no coherent policy on strategy ensuring an economy of defence policy for this country. Indeed, all the Estimates that the Government have presented, and in particular in these Estimates—

Mr. Orr-Ewing: I have got the book to which the hon. Gentleman was referring and I find that it was published in 1946. Is the hon. Gentleman quoting a hypothetical figure taken eight years ago under hypothetical circumstances?

Mr. Foot: The hon. Gentleman need not be so tedious. He has got hold of the wrong book. He will see that there was a book placed in the Library only a week ago discussing the whole German situation from 1945 to 1953. It is a book by a most eminent writer in the United States, and the hon. Gentleman will find it in the Library. He will find that this book was reviewed in the "Sunday Express" on Sunday. If he had not interrupted me about five times on facts that he had not got properly presented, we might have got on a bit better with the debate. The Government's defence strategy and Air Force stategy, meaning an intolerable burden for defence which they have asked this country to sustain, is based on a total misreading of the international situation.

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. Is it in order for the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) to read a book which has nothing to do with the debate?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is out of order for an hon. Member to read a book, whether it is to do with the debate or not.

Mr. Foot: I would much rather he read a book and let us carry on the proceedings. Whatever the book may be, I am sure that it will add to the hon. Gentleman's knowledge. It is a fundamental error of the Government's policy, revealed in these Estimates, and in the

other Estimates, that they have been based on a misreading of the international situation. The Government have all the time sought to pretend to the country that their aim and their purpose was to prepare us and make the necessary arrangements to deal with a giant Soviet attack, a general military attack. That was the danger which was portrayed before us in 1951 and 1952, and indeed at an earlier date. That is still the main excuse for the heavy burden of defence which we are called upon to bear.
I do not believe that it bears any real relation to the facts. There is a danger from Soviet policies in many parts of the world. I believe that the Soviet Government seek in many parts of the world to grab areas which they can bring under their influence; they seek to stir up economic and other troubles for the democracies; and I believe that they will engage in many kinds of conspiracy all over the world. Many people go on from that to think that every disturbance that takes place in any part of the world is due to some Communist intrigue when it is due to nothing of the sort. There are great dangers from Soviet policy, but it is necessary to discover what that policy really is. It is no good burdening and defeating ourselves in preparing to deal with a Soviet strategy that does not exist.
Anyone who examines the history of the Soviet Union since the days of the Revolution will see that there have been only four occasions when the Soviet Union engaged in what might be regarded as a war of aggression. There was the case of Poland just after the First World War, and indeed the Marxist and Leninist deduction which was drawn from that war was that they should never embark on such a war again. Then there was the aggression against Finland in 1940, but that was certainly not a case of launching a major war. It was not a case of the Soviet Union embarking on a policy which might involve a general war with great and powerful nations. Then there was the case of Poland in 1940, when the Soviet Union acted with the German Government in the seizure of Poland. That again was certainly not a policy directed towards a general military attack. The only other case of aggressive action in a major war was the attack of the Soviet Government on


Japan in 1945, which was taken in concert with us, and therefore we can hardly have any complaint about that.
Anyone who looks at the record will see that it has never been a part of the strategy of the Soviet Union to launch a general war in order to secure their aims. Indeed, the launching and the preparation for launching such a war would be contrary to all the theories of Marxism which they accept, at any rate, in part, because the theories of Marxism tell them—they may be right or wrong; they believe they are right—that the Western Powers are going to be defeated eventually by economic distress and the failure of capitalism to organise itself efficiently.
Therefore, I say that anyone who studies objectively the history over the past 30 years can see that the idea of a general Soviet attack involving a world war is not the primary danger with which we have to deal. But if we concentrate on trying to deal with the menace we can easily make much easier for the Soviet Government the successful implementation of their real strategies, because if we burden ourselves with this huge amount for defence, if we neglect, as we have been grossly neglecting, our preparations for our own economic future, if we cut down our capital investment, if we strip ourselves of the power to give effective economic aid to the backward nations in the world, then we will in fact be pursuing a policy which, however it may result in the end, will at any rate strengthen the precise strategy which the Soviet Government have pursued against us for generations past.
That is why many of us were very glad to see that on the debate on the Defence White Paper a Motion was put down against the Government, and that is why many of us wish to press these arguments further. It will only be when the Government adopt a wise foreign policy that they will be able to have a sane military policy at the same time.

10.34 p.m.

Dr. Reginald Bennett (Gosport and Fareham): I am sure we have all listened with some amazement to the discursiveness of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). I wish that the hon. Gentleman might have caught your eye two days ago, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, when perhaps

the subject, although still equally in order, might have been appropriate.
If the House will forgive me, I should like to bring the debate a little nearer to aviation. I should like to extend my warmest congratulations to the Undersecretary for having given an extremely good statement today so very well; in short, for having given us such great reassurance about our air defences—an assurance which for many years past I personally have been badly needing.
I feel, unlike the hon. Member for Devonport, that this is a very well balanced programme of aeronautical defence, one which on any logical consideration is clearly very necessary. In filling in the interim between the pro-pellor age and the push-button guided weapon age we have no alternative but to do what we are doing. My hon. Friend has put it across extremely well.
The two points I want to raise are matters which affect him and, in each case, another Department. The first concerns transport aircraft I cannot believe that the R.A.F. has as many of these aircraft as it would like, or that the requisite number is likely to become readily available in competition with all the other forms of aircraft which are needed for the other commands I would draw my hon. Friend's attention to a project which I am certainly not the first to mention, but which has a great deal of good in it and deserves close consideration. Some arrangement should be made between the Air Ministry, the other Ministries concerned, and the civil airline operators, by which a fleet of commercial aircraft can be kept in full operation, hired from the Ministry if necessary, but available on call when required for the use of Transport Command
I can see no other economical way in which the R.A.F. can be equipped with a sufficiency of transport aircraft for the jobs it has to do, not only for itself but for the other Fighting Services. I stress this point most strongly, and I would ask the Minister whether there is any prospect of any such joint arrangements being made with the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Supply and the operators who might want to take up these aircraft and pay for them at a rate which would amortise their cost
My other point concerns the fact that both he and his opposite numbers in the


Admiralty are having great difficulty over aircrews. It is a matter of old controversy in this House that the command of the air over the ocean is one which has to be shared between the Admiralty and the R.A.F. The Admiralty is restricted, as everybody knows, to the flying of aircraft from aircraft carriers and their corresponding shore stations. All its aircraft have to be suitable for flying from carriers. That means that they are nearly all single-engined or small twin-engined machines. The crews have a somewhat "dicey" time flying on and off these carriers, and after a rather short career of flying in this way there is nothing left for them but to become ships' officers, which means that they are assimilated into the other branches of the executive; they fire guns and other such things.
That seems to be the main reason why the Navy is finding it difficult to get a sufficient aircrew intake. As it is necessary for Coastal Command to go on flying these much bigger shore-based aircraft, which are doing a similar job. I suggest that it may be possible to bring about such a degree of integration of the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command that carrier pilots will be able to graduate to the larger shore-based aircraft for the latter part of their flying careers, to be passed permanently to the R.A.F. or, perhaps, ultimately to come back to naval service. The pooling of pilots in this way for these several and successive functions might very well cause a considerable diminution in the difficulty which both Services have to face in the recruitment of aircrews.
Those are the only points I wish to make. The fact that I have no other points of criticism is a sufficient testimonial to my satisfaction with the form of these Air Estimates, and I hope that the House will pass them in spite of the misgivings of the hon. Member for Devonport.

10.40 p.m.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: Before I deal with what the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) has said, I should like to refer to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). I was interested in the arguments he appeared to be quoting about atomic policy from an American reactionary

journal called the "New Leader," and I think it is worth while referring to the deductions drawn in the Senate by those who were, in fact, criticising the Eisenhower policy. Those deductions were that the American Government were wrong to place faith entirely in the atom bomb, and that so far from cutting the armed forces and the arms budget they should be increased. Indeed, they were also pointing out the need not to reduce the number of ground forces, and the logic of that argument is, of course, in direct contradiction of the argument set forth in the official Opposition Amendment on the defence debate this week.
I would urge my hon. Friend to consider this angle. It strikes me, and here I am entirely in agreement with him, that there is a danger in the policy of a deterrent force, but the alternative is the maintenance of what might be called defensive forces, which would involve the maintenance of the two-year period of National Service. I am not proposing to go further into that argument which might lead to a much more fundamental aspect, that of foreign policy. My hon. Friend is entitled to criticise the Government's foreign policy, but we are not in this debate concerned with foreign policy but with the defences that might be necessary in support of a foreign policy which may be wholly bad. I do not propose to follow that line. But I feel that, far from criticising the Government about the build-up of the atomic deterrent force, criticisms made in the earlier part of week were on the score that they were using out of date defensive forces.
Personally, and here I am at one with my hon. Friend, I think that the atomic deterrent is the most dangerous aspect of the general defence and foreign policy, and it is essential that we should regard air power as the ultimate weapon and then only as a deterrent weapon; but it should not be the main weapon in this period of the semi-cold war. I agree with my hon. Friend on the logic of the point that we should not rely wholly on the atomic defences but on the maintenance of adequate armed forces performing, in effect, a police role throughout the world. My hon. Friend would have an answer on the subject of present day commitments, and I would be entirely in agreement on that point. I fear that this debate has gone rather wide, but I felt


obliged to make some comments on the remarks made by my hon. Friend.
I should like to offer one criticism, and I am sorry that the Under-Secretary has left. I sympathise with his having to do so. My criticism refers to the complete, or almost complete, absence of any mention of N.A.T.O. in the Memorandum. The Under-Secretary made some reference to N.A.T.O. himself: but in the Memorandum there is only an oblique reference. That is a consequence of the emphasis on the strategic aspect of air power, and it is unsound, because, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) made clear, air forces have an important role to play as part of the N.A.T.O. defences. The Under-Secretary of State himself made that clear. None the less, the Memorandum shows rather clearly the thinking that is going on in the Air Ministry on this subject. More attention has got to be paid to the N.A.T.O. aspect.
In particular, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) referred to the need for a light fighter. Since the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence is present, I urge that as we are prepared in the case of the new supersonic fighters, in order to speed up production, to order as many as 20 prototypes, it would be in the interests, not only of this country but of N.A.T.O. as a whole, to order prototypes of the light fighters of a design which are already available in this country. The great difficulty has been the availability of a suitable engine, but I am told that there are one or two possibilities. With a little encouragement from the Government this project, which is extremely interesting, could be brought to a point where it could be adequately judged. I urge that this matter should be more fully considered.
I should like also to refer to another point, which has been raised by several hon. Members on both sides of the House, with regard to the use of the Air Force for transport purposes. One hon. Member mentioned the 20 Beverley aircraft that have been ordered. It may be that the Air Force and the Air Council, obliged to cut their coat according to what they hope they can get in the shape of money for their particular role, are not prepared to go into this

field. I see no reason why there should not be a coherent plan building up over the years by which the great bulk of all trooping was carried out by air, so that if war should come we are in a position to send troops and their equipment wherever they may be needed. Indeed, this would seem to be the only logical development from the position in which we find ourselves, short of manpower and with widespread commitments.
A certain amount of trooping is, of course, done by air, but it has got to be an inherent and fundamental part of the whole of our strategical planning. Whether the charter companies are used or whether the Air Force does the work, I am not prepared to argue at the moment. I see that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation is present, and I should be glad to argue about the subject on Monday. None the less, the fundamental principle is one with which anybody who is airminded will agree. I am quite sure that the Air Ministry would agree, and the only people who might object would be the Navy, because this proposal would make a further dent in their already further declining role in the event of war.
The hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham has dug out once again the argument about Coastal Command, and I see the force of his argument: namely, the need to provide an adequate career for Fleet Air Arm officers. The problem is very difficult. I fully agree, but I do not believe it can be solved by linking Coastal Command to the Navy. If the hon. Member's arguments are carried to a logical conclusion, the proper answer must be—I see grave danger in reopening the whole issue—that the Air Force will have to provide the aircrew for the Navy.
That was the system that existed some while ago before the Navy got its own independent air arm, and I do not think it was a satisfactory solution. It is a difficult matter, but I do not think we could consider putting any sizable part of land-based air power under naval control.

Dr. Bennett: I should not like anybody to think that I was suggesting that the administration or governing of either of those Services in any way should change hands. I was saying merely that it should


be a matter of loans of individual members of aircrew to continue a flying career in very much the same medium.

Mr. Shackleton: I am sorry. I may have misinterpreted some of the hon. Member's remarks, but I wanted to make that general point. It is one which could be investigated further, and it is perhaps unfortunate that there is this rather strong Service feeling which possibly prevents arriving at a sensible solution.
I will turn now to a point which has been discussed by a number of speakers. That is, the use of reservists. The Undersecretary of State was not forthcoming when he was telling us about the developments, the plans he had for making use of Class H reservists in the Air Force, but tantalised us by saying that he had two other plans which he was not going to bring forward at the moment. He might at least have given us a glimpse of what he is thinking about. It might be that some hon. Members have further useful suggestions to make.
We are faced by a fundamental injustice in the matter of call-up. It clearly is unjust that a man called up for the Air Force should have a greater chance of avoiding the disadvantages, from his employer's point of view, of subsequent annual call-up. The Air Force Class H reservist is in a favoured position compared with the Army reservist. The plan put forward is a step in the right direction. It would, however, be a grave error to call up men unless there is something for them to do. This matter must be considered further, and I am glad to see that the Government have been paying attention to this injustice.
There has been talk over the last two or three years of establishing local defence flights, or units, to man operation rooms, but in a number of cases they have not been organised. There is no reason why Coastal Command, and some other commands, should not have these reservist flights set up at once. I would ask whichever Minister is paying attention to this debate to deal with this point, because it is time that Coastal Command had such an organisation.
Another important point is the new incentive pay scheme for Service emoluments. There is evidence that the Air

Force is not being treated as well as the other Services. I should like an assurance from the Minister that the Air Force is getting the same treatment as the Navy. There is greater need for inducements to get men to stay on in the Air Force. The Navy, by and large, has been for many reasons, partly tradition, more successful in getting the long-service Regulars it wants.
Then I must refer to the methods of recruiting officers in persuading young National Service men to sign on for three years instead of two. We realise that these officers are doing their best, but there is no doubt that a number of young men have agreed to serve for three years because of the rather rosy prospects of extra pay set in front of them, and sometimes have agreed to sign on for a longer period, without referring to their parents. I fully appreciate that the Air Force want to get men, but at the same time a certain amount of ill-feeling has been created as a result of these methods, and even more important, if it becomes widespread it may really do a disservice to the Air Force in recruiting regulars.
On the same point, I should like again to ask the Under-Secretary to deal with recruiting for the aircrews through Cranwell and other channels. Again, quite a number of young men are persuaded to give up their career prospects in civil life by the hopes of a good career in the Air Force without ever being told that a fairly high proportion of them are going to be failed on the way. So far it has not been considered in the public interest to give the numbers who are so failed. But I think it is only fair for a prospective employer to indicate to a prospective employee that the prospects of attaining the job for which he is training are not as rosy as appears at first sight.
Among cases which I have had was one of a young man who had given up his articles. He was training to be an accountant, and he was keen on a career in the Royal Air Force. But he was failed. Whether he was failed for right or wrong reasons is not the point. The point is that neither he nor his parents had any idea as to the number of people who were, in fact, likely to get through that course. That is a point of some importance.
There is one small point, and that is with regard to uniforms. The cost of uniforms to officers today is a very serious factor indeed, and I have heard it suggested by a number of Air Force and Army officers that there is no reason why officers' uniforms should not be obtained through the equivalent of regimental tailors. This may shock some people, but it is worth noting that the Guards have their uniforms provided collectively by bulk buying, although there is individual attention to particular need. I would suggest that the same scheme might well be considered for officers in the Air Force and elsewhere. If it could be done it would probably put a number of regimental tailors out of business, or they might be willing to come into the scheme in some way. But a really important saving in expenditure could be made, for the benefit of junior officers in particular, who have very heavy expenses to meet.
I would conclude by returning to the original strategic note in which I followed my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport. I believe there is a fundamental need for a bomber force as a deterrent. I believe, too, with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton that a fighter defence purely as a counter to atomic warfare is not likely to be very effective. If it is not 100 per cent, effective we can regard it as ineffective.
At the same time I would urge the Air Council and the Air Force to realise that, important though a bomber force is. —and it is important—it is particularly important that this country should have an atomic bomber force and not merely the Americans if we are to carry that moderating influence which we want to use with our allies which at the same time will be part of our general national forces. After the war we used to talk about a single Service. Today that idea, for many technical reasons, seems to have disappeared. But the Air Force has to play its r61e in support of the Army, in transporting the Army and the other Services in peace time and, only in the last resort, in war.

11.1 p.m.

Mr. Dudley Williams: When I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), I could not help but feel a certain amount

of admiration for the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) for the courage and helpfulness he has shown throughout. I am sure that my hon. Friends on this side of the House are extremely glad that one section of the Socialist Party is united with us in seeing that there are to be no substantial reductions in the money that is being made available to the Air Force under the Air Estimates. The discussions we shall have next week in the debates on the Army and Navy Estimates ought to be rather entertaining, and it will be instructive to see whether the hon. Member for Devon-port, who I am sorry to see has now left the Chamber, will be prepared to support any reduction in the Royal Navy Estimates.
I felt that many of the remarks made by the hon. Member were most misleading, and I am glad that the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) has gone some way in criticising them. Most people will agree with him that there is nothing that the Soviet wants less than a general war, and the examples which the hon. Gentleman gave us of where they have made limited aggression, support any theory one holds on this subject.
What I am certain Russia does want is the fruits of war without having to pay any of the penalties. One of the examples of the past which would show that the present Government are following the right policy is the deterrent effect of the United States squadrons from the Strategic Air Command that were brought here in 1948. The trouble is that when one is going in for a policy of peace by making it clear to a possible aggressor that there will be war if the peace is broken, one cannot be certain of being successful: one can only be certain of failure if a war breaks out. But in 1948 we had a demonstration that peace through strength would be much more likely than peace through weakness.
I support the remarks made by several hon. Members about certain aspects of our fighter force. I am getting worried about the cost of some of our fighter aircraft, and in some cases the demands that are being made by the Air Staff are being pitched too high. I remember that 25 years ago when I was in the Air Force we often used to make jokes in the Service about the demands made upon


the aircraft industry by the Royal Navy when it was building up its Fleet Air Arm. I hope that my hon. and gallant Friends who have been associated with the Royal Navy will not think that I believe they have the same views today, but in those days they always wanted j machine with a speed of the fastest fighter available, able to carry a large number of people over an extremely long distance, and at the same time with a very low landing speed. They were so extravagant in their demands that it was not possible to get any engineering firms to provide them with the aircraft they required.
The position is getting rather like that today in the Royal Air Force, with radar and armament and all the ancillary equipment which the modern aircraft has to carry, and this is particularly applicable to some of the jobs that a fighter aircraft has to do. I am not criticising in any way aircraft like the Hunter and the Swift, which are absolutely essential for our home defence, but we should not blind ourselves to the fact that these aircraft will be available only in the event of war in very limited numbers because of their expense and the complication they present to constructors. I do not believe it is possible at the moment to get any Continental factory in Western Europe to turn out either of these aircraft, and it is essential, in considering our strategic requirements, that we should always bear in mind the importance of husbanding our supply of these expensive machines. If one accepts that, we have to consider what we are going to use from the fighter point of view in close support of our ground forces.
Bombers, too, have to be escorted to tactical targets, and there will be ground straffing and so on. The defence we should have to get through with our tactical bombers will probably be nothing like so difficult as tactical aircraft had to get through when attacking this country in 1940. As far as I have been able to discover, the Russian defence will probably be something like only one-fifth as numerous as the defences we had around our perimeter during the Battle of Britain. But it will still be quite a difficult defence for tactical bombers, and we shall need a less elaborate fighter than the Hunter for this sort of job. I regret that I can

find no provision for this equipment in these Estimates.
As all hon. Gentlemen here who are interested in aircraft know, there is a fighter being developed and now being constructed in this country by the Folland Aircraft Ltd.—designed by one of our foremost designers, Mr. W. E. W. Fetter, who was responsible for the design of the Whirlwind and the Canberra—in an attempt to reduce by one-third or one-quarter the cost of the present all-weather fighter, and I am very critical of the attitude of the Air Staff to this machine.

Mr. Shackleton: In fact, some figures have been given by Mr. Fetter which suggest that at a later stage the rate of production can be increased five times, and the cost will be a great deal less than the one-third mentioned by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson).

Mr. Williams: I do not want to get into conflict with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but it is certainly substantially cheaper. I think this aircraft may well be in the same position as the Mosquito, which was produced as a private venture and subsequently became of great importance to the Service during the last war.
The real difficulty is that the Air Staff is absolutely obsessed with the importance of the interceptor fighter. That aeroplane is, of course, extremely important to this country. It is the most effective aircraft that we have for our fighter defences, close as they are to our frontiers. But the United States of America see the fighter problem as requiring two different types of aeroplane. They say that not only do they need the interceptor, but also a type called the "air superiority fighter." The function of that aeroplane is to grapple with the enemy over the ground battle area, destroy their air force, escort their own bombers, and then join in as tactical aircraft.
This aircraft which has been designed by Mr. Fetter has attracted wide attention in the United States of America. It has already inspired companies over there to develop a similar aeroplane, and great interest has been shown in it all over Europe. I believe that unless more encouragement is given by the Air Staff


to this aeroplane there is a grave danger that a similar machine may be built and developed in America. As a result of the success which will attend its development, there we may well find that, instead of a British fighter being built under licence on the Continent—with all the attendant advantages that it has as an additional export—the Continental factories may take over the American fighter.
The inspiration which is being given in the United States to that development of this brilliant young British designer will then bring benefit, not to ourselves, but only to America. I hope that my hon. Friend will very carefully consider this aircraft and see if it is possible to give some encouragement to the Falland Aircraft Company which is at present producing it.
I want to refer to the effect which the closing down of the Reserve schools is having on aerodromes such as exist near my constituency of Exeter We have to face the fact that they are being closed down. I myself am convinced that it is the right policy for my hon. Friend to follow. I do hope, however, that every effort will be made to make it possible for aerodromes such as Exeter to continue to function on a similar basis as hitherto. The loss of the Reserve school at Exeter is very serious and is going to lead to grave difficulty in keeping the Air Force running.
Another organisation which is continuing, though perhaps only for a few months, is the Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit. I understand that it is possible that this also may be closed; that it might be felt better to expand one of the other units carrying out this work, rather than keep that which is still operating in my constituency. I sincerely hope that that will not happen. It would be greatly resented locally. It would be a serious discouragement to a county which has always been famous for the manpower which it has sent into the Armed Forces of the Crown. It would also make it almost impossible to continue to run the aerodrome; if it goes there is very little left to operate from the aerodrome, except an occasional run by an airline to one of the Channel Islands. I hope that my hon. Friend will carefully consider any representations which may be made to him by the airport authorities in this connection to see

if it is possible to allow them to continue in the future.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: I wish to make a few observations about what I consider to be the main issue of this debate, namely, the question of whether this country should develop a strategic bomber force. That is the decision of the Government which has come to fruition this year. It is one which this House should debate, because it is of enormous importance to our defence policy and also to our economic policy. It will not be a cheap matter to implement such a decision. Even a minimum strategic bomber force would be enormously expensive, and therefore it is a decision which we must take with reluctance. I am bound to say that I am convinced that the Government are right and that we must develop an effective strategic bomber force, at any rate of a minimum size.
I was impressed by the recent broadcast of the ex-Chief of the Air Force. Sir John S'essor, a very brilliant officer, whom I once had the honour to serve in a very humble capacity during the war. I was impressed by what he said on the military side. The political side of his statement is another matter. But on the military side, as I understood it. his argument is hard to refute. In his view, air defence today and so far as we can see in the future, is unlikely to be very effective.
I would not say that we should dispense with air defence, though interceptor fighters are very expensive. But we must face the fact that we should delude ourselves by thinking that air defence would be effective in any future major war. What constructive conclusion can we draw from that? The one drawn by Sir John Slessor is that the defence of this country in the air must largely depend on the possession of a deterrent air force, which could be nothing but a fleet of strategic bombers sufficiently effective to make a would-be aggressor pause.
If we take the purely N.A.T.O. view of the situation, there would be no cause for us to develop a strategic bomber force. If we think purely in the terms of the present alliance, the present balance of power and the present political situation in the world—if we believe it is certain to endure indefinitely—


if each nation in the N.A.T.O. alliance specialised in a particular force, then the obvious case, often advanced, for leaving this highly expensive strategic bomber force to America would be impossible to answer.

Mr. P. Roberts: When the right hon. Gentleman refers to a strategic bomber force, does he mean a strategic atomic bomber force?

Mr. Strachey: Yes, indeed I do. We are developing these atomic weapons, and their most obvious use is with a strategic bomber force. I call it a strategic bomber force because the type of V.3 bombers which we are developing are now called medium bombers, but they play the role which the old heavy bomber played in the last war.
I am bound to say that, on balance, I do not think we ought to leave this vitally important military function purely to our allies. The military situation in the world is developing in a way which makes the strategic bomber not the only weapon in the world; it is not a unique weapon. We should not concentrate on that alone, but it is the central weapon of the whole of our defence force. It is tending, and will tend in future more and more, to play the rôle which the battleship played it the last century and in the early years of this century—the rôle of the essential weapon for this island, and which is, above all, important for our security. Therefore, I think it right to say that we could not possibly leave the development of that weapon to any ally.
I should like to quote Sir John Slessor's words on the subject. He said:
We cannot leave to the United States the monopoly of this instrument of such decisive importance in the massive issues of war and peace.
If I had used that phrase I think I might be accused of anti-Americanism, but I do not think Sir John Slessor would be accused of anti-Americanism. He has cooperated with them very closely indeed.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: And he still does not trust them.

Mr. Strachey: My hon. Friend puts a gloss on Sir John Slessor's statement. I was about to say that I would not put any gloss at all on it. I would agree with his statement.

Mr. Crossman: As I understand my right hon. Friend, he says that if we have a choice, as we do, of priorities, he feels that it is more important for us to have strategic bombers than to have an adequate form of defence for the civilian population, because of the certainty that if bombers are used a number of the civilian population are bound to be wiped out. Since he advocates the use of the strategic bomber, and this involves destroying civilian life, why does he think it more important to have the bomber and leave the civilian population totally unprotected, as we do in this Estimate?

Mr. Strachey: The reason is simple, and I was just stating it. We must accept the opinion of the experts—and I have quoted one—that air defence today will never be very effective. We cannot neglect the defensive side, of course.

Mr. Crossman: But we are.

Mr. Strachey: We are spending millions on it.

Mr. Crossman: I was referring to civilian defence.

Mr. Strachey: That is still another aspect of the matter. But we cannot neglect the fact that, however many millions we spend on interceptor fighters and all the apparatus of air defence, such as radar screens and the like, and how ever many millions we spend on Civil Defence—

Mr. Crossman: Since there is no way of preventing atom bombers from arriving over this country, my right hon. Friend feels that for that reason we should leave the civil population without any defence. This seems to be an odd argument—that because it is certain that the bombers will get through we should provide no air-raid shelters for the civilian population. This puzzles me, in view of his statement that we must have strategic bombers. I do not see any point in having strategic bombers if, at the same time, we make certain that our civil population, which cannot be defended by fighters, is going to be left unprotected— because there is not enough money for both. If my right hon. Friend says that we should have strategic bombers and yet have no passive defence, I want to know why.

Mr. Strachey: My hon. Friend is now really suggesting, first, that we should leave the strategic bomber force to the Americans and, secondly, that we ought to have no defences in the air or on the ground against air attack. If he finds that argument a fantastic one, so do I; but no one in the House has put it forward except himself

Mr. Foot: Will my right hon. Friend explain in what circumstances he thinks it best for us to use our strategic bomber force when the Americans are not using theirs? If we are not to use it in other circumstances, what is the exact purpose it is going to serve?

Mr. Strachey: That is a perfectly fair question, and I was coming to that point next. The object of having a strategic bomber force is precisely the one which a dozen speakers on both sides of the House have mentioned—and one which I think my hon. Friend could understand quite easily if he applied his mind to it for a moment. It is in order that we can say to any foreign Power whose aggression we might fear, "You can attack us, despite our defences. You can no doubt do great damage to us, but you will suffer the same damage yourself." That is a perfectly simple argument.

Mr. Crossman: The Americans have a deterrent as well.

Mr. Strachey: If my hon. Friend is willing to rely upon the Americans to provide it, that is another matter. I cannot vie with him in his pro-Americanism. I cannot go quite so far as he does. I do not want to be accused of anti-Americanism, and I should certainly never admit to it, but to put the whole fate of this country into the hands of the Americans—as my hon. Friend wishes to do—is going too far.

Mr. Crossman: This is an interesting discussion. I can assure my right hon. Friend that if he really thinks that a minimum bomber force—100 bombers, or whatever it may be—of enormously expensive machines in our hands and a gigantic bomber force in the hands of the Americans prevent us from being completely under the power of the Americans in the event of a war, he is simpler than I am. The moment we start the next war we shall be absolutely in the hands of the Americans. We shall depend upon

them for our food. It is ridiculous to think that with the predominance of American military might we shall not be in their power in the event of general war.

Mr. Strachey: That is a reductio ad absurdum. My hon. Friend's argument is the perfectly simple one, that we should have no defence or weapons in this country but should rely on the Americans for everything.

Mr. Crossman: This is a part of a Socratic process of elucidation which divides us. Every country in Europe maintains the minimum defences it can, in order to get more American assistance. Everyone is doing the minimum he can in order to keep the Americans committed, because they know that the only effective defence of Europe consists of the automatic military commitments of the Americans to come to our assistance under N.A.T.O. That is why the Belgians, the French and other European countries try to humour the Americans into providing a thin red line across Germany. The Russians do not want to kill Americans, because they know they will get an atomic bomb on Moscow if they do. That is a more effective deterrent against war than our minimum force of strategic bombers.

Mr. Strachey: My hon. Friend has made a series of amusing speeches in the interstices of my few and pedestrian remarks. I am sure that we have enjoyed them very much, but they have nothing to do with the subject of defence, which we are discussing tonight.

Mr. Crossman: My right hon. Friend had better wait.

Mr. Strachey: I have no need to wait for my hon. Friend's speeches. They come thick and fast. When his speech is being delivered he might have to wait for a few interjections from myself, but it is interesting that the frame of mind which he has worked himself is, I believe, that the present world situation will continue indefinitely. I do not think that likely. I cannot foresee the situation which this country will have to face in 10, 20 or more, years, but I think that, if the country is to have defences at all, by far the most important single defence will be to possess the deterrent of a strategic bomber force. Therefore, with the reluctance I expressed at the outset


of my remarks, it seems to me right that we are building up a force of that character.
There is certainly one other task which the Royal Air Force has to face, and that is what used to be called, quaintly enough. Army Co-operation. It is a far wider task today, and is not a question of providing Lysanders for spotting for artillery or something of that sort. It is not the enormous task of providing the air component for the ground screen across Europe, which my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) seems to think is drawn across Europe as a bait for the Americans, but has a rather more realistic purpose than that. It is the task of providing Army cooperation in limited wars and I think it is important that we should have adequate forces necessary to conduct limited wars, as the Korean war was conducted, without their spreading into a world war. That is an extremely important function. Perhaps it is mainly an Army function, but the Royal Air Force comes into it intimately. It seems to me that there is nothing in the Estimates to suggest how that function is to be met.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Exeter (Mr. Dudley Williams) may be right in saying that the highly elaborate and expensive interceptor fighters which we are developing in this country are not suitable for this purpose, and I would like the Under-Secretary to deal with it when he comes to sum up. We are promised the development of a delta-winged fighter by A. V. Roe, which they suggest will be suitable for this type of work. I do not know in the least the merits of the rival firms who are seeking to develop these aircraft, but something of the simple, cheaper and more robust type for that kind of work would have been very important.
Of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport must realise that when he is asking for weapons of that sort—and he is right to do so—he is asking for another range of weapons which are very expensive. But he is right in saying that the country must have them, because they help to prevent what the Prime Minister called the other day the bickerings which go on between Powers without a world

war turning into such a war; and it would be utterly disastrous if we had only the threat of a total war to use in those circumstances. Those seem to me to be the chief things which the Royal Air Force today is called on to emphasise: the strategic bomber force, which it has been decided to build up, and some form of aircraft for use in land operations, probably of a limited character; but, of course, these would be essential in the case of a major war also.
If we are to emphasise those two functions, we must find something where the emphasis must be taken off. That is difficult enough to find. Whether it is in the light bomber field or where it is, I do not pretend to know, but somehow or other we must keep even the Air Estimates within reasonable dimensions. It will be difficult enough to do it, but surely these Estimates must be kept, at any rate, from growing to an intolerable size. That can only be done by picking out the most essential of the tasks and putting our main emphasis on those, because if we try to be exactly equally strong in every field, we shall probably succeed in being strong nowhere. I know very well that I am raising more problems than I am solving, but it seems to me that those are the two fields in which the emphasis of the air programme today should lie.

11.36 p.m.

Mr. I. Mikardo: After the interchange to which we have just listened, and in which the provision of amusement was not altogether one-sided, I suppose my role will be to act as a sort of third force between my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). I hope I shall succeed in doing that without suffering the usual fate of neutrals and intermediaries, which is to be kicked in the teeth from both sides.
Like some other hon. Members who have spoken, I am by no means an expert in military or Air Force affairs. Indeed, this is the first time that I have ventured to intervene in a debate on the Air Estimates. I do so only to ask a number of questions which occurred to my lay but inquisitive mind in the course of reading the Memorandum which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Air has presented with the Air Estimates.
Before I turn to those questions and to an examination of the Memorandum, there is one point, not of any great importance and, perhaps, one which might even be considered by the House to be finicky, to which I should like to refer and which arises directly out of the speech of the Under-Secretary of State. The hon. Gentleman referred to some of the developments which had taken place in the design and performance of aircraft and, in particular, with regard to their speeds. He made a number of references to supersonic speeds and at least one reference to breaking the sound barrier.
I wish the hon. Gentleman would not lend his prestige as Under-Secretary and as an Air Force officer to this unscientific twaddle, because he knows as well as I do that there is no barrier at all at the speed of sound, and that the speed of sound has no more significance in aerodynamics than any other speed at all. One does not break the barrier of 331½ metres per second at 176 centimetres of barometric pressure. What sort of barrier is that?
The fact is, as the hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well, that as speed increases, the compressibility of air increases; there is an increasing build-up of aerodynamic resistance, which after a while increases in parabolic measure. Then there is a point reached at which a change in type, as well as in quantity, in this resistance takes place. That point varies according to circumstances and the design of the aircraft, but wherever it occurs it has absolutely no relation whatever to the 331½ metres per second, etc., etc., which is the speed of sound. The only validity there is in the term is that which it had as the title of a film which, I am told by those expert in such matters, was reasonably amusing but was, technically, as scientific as Old Moore's Almanac. Please let us not have this popular, prostituted, armchair science when we are discussing serious matters before the House.
With apologies for having been somewhat pontifical, I pass to consideration of the Memorandum attached to the Air Estimates. I shall refer first to the passage in the Memorandum covered by paragraphs 5 to 9, in which the noble Lord confesses to a gross failure in his Department in the most brazen way, as

though it did not matter a row of pins. No other Department of Government would ever be so brazen in writing a White Paper and saying, "We made a muck of this and a mess of that, and we totally miscalculated the other; but, what does it matter, it is only a few millions?" The Ministry of Education would never dare to admit errors of planning of this magnitude without a single word of apology and scarcely a word of explanation. The Ministry of Health and the Board of Trade, and other civilian Departments, would not dream of doing it, and if they tried to do so they would not get away with it.
The effrontery of Service Departments in putting forward, without a blush, their confessions of gross inaccuracy and waste of public funds never ceases to stagger me. If ever I suffered the misfortune to be a Minister, I would want to be the Minister of a Service Department, not because I know anything about the work of such a Department, or would be good at it, but because they are Departments where the only punishment likely to be received for gross errors is to be elevated to the other place. Let us have a look at these paragraphs. It is said:
In 1953–54 we shall be spending less than we estimated, because production has not come up to expectations.
The Memorandum does not say why. The Under-Secretary did not even bother to comment on these paragraphs when he opened the debate. Will he tell us, when he winds up the debate, why production has not reached expectations? What went wrong? Did the planners expect too much? If so, why are the planners not changed? If the reason is not among those, what was it? Again, it is said:
Another factor which distorts the comparison is that the 1953–54 Estimates included a sum of about £13,000,000 for payments to contractors for work done on orders which were cancelled as a result of the change in the defence programme.
That is wonderful planning.
I cast my mind back to 1951 when a few hon. Members of this party, faced with the obiter dictum of the Defence Ministry, which said it had had things worked out for several years ahead, were met with the suggestion that they should not dare to call into question the oracles by which the Ministry spoke. It could


well be asked whether they were not going to change half way, or whether they were sure that if they moved the figures from one side of the ledger to the other and put down the £ symbol with a figure and a lot of noughts, they could always convert those money symbols into men and machine tools, materials and equipment. When we asked this, we were told that we ought not to meddle with such matters, but it becomes increasingly clear that it was the doubters and not the pundits who were right on that occasion, and this elaborate build-up of this terrific armament programme was erected on hopes and not on a scientific estimate of whether the money could be spent. Indeed, three years later paragraph 9 admits that a considerable proportion of the money voted in 1953–54 will not be spent.
Here we are losing £13 million in the most wasteful of all ways. It sometimes happens inevitably that stuff is ordered which does not turn out to be of much use, and, indeed, sometimes it is not usable at all and has to be sold for scrap at a cheap price. But here there is a 100 per cent. loss. This money has been paid for orders which will never be put in hand, and the consequence is that we paid this £13 million in one year without receiving any material, usable or unusable, in return.
This figure of £13 million is a bit reminiscent of something. I tried to remember where I had heard that figure before. I had to cast my memory back a long way, to 1951, when it will be recalled that that was the amount of the charges which we were told we had to put on the Health Service, otherwise we could not pay for the Air Force and other constituents of our re-armament programme. That was the imposition that we had to put on the poor people.
But that breaking down of the principle of a great social service was made not to give us one more aeroplane, not to give us one more cannon for one more aeroplane, and not to give us one more bullet for one more cannon for one more aeroplane. That grave interference with an important constituent of a great social service was made in order to enable the Air Ministry to pay for orders which were never put in hand. That shows how wrong we were to rely on the evidence of

the pundits. As I said before, when they juggle with sterling figures on bits of paper they think they are converting these sterling figures into materials and machines.
The hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) gave an interesting example of the way that sort of error is made. He had some scheme—I will not comment on its merits, because I am not expert enough—for having some sort of partnership in transport aircraft between the Royal Air Force and the civil airline operators. He clearly thought that all that was necessary was for the Undersecretary to provide the money and those transport aircraft would be there. It never occurred to him for a moment that the provision of those aircraft would mean competing for the same factory space, for the same men, for the same machinery and for the same capacity as the programme which the Under-Secretary, on his own admission, has not been able to carry out in the past year.
We cannot get away from this silly idea that all that has to be done is to vote the money and it will be turned immediately into materials. If only someone would teach the Air Ministry—because the evidence of paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Memorandum suggest that it needs teaching very badly indeed—that when it is doing its planning it ought to measure the load and capacity in industrial terms against each other, it would be a great help. If they do that, maybe they will not next year have to come along and confess to us that they were not able to spend the money for which they budgetted, that production has not come up to expectation, that our sights last year were set too high, and that they have had to spend millions of pounds for orders out of which not a single nut or bolt has ever been produced.
I pass from that subject to a question which I want to ask on paragraph 10 of the Memorandum, and about which I hope we shall have some information from the hon. Gentleman. I: deals with the arrangements between ourselves and the United States Air Force for new works and maintenance on the airfields, etc., and there is the somewhat cryptical note:
A new agreement has been completed with the United States Government which provides for an extended programme of works


services for the U.S.A.F. and for revised financial arrangements.
Surely the House is entitled to know what those revised financial arrangements are? We are having this debate and later on, when we go into Committee, we shall discuss in greater detail these Estimates as a part of discharging our responsibility for being guardians of the public purse. Here we have undertaken to do certain work for the United States Air Force and to receive certain payments. Those arrangements may be fair, they may even be generous, but we do not know and we are entitled to know. Indeed, we cannot judge whether the Under-Secretary is properly discharging his responsibilities of guarding that part of the taxpayer's purse which is emptied into his lap unless and until we know something about the arrangements.
I appreciate, Mr. Speaker, that there will be some part of those arrangements which it would not be in the public interest to disclose. It is quite clear that a Government would not disclose, and ought not to disclose, where and for what purpose money is to be spent, but even within the limitations imposed by that necessity we could have some information as to what percentage of certain types of cost is being borne by us and what percentage by the United States Government. From the figures given in paragraph 10 and elsewhere in the Estimates we can make some calculations of global appropriations, and we are entitled to some more detail which I hope the Undersecretary will give us, in addition to his cryptic sentence about what is contained in the revised financial arrangements.
Now I turn to paragraph 12, which ends:
The continued search for economy in manpower has also contributed to the reduction.
That is the reduction in total personnel. Why has the Air Ministry suddenly become so overburdened with modesty that they will not tell us some more about this? What form does this continued search for economy take? By how much has this search for economy succeeded in reducing the personnel requirements of the Service? Who is carrying it out? What part of the responsibility is it of what Departments and of what officers to search for economy in manpower? And where does it apply? Universally throughout the Service? Does it apply to aircrew, to ground staff, to adminis-

trative Departments? Does it apply to the tail? Does it apply to the Air Ministry itself?
I do not know anything about how the Air Ministry works, but I have had a look at some of the information which is given about the Air Ministry itself in the Air Estimates. On the evidence of three or four pages of statistics I would want some satisfaction that the utmost economy in manpower is used within the Air Ministry. I am wondering whether this searchlight which is being applied to the Service as a whole has yet managed to penetrate the portals of the Air Ministry itself,
I see, for example, that in the typing and duplicating classes 594 shorthand-typists and typists require to look after them, one controller, seven chief superintendents, and 37 superintendents, which makes a ratio of supervision to operative workers of one to 13. That is very much higher than would be considered normal in similar types of offices in commercial enterprises. In the duplicating class we have 37 operators who have six supervisors and assistant supervisors. That is a ratio of one to six—a quite outstanding figure—and I observe that this is maintained over the period which is set out in the Estimates. I would like to know a bit more about this continued search for economy in man-power, and I hope the Under-Secretary will tell us more about it.
I come next to some questions which arise out of the ground staff work—the repair and maintenance of aircraft— about which I have a little knowledge because I have seen something of this work on civil aircraft, although I appreciate the problems are infinitely less complicated than in military aircraft. Nevertheless, some comparisons do remain. I see from paragraph 32 of the Memorandum that the noble Lord is worried about the substantial reduction in apprentice entrants, and he says that we are bound to suffer from that reduction which took place during the war, and from the very low rate of post-war entrants. I will tell him one other thing that he is bound to suffer from, and that is that he does not pay them enough. Although he and the other Service Ministers have been having a look at some types of pay and have made some changes in the last few days, I think he


has been very remiss in not having a look at these apprentices.
The Under-Secretary, in his opening speech, quite rightly said that one of his troubles arose out of the competition from industry. There is no field in which competition is so keen as in the field of engineering apprentices. Competition for the best boys, who are the only sort who will master the complicated apparatus in the R.A.F., is very keen indeed. I see from Table D of Appendix II that first-year apprentices get 2s. 6d. a day, second-year apprentices 3s. 6d. a day, third-year apprentices 4s., and that at 17½ an apprentice can get up to £2 9s. a week and at 18 up to £2 16s. a week. There are certain other compensations, but I do beg the Under-Secretary to look at the market for engineering apprentices and ask himself whether he can possibly hope to maintain the intake with that sort of pay. So long as he does not get the boys in at that level, I put it to him that all the measures he has taken to increase the average length of service of tradesmen will not make good the loss he will suffer if the low post-war rate of intake continues into the future.
As paragraph 32 of the Memorandum suggests, it really is frightfully wasteful to start teaching to men in their twenties skills which they should have acquired in their 'teens. The hon. Gentleman proposes to spend a lot of money in increasing pay and so on. When he is distributing largesse I hope that he will look at this problem. The amount involved must be very small, and he will get better value for it per £ than for many of the other things now under consideration.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I must cut my remarks short, because obviously the Prime Minister has come to take part in the debate, and far be it from me to stand between him and the House. But there are one or two short points arising out of the Memorandum to which I want to refer.
With regard to the supply of aircraft, paragraph 45 of the Memorandum was clearly written with a forward look to the changed arrangements which the Minister of Supply announced a day or two ago. It says:
With modern aircraft, development has to continue while the process of production goes on. This is the background to the delays in

the deliveries of new types of aircraft and equipment to the Royal Air Force.…
That is true, but it is by no means the whole story. I only wish that it were. The new arrangements for ordering a number of pre-production aircraft, instead of a couple of prototypes are, if I may say so, extremely sensible. They will go a long way to cutting out one of the two major causes of the long delay between conception and the aeroplanes rolling in mass off the assembly lines.
But it is not all gain. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the great trouble about that part of the pre-production process is the constant flood of modifications which come in from the Service users. That constant flood has two bad effects—and I know something about this because, at the other end of the scale, I suffered by having to put them into operation at aircraft factories. Apart from increasing the cost enormously, it slows up the period between conception and production. But what the Service users do not realise is that it plays absolute havoc with design and performance.
The designer studies all the latest findings of aerodynamic research, works out all the stresses, strains and compressibilities, and designs a grand new streamlined fuselage. The only thing he will not include is the nonsense of the sound barrier. Then first one chap wants a "bubble" on there, another wants a "blimp" stuck on there, and someone else wants a "bloater" stuck on somewhere else. Before they are finished with it that clean, streamlined fuselage is hung about like a Christmas tree, with bumps and knobs and bulges all over the place. Apart from adding to the cost and slowing things up, that ruins performance.
It was bad enough when those people who, with a fiendish ingenuity which might well have been directed to better purposes, were seeking out modifications at the rate of four a day, and when they had only the time which was required to produce and fly a couple of prototypes. But now, bless their hearts, they have secured production aircraft to muck about with, and will go on modifying till kingdom come. In the end we shall be faced with the same situation with which we were faced at a critical moment during the war. We shall have to decide either to have perfect aeroplanes—and not get


any—or have aeroplanes which are not perfect. I beg the hon. Gentleman—and I speak in no spirit of carping criticism, because I applaud the decision which has been taken—not to think that it will be all profit. There will be some loss. If it will shorten the testing time, it will increase the problem of modifications which come up. We shall find more people flying the aircraft to produce their own ideas of what ought to be added to it.
As I have said, this is only one half of the problem. This is only one of the two major causes for the long period which we have between conception of design and the rolling of the aircraft in quantity off the assembly line. The other main cause is simply slowness and incompetence in the productionising stage; that is, the stage following the finalisation of design and consists of putting the aircraft on the shop floor. It is the stage involved in the making of raw material schedules, component schedules, in getting up tool schedules, requisitioning raw materials and ordering them and feeding the orders out.
This is the one sector of aircraft manufacture in which the British industry is most deficient and most inferior to our competitors in other countries. I ask the Under-Secretary, if his attention has not already been directed to it, to have a look at the analysis of this question made some while ago by the late Mr. Chester Wilmot. I do not mean his most recent series of articles, but one which he wrote some time ago on the difference in the phasing of aircraft production between this country and the United States.
That has a'ways been our great problem. I remember going to one great factory during the war. They were producing Halifax bombers and were in the most awful mess. The reason was that although they had been producing these aircraft for two years, they still had not been able to get from the manufacturers a complete list of parts. It is in the productionising stage, the preparation of raw material schedules and tool schedules, parts and component schedules, that we are desperately slow in the aircraft industry. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to obtain full value from the excellent change he has recently made in ordering, I beg him to persuade the Minister of Supply to turn his attention to this stage.
I make one last comment—it is the comment of a layman—about these Estimates as a whole. I ought to be ashamed to confess it, but I have been in this House for eight years and this is the first time I have taken the trouble to go through the Estimates with a tooth comb. One thing about them that appals me is the amount of work, trouble, accounting, record keeping and personnel involved in charging and payment processes which amount to no more than taking money out of one Government pocket and putting it into another. I am staggered at the amount of inter-Departmental accounting revealed in this document. I am sure this applies to the Army and the Navy as well.
If somebody really wants to do what the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Air calls a continued search for economy, he ought to make the Treasury fellows, who insist on this meticulous accounting of a penny taken out of one pocket and put into another pocket, come to heel and decide how much of it is absolutely necessary. Of course, we know that some of it is necessary, but I should have thought that as between one Department of Government and another, if they got a rough approximation of an item which is going to appear as a debit in one Estimate and a credit in another and therefore cancel out—if they could get a rough approximation of the expenditure on one man-hour, that would have been much more sensible than spending 10 hours to get an exact figure which is going to cancel out.
When I started going through these Estimates, I began to count all the items which are self-cancelling charges of that sort, and on which a great deal of accounting work must have been done, and when I got a third of the way through the book I lost count and gave up counting. There are dozens, and perhaps hundreds. Merely to illustrate this point, perhaps I may mention two examples. I assure the Under-Secretary that if he is really interested he will find many more.
In Vote 10. "Non-effective services" in respect of appropriations in aid. it seems that the Air Ministry sometimes lends some of its civilian personnel to other Departments. We are not told in this document who pays the wages whilst the man is lent to the other Department. Apparently they let that one go by the


board. But what we are told is that the borrowing Department has to pay
an annual contribution towards prospective non-effective benefits … in respect of each civilian lent to them.
Just imagine what a business this must be. Three men are lent from the Air Ministry to the War Office. It is necessary to work out an allocation of how much per annum has to be paid towards the cost of their pensions when they retire. One of them gets £695 a year; he is retiring in 27 years' time, and he is lent for 43 days. The other one gets £795 a year; he is retiring the day after tomorrow, and he is lent for 194 days. Really, one wants a slide rule and an electronic calculator. What does that all amount to? It amounts to the fact that when all is finished, the Air Ministry has got an appropriation in aid of £17 9s. 2d. and the Army has got a debit of £17 9s. 2d.. and it has cost £4 to calculate it.

Mr. Wigg: It is obviously not as complicated as that if it is worked out on a capitation basis. If my hon. Friend had his way. we should be going a long way towards surrendering Parliamentary control. He must not make nonsense of something that is quite a serious business.

Mr. Mikardo: I am not making nonsense of it. That is why I said that it was a serious matter. It was not I who was laughing; it was other hon. Members who were laughing at me. I would not mind if it were on a capitation basis. That is the point I was making. Some of these charges are on a capitation basis. Some are on other forms of averaging or simple calculation, and that makes sense. I understand that. But this is not on a capitation basis. This is a charge in respect separately of every civilian.
I want to quote only one other example. On page 147 of the Estimates— under Vote 9—it says:
Candidates selected for permanent commissions in the Royal Air Force Regiment attend the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Training fees are paid for attendance at this course and, unless waived under reciprocal arrangements, for attendance at other courses under the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office and Ministry of Supply.
If my hon. Friend will turn to page 149 he will find that under the heading,
Expenses relating to courses arranged under the General Education Scheme,

payment is made on a proportionate basis—which sounds a sensible arrangement—and under the next heading another is made as an Air Ministry share—obviously a global share—
of the sterling expense of an education service for children of British service personnel and officials in Germany.
If that can be done in the case of a large amount of money, why cannot it be done in respect of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst? Why must the Secretary of State for War send a bill to Lord De L'Isle and Dudley for the training of one boy for 73 days at 5s. 7d. a day? What sort of sense does it make? Nobody is richer as a result of it. The nation is poorer because of the work of the people who have to calculate the charge, send a chit to somebody, who enters it in a book and sends another chit back for somebody else to enter it in another book.
It is a pity that the Secretary of State for War is not replying to this debate. I should like to ask him on what basis he charges for training Air Force officers at the Royal Military Academy. Does he charge at cost, or cost-plus? Does he make a profit out of the R A.F.? Does he go back to the Imperial General Staff and say, "Boys, I have done some good business this morning; I have made £2 10s. profit from training Air Force people. That will increase the Air Force Estimates and reduce the Army Estimates. I put in my thumb and pull out a plum and say, ' What a good boy am I'". Is it not time that we put a stop to this nonsense?
I do not say that it should all be cut out. I am not impugning Parliamentary controls, but I suggest that we should get a competent body—and I gravely doubt whether any Service Department is a competent body for this purpose, whatever else it may be competent for—to look into this accounting and see how much of it is worth while. If we did that we could save a great deal of manpower and clerical work.
This is an important matter. We have our differences about the level of expenditure on defence, and even about what form that defence should take, but one thing about which we have no doubt is that the obligation rests just as heavily upon Service Departments as upon any other Department to ensure that we get


the best defence per £ sterling expenditure. This is one way in which we might increase the value we get, and I commend it warmly to the Under-Secretary.

12.19 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I am very sorry to learn from my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) that the sound barrier does not exist. After the enthusiasm with which the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) referred to spit and polish in the Air Force, I thought that the sound barrier might have been polished. If there is no sound barrier. I suppose the Air Force is keeping everything shining for the odd ceremonial parade.
I want to deal with the question of the training of Air Force reservists. I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to clear up the doubts about this matter which I have, and which some of my hon. Friends have, otherwise we shall have to pursue the subject on Vote A. Would he explain how many of the 124,000 Royal Air Force men on Class H Reserve will be trained in the present vear—whether it be calendar or financial; how many will be trained next year, and, if he can, although I do not press this, the year after? What we want to get is how many men will this year evade the obligation laid on National Service men serving with the Royal Navy and the Army, and whether the 70 per cent, step up on the 8,500 men trained in the last calendar year will be trained this year and next year, or will it be a different 17,000 or 20,000, or whatever the figure may be, who will be trained in 1954 and 1955?
Would the Under-Secretary also explain why it is necessary to introduce amending legislation to train Royal Air Force reservists in Civil Defence? As I understand it, these men will be called up and will serve under their own officers. They will be part of the Reserve, and the mere business of doing a job which will apply to civilian life does not alter their status. I understand that if they were going to be placed under the authority of somebody other than an officer holding Her Majesty's commission, it would involve a change. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be good enough to

deal with that matter in a little more detail.
Would he also explain whether the policy of training a limited number of men in Civil Defence and a limited number of men of Class H is a settled policy, or whether we are to take it that the Government are to try to close this gap and restore the universality of part-time service for National Service men? Or has that been finally abandoned? Can we expect amending legislation to deal with this in another way?
I am sorry to have fired these questions at this late hour, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman will agree we have tried to clear up this point, and it is absolutely vital that we should, before passing from Vote A, have a clear picture of the numbers involved, and what the policy will be in a short time, as well as an indication of the objects of the Government.
Now may I comment on the Estimates themselves? I hope that by next year the hon. and gallant Gentleman will have examined the form in which they are presented and will give us a lot more information. I hope he will take the example of the improvement in the Army Estimates. We ought to know the actual kind of engagement that is available, the length of Colour service and Reserve service. I would have thought that the Memorandum would have told us the number of men undertaking each of the engagements and the number of National Service men leaving each year.
We do not want to infringe on the security provisions, but we are told much less about the personnel arrangements of the Air Force than the Army has told us. Consequently it is difficult to judge how far the proposals of the Government's White Paper on Defence (Command No. 9088) and the problems they are intended to counter will be met by the proposals in the Air Estimates. Would the hon. Gentleman also tell us how much of the £16½ million it is estimated the increases in pay will cost in the next financial year will fall on the Air Estimates. I should also like to know how much of that sum which will fall on the Royal Air Forces is included in the present Estimates, or whether there will have to be a Supplementary Estimate at a future date. We should also like to know what the


short-fall is, and what is the age problem that at present faces the Royal Air Force.
If the hon. Gentleman would look at the Defence White Paper of a year ago, he would find that there was an estimate of 39,000 Royal Air Force Regular recruits. In the event, all that he got was 31,600. Does the hon. Gentleman, as a result of the White Paper (Cmd. 9088), expect to increase that 31,000? Does he think that these inducements, applying only to people at present serving, will sugar the pill sufficiently to encourage a number of young men to undertake Regular engagements who would not otherwise do so? How many men does he hope to get as a result of the attraction offered in Command Paper 9088?
I apologise again for troubling the hon. Gentleman, but this is the first occasion that we have had any opportunity of getting a break-down of the proposals. The Under-Secretary will agree that if we let the opportunity tonight pass, the chance will not come again, because on the Report stage the Guillotine operates and we have to choose what we are going to discuss.
To sum up, we must by next year have a much more complete picture than we are getting at present. The security argument cannot be advanced, because we do not want more information than the Army Estimates and the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War give. If the picture could be supplemented tonight by this information, it would be advisable to give it. We want to know also where the hon. Gentleman stands today and where he hopes to stand this day a year ahead. If we could be given this information, it would considerably facilitate any subsequent discussions which we might otherwise need to have on Vote A.

12.27 a.m.

Sir Richard Acland: In following my two hon. Friends—I use the word "friends" in much more than its conventional meaning in the House— the Members for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) and Dudley (Mr. Wigg), I am in a little difficulty, because they, although in two rather different walks of life, are two men who are supremely technically expert on different aspects of the matter under discussion. Therefore, it may seem that T am introducing a break in the continuity of the kind of argument that my two hon. Friends have been address-

ing if I bring the matter back to the issues of world strategy which were introduced so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot).
It is, however, that aspect of the matter with which I want to deal, because it is one which most seriously troubles me. I am concerned in case, out of sheer con-servative-mindedness—I use the word in no hostile party sense, but to describe the process which afflicts us all, even those who describe ourselves politically as Socialists—on issues of major strategy we are not committing blunders of quite, literally speaking, world-shattering magnitude. I should like to examine the situation as I see it, and perhaps hon. Members who follow me will be good enough to tell me where I am wrong.
The first proposition which I want to make is a very obvious one: that in the kind of world we are living in now, we cannot be absolutely safe against all risks. When I have heard the Government criticised from this side on the ground that they have not spent enough on preparing to defend the civil population from the horrors which would fall upon them in the event of an atomic war breaking out, I have felt that the Government would have been entitled to reply to that criticism that if one were to start now building such civil defence shelters as would see the civil population harmless through an air-raid on London, there would not be a farthing left for the kind of air warfare which has been conducted over the fighting fronts of Korea and the kind of warfare which might perhaps have to be conducted in 6, 12 or 18 months from now if, contrary to our hopes, another relatively minor conflagration of the type we saw in Korea were to break out.
Therefore, if we cannot be safe against all foreseeable risks, it seems to me to be enormously important to assess the many different kinds of risk which are likely to assail us, and so to behave and to deploy our necessarily limited resources as to reduce the totality of all the risks, not to zero, which is impossible, but to as little as possible. In making that calculation. I feel that the key sentence has been pronounced by the Government at the end of paragraph 5 of the Statement on Defence, 1954, where it is stated,
… it is the Government's view that the continuation for a long period of the present


state of cold war is now more likely than the outbreak of a major war on any particular date.
That sentence is to me a milestone which a good many intelligent people have been able to foresee for a long time. I have described it elsewhere as the milestone which separates the cold war from the cold peace. Those, we know, are nasty terms to describe nasty things. We are addressing ourselves to a situation in which a prolonged period of cold peace is much more likely than the outbreak of the third hot war at any particular time.
Therefore we ought first of all to be considering what kind of struggle the cold peace really is, and what are the intentions and what is the strategy of our rivals. It is important to call them rivals and not enemies. It is not fair to call anyone an enemy. I always remember the letter of Benjamin Franklin to his London bookseller on the outbreak of the American war of independence, in which he said, "Dear Sir … You are now my enemy, and I am yours, sincerely, Benjamin Franklin."
It is a much more accurate description to speak of the leaders of the Kremlin as being our rivals. What are they after in the next half century? Their aims are different from those of any other conquerors from Alexander the Great, and before him, right down until the German Nazis of our own times. All these conquerors fought in terms of their own armed forces, whether on land or sea, and now in our century in the air, overcoming, mastering, and defeating the armed forces of their rivals or enemies so as to dominate, occupy, control, govern, annex, territory. But, to take a concrete example, when the leaders in the Kremlin think for a moment of Peru, in the next half century, I do not think they envisage the time coming when the Russian armies, navy and air force will go to conquer Peru. What they are thinking of, hoping for, planning for and scheming for is that at some time Peru will be governed by Peruvian Communists.
We are hoping against that happening, and we believe that we have good cause to try to prevent that process being achieved within this coming half century. But, in the light of that aim of the Kremlin leaders and their purpose in carrying it out, it seems to me that the major strategy of our defence planning—

and this is equally true of the Air Force. Navy and Army—is little short of crazy, and tonight I want to offer some rather technical reasons for this view which relate particularly to the Air Force.
I very much regret that I have to disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who is not now with us. I do not use the word "friend," in any conventional sense, but in a very personal way. I do not at all share his optimism about the long-range bomber always getting through. I think he is far too optimistic about the future potentialities of this weapon, on which we are now for the first time, according to the official Government statement, going to spend large sums of money, and which will reach an astronomical figure in the next decade in terms of sterling, man hours, raw materials, and so on.
I, too, have been reading the articles by Chester Wilmot, whose death we all so much lament. Particularly have I read the article in the "Observer" of 18th October last about the anti-aircraft guided rocket. His statements are to be interlarded with quotations from official sources. One can practically take this paragraph I am about to read from Chester Wilmot's article as being taken verbatim from statements of the Ministry of Supply's policy, hopes and intentions. It says:
Further remarkable advances have been made "—
quoting almost word from word from official sources—
in the development of guided rockets which can tackle bombers flying as fast or even faster than sound and at heights above 50,000 feet and which no piloted aeroplane could hope to outmanoeuvre. They can travel at well over 2,000 miles an hour and can rise to heights greater than any bomber is likely to reach for many years to come.
Then follows in the article speculation about the launching of rockets from fighter aircraft, and he can reach no hopeful conclusion about a defence rocket catching up with the aggressive rocket. Then he goes on:
Almost identical claims have been made by General Omar Bradley, the retiring Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the new American anti-aircraft guided missile, which has been named rather optimistically after the Greek goddess of victory.
I hope someone with a better knowledge of Greek than I have is not going to


tell me she is called "Neekee," but it is "Nike." I am still quoting from this article:
In the last eight years the U. S. Government has spent nearly 3,000 million dollars on guided missile research.
One pauses there to think what that sum of money might have accomplished if it had been spent on something else, and it is heartbreaking. He continues:
The Americans set great store by the Nike as an anti-aircraft weapon.
And after some more passages in which he says—that for the next four years we shall, of course, need to supplement the guided rocket with the rocket-carrying fighter, he continues:
Scientists on both sides of the Atlantic agree that it will be at least 10 to 15 years before defence against air attack can be entrusted to the guided missiles alone.
Ten or 15 years is not a very long time in terms of the strategy of this contest between democracy and its rivals. And I ask the hon. Gentleman to check this with his scientific advisers. My belief— I have been briefed a little on this by somebody who is a good deal more expert on it than I am—is that in 10 to 15 years the guided anti-aircraft rocket will hit the long-range bomber 95 times out of 100. And although by then it will doubtless still be possible to drop atomic bombs upon Land's End or John o'Groats, I think it will be very nearly impossible for the long-range bomber to get to our vital centres of industrial production.
Someone may say, "Three rousing cheers for that. In 10 or 15 years we can enjoy immunity." But let us follow the argument. If we achieve this result in 10 or 15 years, it is about as sure as God made little apples that the Russians will achieve it in 15 or 20 years, if not sooner, and that again is a short time in the time schedule of this challenge which we are to meet for at least the next 50 years. And when that is finished we shall get this position, that the long-range bombers, which are stationed in Britain, in Canada to fly over the ice cap, or in Spain, or anywhere else, will not get through to the vitals of the Soviet Union. And correspondingly, the long-range bomber will not get through from the Soviet Union to the vitals of the United States of America.
I think, though this is less certain, that we shall also find that the long-range bomber starting from anywhere in Europe will not get through to the industrial vitals of Great Britain. In other words, 15 or 20 years from now the threat of the long-range strategic bomber, on which we are beginning to spend our money, the potential use of it as a means for preventing the third world war by the threat that this is what we shall use against a rival who starts it, will be empty. And at the same time the medium-range aggressive rocket, which will not reach the vitals of the U.S.S.R. from anywhere in America, nor will it reach the vitals of America from anywhere in the U.S.S.R., will be a weapon with which the leaders of the Kremlin will be able to smudge out Western Europe or any part of it in any couple of hours that they may choose to do it, without the slightest prospect of any sort of reprisal.
I believe that an interrogation of our leading scientists today will produce the answer that the forecasts that I am making are, on the whole, more probable than any other technical scientific forecasts that can be made. Let us consider that in terms of the major, long-term strategy of this challenge which our rivals are throwing out. What is the kind of thing which will cause those rivals either to smudge us out, or not to smudge us out, at the time when they will have the scientific means of doing so if they wish. What will stop them? Would the House be surprised if I suggest that the only thing that will save us will be our popularity in the world?
I know it is a strange thing to say to those who are conservatively minded, but put yourselves in the position of the Kremlin leaders and consider this major world strategy, not in terms of bringing your armies, navies and air forces to the ultimate parts of the earth, but in terms of bringing about the establishment of indigenous Communist governments everywhere. Is it too shattering to our self-conceit to suggest that the Communists are relatively little interested in the 50 million people in these islands. They will have a very great deal more interest in the 1,500 million people in other parts of the world not now committed to either Communism or to American-directed N.A.T.O. countries.
The Russian concern will be what, if they smudge out 50 million Britons, is to be the repercussion of these hundreds of millions who really matter from the point of view of the Russian attempt to impose Communism on the world. We have 20 years in which to act, and well did Herbert Agar say that the next quarter of a century may offer the last chance for the white race to join the human race. We have only this period in which to become so popular that to smash us out of existence would be an appalling reverse to Communist hopes of world domination, or we shall be so unpopular that when the leaders of the Kremlin decide to smash us the whole world will heave a sigh of relief.
I do not want to impinge on a Motion which stands in my name and the names of many other hon. Members, tout it occurs to me that if we are thinking of the strategy of the struggle that lies ahead, then how much more important it is to do the things that make us popular with these other people and to make them feel we are partners, comrades and friends, than it is to spend millions on building up a strategic air force which, in 15 to 20 years' time, will not be able to approach within 500 miles of any of our rival's targets which are worth aiming at.
There is a further point I want to make concerning the security of our Common-wealth; it concerns the defence of Africa—and particularly South Africa. It has always been an axiom of Britain's world strategy that it is important for us that the ports around the Southern tip of Africa shall be friendly to us; all the more so if the population in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal is not as friendly as perhaps we should like them to be.
Consider the defence of Africa against aerial bombardment, in terms of the scientific predictions which I have ventured to make with, as I say, a certain amount of expert briefing behind me. On those terms the South Africans, and the Southern Rhodesians—or the Government of the Central African Federation—would presumably be able to make their vital strategic centres just as invulnerable from long-range air bombardment as would the leaders in the Kremlin or the Pentagon, or even ourselves.
It would not be possible, therefore, for the Russians, by long range aerial bombardment to blot out Johannesburg, or the Wankie coalfields, or Salisbury or any such cities. But Africa is a very big place, and whatever may be the prospect of the anti-aircraft guided rocket, I do not believe that the South Africans or the Central African federationists will ever be able to put up enough rocket launching grounds to prevent Russian aircraft—if they were so minded—from flying over some parts of Africa and unloading something somewhere in the African bush.
I notice hon. Members laughing. Perhaps they think that it would not matter very much if a few atomic bombs were to burst in the African bush. At worst they think it would only wipe out a few unhappy savages who have done nothing to deserve such a fate. They may think that it would not greatly influence the strategic strength of the British Empire. Their laughter only shows how very little attention they have given to the strategical and tactical possibilities.
Supposing that the Russian aircraft did not drop atomic bombs, but released half a million hand grenades and revolvers by parachute in the bush 20 years from now. There is nothing strategical to prevent it, and judging from the trouble which we have had from a mere handful of Africans—possessing between them arms and ammunition insufficient to keep a company of soldiers in action for more than perhaps a week of moderate skirmishing—we would get a fair packet of trouble if, 20 years hence the whites are not all that popular in the Southern part of Africa. I commend this line of talk to Dr. Malan, Sir Roy Welensky and others.

Mr. Wigg: And the hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse).

Sir R. Acland: I have often thought that the great difference between Sir Roy Welensky and the members of the Fabian Society—in Sir Roy Welensky's eyes—is that he wants to keep the whites in Africa whilst in his view the Fabian Society wants to get them out. Until very recently—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I think the hon. Baronet is getting a little beyond the Air Estimates.

Sir R. Acland: I am only offering considerations—extremely relevant to the leaders of one of the members of the Commonwealth and also to our Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and our Secretary of State for the Colonies—of major strategy for the long-term defence of the whole British community. I was pointing out that the white leaders of these parts have assumed themselves to be socially and strategically safe for at least two generations and, after that they do not care. Anyone who enters into serious conversations with these leaders and presses them up against logical conclusions will always find that they believe they will be safe for two generations and after that it does not matter. Two generations‡ On the calculations I mention, it could easily be less than two decades.
The point I am making is that this is a strange and entirely new form of challenge directed against us by our rivals. It has nothing in common with the military challenges which conquerors in the past have directed against their rivals. Quite apart from the question of morality, which I have not touched upon because it would be out of order for me to do so in a debate on Air Estimates; on the grounds of sheer self-preservation, defence, the security of our own Island and the way of life of the members of the Commonwealth, the fact of whether we are popular in the world counts as 10 or 100 to one against these considerations of whether we have the military fighting strength for the kind of war which is suggested in the White Paper.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and, 40Members being present—

12.59 a.m.

Mr. George Thomas: I am sorry that it was necessary to bring back to the Chamber many hon. Members who were undoubtedly seeking their rest in other places. It has been my good fortune to hear every speech made in this debate, and it was my misfortune to hear every speech made in the defence debate. I am sorry that no one who is an anti-conscriptionist was lucky enough to have caught Mr. Speaker's eye in the defence debate. I am glad that at last, after 12 hours of this debate, it has been

possible for one who holds an anti-conscriptionist point of view to be heard in the House.
It has surprised me how wide is the field that can be covered under the guise of Service Estimates. My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) who, in my opinion, made a highly relevant speech by an interpretation of the defence of the realm which was unusual but none the less very real, has added substantially to our deliberations. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), who unfortunately has had to leave us, also stirred my blood considerably as he indicated the frivolity of many of the claims which the Government are making in these Estimates.
To me, this debate is a continuation of Tuesday's debate when Her Majesty's Opposition tabled an official Amendment calling for a reduction in the Estimates for the Armed Forces, recognising that we have not the economic strength to bear the military burden which we have sought to bear during these past years. We cannot discuss these Estimates in a vacuum. As has been clearly indicated by my hon. Friends, they can only be tested against the background of foreign, Colonial and economic policy. We have had a little of each of these—a lot, indeed, during the course of this debate.
I believe that the present Estimates, for the Air Ministry in particular, are based upon an unwise appraisal of the possibilities of war. I believe that a certain hysteria, which has affected the peoples of the world during the past few years, is still reflecting itself in our military Estimates. That the Estimates as a whole are too high, the entire Opposition apparently is agreed, and they—

Mr. Speaker: We are not dealing with the Defence Estimates as a whole. We are dealing with the Air Estimates.

Mr. Thomas: Yes, Mr. Speaker. If you had allowed me a moment, I was about to say that while the Estimates as a whole are not being discussed tonight, none the less it therefore becomes the responsibility of Her Majesty's Opposition to say which of the Service Estimates are too large, since we object to them in their entirety.

Mr. Speaker: Tonight hon. Members can discuss only the Air Estimates.

Mr. Thomas: I have been here long enough today, Mr. Speaker, to realise that.
During the day it has been made perfectly clear that the defence force which we are discussing at present imposes too great a strain on our supply of technicians, engineers and materials that are available in this country. I think the Government have the wrong sense of priorities, and it reflects itself in the Estimate which is before the House. We are told by the Under-Secretary that this amount—£6 million less than last year, I believe—is essential for the defence of these islands. He made a passing reference to storing up atom bombs as though he were asking us if we would take two lumps of sugar in our tea, or three.
It makes me shudder when I think of the easy manner in which we talk about atomic warfare, and how we can go on so casually talking about "broken-backed" warfare after an atomic war has begun, when it is realised that broken-back warfare means that these islands would be broken completely and we should be one mass cemetery. In view of that, we might save a little of the resources which we are squandering in the military field, which is the field of the greatest waste of public money in the whole Government service.
I listened with the usual interest to the Prime Minister's speech the other day. He told us that whilst we had been rearming Russia had been disarming, and he went on to indicate that she nevertheless remains the most powerful State in Europe. But, if the available statistics are correct, she is seeking to build up a higher standard of life for her people. The Western Powers recognise that she is making an effort to improve the standard of life of her people, at the same time as we are.

Mr. Speaker: The question of the standard of life in Russia is very remote from the Air Estimates.

Mr. Thomas: I can only accept your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and examine it in the light of the discussion we have had during the day. I shall leave that subject and turn to the question of conscription, which I presume is covered by the fact that we are discussing the Royal Air Force tonight. The Air Ministry has indicated that it does not wish to call up

for part-time training the greats part of the conscripts who have already served their two years' National Service. This establishes a case for the reduction of the period of military service, at least in the Air Force.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must not refer to a matter which would be a subject for legislation.

Mr. Wigg: We have had an announce-from the Parliamentary Secretary today dealing with part-time reservists, and it is therefore surely competent for my hon. Friend to discuss the matter. I referred to it in my speech and I was not called to order.

Mr. Speaker: I am not complaining about that. I thought that the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) was arguing against the period of conscription. It would require legislation to change that period.

Mr. Strachey: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, if we remember the legislation which we recently passed, it would require legislation to extend the period of National Service, but it can be reduced by a Resolution of the House, without legislation.

Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) was referring only to the fact that some Royal Air Force National Service men are being called up and some are not. That is the central point of his speech.

Mr. Speaker: As long as it is kept within due limits I cannot object to it, but I hope that the hon. Member will confine himself to the bounds of order, which he knows as well as I do.

Mr. Thomas: Yes, Mr. Speaker—and which I thought I was observing. With due respect to you, Sir, I was seeking to make the point—which may not have been made as clear as it might have been —that some of the boys who serve in the Royal Air Force do not have to do any Reserve training afterwards. The boys who serve in the Army have to do it, and we make a mockery of the suggestion that conscription is the fairest way of getting the boys of this country to take a fair share of the defence of the islands.
I suggest that the Royal Air Force has indicated, and these Estimates indicate, that the Government's policy in this matter has broken down. These Estimates


make nonsense of the speech of the Foreign Secretary the other day in which he suggested that the atmosphere of international affairs is easier, or at least no worse. But the Estimates indicate that the Government feel we must continue rearmament at the panic rate we decided at the time of the Korean war. For that reason, I think that these Estimates are too high.
We have been told from time to time, and indeed my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Arthur Henderson) said it today, as did the Under-Secretary, that we need all this so that we can negotiate through strength. I wonder what that means. It has been recognised as in order by the Chair during the day that these Estimates are before us so that we shall be strong enough to negotiate with Russia at the proper time. Apparently the moment when we can discuss matters will never come, because both sides are continuing to rearm. Not only are we increasing our Estimates, but the people with whom we might find ourselves in trouble are watching that their resources are improved.
I am disturbed that we can accept the prospect of an atomic war as easily as apparently these Estimates do. In paragraph 42 of the White Paper the Secretary of State refers to his pool of atom bombs which have been put in a safe place. I would not expect him to tell me where they are. All I hope is that they are nowhere near Cardiff or South Wales. I am sure they are nowhere near Scotland, but one thing is sure—they are in these islands, and we shall need them in a hurry when it comes to using them. There will not be time for arguing then. The whole business pains me more and more. There is a search after security which is illusory. The way of the militarist is inevitably the one that leads to war, and these Estimates are not likely to lead to real peace, but are Estimates which, unless some day we call a halt, will lead us once again to the battlefield of the entire world.

1.14 a.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I want, even at this late hour, to return to what I consider the most important problem raised in the debate, that of the money to be expended on a

strategic air force. I am well aware that on this I am speaking as a layman, faced by a block of Ministers and ex-Ministers above the Gangway on both sides, but on this subject I believe that laymen have as much right to speak as anybody else, because none of the reasons given for a strategic air force is a military one.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) quite rightly said that the case for a strategic air force had been given a classic exposition by Sir John Slessor. I should like to read Sir John Slessor's case to show that he is talking as a layman. He is talking about things I know about, not about things I do not know about. These are the two reasons that he gives. First:
We have in this country a gold mine of knowledge and skill in technique, design, invention, aptitude and battle experience which we must contribute to the common cause.
I take that sentence to mean, that we can make and fly the machines—we have the aptitude and skill to do so. But the fact that we can make the machines is no reason for making them. The selfsame skill and skilled men who could make these machines could be making civil aircraft and earning large amounts of dollars thereby. Therefore, this first reason which Sir John Slessor has given is no reason at all; it is merely a statement that we can do it if we decide to.
I was sorry that my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West did not read the second reason fully aloud, because had he read all the words it would have sounded less attractive. This is Sir John Slessor's second reason:
If we want to remain a first-class Power, we cannot possibly leave to an ally, however staunch and loyal, the monopoly of this instrument.
I have often said to the House that the greatest thing which has gone wrong with this country since 1945 is that it has sought to retain the pretension to be on the same level as America and Russia. What do the words "first-class Power" mean? They merely mean a Power which has a strategic air force; because there are only two Powers besides ourselves which have a strategic air force. We rate ourselves above France and Germany. We rate ourselves above every one of our economic competitors. We say that we must remain a first-class military Power: that is, we must have a strategic air force.
I should like the House to observe that this argument, which has been praised so highly as the classic exposition of the case for a strategic air force, does not tell us that it gives us one iota of military protection. It tells us, first, that we can have it; and second, that if we want to remain a military power, on the level of Russia and America, we shall have to have it.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West was a good deal more candid than Sir John Slessor, because he indicated the real reason why people wanted a strategic air force. It has nothing to do with Russia. It is an uneasy feeling that in negotiations with the United States of America we shall have a somewhat stronger negotiating position if we have atomic aircraft ourselves. I was very struck with how my right hon. Friend's words were in line and in harmony with the words of the Prime Minister, who explained to us that if we wanted to rearm the Germans, we must increase our own arms.
We see how expensive it is to have allies. Because the Americans have a strategic air force, we must have one, not as any protection of ourselves, but as a negotiating weapon against America. Because the Germans have got to be rearmed, we must increase our arms in order to have a counterpoise against the Germans. I would say as a layman that these arguments are not military at all. They are purely political arguments, arguments which can be assessed much better in this House than by Sir John Slessor or the Air Chiefs. We have the right in this House as politicians to take what is a political decision: whether or not to have a strategic air force.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West said, quite rightly, when asked, that there will never come an occasion when the British atom bomb is dropped by a British strategic bomber whereas the Americans are not dropping theirs. Therefore, there is no military need for the thing. If we use the bomb, it makes absolutely no difference militarily whether it is marked "B" or "A," nor would anyone say that it makes any difference to our security whether the bomber which drops the bomb leaves from a British or from an American aerodrome in Norfolk. Therefore,

militarily there is no difference. The sole issue in this major capital item in the Air Estimates is whether it is politically advisable to have this colossal expenditure.
I am in favour of tough negotiation with the Americans, but when we start on vast military expenditure solely because it is thought—

Mr. A. Henderson: I hope the hon. Member is not bringing me into this because, for what it was worth, I did not rest my case on political grounds. I endeavoured to base it on military grounds.

Mr. Crossman: The argument has developed further, because the military grounds on which my right hon. and learned Friend rested his case have been destroyed since he left the Chamber, and we are only left with political grounds. We all agree that it makes no difference militarily whether the bomb is marked B or A, or is dropped from a machine which flies from aerodrome X or Y in Norfolk.

Mr. Henderson: I am afraid that the hon. Member was not listening to what I tried to explain. What I said was that just as in the last war there were differences of opinion between Bomber Command and the American Strategic Command as to the order of priorities, so there might be similar differences. For example, if V 1 or V 2 sites were sending weapons into this country public opinion would expect the sites to be bombed. The American strategic force might be engaged in another part of the world. Therefore, we have to maintain our force.

Mr. Crossman: I would suggest to my right hon. and learned Friend that no one really supposes that a large strategic bomber is the weapon with which to bomb V 2 sites over the Channel, though it might sometimes have had to be used in the last war because we were short in the tactical air force. But the medium bombers we are discussing are surely to be built to take part in strategic retaliation. I would say to my right hon. and learned Friend, that I can only believe what the Parliamentary Secretary tells us, which is that they are part of a force which will form our chief deterrent. That means, a force to bomb Russian industry.
From that point of view it makes no difference whether the bomb is marked A or B, or whether the aircraft is British or American. I must ask the Parliamentary Secretary to explain a little more fully the case for this large expenditure.
I believe the House will agree that the main deterrent to Russian aggression in Europe is not the atomic bomb, but N.A.T.O.—the existence of an alliance which commits America to the assistance of Europe. It is no good to say that the main deterrent to Russia is the atom bomb. The main deterrent is the prospect of a long war, because they would find themselves involved with the U.S.A. Where the strategic bomber comes in is that the Americans regard this weapon as their main weapon. They have always believed in it. That is their contribution, or their main contribution, to the defence of the West. But it does not strengthen the deterrent if Britain has atomic bombers.
The right hon. Member for Dundee, West suggested that the strategic bomber corresponds to the battleship of the 19th century. I agree; but we have not the same status in the world as we had in the 19th century. It remains to be seen whether Britain, with our present relative power, would have had a large battle fleet in the 19th century. We have to measure these matters in terms of what we can do.
We all know what the point is—to threaten the Russians; that if they move on land they will get an atom bomb on Moscow. That is the point of having these bombers, to dump bombs on Moscow if the Russians undertake local aggression.
This was the American theory before the Korean war, but I thought that had been exploded by that war. It was there discovered that it was not very easy to deter local aggression by strategic bomber threats because one's bluff is called. We saw a further example of that last month. Mr. Dulles made the threat that if anything happened in Indo-China a deluge of atom bombs would fall on China. It is now clear, however, that it is not the intention of the Americans to start World War III, and over Indo-China there has been a humiliating climb down because it has been made clear that the United States are not prepared to

launch a general war because of local aggression a long, long way off.
All these things I thought we had learned from the Korean war, but the errors are all repeated in this White Paper and in the Estimates. We are spending millions of pounds on a deterrent which is not a deterrent. Nothing is more dangerous than to say to somebody whom we regard as our enemy: "If you commit any local action of aggression I will devastate you with atom bombs." If we do, either our bluff is called or we start a third world war.
With this weapon we put ourselves in a dilemma, which has been the curse of American strategy since 1945. Their whole strategy and way of thinking has been influenced by the possession of this weapon which has placed them in dilemmas as well as burdening them with the sense of guilt from which they are suffering today. It would have been much healthier for Western Europe if, despite what the Prime Minister says, America had not possessed this weapon, because, in fact, it has been the greatest weapon of Communist propaganda amongst the Asians and the colonial people, and it has caused more inhibitions and distracted debates inside the Pentagon than any other single item.
After 1950 the Americans started building a balanced force. They found that they had to have land forces. Previously they had scrapped the army altogether. This year, however, they say, in effect, "We are scrapping the army and going back to press-button war." They are unlearning all that they had learned in 1950. I regard it as a danger that we should be back in the position where the Russians can say, "We need not worry about this atom bomb because the Americans will never actually do it."
What makes me sad is that we are paying out millions of pounds to provide our little contribution to this deterrent which is not a deterrent to local aggression. Is anyone going to tell me that this country, supposing there were local aggression in Indo-China, would consent to the dropping of a Norfolk-based atom bomb on Moscow which would mean the destruction of London the next day? Every time we are brought up against this problem we say, "No."
Apparently Korea has taught us nothing, judging by the debate we have had today. We are simply told we must have strategic bombers if we are to remain a first-class Power. If that is the definition of a first-class Power, I should like to cease to be a first-class Power in that sense of the word.
I will say something now to the Undersecretary about strategic bombing in Germany. I remember the time in 1940 when the Germans bombed Rotterdam and the genuine moral indignation in this country when that happened. I happened to be in charge of propaganda for Germany at that time and throughout the war. And I noticed the change.
In 1940 we thought it absolutely inhuman and a violation of every democratic right to bomb the centre of an unprotected city. Then we started preparing to do it ourselves. We started systematic plans, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West knows very well, for what was called dehousing, which meant deliberately not bombing military targets but systematically destroying working-class areas in German towns. That was the policy of Bomber Command, it was absolutely inhuman, and it culminated in Dresden when, quite deliberately, knowing that refugees were in the town, the bombing took place.
When I look at the money to be spent on strategic armaments, I remember how I watched the degradation of morale which took place between 1940 and 1945. In 1940 we genuinely thought that that type of bombing was a typical Nazi totalitarian thing, but by the end of the war we had developed it far beyond what the Russians or Germans had conceived. It is one of the most humiliating things that the Western democracies, who are the sanest and kindest people in their relations with each other in peace, are more utterly brutal in war than the totalitarian powers. There is nothing more brutal than strategic bombing, and when we sit here planning the strategic bombing of other countries by the atom bomb without a tremor, we forget that in 1940 we were fighting a war to stop that kind of crime.

Mr. Shackleton: I am following the argument with great interest, but it is outrageous to suggest that anybody in this House is planning this without a tremor.

Mr. Crossman: I am glad that we are having some tremors, because I did not notice them in certain speeches. [An HON. MEMBER: "Sensible."] I am arguing the sensible case. At the end of 1945 we had accepted strategic bombing as a recognised instrument of democratic war. I know that we did it because it was not so expensive in our lives—more people can be killed with the loss of fewer of our men by bombing than by any other form of war. That was an important consideration in the minds of the Americans in developing the atom bomb. But the vast majority of these lives destroyed did nothing to help us win the war. The strategic bombing of Germany prolonged the war because it stiffened German morale.
Now I come to 1950 and Korea. Automatically the United Nations in Korea regarded strategic bombing as a method of educating the North Koreans in democracy. The whole country was deluged. There was no sort of pretence that there was any distinction between civilian and military targets. Hundreds of thousands of people were bombed with jelly bombs quite automatically. I want the House to observe the way we felt in 1940 when we saw the Germans do it to Rotterdam and then the acceptance of this as a perfectly normal way of waging war in 1950. In my belief it lost us the war in Korea. For if there was any way of proving to the Asians that this was the white man coming to smash them up, it was the ruthless bombing of North Korea.

Mr. P. Roberts: I am following the hon. Gentleman carefully. He is using a destructive argument at the moment. What is he going to put in its place which is constructive?

Mr. Crossman: I am coming to that. At present I am objecting to the use of millions of pounds of British money on bombers which can only be used to drop atom bombs, and I am arguing that it is ruinous for this country, not only economically but morally, to accept it. Because the atom bomb is merely the logical extension of strategic bombing. I am talking of strategic bombing as a whole. The atom bomb is cleaner in some ways, it explodes higher up, it is neater, but it is not different in kind. We are discussing whether we as a country gained by strategic bombing, by the


enormous diversion of economic resources in the last war, by the hundreds of thousands of young men in the Air Force. Did we gain by it as compared with the use of the conventional type of weapons?
The Germans and the Russians are land Powers. They used their air forces in connection with their armies because they fought to win territories, whereas the democracies fight wars to destroy countries. In the first months of the last war, the German air attack was strictly limited to military bombing until 7th September. It was only when the invasion was postponed that they bombed London because they had nothing else to do. The Russians have never had a great strategic bomber force. They are concerned in wars to conquer countries, whereas the virtuous Anglo-Saxon democracies are only concerned to blow the enemy to bits until there is nothing left.
I remember entering Aachen the day after a 1,000-bomber raid and interrogating the Germans. Only one man had been killed, for there was only a battalion left in the town. But we had destroyed 2,000 houses in which our troops could have been billeted. Towards the end of the war we were constantly wiping out German towns because we had acquired the habit of destroying them. I recall the day before the war ended a raid was ordered on the Skoda Works Unfortunately we hit the brewery at Pilsen a 100 miles away, and I was told at the operations room that the target had been selected because there was nothing else left on the map.
I say to the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) that these things were accepted without a tremor. And now we hear the view that there should be a large capital expenditure on strategic bombers. There is not much of a tremor over that. It is a big decision. Think what we could do with that amount of money in terms of skill and labour. Think how many dollars we could earn. Yet we must forbear, to earn them in order to be a first-class Power, and to have one-tenth of the strategic bomber force of the United States and to feel nearly as good as the Americans. If one defines "first-class" in terms of strategic bombers, we are always inferior to the

Americans. But I want us to be first-class by a different definition, where there is no sign of inferiority.

Mr. A. Henderson: Do I understand the hon. Gentleman to say that he is opposed to strategic bombing, but not to other forms of bombing?

Mr. Crossman: I think I am putting it fairly and objectively. First of all, whether I am opposed to strategic bombing or not makes no difference. The Americans will do it anyway. I am asking myself whether we should spend a large amount of money in contributing a minor ancillary force to the American strategic bomber force. I am arguing that, even were it moral to do that, there is no reason why we should ruin ourselves economically to do it in a small way which does not help the Americans significantly.

Sir Harry Mackeson: If I may interrupt. If we are going to spend any money on armaments the object is to kill men and the method does not matter, according to the hon. Member.

Mr. Crossman: I hope the hon. Gentleman will not take offence, but that is what any German or Russian would call a militarily illiterate remark. The object of arms or aeroplanes is not to kill men but to occupy enemy territory at the minimum cost of life.

Sir H. Mackeson: Is that the best use of arms?

Mr. Crossman: The best use of arms is not to use them at all. The second best is to use them with the minimum destruction of any enemy territory which we want to occupy.

Sir H. Mackeson: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the object of a military operation is to secure the object, and that the method—whether killing men or occupying territory—is a minor matter? The hon. Gentleman is simply talking about the method of killing people. No responsible person wants to kill anyone at all, either by atomic or by other methods.

Mr. Crossman: I do not think that the hon. Member has listened very carefully to my argument. I was arguing about the different methods of warfare we


should use; whether we should vote a large sum of money for a particular method of prosecuting war which will kill a lot of people—and a lot of civilians— and destroy a lot of things which have nothing to do with war.
That action does not enable one to occupy the country. It enables one to destroy much human life, and a great deal of property which might be of some use if one wanted to occupy the country. I say that people rather more rational than ourselves are concerned to leave the enemy's territory as little damaged as possible. The Germans were anxious to exploit France, and so were concerned to leave it undamaged.
It takes the Anglo-Saxon logic of the British and the Americans to say: "The first thing to do is to smash this place to pieces and later spend millions of pounds to put it together again." We first say that the Germans must be wiped out, and then we change our minds and spend lots of money in rearming the Germans. Part of the lunatic policy is this strategic air force. It epitomises the philosophy of total destruction, which was expressed by the hon. Gentleman who said the point of a war is killing people. But the point of a war is to win with the minimum casualties.
My last point is the old one to which we have to come back. Agreed that the Americans will use the atomic bomb. Of course they will. If they are going to use it, and if it is admitted that, in spite of the money we spend a lot of Russian atomic bombers will get through to Britain—as has been generally admitted on both sides—and if we fully support the Americans on this, how can it be justified to have no passive defence for our people at all?
If we are being serious about the "broken-backed" war by going ahead to build the weapons of provocation, how can we do nothing whatsoever for the most exposed civilian community in the world? That seems to me to be either the rankest inhumanity or bluff. We know why there is no expenditure on passive Civil Defence and the building of air-raid shelters—because no one can face the cost. People say, "The bombers are merely diplomacy to keep the Russians from war. The war will not come." If it is only diplomacy, I do not

see why the British should ruin themselves with strategic bombers.
If we are really planning for a hot war, it is cruel to plan raids on Russia from this country and yet have not a single air-raid shelter here. In 1938 it was compulsory to have air-raid shelters in buildings. Now we have abolished all that and all the new buildings which are going up have no protection whatever. There is no legal compulsion to introduce air-raid shelters into new buildings today. The Government are taking no precautions whatever. We have populations in Liverpool, London and Glasgow—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member has made his point. I do not recollect that there is anything about air-raid shelters in the Air Estimates.

Mr. Crossman: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I think I am entitled to draw the implications from the creation of a strategic bomber force. We have been told that a strategic bomber force is the best defence. It has been pointed out that the presence of a strategic bomber force will not prevent hostile aircraft getting through to this country and dropping bombs here. Therefore I am entitled, in questioning these Estimates, to compare the types of defence, and to say that if we are spending millions on a strategic bomber force it is utterly irresponsible to leave the civilian population unprotected. But I have made my point and will not pursue it any further.
In my view, we should not have a costly passive defence. I think that decision is quite right. But I do not think we should have costly strategic bombers either. We should think in terms of N.A.T.O. and save our gold. We should think in terms of balanced land and air forces in Europe. We should give up this delusion about strategic bombers. It is demoralising Western democracy.
I regard the possession of the atom bomb by the Americans as one of the major factors in their demoralisation. It has split their personality. It has given them a sense of guilt and uncertainty. It first made them crazy through over assurance, because they thought they had a monopoly, and then it made them crazy through fear. Though the Americans have got it, that is no reason why this country should make the construction of an atomic bomber force a major item in


the Air Estimates. It will add nothing to our military defence. It will not make us a first-class Power equal with America or Russia, but it will in turn bring us to moral degradation.

1.47 a.m.

Mr. Peter Roberts: I was disappointed by the speech of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). As I said when I interrupted him on one occasion, it was a destructive speech. He went to great pains to say what we all know about the horrors and terrors of bombing. But when I asked him what he would put constructively in its place, he said he was coming to that. But he did not, and he left the question unanswered. If we have no deterrent bombing force, what do we put in its place?
So far as I could understand him, the hon. Gentleman said, "Let the Americans do our dirty work for us." If that is so, I do not think it is a sentiment worthy of the hon. Gentleman or of any hon. Member of this House. We have responsibilities and, if we think there is danger of Communist aggression, I for one am prepared to stand up to those responsibilities together with such allies as I can find.

Mr. Crossman: Let me put it in this way. There is no way in which our Parliament can prevent the Americans from developing atom bombers. All we are discussing tonight is whether we shall construct a stragetic bombing force to carry atom bombs. I am saying we should not spend our money on that. There are other things more important to do in terms of air strategy. The hon. Member says that is leaving it to the Americans. But they are leaving a lot to us. We have the whole military defence of the Middle East. There are a whole lot of things we do for them. Do we have to do this as well and ruin ourselves?

Mr. Roberts: I am addressing myself to the first three-quarters of the hon. Member's speech, when he was saying that strategic bombing as such was of very little use. Then lie seemed to end up by changing round completely and saying that it was of some use, but that the Americans should do it. That is why I was disappointed by his speech.
I was interested in the speech of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), and I think he was the first hon. Member, some four hours ago, to widen the debate to this extent. I was disappointed by his speech because he took an argument so far, in saying that as a deterrent strategic atomic bombing was ineffective, and then at the end of his speech he destroyed the whole of his argument by explaining how the Russian strategy would be to nibble one little piece of territory at a time when they thought they could get away with it. My answer to him is that a strategic atomic bombing force will be a deterrent for the future, because it will prevent Russia nibbling bit by bit.

Mr. Foot: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that if the Russians nibble a bit more of Indo-China, or a bit more of Europe, then he is prepared to agree to the use of a strategic atomic bombing force? If he says that he will not use it in order to deal with local aggression, then he is saying that it is not a deterrent.

Mr. Roberts: I was coming to that point. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned Korea. I disagree with the suggestion that strategic bombing was a deterrent at the time of the Korean war. As an idea, it was in its infancy. In fact, there were few people who thought it was even practicable or possible. Therefore, I think it is correct to say that as a deterrent up till now it has been ineffective.
I now come to the point which the hon. Member for Devonport put to me. The danger which we are discussing now is one on a much larger scale than the aggression in Indo-China. The deterrent which I believe we are building up is going to stop a third major war. It is going to create the peace which we are all asking for. The responsibility which hon. Members opposite have to face is that if they take that deterrent away they are making the third world war, which we all want to avoid, more easy.

Sir R. Acland: Could the hon. Gentleman elaborate his argument in relation to one specific instance which is not all that hypothetical? What would he do with the atomic bomb if economic misery turned Ceylon Communist 10 years hence? It is no use the hon. Gentleman shaking his head like that.

1.54 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I have a very lively recollection of the first debate in which I opposed the Air Estimates. I was ruled out of order after having spoken about six sentences. My mistake was that in the Air Estimates I dared to mention the atom bomb. Your predecessor, Mr. Speaker, asked, more in sorrow than in anger—I think it was about this time in the morning—what the atom bomb had to do with the Air Estimates, and I replied, more in anger than in sorrow, that I thought it had something to do with the Air Estimates but that I must have been under a misapprehension and that perhaps it came under the Ministry of Transport. After that I was allowed to proceed for another half dozen sentences. Tonight we have been discussing the atom bomb on the proper Estimates, the Air Estimates.
I have been looking up the HANSARD report of that debate. The Minister waited very patiently for me to conclude my speech, with which he was not in entire agreement. He made two important points. One was that the Royal Air Force personnel were not looking smart enough. He objected to their looking like a lot of gangsters. I know he said that, because I agreed with him. I stressed the importance of preparing against rockets and guided missiles. He agreed with me on that point.
I went on to argue that the reason insufficient attention was being directed to this matter was that it was under the control, not of the Air Ministry, but the Ministry of Supply. It is still under the control of that Ministry. I know that the Under-Secretary has a great deal of personal courage, which I much admire, but I want him to summon the courage to carry that argument to its logical conclusion by saying to the Prime Minister, "We want to take the control of rockets and guided missiles from the Ministry of Supply." I should very much like to be present when he puts that point to the Prime Minister.
In his speech today the Under-Secretary talked about bombers and fighters going at these remarkable speeds and said that the fighters were going to go so fast that they would overtake and destroy the bombers, but when I asked him the question which I had put six years ago—how will the fighters stop the rockets?—

The skipper answered never a word, For a frozen corpse was he.
Science is advancing, and we have reached the stage where we are spending enormous sums of money on these weapons, but there is still no answer to that problem. We now have faster-than-sound fighters and bombers, but nobody can say how the fighter will stop the rocket.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) remarked that it was out of place to introduce morality into an Air Estimates debate. I presume that it is, but I want to introduce religion. I do not know whether that subject is in order in this House only between 2.30 and 2.33 p.m., but I suggest that we should apply the ethics of Christianity to the Air Estimates. If we claim that we are a Christian nation and an example to the rest of the civilised world, there is surely something ethically, morally and deeply wrong in voting £500 million for aircraft that are mostly destructive without making some sort of examination of the vital principle of the Christian religion. I do not pretend to be a very orthodox churchgoing Christian, but I believe in the Christian ethic. When people say to me that Christianity has never worked, I retort with Bernard Shaw that Christianity has never been tried.

Hon. Members: Chesterton.

Mr. Hughes: I do not know whether it was Chesterton or Shaw, but that is my answer. I would suggest that there is a very strong body of opinion in this country that believes that the Archbishop of York, an eminent leader of the Christian religion in this country was right when he suggested in a recent broadcast that there was something wrong fundamentally, ethically and religiously with the idea of our using the atom bomb, or making it. I have seen Moscow, Shanghai, Pekin, Paris and most of the other capitals of the world, and I say that it is a crime against humanity and civilisation to make atom bombs.
I know hon. Gentlemen who have risked their lives as airmen, and I respect them for their courage and personality, but there is something diabolical in training young men to drop atom bombs on defenceless cities. We have no respect for the human decencies when we


drop these bombs. We destroy women and children and institutions of all kinds. We destroy schools, hospitals, lunatic asylums and all life, diabolically, viciously, and I say that on those grounds alone I would oppose these Estimates.
It was said in that Book which is the foundation of the Christian religion:
for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.
He who takes the atom bomb is in grave danger of being destroyed by it. It was not the Russians who invented the atom bomb. It was the Christian nations, and they dropped it on the Japanese. Today we are having a discussion about the atom bomb, and the number of people who really think that the atom bomb was a Communist invention is surprising. It was the invention of the so-called Christian nations, and I submit that, if we are to base our strategy, call it long-term strategy or deterrent, on the destruction of human life in any part of the world, it will recoil terribly and destructively on this country.
We live in the heart of a great city. One atom bomb dropped in the centre of London would destroy the religious edifices with which we have been associated for so long. ie would destroy St. Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey and many of the great churches in our city. I agree with Sir George Thomson, the Master of Corpus Christi, Cambridge, and one of the leading atom scientists, who has urged on the Government the need for announcing that the cities of the world shall not be bombed in a future war. If we once agree to that, we could reason it out rationally. Why should we not agree that there should be open cities? Paris was one during the last war, and it was occupied by the Germans. Berlin was not an open city; it was partially destroyed by British bombs.
Now that we have reached this kind of stalemate in the possible results of war, we should try to explore new ideas, and we should agree to open cities and open countries. If any one country should be an open country in the interests of the great mass of the civil population, that surely is a country in which we have 50 million people congregated into such industrial centres as we have in this country.
I have spoken of London, but what would happen to the city of Glasgow, near which I five? I have a quotation from a leading scientist, Professor Oliphant, a great authority on atom war, who said:
If an atom bomb was dropped on Glasgow, it would kill 50,000 people and seriously injure another 100,000, and completely destroy three square miles of the city.
That was three or four years ago. And today the city of Glasgow is almost completely defenceless if one of these atom bombs drops. I have a report from the "Glasgow Herald" of only last week, which refers to the assistant chief constable, Glasgow, who is in charge of air-raid precautions in that city, which is much more congested in its centre than the city of London. Hundreds of thousands of people live piled together in tenements, in one-room and two-room dwellings. In this report, the assistant chief constable said that:
If an atom bomb were dropped on Glasgow, it would be Scotland's bomb, and with all the resources Glasgow could not handle it.
All this huge expenditure on the Air Force year after year does not do the elementary thing for which it was contemplated: it does not guarantee any sort of security to the civil population. I am not thrilled at the thought that we are building up a big, mighty atom bomb force for the purpose of acting as a deterrent and for bombing Moscow. Leningrad. Kiev or any of the great industrial cities. I have seen the Russian Air Force. I saw a good deal of it in flying across from Moscow to Siberia. There are far too many fast heavy aircraft there to give me any sense of assurance that if we do get a war, if somebody does press the button, we will not have the Russian Air Force wiping us out while we are attempting to wipe out Moscow and the other cities.
Last week I drew the attention of the Prime Minister to the fact that America was making elaborate precautions against an atom bomb attack from the Russians. Sixty-five miles away from Washington they have spent £12½ million in making a special air-raid shelter so that the Pentagon would be safe and secure in the next war. What a curious thing it is that, while the Pentagon already has this wonderful air-raid shelter, proof against bacteriological warfare, gas warfare and atom bomb warfare, the cities


of Glasgow and London, which would be in the front line, have practically no protection at all if war should break out.
I am very glad to see that in this Labour Party of ours there is a stand, and a determined and a growing stand, against these increased armaments. I am not so much alone tonight as I was five years ago. More important than any preaching or talk in the House of Commons, one thing that determines opinion is the march of events. I am glad that tonight opposition to this rearmament policy is growing, and that a very large number of people in the country would simply repudiate any suggestion made from the Labour Front Bench that we should spend more money on the Air Force. We want to cut expenditure on the Air Force, and we are going to do it. The time is coming when there will be a strong Opposition in this House which will cause the Government to turn their back on the policy of arming for war and will lead the nations forward to internationalism and peace.

2.11 a.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: I have been much moved by the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). A year after the atom bomb was dropped on Horoshima, I looked on the ruins and was horrified. It is terrible tonight to be contemplating atomic weapons and their use; but I ask my hon. Friend, to understand that many of us who disagree with him do regard ourselves as Christians and lovers of humanity. I think I remember the instance during another Air Estimates debate when he was ruled out of order for discussing the atomic bomb. The reason was clear. That matter was not covered by the Estimates which were being discussed. Tonight we are considering Estimates which do cover atomic weapons.
I have been in difficulty, and I hope the Under-Secretary will help me, finding where in the Estimates expenditure on atomic weapons is covered. I should like to suggest to the Under-Secretarv, though it may perhaps be rather impertinent of me, that when he answers this debate, since he has already made two speeches, he should concentrate upon questions put to him by my right hon. and hon Friends who are present here.
I ask him to answer the general point about strategic bombers, and I should like him to answer the more detailed points, such as the manning points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg).
In many ways, this debate has followed the usual course of an Estimates debate, in that hon. Members have pointed out the heavy cost, have criticised, and have asked the Air Ministry what is to be done with the money. Some of the speeches were rather more general and less tied to details of the Estimates. Last year I pointed out that we were about to enter a period when there would be on both sides of the Iron Curtain hundreds of atomic weapons, and secondly, that our ability to deliver them, or to defend ourselves against them, would be more important than having a stock of atomic weapons. We have entered that period, and I believe it is generally recognised in the West that we cannot afford to take full advantage of our technical and industrial superiority unless we can economise in the traditional weapons and organisations which are found especially in the two older Fighting Services. I said "especially" because even in a young service the dead hand of conservatism can be dangerous.
The first question I should like to put to the Under-Secretary is, how far is the Air Force looking ahead to prepare itself for the new age with new weapons? What, for instance, about changes in organisation? We know the history of the R.A.F. and how it inherited the squadron, both organisation and nomenclature, from the cavalry. It may have completely outgrown that today. The organisation we have may have been suitable to the aircraft of the last war, but is it necessarily suitable to the aircraft of the future? I want to know if the Air Council are considering the full implications of this change of aircraft on the structure of the organisation.
Secondly, there is an obvious question are the pilots and navigators getting enough preparatory training in high altitude flying to enable them to make good use of these highly expensive weapons which will be given to them? Thirdly, a difficult question. Is enough consideration given to the qualities and the future role of the general duties officers? In the summer I asked a Question as to which


branch of the Air Force was going to man the ground-to-air missiles and I was told the general duties branch. That may be a good decision. I am not criticising it, but I wonder if its significance has been appreciated. Remember the emphasis that is laid on the eyesight of the general duty officers. Perfect eyesight is all important to an ordinary general duties officer, but those who play the role of an artillery officer do not need it. Is it not one of the factors which could be outweighed by intelligence, leadership, academic ability and many other factors? Is it certain that the Air Council is looking ahead to these developments in all these fields?
A number of my hon. Friends, like the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo), have talked about the financial implications of this new atomic weapon. It must be considerable, and I hope the Under-Secretary has got the information as to where in the Estimates it is accounted for. But I will not press him any more if he has not got the information now.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and others referred to our front line being N.A.T.O. Last year in this debate I spoke early in the morning, just as I am doing now, and the same afternoon I was speaking in Bonn at a committee in the German Parliament House. There was nothing remarkable in that except it was so easy to realise how closely knit we are geographically, and how the Air Force role in N.A.T.O. is of the greatest importance to the security of this country.
I was really shocked six months ago when I learned what was happening in the exercise held under the auspices of N.A.T.O. I want an assurance that that is not the condition of affairs in N.A.T.O. today. In this connection I thought the lion. Member for Brentford and Chis-wick (Mr. Lucas) and the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) were much too easily satisfied. It was said that we, the inventors of radar, were so far behind today that our radar system was really useless, and there were cases In the exercises where "enemy" planes came in low and were detected only 12 seconds away. There was 50 seconds' warning by visual observation, yet here,

by radar, it was only 12, whereas in the American sector they had radar which was working.
The allegation was made six months ago, that the Sabres on which we relied so much were nearly all grounded because there were no helmets to be used with them. I would like to hear that this is not so. It was alleged that the communications broke down completely and that pilots sat at the end of the runways in many cases waiting for "scramble" orders which never came at all. It was alleged that -it was not the strong front line about which hon. Members have been so pleased, but a very poor show.
The hon. Gentleman and others mentioned the three V bombers. I am anxious that we should not make the same mistake with them as with the Lancaster and the Stirling and the Halifax. Can the hon. Gentleman assure us that he and the Minister of Supply will as soon as they know which is the best, go into production immediately on that one only, and not make the mistake that we made producing those three bombers during the war? That is a most important point, and I hope I can have that undertaking.
The Under-Secretary said in the middle of his speech that manning was as important as equipment. Last year and the year before I had complained that the Memorandum and the speech of the Under-Secretary had passed too lightly over the manning problem. The Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State had the good fortune to come into office after the best recruiting year since the war, and it appeared that they were led astray by this and not seized of the real importance of manning and the real problems that lie behind it.
But this year it is clear that the Secretary of State has awakened and has done something for the aircrew, something nearly as important as what my right hon. Friend did when he introduced the new trade structure and the three and four year engagements at regular rates of pay. I refer "to the Cranwell scholarships. I wish them well. We all do. It is an imaginative scheme and I only wonder what imaginative scheme the Air Ministry will now produce for the skilled Regular tradesman, because the pay is


there, it is true, but something more is necessary.
As many hon. Members know, I represent the city of Lincoln, which is in the heart of a county in which there are many airfields. I am constantly having brought to my notice the difficulties of Regular officers and men in educating their children because they are moved from place to place. The hon. Member for Bradford, North (Mr. W. J. Taylor) mentioned it, and so did others. If it is true that there is a Civil Service precedent for meeting this cost, I should like to know, and if anything like that could be done to help to educate the children of Regular officers and men.
There is a point which I want the Under-Secretary to look at. I do not expect him to deal with it now, but I want him to challenge the whole basis of the aircrew to aircraft calculations for finding the requirement of air crew. May not the ratio be too high? In the case of the new bombers, is it not as high as 1:25 aircrew to 1 bomber. This is a difficult point which it is impossible to discuss at this hour of the morning, but I hope he will look into it. There is a human factor used at arriving at any planning ratio, and the fact is that senior officers are human enough to want to see more junior officers coming into the Service. If the calculations were done by a mechanical brain, the robot factor might well work out in favour of a higher ratio of bomber to aircrew. The manning problem in this expensive form of pilot and navigator training is difficult enough as it is, but it might not be quite so difficult if this investigation were made, because the ratio might be found to be nearer 1 to 1.
I would like to refer to what I said two years ago on the Estimates about the free falling bomb. I said then:
If tens of thousands of man-hours go into the making of an atom bomb, the accuracy with which it is delivered is vital. If there were a small front-line bomber force, it would not necessarily be a weakness provided large resources of brain power and man-power were devoted to research development, production and maintenance, of devices capable of delivering the bomb with greater accuracy. I think I am right in saying that if bombing error is halved, the number of aircraft needed is divided by four. In other words I ask the Secretary of State to consider whether some of the resources of men and materials going into aircraft research, development and production could not be of greater value if they

were put on to navigation and bombsight research, development and production."—[official report, 17th March, 1952; Vol. 497, c. 2258.]
I wonder what has been done since, for the basic problems still exist. Do we really know that these forms of scientific equipment are as advanced as our aircraft?
On page 6 of the White Paper there is a statement that less emphasis has been laid on the accumulation of warlike stores and equipment. That worried me, but I was even more worried when the Undersecretary told us this afternoon—or yesterday afternoon—that there was a reduction in the works Vote. The airfields having been extended, I always assumed that there would be a programme of construction of facilities for oil storage and distribution. Everyone knows that even in peacetime we use much more petrol and kerosene—more fuel—than before the war. But would not the consumption of fuel increase enormously in time of war? And is not the problem greater now that we have jets? I am told that, compared with a Spitfire, a Sabre uses 30 or 40 times as much fuel just to warm up and taxi. Can the hon. Gentleman tell us that he is satisfied with the arrangements made for supplying, not only ourselves but our allies with fuel? Is there any danger that the oil companies, because of their tank-age capacity and—I do not use the term in an evil sense—their vested interest in the traditional methods of distribution, may not prejudice the re-establishment and expansion by a large pipe system?
We all know that there was a pipeline system in the last war. We know that some of it is not in commission now. Will the Under-Secretary see if we cannot build up a supply system by the use of pipelines? One of the cheapest ways which has been pointed out to me —although I do not know if there are any snags in it—might be for the line to follow along the banks of the canal systems. Through the line not being buried that would save many thousands of pounds per mile. We have many thousands of miles of canals, some abandoned and some in use, radiating to all parts of the country. Will he look into that? It is of the greatest importance.
Each year in these Estimates debates a large part of our discussion is taken up with the training of Reserves. It has been


the same this year. About five weeks ago I asked the Under-Secretary two questions as to the number of Class H reservists who had been called up, and the figures he gave have been used in this debate. Those of us who take an interest in Civil Defence had been expecting a considerable number of reservists to be used for the mobile columns. I must confess that what we have seen has been nothing but a patchy improvisation—almost as patchy as his announcement today about the Reserve Flight Scheme.
A really damaging case has been made against the Government's failure to make use of these Reserves. I was not present to hear the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence on Tuesday—I was in a Standing Committee upstairs. But when I read the report in hansard I was amazed how weak that scheme was—to start in 1955 and eventually to train 30,000 men each year. That is all that is offered after this great delay.
I have been waiting—and I know the Civil Defence authorities must have been waiting—for such an announcement for a long time; ever since the present experimental mobile column got under way at Epsom. I never expected anything so weak as this. "The Times" this morning said:
It is not the Home Office's fault that this source of manpower has not been tapped earlier. Negotiations with the Service Departments have been slow, and clearly an important point of principles has been conceded. Civil Defence has gained a victory …
One does not have to have had experience of a Service Department, and of the Home Office to know what a tremendous concession has been made by the Service Department in this case. But, in view of the definite feeling of the House on the use of Reserves and of the necessity for Civil Defence, it is up to the Air Ministry to make this work. I hope we shall have an undertaking that that will be done.
My hon. Friends have made a formidable case against the Government. I am sorry that the Under-Secretary and the R.A.F. should have to suffer for this Government. But the indictment is there, and I shall mention only a few counts. Neglect of our vital front line at N.A.T.O., where our performance makes nonsense of our words: complacency

about the manpower problem and the evidence now of the 16½ million scramble; the policy on Reserves; the failure of production and the failure of information.
As I speak officially for the Opposition, I wish to make clear that we believe the Air Force has done well to overcome so many of the problems presented by Government policy. We think the men and women in the Service should be thanked for the fine work they are doing for this country and for the peace of the world.

2.37 a.m.

Mr. Ward: I hope I may be forgiven if at this late hour I do not debate again the value of the V class bomber as a deterrent, or whether there ought to be a deterrent or not. I think the attitude of the Government on that matter has been made plain.
I wish to refer to one point made by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). It would not be a proper debate on the Air Estimates without his contribution, and even if I have never yet been able to agree with him, I admire his sincerity, eloquence and wit. Paraphrasing a Biblical quotation, the hon. Member said that those who use the atom bomb shall perish by the atom bomb. Is not that precisely the deterrent power of the bomber? We hope the Russians will realise that those who use the atom bomb shall perish by it. Of course we share the abhorrence of the idea of using the atom bomb on anyone. We do not want to use it and we still think that our abhorrence may be shared by the Russians, which will have the effect of preserving the peace when other weapons have failed.
I will try to reply to the more important points which have been raised in this debate, although there were a great number of them.

Mr. de Freitas: At the risk of being considered impertinent in trying to suggest how the hon. Member should conduct his speech, I would say that if he will reply to those of us who are present and write to the others we shall be quite satisfied.

Mr. Ward: I think it would be fairer to reply to points which have been made by several hon. Members and not to


bother too much with points raised by one hon. Member only. We will see how we go along.
First, I should like to say how much we on this side of the House, if I may say so with respect, appreciated the broad sweep and the acute penetration of the remarks made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson). We agree with him absolutely about the importance of air power and the efforts which must be made to bring the strength and efficiency of the Royal Air Force up to even higher levels than we have already achieved.
May I also say, on behalf of my hon. Friends, how much we regret that illness has prevented my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) from being here. [HON. members: "Hear, hear."] This is probably the first Air Estimates debate that he has ever missed since he has been in this House, and I am sure that he will be very sorry to have missed it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman drew attention to several matters of very great operational importance, some of which I am quite sure he knows, having been Secretary of State, would be quite impossible to answer in Parliament. There are, however, two points on which I should like to comment—the Washington and the light fighter. The light fighter particularly has been raised. The right hon. and learned Gentleman shares our view that we must build up a jet bomber force as quickly as possible, and I can assure him that one of the primary reasons for the steps that we have taken to run down the Washington force was in order to be able to increase the Canberra force more quickly in the immediate future and to help build up more quickly the jet medium bomber squadrons. We have done this deliberately, and we have done it after making a very careful study and balance of all the factors involved. When the results of our decision are seen, I do not think that we shall be proved to be wrong.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman and others, including the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) and the hon. Members for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) and Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas), all raised the question of the light fighter. This is a matter of very great concern

both to the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply. There is always a conflict, in equipping a force, between the principle of going in for the best and going in for something less than the best with the idea that, since it will be cheaper, one can afford to buy more. I am sure it would be wrong for us to assume that the right thing to do would be to bat on our opponents' wicket.
However important it is for us to bring down costs in order to achieve a balance between our defence effort and our economic effort, we cannot ignore the fact that the mere weight of numbers will always be against us. We can never compete on the basis of numbers. But where we cannot match quantity, we can more than make up the gap if we go for quality. Here we are considering a problem where it may be literally vital to get the right answer, both for the defence of the country and of our forces on the Continent in conjunction with our allies in N.A.T.O.
I cannot give the House the details of all the practical considerations which we have to bear in mind in this matter, but there are one or two which I can mention as examples. From the point of view of economy, leaving aside operational efficiency for the moment, we have to decide whether it is best for the Royal Air Force to have a type of aircraft that has a good performance at all altitudes and in all kinds of weather. The question is: Should we choose a simple aircraft with limited armament, or a more complicated type with more powerful hitting power? This question of versatility is extremely important both for Fighter Command and for the Royal Air Force Squadrons in the Second Tactical Air Force on the Continent.
It is sometimes suggested that the light fighter would enable us to dispense with concrete runways, and that this would be of special importance on the Continent. It is perfectly true that there is a point in favour of the light fighter, especially in a tactical role, and if it turns out to be much lighter it will be able to manage with P.S.P. runways, but we cannot be certain about it, and in any case it is only one of the factors which we have to bear in mind. The penalty is that so long as an aircraft remains really light it is bound to be less versatile than the current types, and if we go in for it we must be prepared to sacrifice such qualities as range and hitting power.
There is also the fact that the light fighter could not be put into service in the Royal Air Force until after we have completed equipment with the current swept-wing fighters.
Whatever are our views on the needs of the Royal Air Force and the best way of meeting them, we shall be very glad to give any advice that N.A.T.O. may seek from us. We know that S.A.C.E.U.R. has his own operational problems to consider, and it may be that some N.A.T.O. countries will feel that their needs are different from ours. Because we do not at the moment see the light fighter as a military requirement for us, it does not follow that we have no part to play in helping it as a N.A.T.O. project if they want it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman regretted that we had cut down the large intake of National Service pilots and navigators, and implied that this might be partly responsible for our difficulty in providing aircrew in sufficient numbers. I would remind him that it takes some 21 months to train a pilot or navigator up to operating standard, and a National Service aircrew could give very little productive service.

Mr. Henderson: I am sorry to take a different view, but unless something has changed since I was in the Air Ministry it should take only 18 months to train these men, leaving six months for productive service.

Mr. Ward: Productive service in a squadron is what counts. We are developing all the time, and now that we have the new Provost Vampire training sequence we are giving a 21-month period of training. The right hon. and learned Gentleman will therefore realise that it will be much less economical generally to rely on National Service pilots at the rate of 21 months each for training out of 24 than to try to get longer-term Regulars.
Several hon. Members—including my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. W. J. Taylor), my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) and the hon. Member for Lincoln—were worried about the education of officers' children.

Mr. de Freitas: I was concerned with other ranks.

Mr. Ward: All children, yes. I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North was talking mainly about officers' children. Anyway, we will discuss them all.

Mr. W. J. Taylor: I mentioned officers' children as being the main class affected by this difficulty, but I included warrant officers, senior N.C.O.s and other ranks in my remarks.

Mr. Ward: I sympathise with those officers and other ranks who consider that these problems can be met only by sending their children to boarding schools. We are constantly looking for ways and means of improving the position, in consultation with the education authorities. Provision already exists under Section 81 of the Education Act, 1944, by which a local education authority may contribute towards the costs of boarding and education of any children if it is satisfied that such education is desirable. Under Section 6 of the Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,1953, it is a duty that the authority shall pay the whole of the fees where board and lodging are provided for the pupil at the school and the authority is satisfied that suitable education cannot otherwise be provided.

Mr. Wigg: I am sure that the Undersecretary is not trying to mislead the House, but his answer is a little misleading. He is telling us what power the local education authority has got, and, with respect, we know that. The trouble is that many people who join the Forces and obtain a commission have no local education authority who will accept responsibility for them.

Mr. Ward: Most Service families are the responsibility of the local education authority.

Mr. Wigg: But, with respect, I cannot understand how the hon. Gentleman can say that. Take the case of an officer serving on the Rhine, who wants his child to go to school in this country. What local authority will accept responsibility for that child?

Mr. Ward: I am talking of the local authority in which the family lives.

Mr. Wigg: But the man may be on the Rhine.

Mr. Ward: When both parents are abroad any authority with which they, or their children, are connected may accept responsibility.

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry but the hon. Gentleman is not answering the point. A local education authority will accept responsibility only for ratepayers. If the officer or warrant officer is abroad he is not a ratepayer, and the same thing applies to a man in this country who is in married quarters. He is not paying rates, and no local authority will help him.

Mr. Taylor: It is not a question of a local authority accepting responsibility for a ratepayer, but for a citizen. Any citizen is entitled to free education for his child under whatever authority it may be.

Mr. Mikardo: But it is not getting it.

Mr. Ward: All I can do, and all I am trying to do, is to point out the legal position. We have done all we can to bring these arrangements to the notice of officers and men, and I will certainly see if there is anything we can do to improve the liaison between the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Education in this matter. Apart from bringing the legal position to the notice of those in the Air Force, there is nothing we can do. I hope that the recently announced pay increases, which were designed primarily to help people with family responsibilities, will go some way towards making things easier.
Now if I may come to the 124.000 Class H men about whom several hon. Gentlemen were interested. Last year we called up 10,000. and I announced that recently.

Mr. Wigg: In November?

Mr. Ward: In November it was 8,500. In the whole year we called up 10,000. During the coming year we shall call up an estimated 17,000, mainly for training in the reserve flights.

Mr. Wigg: The same lot or different ones?

Mr. Ward: I am coming to that. The scheme for training in mobile columns will require legislation. We do not expect to call up any men under that scheme in 1954. We are making plans to call

up 15,000 men in 1955 and increase it to 30,000 in subsequent years.
What we are contemplating is that Class H reservists selected for civil defence training will carry out two periods of training, each for a fortnight during their three and a half years; so that although they will not necessarily always be the same people, they will be the same people twice in the three and a half years.
We have also in mind an extension of the Reserve Flight Scheme in the light of the experience gained this year—that is, what I have described as "Phases 3 and 4." Where a Class H reservist is a member of a reserve flight, he will normally be called up every year. Obviously, it is an essential part of the scheme that this reservist should be as, far as possible a local man, who lives near his war station, and he will be called up every year to take part in major exercises. We have also under consideration certain proposals for forming Class H reservists into reserve units of the R.A.F. Regiment and training them as such.
Having said all that, I do not want at this stage to forecast exactly what the total number of Class H reservists called up each year is likely to be when all these various schemes are in full operation, but I should be surprised if it was less than 70.000.

Mr. Swingler: Can the hon. Gentleman say how many of the 124,000 will be called up for reserve training during the-coming year?

Mr. Ward: I will try to recapitulate a little. There will be 17.000 on the Reserve Flight Scheme in the first two phases. There will be a few more under the R.A.F. Regiment scheme; I am only guessing, but I should think slightly less than 20,000.
I am anxious that the House should not be under a misapprehension on this, point. It is not part of our policy that every Class H reservist should be called up for training either as a member of a reserve flight or on civil defence duties in each of his years of compulsory part-time National Service. I do not believe that we could justify the cost which would be involved in training a reservist unless such training is directed to meet some


quite specific requirement on mobilisation. I am a little surprised that this suggestion, which would certainly involve a considerable increase in expenditure and in the amount of the Air Estimates, should have come from hon. Members opposite. All the time they have been saying that expenditure on defence was already too high.
It goes without saying that the original purpose of the National Service Act was twofold: first, to enable the Services to man up their cold war requirements; and second, to provide the reserve that they needed on mobilisation. We have no option at the moment but to take in National Service men at the present rate to meet our current cold war requirements. The plain fact is that we could not keep our aircraft in the air without the help they can give us, not only on servicing duties, but in the supply organisation, on radar and wireless operating, and on clerical and administrative duties.
The hon. Members for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) and Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) both asked what our ideal target was for the recruitment of Regulars, and how close we hoped to come to the target with the new inducements. I was asked also the principles on which the new rates of pay were settled, and whether the new pay code could be simplified. I do not want to be drawn into a discussion of ideals, but certainly if we could attract into the Service double the number of Regular recruits that we are getting now, and if we could keep in the Service twice the number of men who are at present extending their service at the end of their engagements, no one would be more delighted than myself.
As for the new measures, we certainly hope they will have a marked influence on recruiting. We hope, also, that they will bring people back into the Service; but by far the most important object is to induce men in the Service to increase their skill, and to encourage extension of service.

Mr. Wigg: If the target for recruiting is double the present figure, namely 62,000 instead of the 31,000 estimated for this year, what Reserve liability will a man have. Will he do three years with

the Colours and four on the Reserve, and do training then?

Mr. Ward: It would vary, would it not? I cannot go into it now. If the hon. Member really wants to know perhaps he will let me find out. It cannot be a fixed period.

Mr. Wigg: Unless we can be given this information, which is not in the Estimates, or in the Secretary of State's Memorandum, the House is in a difficulty.

Mr. Ward: The hon. Member did not raise it earlier. Had he done so I might have been able to get the answers.

Mr. Wigg: I did raise it earlier. At the hon. Gentleman's convenience, I will have that information now or on Vote A, but I am going to get it.

Mr. de Freitas: I did ask the hon. Gentleman to be careful to do his best to answer on this point.

Mr. Ward: I will see if I can give it at the end of my remarks. There is no reason to think that the new code will be more complicated than the present one, and I am sure it will be a better one.
Several hon. Members raised the matter of under-spending, and I think I ought to go carefully into this. Of a total money provision of about £240 million in the 1953–54 Estimates for our present year's production deliveries, we expect to be under-spent by a little less than £20 million; but this is only a forecast. Some of this under-spending is due to lower prices than had been expected when our estimate was framed. About £2£ million is due to accelerated deliveries in the latter part of 1952–53, which meant that we got in that year some equipment which our estimate had been assuming would be delivered in 1953–54. This acceleration was largely due to super-priority measures in the radio and radar field. We have also been able to save about £2 million on miscellaneous materials through reduction of our requirements and another £2 million on mechanical transport vehicles through establishment and other economies.
The remainder of our expected under-spending on production in 1953–54 is due to various set-backs during the year. These have mainly been on aircraft, bombs and ammunition, and radio and


radar. To an extent, but a very limited one, this has set back our re-armament programme for the front line, and has had some slight effect on the provision of reserves. We have done all we could to clear these set-backs which, I am afraid, in the field of Royal Air Force equipment, will always be with us to a greater or less extent in any programme which aims at the provision of a wide variety of equipment which is also of the highest quality and performance, and of the latest design.
Estimates of expenditure always take account of such set-backs, foreseen and unforeseen, but it is almost impossible to forecast with real precision before the financial year begins what will be the total progress during that year on a production effort so highly complicated— particularly as the delivery of aircraft and other stores which we have on order at any one point of time stretches over many years ahead. The re-assessment of the requirement for the Royal Air Force Work services will result in a surplus of some £15 million in the present year, and lower prices of petrol are expected to save upwards of £2 million.
I promised to explain to the hon. Member for Preston, South in greater detail how it was that the R.A.F. does not come off worse in the new pay settlement than other Services as he feared might be the case. I think he bad in mind the Group X, Class 1 sergeant and above in the Army shown in Table V of the White Paper as getting 10s. 6d. a week more than R.A.F. technicians and N.C. Os. on the higher scale shown in Table VI. The fact is that advanced tradesmen in the trade groups responsible for servicing aircraft and air equipment from junior technician upwards to warrant officer will receive 10s. 6d. a week extra pay and in consequence will be at no disadvantage compared with the N.C. Os. in Group X of the Army.
Several hon. Members asked about the overseas radar screen, including my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, North and the hon. Member for Lincoln, who asked whether we were installing new air defence radar abroad, especially in such places as Gibraltar, Cyprus and Malta, and they also asked about the provision of radar in Western Europe. I can assure them that we have

ordered all the new radar that we need not only in the United Kingdom but also for every Royal Air Force theatre overseas where our fighters may have to operate. This includes the Second Tactical Air Force on the Continent and the Middle East and Far East Air theatres as well as the Mediterranean islands. We are also in consultation with the other members of N.A.T.O. about whether they need any of the British radar in the areas for which they are responsible.
Just one quick word about transport, because three or four Members raised that issue. Plans have been worked out in considerable detail for the use of the resources of the civil aviation Corporations in war. They allow for the maximum flexibility in the use of our resources in war, both for civil and military purposes. The structure of the Corporations would remain intact because that is clearly the best way to ensure the utilisation of our full resources and avoid a disruption which we could not afford.

Mr. Mikardo: If it is the case that the Royal Air Force in war are anxious to use to the full the facilities which can be provided by the Corporations, why is it that trooping contracts are now being consistently diverted away from those Corporations? Would not the sensible thing be to give them some practice in trooping transport instead of diverting the contracts from them to other people?

Mr. Ward: No, Sir. As the hon. Member well knows, these trooping contracts have normally been given to independent operators, who are carrying them out extremely efficiently. The volume of air trooping has risen during this past year and 54 per cent, of the personnel trooped to various parts of the world were carried by air compared with 49 per cent. in the previous year. Also 91 per cent. of all trooping movements between the United Kingdom and the Middle East were undertaken by air compared with 80 per cent, in the previous year, and it has been done with great regularity and great safety.
The hon. Member for Reading, South also asked me to amplify the statement in paragraph 10 of the Estimates. Memorandum that revised financial arrangements are being made with the United States Government about works service for the U.S. Air Force. I gave


some details of these arrangements in the reply which I made to the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey) on 17th February this year. I said then that the capital expenditure on the U.S. Air Force construction in this country for the period 1951–55 will be of the order of £125 million and that we shall be making a direct financial contribution of £22½ million and, in addition, providing free of charge certain accommodation and facilities surplus to our needs. As for the cost of maintenance and of minor works services, all of this, with one small exception, will be borne by the U.S. Government.
The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) also asked about the R.A.F. share of the £16½ million for pay. He is right in assuming that a Supplementary Estimate will be needed in due course because these Estimates do not include provision for that amount. My hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) and others were concerned about the presentation of the Air Force. We are most concerned ourselves about publicity, we have been giving particular attention to it, and the Air Council have now formed their Publicity Committee, of which I am the chairman, to try to improve the presentation of the Air Force to the world, and also other forms of publicity, and I hope that we shall see considerable improvement in the near future.
I am very conscious of the inadequacy of my winding-up speech. I know there are many points with which I have not dealt, but I can assure the House that I have made notes of all of them, that we will examine them closely at the Air Ministry tomorrow and that I will communicate with any hon. Member who raised any point which security allows us to answer. May I say finally what a valuable debate this has been and how much I have appreciated the atmosphere in which it has been carried on.

3.14 a.m.

Mr. Tom Driberg: I am sorry to put the hon. Gentleman to yet further delay and trouble when he has been so extremely good in dealing with the various problems raised in this debate. I had intended to raise several points severally on specific Votes, but it seems in some ways more convenient to

raise them now, while we are still on the general debate. So I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be a little patient still and will consider the various points that I want to draw to his attention, of some of which I gave him notice earlier in the day. These are comparatively minor points and fairly non-controversial, and probably fairly boring, so if hon. Gentleman opposite want to go out I promise not to call a count myself.
The first point I want to mention is one which I raised on Tuesday at Question time with the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. It was a rather curious point that has not cropped up before I think, and it was brought to my attention by the local authority concerned. I could not get any satisfaction out of the Treasury by correspondence, and so it seemed reasonable to raise it at Question time. I asked the Financial Secretary on what grounds he had ruled that shops run by private concessionaires at the United States Air Force base at Wethersfield were not rateable.
This United States base although it is entirely manned by Americans now is, in a general sense, under the administration of the Air Ministry. It is still officially described as an R.A.F. base. The answer given by the Financial Secretary was:
The premises concerned are held on requisition by the Air Ministry, and in accordance with usual practice rates are, therefore, not payable. The concessionaires referred to in the Question are operating for the United States Forces a service equivalent to that performed by N.A.A.F.I. in respect of Her Majesty's Forces."—[official report, 2nd 'March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 1010.]
I asked the hon. Gentleman to look at the matter again, because it does seem to me a bit hard on the ratepayers locally in that rural district that what are, in fact, perfectly ordinary private traders or shopkeepers working for private profit should be exempt from rates merely because of the accident that the ground upon which they happened to be operating is requisitioned land.
The Financial Secretary, when I put this point to him in a supplementary question, said that they were not really ordinary private traders but agents on behalf of the United States Forces. He added that the provision rests on a general provision of law that land held on requisition by Service Departments does not pay rates. That may be so, but I wonder if there are any exceptions to it and whether


when that law was first promulgated this particular kind of situation was foreseen. It probably does not occur in many places, but there are a number of American air bases in England now, and I wonder whether there are a number of these shops operating which escape paying rates and are able therefore perhaps to compete rather advantageously with the ordinary local shopkeepers because of this fortunate accident for them.
The Financial Secretary said that they competed with shopkeepers in the sense that N.A.A.F.I. does on British stations, but of course that is rather different. N.A.A.F.I. is a non-profit making organisation, and these are traders operating for private profit. There is nothing criminal about that, of course, but it does seem a bit hard on the other shopkeepers in the neighbourhood who are, after all, paying rates. One or two hon. Gentlemen with whom I have discussed the matter have argued that no doubt the United States Air Force would charge a fairly high rent to these concessionaires, and if they had to pay rates on top they might not be able to do the job and: he service would not be provided. If that is so, I suppose that the United States Air Force wants them to do the job, that it is for the convenience of the U.S.A. to have them operating on the place. I should have thought that the U.S.A. might charge them a little less rent if they had to pay the rates, and it might be to the advantage of the local authority and the local ratepayers if some such slight readjustment could be made.
I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should consider whether the Air Ministry, which is directly concerned, could take the initiative—in consultation with the Treasury and the local authorities concerned, not only at Wethersfield in my constituency but various other parts of the country—to see if some slight relief could be given to the ratepayers, without in any way damaging the useful and necessary service provided for the American airmen by these concessionnaires at these bases.
My second is a quite different point. It would, I think, be in order on Vote II, but as I am speaking now perhaps I may mention it. I have a Question down for a few weeks hence to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence on the general aspect of this matter, but

I should like some assurance from the hon. Gentleman tonight on the particular aspect for which he is responsible.
A few weeks ago there was a most unhappy and, indeed, tragic accident in Essex. A Member of a Sea Cadet force was accidentally killed during rifle practice, and some really rather disturbing facts emerged at the inquest. It was shown that the rifle with which he was being trained was a completely obsolete American weapon which came here during the war under Lend-Lease. It had not been properly proved or tested, and it was so very unsafe that it would go off merely if banged on the ground—as unfortunately it had been.
The general Questions which I am asking next month are about pre-Service units in general, but, to be on the safe side. I want to ask tonight whether the A.T.C. is properly equipped with reasonably modern weapons for training the cadets in the use of firearms. We want to be quite sure that no accidents comparable to that which resulted in the cadet's death will again happen—not through anyone being inefficient particularly, but merely because weapons which should not be used at all in 1954 are still being used in training these lads in the use of firearms.

Mr. Ward: On the last point, I can assure the hon. Member that all the firearms in the A.T.C. are tested periodically. Indeed, after this accident happened they were all specially tested. We found nothing wrong with any of them, so it looks as if it is all right. On the point which he raised about the rates, perhaps the hon. Member will allow me to look into it and to write to him.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

AIR ESTIMATES, 1954–55

VOTE A. NUMBER FOR AIR FORCE SERVICE

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a number of officers, airmen and airwomen, not exceeding 288,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1955.

3.24 a.m.

Mr. Shackleton: I am very sorry to harass the Under-Secretary. He has had a trying day, I know, but there is one question to which I want an answer, if possible. It is a matter on which I have corresponded with him. I speak of the percentage of recruits for commissions—certainly for commissions in the general service branch—who fail in the course of their training.
The reason I ask is because quite a number of these young men are persuaded to throw up the training or apprenticeship which they would have been able to complete under ordinary deferment arrangements, and when they fail in the course of their training they are no longer able to complete that training. As I said in my speech, although the Under-Secretary was not in the Chamber at the time, it would seem fair that prospective employers should indicate to prospective employees what are the chances of their being employed at the end of their training, and it appears that no such indication is given to a number of these people who are failed, or who fail to make the grade.
I realise that there may be some reason for not publishing this information. The hon. Gentleman was good enough to indicate that he would speak to me privately about it, but it seems to me of such public importance that I wanted to raise it in the Committee, and I should be grateful if an answer could be given.

3.26 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo: I wish to ask a question and raise a point on this Vote. On page 9 of the Estimates there is an explanatory note on Vote A which, among other things, lists all the categories included in Royal Air Force personnel. The second of these categories is described as:
personnel of the Royal Air Force lent for service with other governments;
I should like the Under-Secretary to tell us a little more about that. How many people are being lent by the Royal Air Force to other Governments? To which Governments are they being lent? How many are being lent to each Government? And for what purpose?
This is an extremely important part of the whole matter, because it is part of the use of the Royal Air Force as an instrument of the general policy of Her

Majesty's Government. I hope I have not caught the Under-Secretary without the information at his disposal, and I am sure that if he has it he will be glad to give it.
My other point concerns a matter which I raised some time ago at Question time. Although I do not wish to be rude to the hon. Gentleman, because we are all fond of him, I am bound to say that I think on that occasion he was, to put it at its lowest, evasive, and to put it at its highest, he exhibited less than the fairness which is his normal wont.

Mr. Ward: On what occasion was that?

Mr. Mikardo: On the occasion when I put a Question about the matter to which I am now about to refer, which concerns the nursing personnel—in regard to isolation pay for cholera plague—

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. H. Hynd): We are debating Vote A, and the discussion must be confined to the maximum number of men to be maintained for the Service.

Mr. Wigg: With respect, Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service is borne on Vote A, and, therefore—

The Temporary Chairman: The hon. Member was referring to pay, and the discussion must be confined to numbers.

Mr. Mikardo: With respect, Vote A includes a number of other things.

The Temporary Chairman: The Question before the Committee relates only to numbers. That is all we are now dealing with.

Mr. Mikardo: I am grateful for your guidance, Mr. Hynd. Do I understand that we shall then proceed to certain of the other Votes, when it will be in order to refer to this matter?

The Temporary Chairman: They will come later.

3.30 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: The question arises on this Vote whether we ought to vote for the total of 288,000 personnel for the Royal Air Force. One of the interesting aspects of this Vote is that it includes


some of the members of other Commonwealth Air Forces. The explanatory note says:
The personnel of other Commonwealth air forces covered by this Vote are personnel of air forces of fully self-governing countries of the Commonwealth other than the United Kingdom, who are (a) serving within the United Kingdom or (b.)serving outside the United Kingdom and paid from Air Votes.
A question that has constantly arisen, in discussing the manpower of the Services as a whole, and in particular of the Royal Air Force, is the question of the very heavy burden of armed manpower which this country carries. In connection with this Vote. I should like to refer to paragraph 73 of the Defence White Paper, which relates to the manpower of the Air Force, under the heading of:
Co-operation within the Commonwealth and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The paragraph says:
An important part of Commonwealth defence co-operation is the continued exchange of personnel and information between the various Commonwealth countries. Much of this is carried out through day-to-day consultations by military liaison staffs in London and the other Commonwealth capitals. A successful meeting of the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science was held in New Delhi in March, 1953. Canada continues her valuable help in training Royal Air Force pilots and navigators and Royal Navy observers. Australia collaborates closely with the United Kingdom in the testing of weapons on the range which she has established for this purpose at Woomera and is thus making on outstanding contribution to Commonwealth security.
I am sorry to bother the Under-Secretary with this question at this time, because we all admire his patient endurance, but constantly in our debates on this subject of manpower for the Air Force the question of Commonwealth co-operation has been raised.
The party opposite have always prided themselves on standing for the Empire and Commonwealth. Constantly in our debates on Air Force manpower in past years the question of getting effective distribution of the burden of manpower between the Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. countries has been raised because attention has been called to the fact that this country has been bearing a disproportionate burden of armed manpower.
This country has, in the past generation, fulfilled its military obligation in 10 years

of world war, and has suffered physically to a far greater extent than the majority of the other countries within the Commonwealth or within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But when we come to consider the number of men whom we are asked to provide in relation to other countries, we find still, in 1954, in spite of protestations which are made by various hon. Members, that this country is carrying a disproportionate burden of manpower.
A few days ago an hon. Friend of mine mentioned this question and was challenged from the other side of the House; it was alleged that he was making an attack upon the Commonwealth. It was stated that my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) had made an attack on the other Commonwealth countries because he had drawn attention to this fact. The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) said:
The strengths represent very good percentages of the populations.
A little later, he said:
If they are able to get the number of men they want by voluntary effort, that is all to the good."—[official report, 2nd March. 1954; Vol. 524. c. 1099.]
I want to draw attention to the fact that we carry a far greater burden of manpower in the Royal Air Force in relation to the total population than any other country in the Commonwealth. The figure which we are now asked to vote represents 0.54 per cent, of the total population, whereas the personnel of the Australian Air Force represents 0.18 per cent.: that of Canada. 0.25 per cent.; that of New Zealand, 0.20 per cent., and that of South Africa, 0.026 per cent. Our proportion is at least twice that of any other Commonwealth country.
I would remind those Members who are constantly talking about Commonwealth co-operation in defence, equal sacrifice and the proper distribution of the burden, that not only do those countries have a very much smaller percentage of their populations in their Air Forces, but most of them have no system of conscription. Even in Australia the men are called up only for 30 days a year, whereas the men in respect of whom we are asked to vote at this hour of 3.37 a.m. suffer the disadvantage of having to serve for two years.
I realise that this question is beyond the control of the Air Ministry, but many of the men who are called up for service in the Royal Air Force are the sons of widows who have inherited one-man businesses, such as boot repairers, and their businesses are often ruined; their educations are interfered with, and they lose financial advantages which they would otherwise get, because of the system of conscription. They have other liabilities besides that of two years' service.
In other Commonwealth countries— upon whom I make no attack—not only do the men not suffer the disadvantages which are inherent in any system of compulsory military service, but they contribute much less to the total manpower of the Commonwealth Air Forces. We want to know from the Service Departments—and especially from the Air Ministry—what efforts have been made in the negotiations with the Commonwealth, the leaders of the Commonwealth forces, and the N.A.T.O. countries, to obtain proper distribution of this manpower burden.
We often get the idea that the military chiefs of this country have come to accept the system of two years' compulsory military service in this country as a permanent feature of the system of providing manpower for the Armed Forces. I do not accept that assumption. I would call attention to the fact that the leaders of our major political parties pledged themselves to the view that the period of conscription was a temporary expedient for the emergency which it was alleged existed in 1950, and that it would be abolished as quickly as possible. But this is the only important country which now maintains the two-year period.
Most of the Commonwealth countries have no system of conscription and have much smaller Armed Forces. When we raise that matter we are fobbed off by the heads of the Service Ministries with references to urgent negotiations or discussions with the N.A.T.O. Council, but the time has come for some definite assurance about it We demand that the period of National Service should be reduced and that there should be an inquiry into the distribution of manpower in the Armed Services. We assert that

there is no system of co-operation whatever between the Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. countries about the distribution of manpower called up for the air forces, and that so far as the United Kingdom is concerned it is unique in maintaining a two-year call up for men.
I am still not clear about the Reserve obligations of young men called up for National Service with the R.A.F. We have a figure of 124,000 National Service men in Class H Reserve at the end of this financial year, and they are part of the R.A.F. manpower. We are also told that 10,000 have been called up for Reserve training. We are now informed by the Under-Secretary that future policy will be to try to organise 30,000 of these reservists for Civil Defence training, plus 17,000 for these Reserve flights. That is 47,000. Those will not be the same from year to year. There will be changes.
But each year the R.A.F. is taking in 60,000 men for two years' training, after which they are supposed to have a Reserve liability for a number of years, to be called up for training and to be maintained as a trained Reserve. The figure of 124,000. therefore, is not a static one; it will grow bigger year by year. But it is suggested that the figure of 47,000—

Mr. Ward: As well as people coming in, there are those who go out at the other end.

Mr. Swingler: It is true that over a period of three years a number of men have their Reserve liability exhausted. Nevertheless, 65,000 National Service men came into the Royal Air Force last year, and 60,000 are expected to come in this year; that is, another 125,000. Therefore, we have this increasing number.
It should be possible for the Undersecretary to say now how many men will escape Reserve liability altogether, and how many of the 124,000 will not be called upon for any Reserve training. Obviously, a large number of the 124.000 will escape it. The question then arises. for 1955 and succeeding years, of how many of each year's call-up the Air Ministry calculates will not be required for any Reserve training.
I could not agree more with the Undersecretary when he says that we should not call up men whom we do not need.


But who asked for this Reserve liability? We here did not ask for it. Who were the people who came forward and insisted that National Service men must be called up for two years' training and afterwards have a Reserve liability, because the National Service scheme was aimed at providing trained Reserves?
If now the Under-Secretary is saying that that policy is wrong and all these trained Reserves are not needed, that the Air Force cannot provide for their training and that it is too expensive, uneconomic and not worth while, we would agree with him; but surely he would admit that this provides the basis for an inquiry into the working of the National Service scheme. It is grossly unfair that those who go into the Army are faced with the prospect of a liability to the country of two years' full-time training, plus a full period of Reserve training, whereas, say, half of those who go into the Air Force will serve merely the two years' full-time training and then the Air Ministry will say, "We do not require them in the future."
All that we ask the Under-Secretary to agree to is that this position provides the basis for an inquiry into the working of the Reserve scheme. We cannot provide the solution at once, but if such great inundations are to be made into the working of the scheme, some inquiry should be held. It is as if there was an immense extension of exemptions. All hon. Members have objected to a great extension of exemptions from National Service and have said that the exceptions must be kept down to a small number in order to keep the National Service scheme equitable as between all the men who are liable to be called up. The same applies to the Reserve scheme. It must be kept equitable to preserve a sense of fairness among the young men concerned.
If the Under-Secretary shrugs his shoulders and says he does not require 50 per cent, of the men for the Air Force training, I say that it is time an inquiry was held into the working of the National Service scheme in the Air Force to ascertain how National Service is working out. If there is a surplus of manpower for the Reserve forces, let us see how that surplus can best be used for the benefit of the nation. These are serious points concerning the great demands on manpower for which the Air

Force is making, and I hope that the Under-Secretary will investigate them carefully.

3.50 a.m.

Mr. Wigg: I have the greatest sympathy with the Under-Secretary. He has struggled with this matter manfully for 12 hours. He has made three speeches. I do not want to add to his burden. He has been left in splendid isolation by his colleague, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. He is "carrying the can" for the incompetence of the Minister of Defence, because the questions asked today ought to have been answered in the White Paper, or details ought to have been given during the defence debate.
It is clear from the hon. Gentleman's inability to reply that the Government have no idea where the manpower problem is leading them. We had the admission this evening from the hon. Gentleman that there are 150,000 National Service men, and that the ceiling will rise until the 1st July when there will begin a trickle of men coming out of the Service which will more or less balance those going in. He has also admitted that at least 70,000 of that number are to escape their liability as a result of the Government's policy.
This is disappointing. I think he was a little less than fair, though I forgive him, when he said he was surprised that we should raise the matter. He must remember that it was a complete departure from the tradition of the Labour Party when it accepted the principle of National Service. It only accepted on the condition that the burden was equally shared.
Of the National Service men borne on Vote A, about 72,000 are now being given a bonus, a cash bonus: and it is not only being given to them but to their employers. Any National Service man wearing Royal Air Force uniform is in an advantageous position compared with those who wear khaki.

Mr. Ward: Is the hon. Member saying that it is the policy of the Labour Party to call up men, to take them from one-man businesses, from farms, shops, or other civilian employment, although there is no need to do so, and one does not need to employ them?

Mr. Wigg: Certainly not. What we say is that the Government's manpower policy has got so out of joint that a bonus is being given to 70,000 men. My view is that the Prime Minister spoke the truth when he said that the manpower problem ought to be looked at again. The figures show clearly that these men are needed for two years. There would be great difficulty in running the Air Force without these men.
The Royal Air Force is paying the price for soft options. It introduced a period of three years' service and got an enormous boost in 1951. A big boost of recruits was required at the time, and the Air Force got them. Then, unfortunately, the Government were persuaded that this was the answer to the manpower problem. Now the Government are digging a pit for themselves, and the longer this situation continues the bigger that pit will become.
The Under Secretary has done his job magnificently today. He has given one of the best shows on a Service debate which I have seen during the time I have been in the House. Should he become Secretary of State for War, there might be some hope for the Army. He is faced with the problem of a breakdown which does not start, or end, in the Air Ministry. It is a problem which belongs to the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Defence and it needs to be looked at. We shall keep hammering at this problem until the Government take action. It is no good the hon. Gentleman coming here to give us, as answers to questions which we put to him, advice passed to him. The fact is this is a Government problem.

Mr. Ward: What is the policy of the party opposite?

Mr. Wigg: Our policy is to have an inquiry on a non-parry basis, because this is an issue which confronts the whole nation. We have to get this manpower problem right simply because we cannot afford to pay the bill, and sooner or later if it is not done—and this is my last word—when the people of this country become aware, as they will become aware, in every town and hamlet, of the advantage enjoyed by the Royal Air Force National Service man. then there will be a revulsion against National Service itself. I do not want that to happen, because I am quite sure that for a long time to come this country has to accept National 'Service. There is no way out of it.
The long-term solution is to try to recruit a regular Air Force which will enable the Government to tackle their problems with fewer numbers than are needed at the present time. But that is something for the future. The manpower difficulties are worse this year than last year, and if the present Government are in office next year—which God forbid— then they will be worse next year, and it will be the same each successive year until this problem is tackled. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have a talk with his noble Friend and get him to have a talk with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence about the whole matter.

Mr. Ward: Perhaps I may be allowed to answer the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), who made a special point. I would still prefer to discuss the matter with him outside the Committee. I do not want to give the wastage figures publicly hi the Committee. This is not being silly, but as he knows quite well the wastage is high and I do not want to frighten away the better quality candidates who would be above the average, and. therefore, would not be affected by wastage.
Secondly, it is misleading to judge this year on the figures which we have, because figures available for training wastage always refers to a time about a year before, so that the figures we have got do not reflect the present position. I hope the hon. Gentleman will excuse me from announcing it in the Committee, but I would be very pleased to discuss this matter with him outside any time he likes.
The hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) asked me what the other Governments were. They are mainly Commonwealth Governments. Pakistan is one example. Other hon. Gentlemen spoke about reservists, but I do not think they will expect me to go on with that subject. I have tried to make the position clear.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a number of officers, airmen and airwomen, not exceeding 288,000, all ranks, be maintained for Air Force Service, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1955.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report the Resolution, and ask leave to sit again." —[Mr. Legh.]

4.0 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo: A few moments ago, Sir Charles, I sought to raise on Vote A a matter which I was advised by your predecessor in the Chair was not appropriate on that Vote, but could be dealt with later. I can deal with this matter shortly because I do not wish to detain the Committee.
During the day and morning, and especially in the latter part of it, the Under-Secretary has been heaped with well-deserved praise, but at the risk of introducing a note of discord I am afraid that on this one point I must be a little rough with him. As I suggested earlier when I was interrupted, quite rightly, by the occupant of the Chair, this is a matter about which, when it was raised at Question time a few weeks ago, the hon. Gentleman was evasive and, indeed—

The Chairman: Order. The Question is to report Progress and ask leave to sit again. Unless the hon. Gentleman aims at not reporting Progress, it is not in order now to raise it. The Question is quite narrow.

Mr. Mikardo: May I seek your guidance, Sir Charles? The Order Paper lists Votes A and 1, 2, and a number of others. I sought a little while ago to raise a matter which is concerned with Vote 1, but I was advised by the occupant of the Chair that I was wrong to do so then but that I would have an opportunity later of doing so under Vote 1, which is one of the matters set down for consideration on the Order Paper. This is the point I am trying to raise. May I do so? If I may not, then what is the opportunity which is provided for discussing an important matter of pay and conditions of members of the Royal Air Force?

The Chairman: The opportunity may come, but it is not now because, although it is on the Paper, the Motion to report Progress has been moved. That is all that is before us and Vote 1 cannot be discussed on this occasion.

Mr. Shackleton: My hon. Friend has undoubtedly been misled quite unwittingly by the occupant of the Chair into believing that Vote 1 was bound to come up for discussion. We are familiar with the fact that it is common that the Government will move to report Progress if a lengthy discussion takes place on

Vote A, but my hon. Friend was not aware of that.
I suggest that it would be fair and reasonable for the Government to withdraw their Motion now so that the action, quite unwittingly, which has prevented my hon. Friend from making his point—he might have found a more ingenious way of presenting it so that it would still have been in order under Vote A—can be put right and my right hon. Friend be allowed to make his point without embarrassing the former occupant of the Chair. Otherwise, the Government must have been aware of the position that they were likely to move to report Progress and that my hon. Friend would, therefore, be denied this opportunity.

4.3 a.m.

Mr. Foot: It seems to me that there is some misunderstanding about this situation because, although it appears that my hon. Friends were opposing the Motion moved by the Government, it seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for this Motion moved by the Government; indeed, it is one of the best things they have done all day, because under the procedure as I understand it, we shall have a fuller opportunity for discussing Votes 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11 which are on the Order Paper.

Mr. Shackleton: indicated dissent.

Mr. Foot: My hon. Friend shakes his head, but if the Government report Progress we come back to the same point of procedure where we were when we left off. As I understand, we shall be able to discuss all those items on a future date. If I am wrong, I hope you will put me right, Sir Charles, but I gather that the debate is to be suspended, the Government will have again to put these undiscussed Votes on the Order Paper for another day, and we shall then have the opportunity to debate them. My hon. Friend will have the chance of raising the points he wished to raise on Vote 1, and I shall have a chance of raising the points that I wanted to raise on Vote 7.
Indeed, I gathered that the purpose of the Government in moving this Motion was because they realised that there were many substantial matters which still have to be raised on all these other Votes, and that was why they were suggesting that it would be much better for the Committee if we postponed this discussion


to another day, thus giving us an opportunity to discuss them at a more convenient time.
But if we are to be prevented from raising our points, and the Undersecretary prevented from replying, then I am sure we shall have his support in opposing the Motion. I do not think there can be any misunderstanding, and if there is the Chair will correct us, but all that we are saying is that these things should be discussed on another day. If the Motion means anything different then I am afraid my hon. Friends would wish to consider voting against it. However, I think I have put the position exactly, and I hope that the Government spokesman will make it clear that we will have a full opportunity to raise these matters on all the other Votes that are on the Order Paper.

The Chairman: The Chair is not responsible for what Votes are put down. I only carry out the rules of the House, and none of these matters can be discussed now because a Motion has been moved to report Progress.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I believe that in previous years the procedure has not been quite so simple as the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) has suggested. I wish to raise certain matters on Vote 7, which refers to a very substantial sum of money to be spent on aircraft. I want, for example, to ask what is the cost of an atom bomb, the cost of a bomber, of a fighter, and of various other items, about which we are entitled to know some detail. When we come to Vote 7 shall I be able to put these questions with some prospect of getting an answer?

The Chairman: There again, I am being asked for an undertaking which I am not qualified to give. All I can say at the moment is that we have a Motion to report Progress.

4.6 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: In an atmosphere of universal admiration for the Undersecretary, and with the amicable spirit prevailing, it would be a very good time for this Motion to be withdrawn. At any rate, I oppose it because I think the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) ought to be enlightened. Our previous experience is that when this Motion has

been passed the rest of the Votes are subject automatically to the Guillotine procedure. Of course, we have had a very full debate on many points, and although there are many questions, for example, on Vote 1 relating to pay, which could not be adequately discussed during the defence debate, nevertheless hon. Members have imposed upon themselves a self-denying ordinance and do not desire to raise these points at this stage.
The hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) has a most detailed and important point which certainly deserves an answer from the Under-Secretary who would. I am sure, be quite willing to give it. The Leader of the House should consider withdrawing this Motion temporarily to allow my hon. Friend to put his point and have an adequate reply, on the understanding that we do not wish to have a general debate because we hope the Government will provide in due course time for debate on the new pay codes, which raise many important points.
It could not be adequately debated on a recent occasion because of the rather extraordinary late time at which it was produced. We recognised that was as a result of the resistance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was in Sydney, and the general friction on this question within the Government. We do not desire to debate that point at this hour of the morning, but I do feel, Sir Charles, that in order to avoid any Division in the Committee—which would be unfortunate in view of the spirit which has been prevailing—it should be agreed that this Motion can be withdrawn so that my hon. Friend can raise his point.

4.10 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo: Thanks to the Ruling which you have been kind enough to give, Sir Charles, and to the explanations of my hon. Friends the Members for Devonport (Mr. Foot) and for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) perhaps I may now vehemently oppose the Motion. I am sorry to cause so much trouble by being slow in the uptake; my excuse must be that it is past four o'clock.
A certain matter—which I must not describe, or I shall be out of order—was the subject of Question and answer a few weeks ago. It was connected with the pay and conditions of an important branch of the Royal Air Force. On that


occasion the Under-Secretary was evasive and, I think, quite unfair. I agree that it was one of those days, which are very common, when it seems impossible to probe a subject by Question and answer. It seemed to be the ideal type of point to be raised during the debate on the Air Estimates. It is just the sort of thing for which Service Estimates are almost tailor-made.
I decided not to bother the Undersecretary then but to defer the matter until these Estimates came along. Now that they have come along we find that, although pay is the heaviest item in these most important Estimates, the Guillotine is being put on that by the Government.
I do not know why the hon. Gentleman who moved this Motion expects to get away with it on the nod. It may well be, as someone has suggested, that when we divide against this Motion there might not be many of us to go into the Lobby. I do not mind the country knowing that the Government were unwilling for pay and allowances of the Nursing Reserve to be discussed; that they were unwilling that such an obvious anomaly should be broached. Let the country know that the Government were not so sure of their case as to enable a simple question to be asked and a simple answer given.
I should have thought that this debate was the obvious occasion to consider pay conditions in the Service. But I am happy that it should go out to the country that the Government—with the Leader of the House sitting there—closured a debate to make sure that this pay question should not be discussed.

Mr. Driberg: I fully appreciate your position as you have explained it, Sir Charles. But could we have an answer from the Government, from the hon. Gentleman who represents the Patronage Secretary, to the question whether we shall have another opportunity of debating these Votes if we agree to the Motion? Can the hon. Gentleman say that they will be debated, or are they just going to be skipped?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): We are in Committee and all those Votes go through Report stage.

Mr. Driberg: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman. Does that mean that there will be an opportunity to debate these other Votes?

Mr. Crookshank: That largely depends on the Opposition. As the hon. Gentleman knows, matters of Supply are very much a joint affair on their request.

Mr. Foot: It seems a very strange answer from the Leader of the House.

Mr. Mikardo: Not satisfactory at all.

4.15 a.m.

Mr. Foot: Surely we are entitled to have from the Leader of the House a clear explanation of the procedure under which we are working. It appears from what the Leader of the House has said that the understanding under which we believed this procedure took place was wrong. It appears that this Motion amounts to a closure on these Votes which are on the Order Paper.
If that be the case we have the absolute right to have from the Leader of the House a clear statement without any kind of equivocation, because part of 'his duty is to assist the House in the conduct of its business. You, Sir Charles, have said that it is not possible for you to tell us what position would arise if this Motion were carried. If it is not possible for you to tell us in what position the House is placed I say that it is the duty of a member of the Government to give us an opinion on the matter. Instead of explaining the position to us clearly the Leader of the House has given an equivocal answer.
I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman was in the Chamber when my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) was speaking, but an understanding was given to my hon. Friend that he would have an opportunity of raising the matter he wished to refer to at a later stage. He sat down and was ready to wait until that occasion arrived. But now we understand that the position is altered.
It is not sufficient to say that the Opposition should provide time on some other occasion. We have rights in this debate to discuss all the Votes on the Order Paper and we are being deprived of those rights under procedure which the Leader of the House is not only not ready to define, but does not appear to understand. Some people appear to believe that the Motion means a closure on these Votes and others that it merely means that all these Votes would have


to be put down again on another Order Paper in precisely the same terms in which they appear today and that we should have an opportunity of discussing them.
If there is any dispute about the correct interpretation we are entitled to an explanation. If, as appears from the shifty attitude of the Leader of the House, the closure is being moved, and if that is the way in which the Government propose to treat the House, then we had better have a vote and probably the Government will; not be able to get a majority.

4.20 a.m.

Mr. Crookshank: May I make it clear to the hon. Gentleman? I thought he knew what the situation was on Supply Days when we move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on the various Service Estimates. What happens is that the opening speech is made by the Minister. Then, eventually, an Amendment is moved to the Question "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair." We then go into Committee, and for the Committee stage a number of Votes are put down. But no statement is made, and no guarantee is given, that all those Votes will be taken. They are merely put down. Vote A having lasted for so long, I naturally thought that the Committee was prepared to conclude its deliberations on this subject.
On the point as to whether something should or should not be in order, it has nothing to do with me, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman realises. Nor could anyone who was in the Chair give any guarantee that a particular Vote was to be discussed, because the Chair would not be aware of the fact one way or the other beyond having seen the list which is on the Paper. Then, Progress being reported, that ends the Committee stage. However, all these Estimates have to come again before the House on the Report stage, and all I was saying earlier—

The Chairman: There has to be a further Committee stage.

Captain Crookshank: The Report stage is the one where there is likely to be a debate, and what I was referring to as the common practice was that on those

days arrangements are made through the usual channels as to what Votes should be discussed and so on. I thought that the hon. Gentleman was seized of that point. If I spoke rather too telescopically or telegraphically, whichever is the right word, I hope he will forgive me, because it is a quarter past four.

Mr. Foot: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. The main point on which I was seeking elucidation arose from the intervention of the Chair a minute or so ago. You said, Sir Charles, that there will also have to be a further Committee stage.

The Chairman: Yes. I thought that the Leader of the House had made a slip. There will have to be a Committee stage and a Report stage.

Mr. Foot: In that case, do I understand that we resume the Committee stage at exactly the point where we have left off—that is, following the Vote on Vote A—and that in that Committee stage we start again with Vote 1 with the same possibility of discussing all those Votes that we would have discussed if the Motion to report Progress had not been moved? The real issue on which I am trying to discover the facts, because I do not know the procedure, is whether you are correct in saying that we shall have a full Committee stage and a Report stage later, or whether the Leader of the House was,' correct in saying that the Committee stage will go by the board because of this Motion and we shall be left merely with the Report stage.

The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman is putting words into my mouth. I did not say that there would be a full Committee stage. I said there would be a Committee stage and a Report stage.

Mr. Swingler: Can we not be perfectly frank? Owing to reforms which have been introduced into the procedure, these later stages are subject to the Guillotine. May I, through you, Sir Charles, appeal to the Leader of the House? We know that one of the reasons' these discussions are prolonged is because the later stages are subject to the Guillotine procedure, and discussion can be very much curtailed. This is because of a reform that was introduced some years ago. There would appear to be no guarantee that these other Votes can be raised, because at a later stage these Votes are taken


en bloc according to a Guillotine procedure, and there will be no opportunity of discussing them at all.

Mr. Driberg: I am sure the Leader of the House realises that it would have saved him and the Committee a good deal of time if he had not moved to report Progress, and if my hon. Friend had been allowed to raise his single point on Vote 1. I should like to know whether the right hon. Gentleman will consider withdrawing the Motion for that purpose. I should also like to ask you, Sir Charles, if you would be good enough to explain how you distinguish between a "Committee stage" and a "full Committee stage." You made a distinction between them, and I could not make out what you meant.

The Chairman: I do not know what is meant by a "full Committee stage." The only stages known to me in this connection are the Committee stage and the Report stage.

Mr. Driberg: It seemed at one point that you were correcting the Leader of the House.

The Chairman: I corrected the Leader of the House because he had forgotten to mention the Committee stage.

Mr. Driberg: When my hon. Friend said something about a "full Committee stage"—which is not a Parliamentary term—you corrected him and said, "I did not say a ' full Committee stage'; I said a ' Committee stage.' "Does that mean that the Committee will not have a debate, or that there will be an opportunity for one?

The Chairman: I cannot answer that.

Mr. Swingler: The whole point is whether it is subject to the Guillotine, and I assert that it is. We need not be disingenuous about it. The point is that after tonight the Votes will be subject to the Guillotine, and our discussions will be severely curtailed.

Mr. Crookshank: There has to be a Report stage, whatever happens. Whether or not this Vote comes under the Guillotine with the rest of the Committee stage, there still has to be a Report stage on Service Estimates. What Votes are taken and in what order is a matter to be arranged through the usual channels.

4.28 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: The Leader of the House has shown, on occasion, that he realises that as Leader of the House his job is not only to protect the Government and expedite their business, but that he is a servant of the whole House and has to consider minorities and the position of the Opposition, especially on debates on Estimates, with all the traditions associated with such debates. I do not think that the Leader of the House was present when my hon. Friend was quite unwittingly misled by the previous occupant of the Chair. If he had been I do not think he would have been quite so unfair as to spring this Motion to report Progress on us until my hon. Friend had been able to raise his single, limited point on Vote 1.
He was just a little unfair, and although, as is well known, the occupant of the Chair could not give an absolute undertaking that a certain Vote would be taken merely because it was on the Order Paper, my hon. Friend was given to understand that it would be taken, and it would be more in accordance with the traditions of these Estimates debates if the Leader of the House were to remember his duties to the House as a whole and not merely to the Government, and withdraw this Motion, briefly and temporarily, to allow my hon. Friend to make his point.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: This is an important precedent, which covers not only the Air Estimates but the Navy and Army Estimates. Hon. Members opposite will find, if they rush this through, that they will not only have curtailed the debate, contrary to precedent, but that when they wish to raise points on the Army Estimates next week a Motion to report Progress may be moved again and there will only be a limited discussion. If this is to be a precedent for the discussions on the Army Estimates, hon. Members opposite—40 of whom, I understand, wish to cause trouble for the Government on those Estimates—will be disappointed, because their discussion will be curtailed.

The Chairman: The question of what happens on the Army Estimates next week does not arise now.

Mr. Hughes: If this precedent were followed on this occasion hon. Gentlemen might find themselves in the same position next week.

Mr. Mikardo: If the object of the Government Whip in moving the Motion was to ensure that his tired and rested cohorts could go home he could have achieved it much earlier than the present hour and without the; Motion, and earlier than is likely to have been the case when we come to dispose of the Motion. Notwithstanding what he has said, one has no guarantee that the future stages of these Estimates will not be treated in the way that this stage has been, and that there will be no facility for the maximum possible discussion, but rather that there will be an attempt to repress such discussion.
After all, we have not, during the course of this debate, been in any way obstructive: but had we been, and if the situation now was that we were seeking to prolong the debate unnecessarily by raising a whole host of matters, one could understand, even if one did not agree with it, the Government moving the Closure to protect themselves. But here was a situation in which the Motion "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" and on Vote A we had debates which every member of the Committee will agree were absolutely constructive, and which the Under Secretary would agree were helpful to him.
It was then when my point was raised on Vote 1, a point which could have been got rid of in less than five minutes and my hon. Friend the -Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) would have been in the process of getting his Adjournment Motion, for which he has waited so long and with so much patience, that this Motion was moved. The Government have not got very far in taking that unreasonable action. They could have still disposed of the debate in the same atmosphere of calmness and good will in which it has progressed in the last 12 hours. Apparently the Leader of the House believes in digging in rather than in getting business done in the quickest and simplest possible way.
As I have, however unwittingly, been the cause of the trouble you may perhaps allow me to put the: point, Sir Charles. It may well be that the Chair cannot possibly know what debates are to be initiated, or what Votes will be taken, and, therefore, the Chair cannot give any guarantee that it will be possible to raise

a particular matter. But the fact is that although it would have been legitimate to raise this point on Vote A I did not raise it then to prevent the debate being unduly delayed because I was given the impression that it would be open to me to make the point on Vote 1.

The Chairman: Since the matter was first raised I have had the opportunity of seeing my predecessor in the Chair. The words he used were that Vote 1 will come later, which was quite correct.

Mr. Mikardo: I think everyone on the Committee took it to mean that it would come up on the conclusion of Vote A. I am not saying that the Chair can be bound, because it cannot, but I am saying that it is a good reason for refusing the Motion to report Progress.
That is why we did not want to do it, but are indicating even though we have not done it, although we feel reluctantly compelled to, our opposition to the Motion. That same Motion could have been taken four minutes afterwards without any discussion at all and without a Division. But if the Leader of the House wants it this way, if he wants it known in the country that an important matter affecting the pay of the Nursing Reserve on difficult and delicate operations is considered by the Government to be unworthy of discussion in the House of Commons, all right, let him have his way.

4.35 a.m.

Mr. Foot: One point which my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) has made is not yet absolutely clear to me. Even if Vote 1 were taken instead of having the Motion to report Progress, would the other Votes still be taken? Therefore, the question arises as to whether those Votes would be subject to the Guillotine procedure.
If the Leader of the House were completely candid, he would admit that in his last statement he was somewhat fogged about this procedure and was not sure whether the Motion to report Progress involved applying the Guillotine procedure to these Votes on the Committee stage. The reason I say that is because the right hon. Gentleman said, "Whatever happens under the Committee stage, there will still be the possibility of raising these points on the Report stage." Had the Leader of the House been quite certain of the consequence


of the Motion which had been moved from his own Front Bench—either that it would or would not have meant applying the Guillotine—he would not have used the phrase "Whatever happens under the Committee stage"; he would have said quite definitely one thing or the other.
We come again to the point, which is a curious state of affairs, that there is a plain contradiction between the advice which is given to us by the Leader of the House and the advice which has been given to us by the Chair. There was some argument by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) as to whether I used the phrase "a full Committee stage" or "a Committee stage"; but the question with which I am concerned is whether there is to be any Committee stage on Votes 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11 such as we have already had on Vote A.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: They are all guillotined.

Mr. Foot: My hon. Friend says that they are all guillotined. If that is the definite procedure, it contradicts what has been said from the Chair, because we have been told from the Chair that we will still have a Committee stage on these Votes. We know there are other Votes still to be put down. Votes 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 have to be put down at some time or other to be discussed, and presumably they are not subject to the Guillotine. But we had the statement from the Chair that these Votes will still be subject to a Committee procedure as well as a Report stage. If that means anything at all, it means that these Votes are not subject to the Guillotine procedure.
It may be that my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) is right, but three different kinds of counsel have been given to the Committee: first, the advice that my hon. Friend has given us; second, the advice which takes an intermediate position, that given by the Leader of the House; and third, the advice which you, Sir Charles, have given us from the Chair. I certainly clearly understood you to say that if this Motion were passed, we would still have a further Committee stage on Votes 1, 2. 7, 8, 9 and 11.
If, after the Chair had said that, we were to discover that we did not have a further Committee stage, the House, and, indeed, the Chair, would be in some difficulty. Therefore, it would be much more sensible for the Government either to withdraw the Motion to report Progress and discover what is the true situation and let us proceed with the debate on these Votes, or to give us the guarantee that we shall have what the Chair says we are entitled to have: that is, a full Committee stage on all these Votes that are still to be debated.

The Chairman: I must protest against words which I have never used being put into my mouth. What I said was that there would be a Committee stage and a Report stage. I do not know what a "full Committee stage" is, and I have not used the expression.

Mr. Foot: I apologise, Sir Charles, for using the words "full committee stage." It was wrong of me to have attributed them to you.
However, if I may respectfully say so, it does not make any difference to the argument I am presenting, because I think that when I used the words, "full Committee stage," they were foolish words. If, on the Committee stage, these matters are subject to the Guillotine we will have no decision on these Votes. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but it is a matter of some interest. We have had directly contrary advice from the Chair and from the Leader of the House. The House will be in difficulty about it.
The Leader of the House, while he has not said definitely, probably because he was in doubt about it, says in effect that whether or not there is a Guillotine, or whatever it is on the Committee stage, there will be the Report stage. That is different from what was said by the Chair. I would ask the Leader of the House whether he has reconsidered the matter; whether he has had the opportunity to discuss what is the precise situation, and whether he will bring his undertaking into line with the statement made by the Chair; or will he withdraw the Motion so that we can proceed with the discussion?

4.41 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: We have appealed repeatedly to the Leader of the House in reasonable, almost genial, terms, but if he is going to be tiresome it will be necessary to examine in much greater detail the reasons against agreeing to the Motion. There are solid reasons for not agreeing to it in these Votes which we are not to 'be allowed to debate. Vote 1
… provides for the pay cash allowances (other than those noted below), and contribution payable from Air Votes under the National Insurance Scheme for: —

(a) officers and airmen of the Royal Air Force;
(b) officers of …"

The Chairman: The hon. Member cannot discuss them now. He can only discuss reasons for reporting Progress, or otherwise.

Mr. Driberg: I am not trying to discuss them. Sir Charles.

The Chairman: It; sounded as though the hon. Member was going in that direction.

Mr. Driberg: I was only indicating the importance of these subjects as a reason for not agreeing to the Motion. I shall be grateful if you will call me to order if I stray beyond the proper limits, Sir Charles.

The Chairman: I will certainly do that.

Mr. Driberg: Apart from those I have mentioned there are officers and airwomen of the Women's Royal Air Force, and personnel of the reserve and auxiliary forces serving with Royal Air Force as officers, airman and airwomen, other than those carrying out training under the regulations of the reserve or anxiliary force, and so on. There is also a matter on which I would have liked to speak on Vote 1, only in view of the undertakings we have been given I would prefer not to do so if the Leader of the House will withdraw the Motion for a brief interval to give the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) to make his single, brief point.
A point I should liked to have spoken on was Korea gratuities. I notice that in accordance with the bad custom of reduced rates for women, the women's Service is to receive approximately three-quarters the rate for men.

The Chairman: The hon. Member cannot discuss that.

Mr. Driberg: I was only quoting it by way of illustration of the importance of the subjects we are prevented from discussing by the obstinacy of the Leader of the House.
We turn from Vote 1 to Vote 2, which we had hoped to be able to discuss this morning. This concerns the Reserve and Auxiliary Services. Then there is Vote 7, which covers aircraft and stores. This Vote provides for the supply of aircraft, warlike stores, technical equipment, materials and miscellaneous equipment, meteorological equipment, general stores, clothing and medical stores, a vast number of extremely important subjects. I am not going to presume to argue about them or discuss them in any way, but I merely cite them to show the Leader of the House of what it is he is depriving the Committee.
It is all rather regrettable, and I think he is beginning to feel sorry for himself, though he has the remedy in his own hands. I will give way to him any time in the next half hour to allow him to withdraw this Motion to report Progress and allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South to make his single limited but important point, the nature of which he has already indicated to the Committee.
There was something else on Vote 7 to which I wished to draw attention, namely, radio, radar and electrical equipment, and my hon. Friends will no doubt notice other subjects while I have been speaking to which they will wish to draw the attention of the Committee in due course if I myself fail to put them forward by way of argument against this Motion.
Vote 8 deals with works and lands. Here indeed is something which we cannot just pass by without any consideration at all. I do not think we ought to agree to report Progress until there has been some brief discussion on this extremely important subject. Part I of this Vote provides for.
New works, additions and alterations amounting to £10,000 each and upwards.
These are all extremely important matters.
Vote 9 deals with "Miscellaneous Effective Services," which covers all sorts


of extremely interesting things such as training by civil flying companies and clubs, and fees, etc., for personal services, whatever they may 'be. We should like to ask what they are. Then there is compensation for losses, damage, etc., and maps and charts. I do not think there has been any discussion of maps and charts in the whole course of our debates since 3.30 yesterday afternoon and I think there ought to be.
Next we come to Vote 11 which refers to additional married quarters. I suppose there is no one single subject which has a stronger bearing on the possibility of retaining in the Royal Air Force senior N.C. Os., married men and so on. I am sure the Under-Secretary, if he were still with us—and I for one do not blame him for going out for a little rest and refreshment at this time of the morning—would have been anxious to discuss this Vote because he would realise what immense importance it is to the welfare of the Royal Air Force and the men serving in it and their dependants.
This is a very brief indication of the wide nature of the subjects which we are now being debarred from discussing and I hope very much that my hon. Friends, while I have been speaking, will have noticed other aspects of this important matter. I see here a grant to the Royal Society in aid of meteorological research. One could keep this up to the crack of dawn.
These are all matters that we should be discussing if only the Leader of the House would allow us. This time wasting Motion of his to report Progress has taken up nearly an hour of valuable Parliamentary time when we could have been discussing these important subjects, and in particular the single, limited point which my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South has already mentioned, which he wished to raise. This is all the fault of the Leader of the House for being so stubborn, and I wish that even at this late hour he would repent and withdraw this Motion for five minutes to allow my hon. Friend to make his point.

4.50 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: I think it would have paid the Leader of the House to have been really frank with the Committee. You will recall, Sir Charles, that this situation could not have arisen years ago

because in those days the opportunity arose for going through the whole of the book. I can well recall some years ago on the Estimates for the Service Departments the opportunity of going through Vote by Vote the detailed points in an Estimate such as this. But since that time the procedure has been altered and, let us be frank, it has been the custom of Governments in recent times to have the general Estimates debate and to expect hon. Members to raise all their questions on the Estimates in that general debate, then to take Vote A and, after that, to report Progress.
I think the Leader of the House will agree with me that this has been the general custom in recent times, and one of the reasons for it has been that under the new procedure, introduced a few years ago, the Government are able to get the rest of the Votes in Committee and on Report under a time-limited discussion. It is no good the Leader of the House being disingenuous about this. He knows that the effect of this Motion is that the discussion on these Votes in the future, whether they come up in Committee or on Report, is time-limited, and the Opposition are put in the position where they have to operate a stringent order of priority on questions they want to raise on these Estimates, within a matter of two or three hours of discussion. Therefore, it does not give an opportunity for every Member who might have a point of importance to raise it.
We know that the majority of hon. Members are not interested in these Estimates, they are only kept here by the Whips, but there are hon. Members like my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) who have important interests of a constituency nature or awkward questions to raise on certain Votes that might well be excluded as a result of the procedure under which we now operate and which the Leader of the House well knows.
It would have paid the Leader of the House to say all this, instead of saying what he did say when this Motion was proposed and trying to pretend that there was a full opportunity for my hon. Friend to raise the point in future, because that is not so. We have all had experience of being excluded in the past once the normal annual Estimates debates have


passed. As a result of what I call the Guillotine procedure which now operates, we are excluded from raising specific points on certain Votes.
It would have been simple for the Leader of the House to have taken Vote 1. That Vote deals with a particularly important question, the pay of the Air Force. Why should we resist this Motion now for the purpose of discussing pay? Surely there is some point in the fact that just a few days ago we had a defence debate and, in the middle of it, the Government produced a new White Paper with a new pay code for the Forces, and now we are having the first of the Services coming up for discussion. It is very natural that all through this debate questions about pay for the R.A.F. have been raised, and now my hon. Friend, unaware of the procedure, did not raise this question in his general speech and wishes to raise it now.
I make no complaint whatever, for I know how this procedure has operated in the past, and the Leader of the House knows that his instructions are that as soon as Vote A is obtained the Motion is put to report Progress. It will be done with the other Service Estimates, and the Government will get the rest of the Votes under the Guillotine. If any hon. Gentleman is interested in a detailed point in any of the Votes after Vote A he had better raise it in his general speech on the Estimates, for when we get to the Report stage perhaps; only a couple of hours will be allowed for the remainder of the Votes. There are 230 pages in the Air Estimates.
Next week we shall have the Navy and Army Estimates, each, no doubt, of a similar number of pages. That is 500 pages in all, and I reckon that we shall get a day for the Report stage of the Service Estimates, with three hours for each Estimate. The argument has been in modern times that because we have a Select Committee on Estimates it is not necessary for hon. Gentlemen to go through the Estimates in detail, and, apparently, because so few Members participate in these debates the Guillotine procedure has been introduced. I should have thought, that in these circumstances it was reasonable for the Leader of the House to pay attention to hon. Members

who are interested in raising particular points on the Estimates and enable them to raise them. It does not take a great deal of time.
The Under-Secretary need not worry. The rest of his Votes are all secure under the Guillotine procedure. It is just a question of allowing one hon. Member and possibly another to put a point, by taking Vote I and reporting Progress then. On the other hand, if the Government insist that in all the Service Estimates they are going automatically to report Progress after they have taken Vote A a number of hon. Members, and possibly some on the Government side, who have detailed points to raise, will be frustrated, and, as a result, there will be discontent about the way this debate operates. There is no reason why it should always be on Vote I. We could take the Votes of most interest to hon. Members and then report Progress, and by that means the Leader of the House would save the time of the House at the later stages because hon. Members would have already had the answers to their detailed points. There is not a very large pressure of Members requiring to take up the time of the Committee at a later stage. That is a very simple position.
If the Leader of the House is not prepared to make clear just what was his policy in reporting Progress in this instance, what would be the effect of passing this Motion now, and what future opportunities might my hon. Friends and others have of raising questions on the later stages of the Air Estimates? We have now had a long debate on the question of reporting Progress. We are still desirous of asking the Leader of the House whether he will enable my hon. Friend's question to be raised, so that the Under-Secretary—who has been sitting patiently all the time—may have an opportunity, which otherwise he is denied, to make a statement. We are all denied an opportunity of hearing a question and an answer on this point—which may take only five or 10 minutes.

Mr. Ward: If it will help at all, I might say that I know perfectly well the point which the hon. Member wished to raise. I should certainly have wished to refresh my memory on the answer which I gave him at Question time not long ago, and to consult the parties. I could have given him an answer then, or given a Written answer later. So far as I can


see I can still do either of those things. Therefore, so far as the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) is concerned, he is no worse off now than had he been able to ask his question.

Mr. Mikardo: The Under-Secretary cannot possibly know what I would say, because I was not allowed to say it.

Mr. Ward: The hon. Member was able to say enough to convey to me that he is still worried about the tuberculosis boards—a matter which he raised at Question time not long ago.

Mr. Mikardo: Although the Undersecretary may know the nature of the subject I wished to raise, he cannot—unless he is divinely inspired which I doubt—know the nature of my observations and representations. To suppose that I wished to do no more than reiterate my previous questions is, he will realise, surely dong me an injustice. I am quite sure that this could have been simply put, quickly understood and answered. There would have been no difficulty in the hon. Gentleman deferring it to some future occasion, or taking the trouble to write to me later.
We could have done all that, and hon. Gentlemen opposite, who are clearly getting more and more peevish and petty as they get more and more tired—and who have not honoured us with their presence in these proceedings until about an hour ago—previous to which they were, no doubt in some more pleasant, if less seriously minded place—could long since have been tucked up in their beds without a thought for the Air Estimates or the duties of the members of the Nursing Service in the tuberculosis wards. Everyone would have been happy. All that has been frustrated solely because the Leader of the House simply hates to lose face once he has stuck up his face on a pole.

5.4 a.m.

Mr. Foot: I think I should add a word or two to my previous remarks. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has given a very clear explanation to the Committee as to how this procedure has been built up in the past and the reason for our present position. After hearing that explanation I feel differently about this from when the original Motion was moved.
When I first heard the Motion moved by the Government my natural instinct was to rally to their support. Those who were here at the time will recollect that I did, indeed, support that Motion. But I now discover that the facts are different. I now understand the position to be that the Government were trying to rush these Votes through and deprive us of our rights. All the Government have done is to add a great deal of time to the amount of time we should have spent discussing these matters.
They have deprived the House not only of the opportunity of discussing Vote 1 but also the other matters on the other Votes, and have given an indication of how they mean to seek to protect themselves in the future. I cannot believe that that was the intention of the Leader of the House and it is still not too late for him to withdraw from an error into which he was rushed because of the poor advice he received from one of the assistants of the Patronage Secretary—I do not know who was responsible.
No one would hold it against the right hon. Gentleman if he decided to change his mind. One of the most attractive things about this House is that when an hon. Member is ready to admit a mistake, however grave, or however serious may be the difficulty into which he has landed other hon. Members by keeping them here until five o'clock in the morning, they are always ready to acknowledge the action and show a spirit of amity. That is always the case if an hon. Member is prepared to come forward and acknowledge his mistake and repair his folly, and I appeal to the Leader of the House to take that course now.

5.7 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I wonder what the Prime Minister will think of the conduct of the Leader of the House. We all know the Prime Minister takes a great interest in the Service Estimates. In fact, during the debate on defence he pointed out that when the Service Estimates were discussed hon. Members would have an ample opportunity of discussing their grievances. When the Prime Minister is told of the conduct of the Leader of the House, and that he has slipped, he will think that the Leader of the House regards the House of Commons as a banana skin.
If we are to pay that proper attention to these matters, which we know that the Prune Minister would desire, then he should be consulted. But not only the Prime Minister will be disappointed. There is also the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in these debates I regard the expenditure purely from his point of view. The right hon. Gentleman will be disappointed if he hears that the House of Commons has not had an opportunity to scrutinise carefully every item on the accounts, in view of the need for economy at the present time. On Vote 7 I had proposed to make various suggestions which would have assisted the Chancellor in planning his Budget.
There are other Ministers involved. The hon. Member for Droylsden (Mr. W. R. Williams) pointed out that the Postmaster-General had to clear up the intricate and difficult point regarding telephone charges about which even the Under-Secretary himself was perplexed. That point could have been raised under Vote 7. The Minister of Housing and Local Government has always taken a great interest in previous debates of this nature and for some time he led the then Opposition in criticism of the conduct of the Labour Government on these matters.
I remember a very eloquent, interesting and convincing speech made by the Minister of Housing and Local Government in which he denounced the Labour Party of the day for their policy of too much secrecy. I think the Minister of Housing and Local Government will be greatly disappointed when he learns that the House of Commons has had to agree to a Motion to report Progress when we have been trying to dispel this veil of secrecy to which he objected so much. There are other Ministers. We should certainly have had the benefit of the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown —the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, and the Lord Advocate—and the Ministers for Scotland.
I do not wish to go further into the list of Ministers who will feel that the Leader of the House has fallen down on his job, and that the House of Commons has been denied its rights of free and full discussion of very important Estimates. I would point out that there is this important question of precedent. We on

this side of the Committee are not only fighting for the rights of discussion for our own constituents. We are fighting for the rights of discussion for hon. Members opposite. One never knows what may be the turn of events at the next Election.
In the next Air Estimates debate the present Under-Secretary may want to press for information from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), who has been seeking information tonight. I submit that we should have the full support of hon. Members opposite, and that the Leader of the House should take all these facts and arguments into consideration and withdraw this Motion.

5.12 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: It was fair and helpful, and, if I may say so, typically decent of the Under-Secretary to intervene as he did a few minutes ago and try to help us and go as near as he could, within the rules of order, to indicate that he thought he knew what my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) was trying to talk about. But of course, the very fact that his intervention—fair and helpful as it was—did not lead to anything very conclusive shows how unfortunate it is that this Motion to report Progress was moved. My hon. Friend corrected him, quite naturally, and said that the hon. Gentleman could not possibly have known what he was going to say about the subject that he wanted to discuss. If only my hon. Friend could have made his speech an hour ago we should all have been away long ago.
There is still time for the Leader of the House to think better of it and let us go home. All he need do is to ask leave to withdraw his Motion. We give an undertaking not to carry on the discussion for long, but merely to allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South to raise his single, brief, limited point, the nature of which he has already made clear, although it has not been possible for him to make the observations that he would have liked to make.
I myself would have liked, under Vote 8, which we are not allowed to discuss, to raise a matter of profound interest to my own constituents—the question of the replacement of roads permanently


closed owing to the retention of war-time airfields and the extension of airfields to meet present day requirements. That is a matter of very great and urgent interest to agriculturists, farmers and others living in various parts of Essex, East Anglia and wherever these airfield extensions are going on. As the Under-Secretary knows, he and I have had some correspondence about one airfield in Essex and the future plans for it.
In order to curtail my remarks in general debate, I did not raise that question, although I had given the hon. Gentleman notice that I might do so. But I thought, in fairness, to him and to save time, I would cut my remarks short. It is most unfortunate that our considerate-ness has been repaid in this rather scurvy way by the Leader of the House and the Patronage Secretary. It would have been of very great interest to my constituents if I could have found out a little more about the question of the replacement of roads permanently closed owing to the retention of war-time airfields.
That is another example of how the Leader of the House is depriving our constituents and Members on both sides of the Committee of their rights. It may be that among the supporters of the Government there are some who are interested in certain of the matters covered by these Votes, and who would have liked to air some of their views and given us the benefit of their observations. They have been rather silent on the whole, except for barracking, but some of them might have found their voices in a discussion on Vote 9, "Miscellaneous Effective Services," or "Maps and Charts." I make yet another appeal to the Leader of the House to see if he cannot let us have just five minutes in order that my hon. Friend can raise his point, and then we could all go home. We do not want to stay here. It is the Leader of the House who has kept us for a whole hour.

5.16 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: May I make a final appeal to the Leader of the House? I do not know whether there is some feeling on his part that the discussion of these Estimates has been unduly protracted. Nothing has been mentioned in the debate. I do not think that the Under-Secretary complained that there

was any waste of time, or ineffectual discussion in the general debate.

Mr. Driberg: The Leader of the House did say—and I meant to pick him up on this—that there had been a long debate on Vote A, when there had not been.

Mr. Swingler: My hon. Friend has anticipated me. I was just coming to the point that there were many other questions that we could have raised on Vote A, but which my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and I deliberately did not raise, in order not to prolong the discussion. I would point out to the Leader of the House—if he is feeling some grudge against hon. Members because of the length of certain discussions—that quite a large amount of time was taken up by hon. Members opposite who spoke on the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Ton-bridge (Mr. G. Williams).
Quite a large proportion of the speakers in that debate were on the Government side, and some of them made quite long speeches. Nobody on this side of the House wished to make any complaint about that. The discussion was a useful one, on the subject of airfields. If anybody cares to assess the time taken in this debate he will find that a due proportion has been occupied by hon. Members opposite, who have made a very considerable contribution.
We should certainly like to know whether one of the reasons for the refusal of the Leader of the House to withdraw this Motion was his feeling that there had been some waste of time, or some deliberate protraction in the discussion of these Estimates. If that is not the reason, it is difficult to understand why he has this very obstinate objection to what is such a very small point. We have had a general Estimates debate, which has not been abnormally long, and we have had a very short debate on Vote A. The points have been raised effectively and without undue protraction of argument, and the Under-Secretary has dealt very effectively and straightforwardly with the questions, or has promised to deal with them in correspondence.
I see no reason why he should not be able to deal just as effectively with the point which my hon. Friend wants to raise, without needing any great amount


of time. The point is a very narrow one. All the Leader of the House has to do is to withdraw the Motion to report Progress, and move Vote 1 to allow my hon. Friend to raise his point, after which the Under-Secretary can give a considered reply, or consider what action should be taken, and the Government can then move to report Progress or take any further action they may wish to take.
That would not be anything unprecedented or unique. In former days Leaders of the House were accustomed to having the whole of these Votes thoroughly discussed, and Service Ministers thought nothing of sitting up hour after hour dealing with the most detailed questions and asking their advisers for explanations about every little point. Now, after a few hours' debate we are asked to pass this Vote, amounting to more than £500 million, and yet there is a stubborn objection against allowing a small point about a certain part of the Royal Air Force to be put.
It gives one a sneaking suspicion that the Leader of the House is seeking to set a precedent that nothing except Vote A shall be discussed by the Committee, and that the rest shall be subject to the Guillotine procedure. I make my protest, and thoroughly deplore such action. If there is to be a new procedure for dealing with Estimates, by which hon. Members are required to deal with every point they wish to raise in general debate and if there is then to be a short debate on manpower but no detailed point will be permitted to be put afterwards because it is argued that all that can be dealt with by the Select Committee on Estimates, it will be a deplorable shelving of the, responsibilities of the Committee and a. deplorable attempt to remove the right to raise grievances.
I am sure that the Service Ministers will not favour that procedure because it will involve them in an increase of correspondence and in the complaints they will receive at Question time. That will reflect the increased discontent of hon. Members, because these Estimates form a useful chance of developing matters previously raised on the Floor of the House by supplementary question, and I hope that the Leader of the House is prepared to make it clear that he will not set a precedent for the way in which Service Estimates will be discussed.
There has been no objection to the manner in which the debate has been conducted, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman, having had an opportunity to have second thoughts, will agree to the withdrawal of the Motion for a short period to enable my hon. Friend to ventilate his grievance in the traditional Parliamentary manner.

5.25 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo: May I put one additional argument in an attempt to persuade the Leader of the House to take the action which has been urged upon him in the last half an hour or so? A number of my hon. Friends have represented to him that if his object in moving to report Progress was to bring our proceedings to an end, he has already effectively defeated his object by his own action.
The right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that whatever matters we want to discuss on any of the Service Estimates other than on Vote A, we had better raise in the general debate on the Estimates. This means that future debates on Service Estimates will be much more protracted than they have been today, for we shall not have the ghost of a chance of raising any matter on a Vote other than Vote A except by raising it in the general debate. That is a great pity, because it might lead to a situation in which we could not possibly have as good and as constructive a debate on any Service Estimate as we have had during this Sitting.
A great many matters connected with such things as pay and conditions in the Forces, works, buildings, and so on, which are covered by the Estimates, are common to more than one of the Service Departments, and quite a number of matters are common to all three Service Departments. The Leader of the House must not think that by his wasting of an hour and a half of the Committee's time he has gained immunity from these matters being raised. Next week we are to have the Navy and the Army Estimates, and for my part, since the Leader of the House has obstinately refused an opportunity for raising one particular matter, I propose to devote the time between the rising of the House and breakfast to doing research on the extent to which the point I have in mind is common to one or both of the other Services in addition to the Air


Force, so that I can raise it in the general debate on either the Navy Estimates or the Army Estimates, or both. If I raise the matter then, it will clearly take a good deal more explaining than had it been done while I had the thing fresh in mind an hour and a half ago.
I cannot think what the Lord Privy Seal imagines he has gained by the pantomime into which he has forced the Committee in the last hour and a half, and what he thinks he has gained by the narrowest and silliest piece of obstinacy which I have seen during the whole of the proceedings of the Committee. In order to deny an opportunity for one point to be raised, which would have taken less than five minutes in all, the right hon. Gentleman has kept the Committee another hour and a half—and we are not through yet by any means. It really is shameful, and it is not merely we on this side of the Committee who have taken note of, and objection to, the Lord Privy Seal's saving of his own face at the expense of other people.

5.29 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: You will be just as anxious as the rest of us, Mr. Hynd, to hear the Government spokesman move the Adjournment of the House, and I shall try, therefore, not to detain the Committee longer than I need; but all the delay, of course, has been entirely caused by the obstinacy of the Leader of the House. I say to him, in the friendliest possible way, that I hope he does not go on allowing any foolish conceited notions of his own prestige to prevent him from doing the right thing and coming to the Box and asking leave to withdraw the Motion just for a few minutes, for the reasons that have been advanced.
This is, after all, the first Friday in Lent—a very good time for an act of penance and humiliation of that sort. There are so many other things which we could, and should, have been discussing in the past hour and a half which are much more directly relevant to the needs and welfare of the Royal Air Force than this procedural debate that we have been having owing to the obstinacy of the Leader of the House. I can conceive it is arguable that if an item comes up year after year in the same form—some recurrent expenditure on the same scale—it might be passed over in

alternate years, or in two years out of three. But all these items are not of that nature. There is the item concerning meal vouchers for juvenile staff. If we had been able to discuss that the Undersecretary would have had to tell us that it was a substantially larger item this year owing to the Government's policy of putting up the price of food and cost of living. I have no doubt these new vouchers bulk considerably larger in the Estimates than they did under the Labour Government, which controlled food prices. I quote that as an example of the sort of item which is not recurrent in an identical form. We ought, in the interests of the R.A.F., to be able to discuss these things. I hope that even at this hour the Leader of the House will relent and enable my hon. Friend to make his brief point.

5.32 a.m.

Mr. Foot: Both my hon. Friends have used strong language condemning the action of the Leader of the House, and in one sense I would say language of excessive strength. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) talked about one of the most outrageous acts of obstinacy he has seen in the House, and my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. Driberg) used language not very different. My reading of the situation is different. I do not believe that the Leader of the House originally got into this situation through obstinacy. I think he stumbled into it, that he did not know exactly what course he was taking.
The estrangement which we had at the beginning of the discussion, between the Chair and the Leader of the House, proved that the Leader of the House was not aware of the full significance of the action he was taking. Therefore, I do not think it is right to condemn him. I think he made a genuine mistake because he was told by someone that after Vote A it was normal practice to move to report Progress and that to do so would not deprive the House of its rights.- But since he has heard the real situation— [Interruption ]. I wish that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) would get up and say what he has to say. The hon. Gentleman is just the kind of person to rally to the Government when it is in such a difficulty. As for the hon. and learned


Member for Hove (Mr. Marlowe), so far from wishing for his support, I am sure the Whips would be ready to ask him to stay away from the House, They might even sacrifice his vote. It may be that the two hon. Members are "paired," one a supporter of the Government, the other a rebel.
It is an astonishing situation. Following the original error, which I put down to pure innocence on the part of the Leader of the House, one would have expected, after the discussion which we have had on this matter, and the whole series of points that: have been raised, that the right hon. Gentleman would have been prepared to state the reasons why he thinks this discussion should come to an end. But the fact is that the Leader of the House has not stated to the Committee any of the arguments which persuaded him to move his original Motion.
My hon. Friend the Member for New-castle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) has argued the case that no reason whatsoever has been put to the Committee for the acceptance of this Motion. If the Leader of the House will not take the trouble to explain to us why this Motion has been moved, I do not see why we should rush to his aid and give Mm what he wants. He might have taken the trouble, particularly after he discovered that he had got into these difficulties for perfectly innocent reasons at the beginning, to say five or six sentences on these lines, "These are the reasons why I think the Committee should now go about its business. These are the reasons why I think it is right that we should not discuss Votes 1, 2, 7 and all the rest. These are the reasons why I think it is wrong to discuss important issues about civil aircraft which arise on Vote 7." These things could have been argued by the Leader of the House, but he has not taken that course.
I think it is a bit thick for the Leader of the House to expect us to agree to a motion of this kind which, as he must have known later was a mistake, even if he did not know, at the time when it was moved, by one of the Whips. It is asking those of us who sit on this side of the Committee to forego our rights to discuss all these matters without having been presented by the Leader of the House with one reason why we should do so.
It is really an extraordinary situation and it would be most humiliating if hon. Members taking part in this discussion were prepared to accede to the request of the Government without one reason being given by the Government why we should accept the course which they are recommending to us. It is an old doctrine that it is the business of the Opposition to oppose, and some people even object to that. I do not object, because I think it is a very good doctrine. Certainly no one has ever laid it down that it is the business of the Opposition to accept a request of the Government without hearing the reasons for it. Yet that is the position in which the Leader of the House has put us.
Although the right hon. Gentleman embarked upon this course perfectly innocently, I think he is now treating the Committee with contempt, because he should be prepared to put the case for the Motion which has been moved. This Committee and this House cannot be conducted by peremptory Motions read out by the Patronage Secretary or one of the Assistant Whips, who are not in the habit of speaking in this House. Most of them can hardly stutter out more than a few words. Most of them are incapable of moving the adjournment of the House without stumbling over their words.
It really is intolerable that a debate of this nature should end without us hearing any argument from the Leader of the House. Indeed, he has not attempted to intervene to put any arguments. He only rose to his feet on a technical point which he happened to get wrong anyway.

Mr. Beverley Baxter: On a point of order, Sir Charles. I have listened attentively to this speech—[An HON. MEMBER: "The hon. Gentleman has only just come in."] I was only absent for 10 minutes, otherwise I have been present all the time. I have now heard for at least 185 times the statement that the Leader of the House said nothing. I do not suggest that it has yet reached the stage of repetition, but it is certainly tedious. May I ask, Sir Charles, at what number—perhaps 500—the same statement would appear to you to be tedious repetition?

The Chairman: I would not like to say how many times a thing may be repeated, but I personally quite understand the position now, and it is becoming a bit tedious.

Mr. Foot: I am sorry if I became tedious, Sir Charles, and I apologise—

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Try to brighten it up.

Mr. Foot: I think I am entitled to protest when a Motion of this character is moved in this House without anybody opposite making any case for it whatsoever. The hon. Member for Southgate protests that I have said this 185 times, although I am sure that if he consults HANSARD he will find that his arithmetic is incorrect. But if the Leader of the House is not prepared to defend this Motion, is the hon. Gentleman prepared to get up and defend it? Is any hon. Member opposite prepared to defend it? If there is no hon. Member on that side of the House prepared to defend this Motion, why should we agree to a proposal put forward by the Government, a proposal which no one is prepared to support?
I have said that twice and I have not been able to provoke the hon. Gentleman into speaking in support of the Motion which he is apparently going to back. I say that it is a shameful way to treat the House of Commons, to put forward Motions which are not discussed in any reasonable fashion, and which no attempt is made to explain.
Therefore, if this kind of procedure is to be followed, those of us on this side of the House will have to take action about it. We shall have to devise how we shall deal with such matters in the future, and we shall have to decide what is the best course for ensuring that we get adequate discussion of all these matters which appear in the Service Estimates. But it is a pity that the situation should have reached that stage, because I do not believe this was due to any wicked, deeply-laid design on the part of the Government.
I do not think it was some Machiavellian plot thought up by the Chief Whip. We saw him pottering in and out an hour or so ago. We were not quite sure what he was up to, but I do not think it was some brilliant scheme thought out by him-

self and the Leader of the House. I do not believe their mastery of strategy to be sufficient for the purpose. I think it was a perfectly genuine error in the first place. What they have done since shows that they are incapable of recognising when they have put themselves in a difficult situation.
It is the old story. Like all weak Governments, they resort to strong measures, and this is what they think is a strong measure—to stand up in defence of their original error. Indeed, it is very much like the situation we have been discussing on the Estimates themselves, that many people approved the armaments programme originally and then sought to fight to the death to defend their folly, even though it involved the country in the expenditure and loss of millions and millions of pounds. If the Leader of the House had listened to the powerful arguments on that subject during this same debate, he might have learned that it is much better to admit a mistake than to continue in such obstinate courses as he has pursued now for about two hours.

5.45 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: I think I must correct the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) on one point. He said that no reasons at all were advanced in justification of this Motion. I think one reason was advanced by the Leader of the House originally. The right hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong, but my impression is that he did say that one reason for moving to report Progress was that the debate on Vote A had been a long one. That is the only reason and it is, of course, quite misconceived and inaccurate. Everyone would agree that the general debate was a reasonably long one, but no one would seriously say that the debate on Vote A was a long one.
I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman was here for some or most of the debate. Perhaps he came in at the end and assumed that it had been going on for some hours. Of course, the length or shortness of a debate is a matter of opinion. Some speeches and debates that may seem very short to the people enjoying them may seem incredibly tedious and long to others, and very often when an hon. Gentleman says "I intend to speak only for a moment or two" or "I only wish to say a few words," he goes on to


speak for 40 minutes and utters about 10,000 words. But I do not think that any reasonable person could, by any reasonable standard of judgment, argue that the debate on Vote A was unduly prolonged, or even a long one at all.
On Vote 7 there is another point, rather similar to the one I made before, about the food vouchers for juveniles, a matter which it would have been desirable to discuss for the simple reason that it is not the same as last year. Obviously some of these items recur year after year in more or less identical form, but here we are told that the increase in the gross total of this Vote is mainly due to increased provision for aircraft, ammunition, explosives and clothing, and then the explanatory note says that this increase is largely offset by decreased provision for radio, radar and electric equipment.

The Chairman: That is the sort of point on which hon. Members cannot go into detail. It arises on a Vote which we are not discussing.

Mr. Driberg: I am grateful for your guidance, Sir Charles. It will help me in future speeches in the course of this debate to avoid transgressing. I was merely giving an illustration of the kind of thing which we ought to be discussing.
There is also another point upon which I should have liked an explanation, and that is receipts from sales of clothing. I am glad the R.A.F. are selling it off and not just tearing it up rather as British Railways smash crockery; but the idea of the R.A.F. going into the rag trade is rather curious. That is the kind of thing which we should have had the opportunity of discussing tonight, and I cannot agree to this Motion unless the Leader of the House gives us one small concession for the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, North (Mr. Mikardo).

5.50 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I wish to make a suggestion which might help towards a more conciliatory spirit. I am firmly convinced that if the Leader of the House displayed the same conciliatory spirit as the Minister of Labour in industrial disputes this matter could be amicably settled. I am quite sure that if the Minister of Labour

—who sets such an example in conciliatory behaviour, who gets his way in the House and whom we all so much admire—knew what was at stake he would be pleased, even at this hour, to leave his bed to solve this point. If industrial leaders in a movement for higher wages took such an unconciliatory attitude towards the employers, and if the employers took a similar attitude, there would be an industrial deadlock on a large number of fronts.
I suggest that the Minister of Labour is the person whom we are prepared in this matter to accept as arbiter. What could be more reasonable than to say to the Leader of the House that we, on this side of the Committee are prepared to be conciliatory, to put the matter to arbitration, and abide by the good faith and the decision of the Minister of Labour in this controversy?
The stake is not a small point relating only to the hon. Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo). At the back of this lies a big constitutional issue. I can see it emerging again in the debates on the Navy and the Army Estimates—and particularly in the debate on the Scottish Estimates. We must look far ahead in these matters. If we are forbidden to discuss something involving £500 million of public money, and Ministers are to come to this House to get these huge sums by this kind of procedure it is indeed serious.
In much the same way Hitler and Mussolini ruined the constitutions of free Germany and free Italy. I acquit the Leader of the House of any desire to depart from the formalities and conventions of the House, but though he does not mean it, he is, by preventing the important discussions which this House must give to public expenditure, taking up precisely the same attitude as did Hitler, Mussolini and Franco.
In this House we have pictures of hon. Members who fought for the liberty of the subject and the right to grant money. We recall the action over Ship Money and other great historical precedents. Were it not for these precedents I certainly would not support my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South. I have always been a great believer in the constitutional proprieties, and respectful—even slavish—towards precedent.
If we give way on this matter we shall be sacrificing the constitutional liberties which have made this the Mother of Parliaments and which have gained for this House the respect of countless other legislative assemblies throughout the world. What would the people of British Guiana think if they heard that we had abandoned this struggle now? What would Dr. Malan say if he knew that in the House of Commons we were prepared to abandon the principle of fighting to be allowed to discuss £500 million expenditure? What will the Foreign Secretary say when he hears what is being done, with the eyes of both East and West Germany upon us here tonight?
It was not I who dared suggest that the Leader of the House had slipped. I would never have dreamt that he could have slipped on such a matter of procedure.

Mr. Mikardo: He was pushed.

Mr. Hughes: I do not wish to push him any further. I wish him to recover his balance and his sense of proportion.
I suggest that these facts have been eloquently and forcibly presented to him. He should realise the constitutional proprieties which are at stake, and that the democracies of the world base their procedure on the proceedings of this House. In the countries of the Commonwealth and in the Parliaments of Africa and the Colonies they are studying meticulously every point of procedure so that they may be guided in their future deliberations. We should not betray the rights of democracies on this occasion.
Frequently I see members of the Commonwealth and coloured people who come to this House. I have seen them in the Table Office studying every part of our Procedure so that they may do the same in their own Parliament. I think, therefore, that the Leader of the House should not think of trying to score a point, or of using his power over a small minority, because minorities have frequently been right. I have been right on some occasions and the House has discovered it only after five years or so.
I would ask the Leader of the House not to be stubborn. We remember when he was in Opposition what splendid, tenacious, persistent and continuous struggles he put up for the rights of the Opposition. He opposed the Government

on every possible occasion. I am sure that had he been below the Gangway tonight and in Opposition he would have endorsed every word which has come from hon. Members who have done nothing more than their duty in demanding the fullest possible discussion of public finance.
The Leader of the House should remember that there may come a time when he is not on the Government Front Bench, but in Opposition and below the Gangway. Then he will realise the handicaps suffered by people in a minority when they are trying to put a point of view. I seem to be condemned to be in a perpetual minority and because of that I think that the rights of minorities should be protected on every possible occasion. This is not just a matter of being difficult. We want to see this great Constitution of ours flower until it is the light of the civilised world.
We note that the Leader of the House has had the benefit of a consultation with the Patronage Secretary. I have always found the Patronage Secretary to be amiable, courteous and civil and a very colourful personality in this House. I have no ill will at all towards the Patronage Secretary. If he had been the Whip on our side it might have been rather difficult. But I ask him to give a little sober, restrained, intelligent and statesmanlike advice to the Leader of the House. If he does that he will rise in our estimation and we will assist him on every possible occasion in disciplining his own mutinous rebels on the Government back benches.
I am prepared to strike a bargain with the Patronage Secretary. I am prepared to assist him against his own rebels. But he must realise that there must be a quid pro quo. I am prepared to ask the so-called rebels on the Conservative side to withdraw their Motion which is causing embarrassment to the Government now, and which may cause similar trouble when we discuss the Estimates next year—

Mr. Mikardo: Is the hon. Member asking for a "quid" from each or a "quid" from the lot?

Mr. Hughes: I do not want to degrade this discussion to the level of the market place. I stand by the proprieties. I wonder what Sir Erskine May would


have thought of this procedure. It is enough to make Sir Erskine May rise from his grave and throw stones at the Leader of the House. Out of respect for Sir Erskine May, if not for the minorities, out of respect for the past as well as the future, I feel that the time has now come when the Leader of the House, assisted by the Patronage Secretary, should think first of all of liberty and democracy and dc the decent thing by this Committee.

6.1 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: I ask my hon. Friends to consider the difficult position in which the Leader of the House finds himself. It is extravagant of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) to accuse the Leader of the House of being unconstitutional on this occasion. The Leader of the House is merely following the precedent of recent years.
What we should realise is that we on these benches are questioning whether this precedent, which has been set up in recent years, and which has been followed during the night, is right, or whether the Leader of the House ought to grant a concession on this occasion. I quite agree with the procedure which has been laid down and which curtails discussion on these Service Estimates. It is quite clear that in recent years these Estimates have become far too complicated and long for them to be discussed in detail. After all, what is the purpose of having a Select Committee on Estimates if it is not to go through the details in these Votes?
Therefore, I thought it was a good idea when, in recent years, a Select Committee returned in favour of a general discussion on these Estimates, so that we could have a general discussion on Vote A relating to manpower, which is the Vote that the Government must get, and then have a curtailed guillotined discussion on those items which the Opposition might think important. That is the position now, which the Leader of the House is inevitably following.
The position is that my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) challenges that precedent and requests the right to raise the subject of Vote 1, whereas the Government have moved to report Progress in the automatic routine way. The Leader of the

House says, "It is only one Member; why bother? He can make an attempt to raise it some time later or through some other channels, and, therefore, we should carry on doing the automatic thing that has been done in recent years."
Hon. Members ought by now to appreciate that this is an issue which might affect any Member on either side of the Committee. A large number of issues are involved in these Estimates. For example, not long ago we had the hon. and learned Member for Hove (Mr. Marlowe) sitting opposite. One of these Votes deals with the retired pay of officers. The hon. and learned Gentleman and some of his hon. Friends might well have been eager to use this opportunity to raise the question of the retired pay of air officers on Vote 10, had it not been for the fact that the Government at the eleventh hour foresaw that possibility and granted a very minor concession to that group of Members in order that they should not kick up a row as they threatened to do when the Service Estimates came along. Not that they would have been able to do that; if that position had arisen and the Leader of the House had moved to report Progress, the hon. and learned Member would have had no opportunity of raising the matter.
Other hon. Members might wish to raise questions relating to hospitals, or married quarters, or other detailed questions concerning their constituencies. One only needs to cast one's mind back a few years to recall examples of these very questions being raised by hon. Members opposite, who used the opportunity of the Estimates debates to deal with extremely detailed questions under these Votes. I do not accuse the Leader of the House of doing anything unconstitutional. He is doing what has been done automatically in recent years, since this new procedure was introduced, but the question I would ask hon. Members opposite is whether this procedure is a good thing. Should hon. Members be denied the right to raise individual questions on the Estimates debates?
These are not questions which can be raised in the ordinary way on the Adjournment. This is the only opportunity for raising them. 'It is an opportunity which has been highly valued in the past, and any pretence that hon. Members may make that there is an opportunity later


on simply arises from their ignorance of the procedure which has 'been introduced, which imposes a stringent Guillotine on further discussion.

Mr. Roland Robinson: If there are so many questions to be discussed, can the hon. Member say why the whole Front Bench opposite has gone home? Every Labour Privy Councillor has gone home, and only five back-bench Members opposite are left.

Mr. Swingler: It seems to me that one has a peculiar sense of values if one says that the only people who count are Privy Councillors and ex-Privy Councillors. I must protest at the idea that just because a small number of Privy Councillors or ex-Privy Councillors are not here the Members remaining are unimportant. This is a typical example of an attitude which is becoming widespread, that the ordinary Member is of no importance whatsoever, and has no rights. Because none of my right hon. Friends is here I have, apparently, no right to speak. The rights of the ordinary Members of the House and Committee are being eroded to an increasing extent.

Mr. Baxter: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that the failure of Members of his Front Bench to turn up shows that they have an utter lack of grasp of the important issues which are now being discussed? None of them has had the brains to realise the collossal importance of this subject.

The Chairman: Order. This discussion is going far away from the Motion to report Progress.

Mr. Swingler: I fail to understand why the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) stays here. Let him go. What prevents him? He is not tied to the place. I presume he can act as a free agent. I do not see why he should object to other Members using their Parliamentary rights.
If there were trouble at some crossroads in Southgate and the hon. Member wished to raise the point many Members would say. "What a waste of the time of the House to talk about South-gate when there are so many other important issues to be discussed." That is the last thing I would say, although I do not guarantee to stay if the hon. Member for Southgate wishes to raise such a point. If he wishes to do so, it is his

right, and we are proud of the fact that he is entitled to do so. He may not regard my hon. Friend's point as important, but he can always leave if he so wishes.
The hon. Gentleman can go home to bed. There is no reason why he should stay here and prevent my hon. Friend from raising his point, or to support the Leader of the House in frustrating my hon. Friend. If we agree to the Motion we permanently prevent him from raising it and setting a precedent for not being allowed to discuss these matters in future. Perhaps when next the hon. Gentleman sits on this side, and he or his hon. Friends wish to raise a point on the Votes, the precedent will be quoted against him. If hon. Gentlemen opposite are satisfied that the Leader of the House should lay down that this shall be the procedure for the future I shall be most interested to hear what hon. Gentlemen opposite have to say when, later, they may wish to raise matters affecting their constituents and are told that in 1954 the Leader of the House laid down that after Vote A has been agreed Progress must be moved and the remainder of the proceedings guillotined. The Government's procedure means that 270 pages of the Votes will be consigned to the Select Committee on Estimates, which reports every nine months. Who reads its Reports? Does the hon. Member for Southgate?

Mr. Baxter: indicated assent.

Mr. Swingler: Very good. He only has the chance of reading them every nine months. What we are asking is that an opportunity should be given to discuss this one particular Vote, and in asking that we are not wanting the door to be opened so that we can discuss all the other Votes. We are asking that my hon. Friend be allowed to raise a point on Vote 1. If the Leader of the House thinks we are going to debate Vote 1 he is under a misapprehension.

6.12 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: I am glad that at last some Government supporters have started to intervene, because at this time of the morning, when their masks are off, they are shown clearly in their true political outlook and nature, and the most marked characteristic, as my hon. Friend has said, is, of course, their profoundly authoritarian and almost totalitarian attitude to the Parliamentary rights of Members. We have been standing up for the rights


of back benchers and the rights of Oppositions on Estimate days.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) got the point slightly wrong when he made a tremendous ridiculing attack on this side, saying, satirically, that these big issues were being discussed but asking why no Front Bench Member was present. But our complaint is that important issues are not being discussed, because we are not allowed to discuss them. That is why we oppose the Motion, and should have been allowed to discuss the Votes. I hope the hon. Gentleman now understands.

Mr. Baxter: My point is a simple one that will not cause any trouble. Does the hon. Gentleman not feel some shame because his immediate leader, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), and those who fail—

The Chairman: I said that we were not going to discuss who was here and who was not. That has nothing to do with the Motion.

Mr. Driberg: I am sorry that you ruled that remark out of order, Sir Charles, because I would very much have liked to have replied to it. The hon. Member is not at all well informed on the affairs of the party on this side. However, perhaps I can discuss that with him on some other occasion.

Mr. Mikardo: Even then, he would not understand it.

Mr. Driberg: Probably not.
There has been amply reasonable discussion of the Motion. I only wish we could equally have had an ample discussion on Votes A and 1. I have been wondering why the Patronage Secretary has not attempted to move the Closure. Presumably he dare not do so because he has such a poor attendance of Members on his side that he would not get the necessary 100 votes. However, that is his misfortune.
One rather important constitutional point which we should have had explained to us before agreeing to the Motion to report Progress is that under Vote 8 there is a reference to

greater contributions from another government towards the cost of works services.…
Although I cannot argue the merits of that, it is strange to find in the Estimates that the R.A.F. is to some extent subsidised or has a subvention from an alien Government. If it were the United States Government we would understand it perfectly well and would know what was meant, but I presume it cannot be the United States Government or it would have said so. Is there any need for it to be veiled in this obscurity in what is miscalled an explanatory note?

Mr. H. Hynd: Russian gold.

Mr. Driberg: Yes, possibly. This is a peculiar thing and it would seem to have some sort of constitutional significance. I feel strongly that we cannot agree to the Motion to report Progress unless we could have some kind of allusive explanation of this point or, at any rate, until the Leader of the House will accede to our repeated requests to allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) to make his single brief, limited point.

6.18 a.m.

Mr. Mikardo: I had not intended to intervene further, if only because it will be generally agreed that I have probably had a fair innings. But I am projected into doing so by the welcome if unexpected intervention of the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. R. Robinson), who represents half of the salubrious borough of Blackpool, and the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter), who represents an underground station in the north of London and whose interventions were extremely welcome, even though, each time the underground station started functioning, it got out of order very quickly.
It is apparently being suggested by these two hon. Members that a debate is of no importance if it is not graced by the presence of a large number of people, and particularly by the presence of people on the Front Bench and Privy Councillors. That is a doctrine which, surely, the whole Committee ought to join in resisting. It is particularly the case with regard to debates on the Service Estimates—

Mr. Baxter: On a point of order, Sir Charles. When I mentioned that very subject which is now being discussed, you were good enough to point out that I was out of order, and I sat down. The hon. Member is now discussing it and he is not being rebuked from the Chair.

The Chairman: I beg pardon. My attention was distracted for a moment.

Mr. Mikardo: Even had your attention not been distracted, Sir Charles, you would not have found anything in my observations to which you could take objection, because there was nothing in them which conflicted with the guidance you had been so kind as to give the Committee a little while before.
I was about to say that in the debates on the Service Estimates, above all we are provided with an occasion when the back bench Member has the right and the duty to raise particularly points which are brought to him by his constituents. I suppose that one of the outstanding changes which has taken place in recent years in the relationships between the House and the community at large is that, for the first time, Members have been freely getting correspondence from personnel in the Armed Forces.
It is true that some in the armed forces are still under the impression that there is a regulation against their writing to their Member of Parliament. Even so, I get letters, and I imagine that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee do, from men serving in the Navy, and occasionally in the Air Force, who request that their names shall not be disclosed saying that it is against regulations to write to a Member of Parliament.
Notwithstanding this impression, it is true that people in the Services who have problems do not hesitate to write to their Members of Parliament. For that reason we ought to be better informed than were hon. Members formerly on Service matters, and debates on the Service Estimates are pre-eminently occasions for bringing forward these matters. They are occasions for the 16-inch guns of the Front Bench, and for the "pom-poms" of the back benches, which are trained on different targets with the object of getting assistance for their constituents.
The issue which has caused all this trouble, and given the Lord Privy Seal an excuse for keeping the Committee here

for two and a half hours without giving us a chance to discuss the Estimates, is —[An HON. MEMBER: "Idiotic"]. If the hon. Member for Southgate wishes to use the term "idiotic," and be objectionable, there is only one way for him to turn when using that term.
The point which has given the Lord Privy Seal the excuse for keeping us here all this time is one raised by a constituent who said that his grievance was widely felt among the personnel of the Service he is in. It is within the proper province of an hon. Member to exercise his privilege and bring up such a matter on this occasion. It ill becomes hon. Gentlemen to sneer at the fact that there is only a handful of us here. At least we are participating in the proceedings, not sitting giggling, like hon. Members opposite.
We have sought to exercise the right of back bench Members to ventilate points on the Air Estimates, and hon. Members opposite ought not to sneer because we have continued to do this whether or not we are surrounded by an imposing battery of Privy Councillors. That is not the real issue. The Front Benches on both sides can look after themselves. It is up to back bench Members to protect the interests of private Members, and I would have thought that the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) would have been amongst the first to lend us a hand in that task instead of sneering at our efforts.

6.25 a.m.

Mr. Driberg: I do wish the Leader of the House would let us go home. We are getting very tired. I have a luncheon engagement with an American editor, tonight I have to speak to the boys of Eton College, and I have all sorts of things to do as well as keep this rather wearisome debate going. Will the Leader of the House make one small concession and show a little generosity and allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) to make his point?
There is another thing. Next week we shall be discussing the Navy Estimates. One point which we shall raise is the question of discharge by purchase, because the practice in the Navy differs in some respects from the practice in the other Services. To enable us to raise that effectively and in an informed way,


it would have been extremely useful if we could have had a short discussion and a little information tonight from the Under-Secretary of State for Air about the practice in the Royal Air Force.
That occurs under Vote 1, which the Leader of the House has now unfortunately prevented us from discussing. It would have been extremely useful for our debates next week if we had had that information tonight. I hope I have made that point clear, but it makes no alteration to the damage that is being done to our discussion and to Parliament by the obstinate attitude of the Leader of the House.

6.26 a.m.

Mr. Swingler: I hope that by now the Leader of the House has had sufficient time to reconsider the position of this Motion, because I think before we move into the next Parliamentary day there is just time to withdraw this Motion so as to enable the Committee to consider the one small point which my hon. Friend wants to raise. It did occur to me that perhaps hon. Members do not realise what is the effect of this Motion in excluding or preventing discussion in this Committee. There is a very important point to be considered here. The Air Estimates do not have a very wide circulation among Members of this Committee, and very few anyway take the trouble to read all that appertains to them.
Let us look at the index, which covers many pages. We start off, for example, with the question of accommodation and charges for occupation of married quarters, personnel, services stores and technical staff. Then we find bakeries, balloons, grants to band funds, barrack accommodation, recoveries in respect of batmen, bedding, benches, board and lodging, bombs and bomb gear, boy entrants, which deals with apprentices, and weather forecasting for joint communications, which we find under the heading of the British Electricity Authority. All these are very interesting subjects and well worth study on the part of hon. Members.
I could multiply these many times, but here are just a few more samples. There is the payment for services of hairdressers, sales from handicraft classes, harbour charges, harness and saddlery,

horses, and so on. This shows the wide variety of subjects which are the concern of the Secretary of State for Air. I do not expect many hon. Members knew, for example, that horses came under the Air Ministry, or that the question of organists looms very large. There is a very large table on the question of pay for drivers' attendants, parachute duties, sanitary duties—

The Chairman: Order, order. I have been very patient, but the hon. Member must not continue further on that line.

Mr. Swingler: I was only trying to show some of the things referred to the House of Commons by the Select Committee, and that we have only a general opportunity of discussing them. That satisfies the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter), who is concerned with the broad and important issues. I appreciate that he does not want to go into the detailed questions. That is the general provision which is made and it leads to this kind of Parliamentary situation. We have considered the broad issues in a debate about which no complaint was made, but there has been no opportunity for detailed questions to be raised.
Now we come to the question, has an hon. Member now no longer the right, under the new procedure introduced in the last three or four years, to raise detailed questions after the hon. Member for Southgate has gone home? Having concerned himself with the general issues, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not object to other Members interested in the detailed issues discussing them, even if he did not agree with the opinions expressed. The hon. Gentleman may feel uncertainty because not sufficient Privy Councillors are present, but, nevertheless, I am sure he would not register violent objection to the fact that other hon. Members would have a right to raise detailed questions on the pay of trumpeters, tuberculosis—

The Chairman: I have already objected to the hon. Member reading out from the list. I hope it will not be proceeded with.

Mr. Swingler: I beg pardon, Sir Charles, but those are the kind of detailed details which my hon. Friend for Reading, South (Mr. Mikardo) wished to raise. That is the only point now at issue and we are trying to give the Leader


of the House some time to consider this situation, which is admittedly difficult, because this is a new procedure which has only arisen in the last few years and the precedent has been set for the Leader of the House for moving this Motion to report Progress after Vote A. Therefore it was only right that, since we have challenged this point, we should give some time to the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether he ought not to withdraw the Motion to report Progress to enable other Votes in addition to Vote A to be considered.
I hope, therefore, that our arguments have been considered to be sufficiently powerful by the right hon. Gentleman for him to feel that without necessarily creating a precedent or in any way feeling that it will raise a problem, he might now gracefully come forward and withdraw this Motion to enable this small point to be considered now, to enable those hon. Members who wish to do to go home, and so that hon. Members will know in future that they can assert the right to discuss details included in these Estimates.

6.34 a.m.

Mr. Foot: I think I can compress everything further I have to say on this matter into a few sentences, and I will certainly do my best to do so despite all the provocations which have come from the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter), who has certainly lengthened this part of the proceedings by one of his rare interventions. We are sorry we do not hear him more often, but I am sure his constituents will know that he has made a notable contribution to this debate.
It seems that despite all the efforts of the hon. Member for Southgate to assist us in getting the Leader of the House to make a statement, he is unwilling to do so. I deeply regret it in the interests of the reputation of the Leader of the House, as much as in the interests of the constitutional liberties which others have discussed at greater length than I certainly intend to do.
The Leader of the House has learned one thing tonight which he will not forget for a long time. Put in colloquial terms, at any rate he has learned that he must make up his mind never to bite off more than he can chew. He cannot implement that decision to report Progress. Many months will pass before he moves a

similar Motion when he has not got 100 Members in the House of Commons. I do not think he will be doing that again very soon. It is a pity that having got into that situation he should not have acted more graciously, and for all we know the hon. Member for Southgate (Mr. Baxter) might have been back in his underground station by now.
This has been a sorry evening, especially in view of the courtesy shown by the Under-Secretary during the previous debates. Although he did not answer the points I raised it was not because he would not, it was because he could not. He would have answered them if he could. I certainly do not hold that against him, and everyone believes that he has done his very best to deal with the whole debate. He answered a number of complicated points. He was going along beautifully. Everyone agreed that the procedure was being used properly, and suddenly out of the blue comes this action of the Leader of the House.
It was a great disappointment to us, but I hope that, having learned his lesson, even although he cannot struggle to his feet to admit it, he will be very careful about the numbers he keeps here in future. I am not speaking of those unfortunates scheduled to stay tonight, but of the 49 who are not here. Or are they being rallied to the cause now? What time will they arrive? Perhaps we ought to give them a reprieve. Let the Patronage Secretary tell them to carry on with their sleep.
We hope that the Leader of the House will never behave again in quite the spirit he has shown this morning. Even although he cannot bring himself to utter any words, even now as he is rendered speechless by the shame swelling up in his bosom, I believe he is fully conscious of the feelings expressed by hon. Members on this side, and he will be conscious of the feelings of the larger numbers in his own party who will have to be kept in future to be sure of carrying the Motion to report Progress.
In view of the circumstances, I wish the Leader of the House a quiet and instructive weekend with opportunity to recall that whatever other follies or mistakes in procedure he may commit it is very unlikely he will again make the same silly blunder that he has made tonight.

6.40 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: It is far too early in the year to wish the Leader of the House a merry Christmas, and I think that, until this question of constitutional propriety is cleared up, the magnanimity of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) is slightly misplaced. I do not know how the Leader of the House will be able to face the Colonial Secretary, who has such a respect for constitutions, when he returns from Kenya.
Certain points should still be brought to the attention of the Leader of the House. Someone should say a word for the Patronage Secretary. Some of the remarks made about him were unworthy. I do not see how, after the way the business has been so grossly mishandled this week, the Patronage Secretary could hope to keep more than a hundred Members of the Government here.
It should not go out from this House that its Members are not diligent in attending to their duties. I have never known a time when there has been such a strain on Members, and they need the relaxation of a long week-end away from the drudgery and cares of the House. I speak for my absent colleagues from Scotland. I know that not many of them are here—otherwise these proceedings might have been prolonged still further—but I am sure that they will support our stand for constitutional liberties. The country should not think that absent Members have just gone away to the neglect of their duties. We have had a hard and severe three weeks—I speak with knowledge. In the Scottish Grand Committee, for example—

The Chairman: We are getting far from the present business when we talk of the Scottish Grand Committee.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I was not going to deal with it in detail, Sir Charles. That would be far too complicated for some hon. Members to understand.
I was only pointing out the strain upon hon. Members. They have to attend early in the morning on several days of the week. There is very important legislation going through at present. The Housing (Repairs and Rents) (Scotland) Bill demands all the concentration that the Scottish Members can give to it. This week I was on two Committees at one and the same time.

The Chairman: I dare say, but I do not think that has anything to do with this Motion.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I was only trying to justify the conduct of the Patronage Secretary, realising his difficulties, with hon. Members subjected to great strain.
Hon. Members have also to face the future. During the week-end they have to meet their constituents. They have to prepare themselves for the forthcoming important Army and Navy Estimates debates. It would be a great mistake to think that even Privy Councillors are negligent of their duty. I do not wish to mention any particular hon. Members, but there are hon. Members who will lead debates in Committee. That is a very onerous task, and they are entitled to a little relaxation. How are they to know that the Leader of the House will slip up in the early hours of Friday morning? I think I should say that out of courtesy to the Conservative Members who come from Scotland.
What troubles me also is the bad impression this will have upon the Soviet Union. I am sure the Leader of the House does not realise it, but he is helping the very Communism which he detests. Let me explain. After all, we must defend our democratic institutions and this is the very time of the year when the people who convey information to the Soviet Union are most keenly interested in the debates in this House. They read HANSARD meticulously—every word, every sentence, every page—not to find out what I am saying, but because they desire to seek the latest possible information about the Air Estimates.
Imagine the editor of "Pravda" reading his HANSARD next Monday. He will read the proceedings of this House and he will say, "We thought that was a democracy,. but this is dictatorship. Although Stalin was a dictator and Lenin was a dictator they were so more or less openly. But the Gentleman they call the Leader of the House of Commons knows a trick more than that. He does it insidiously." In the Soviet Union they do not discuss things so openly as we do. The Soviet Union does not examine the Air Estimates with the meticulous exactness that we do in this House. I should not like to think what would happen were I to address the Presidium of the


Soviets in the same way as I am addressing you, Sir Charles. I do not think I should be allowed full liberty to criticise the leadership there.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Member would not last five minutes.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: That shows the superiority of the democratic institutions which we are trying to preserve.
When the Leader of the Soviet Union reads of the conduct of the Leader of this House he will suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is a Communist in disguise and that in an insidious, roundabout, totalitarian way, he is suppressing freedom of discussion. I will have nothing to do with totalitarian rule, whether carried out by the Leader of the House or by Mr. Malenkov. I am quite sure that they will be impressed in the Soviet Union. They will say, "Oh, yes. All this immense preparation for rearmament and the spending of this £500 million does not matter. We have captured the House of Commons from the inside. We have captured the Leader of the House." I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to think of the impression which his conduct, and this undermining of democratic institutions, is causing in the countries behind the Iron Curtain.
Let him also think of the impression which will be created in Ireland. I do not know how hon. Members from Northern Ireland will be able to explain the procedure of this House to their constituents. Those proceedings are being read very carefully by the people of Southern Ireland because they are anxious to know why the people of Northern Ireland wish to spend £500 million on the Air Force. They will be reading HANSARD in Dublin next week and saying, "What curious people they are in this House of Commons. Why do they need to spend £500 million on an Air Force. We do not need one. We do not need conscription. We do not need bombers or all this parade of militarism in our country, because we are a decent, God-fearing, sensible country, which does not need a large army and so this procedure would be impossible in Ireland."
I do not know how the hon. Members representing Northern Ireland constituencies are going to face the criticism which they will inevitably receive as a result of the proceedings in this Committee. In

deed, I am sure that when the two hon. Members from Northern Ireland who sometimes sit on this side of the Committee read the official report and tell their constituents what has been going on, there will be an immediate demand in Northern Ireland for the withdrawal of the Northern Ireland Conservative Members. The result may be that they will be prepared to drop the iron curtain and unite with the Irish Republic.
The impression which will be created in the outside world will be calamitous, because we have a stupid and reactionary Leader of the House. I suggest that the Leader of the House, out of respect not to us but to countries which are watching us, and which will come to the conclusion that he has been stubborn and obstinate, should give the necessary apology that is due to hon. Members on both sides of the House.

Mr. Driberg: Would the Leader of the House care to say a word or two, just to wind up the debate?

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be received this day; Committee to sit again this day.

Orders of the Day — SPRINGFIELD MATERNITY HOME, BLACKBURN (CLOSING)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Vosper.]

6.54 a.m.

Mr. H. Hynd: It is unfortunate that I have to raise this matter at 7 o'clock in the morning, but as I have sat here with all the patience that I could muster for many hours, I can hardly be blamed.
This is an important subject which may have repercussions in other parts of the country as well as in my own district. I think that the background of the matter has been illustrated by the petition that was presented at the beginning of this sitting by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Fenner Brock-way), by last Tuesday's Adjournment debate opened by the hon. Member for Solihull (Mr. M. Lindsay), and by various Questions that have been asked recently.
It is quite obvious that there is a general move to close maternity homes


throughout the country. I cannot understand why, because I have before me an extract from a speech made by the Minister of Health at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Executive Councils' Association in October, 1952, in which he says:
Another thing that I think we can do to increase and help the status of general practitioners, particularly, of course, in the smaller towns and in the rural areas but not necessarily confined only to them, is to see that they have charge of their own patients in hospital who do not need specialist care but who do need admission. In any mind this applies not only to general cases but also to maternity patients where the confinement is expected to be normal. We will do everything we can to encourage hospitals to make beds available in that way.
Despite that, the Blackburn Hospital Management Committee were faced with a cut of over £25,000 in their estimates last November, although at that time more than 2,000 people were awaiting admission to hospitals within their jurisdiction, including 84 gynaecological cases.
The maternity home to which I refer is called Springfield, and is a 20-bed general practitioner maternity home. It was opened by the Blackburn Corporation some 30 years ago and it was the only one in the town, which has a population of 110,000. In view of what was said at Question time today, I should explain that the catchment area for this home extends not only to the Division of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle) but to my constituency. I am raising the matter for that reason, and with the full co-operation of my hon. Friend.
In October last, without consultation with the Blackburn Executive Council, the Lancashire Executive Council or the general practitioners concerned, the hospital management committee recommended the closing of this maternity home. That was admitted by the Minister in a letter to me, dated 31st December, in which he said:
Your constituents are right in saying that they were not consulted about the proposal to close Springfield itself.
The closing led to many protests, and I should like to quote one letter which was sent to my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, East, by a lady who said:
I am 26 years of age and have one child aged three years. My husband is a sheet metal

worker.…. My mother is a sick woman and is awaiting admission to hospital for an operation. I have two sisters, both married, the elder being a full-time cotton operative and the younger who is aged 21 has a baby of eight months herself. Unless I am able to secure a bed in hospital or nursing home I will be obliged to remain at home for my confinement. As I can call on no one else I shall have to depend on my younger sister. This will necessitate her husband and child living with us also until such time that I am able to look after myself and family.
It is very difficult to see how they could live in her house, which is a typical small Lancashire house. That case has been refused a bed in any hospital. There was a deputation of local doctors to the Ministry on the general question of closing this hospital, but I do not want to dwell on that, because, whatever the rights or wrongs of the decision to close this home, I am more concerned with how it was closed than with why it was closed. The facts, which I have taken a great deal of trouble to verify, are very bad, and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to give some explanation of them.
On 7th January, at about 8 o'clock in the evening, the patients and staff in this hospital were told that, starting from 10 o'clock next morning, patients would be transferred, with their babies, either to their homes or to another maternity hospital called Bull Hill, eight miles away, on the other side of the neighbouring town of Darwen. The doctors in charge of these women were told nothing about this until the next morning, with the exception of one who heard accidentally the same evening. The mothers and babies were moved without medical inspection by laymen, some to their homes and some to Bull Hill Hospital. Some members of the Hospital Management Committee learned of this only from the newspapers.
I raised this matter with the Minister by Question in the House on 21st January, when he told me that the doctors of the seven patients who were sent home accepted the proposal. The doctors informed me that they did not accept the proposal in that sense. They were told on the telephone the following morning that removals had already started, and when the right hon. Gentleman said that the doctors were consulted and accepted it, I can only assume that he had been misinformed. It so happens that the date of the transfer was the coldest day of


the winter, and I am told that one of the ambulances could not travel up the icy road to one of the patients' homes. She had to walk with her new baby about 300 yards over icy pavements from the main road. The other five mothers and their babies went to Bull Hill Hospital.
The Minister admitted to me in the House that one doctor strongly objected. He did so because the baby had been born only on the 6th, that is, the day before they were told of the move. That objection was of no avail and the mother and her baby were moved. Other doctors could not be reached by telephone because they had started on their morning rounds. One doctor did object to the moving of a dying baby. The mother had gone home, and the doctor simply dug his heels in and said. "You are not to move that dying baby." The baby was left behind with a skeleton staff, and died about 36 hours afterwards.
The Minister also told me on 21st January that no ill effects had followed the transfer. I am sorry, but that information also is not correct. As a matter of fact, about 10 days before he told me that, an outbreak of strepto-coccal throat, which I am told is the most dangerous type of infection in a maternity home, had broken out at Bull Hill Hospital to which the women were transferred. One of the mothers was found to have a throat infection., and I have a statement signed by two doctors who examined her in which they say,
In our opinion the patient caught cold through being transferred to Bull Hill Hospital.
Within three days six patients and one ward maid were affected.
Here is a curious feature. This resulted in the hospital being closed, and there were efforts to keep it quiet, quite understandably. Doctors who asked about the admission of women in labour were told that the hospital was full. But it was not; it was closed because of infection. It was three days before the medical officer of health, the doctor who should have been first notified of the infection, was informed. Another doctor was called in, and this irregular procedure was evidently taken to try to covet the fact that infection had taken place. It seems to me as a layman that the proper way to close a hospital of that

kind would be to stop admissions at a certain date, and then automatically within about 10 days the place would be empty. Why it should be suddenly closed at such short notice, I cannot understand.
Here is a letter that one of the fathers wrote to the "Northern Daily Telegraph" on 12th January:
I personally never thought it was humanly possible for authorities to take such a step against wives and newly-borns, causing such anxiety and domestic disorder.
The Lancashire local medical committee, quite properly, I believe, asked for a public inquiry about this, but it was refused. The British Medical Association have become interested in it. They printed a critical article in their Journal, and, I am told, they are sending a deputation to the Ministry. In a letter which they wrote to a local doctor on 18th January, they said
There does seem to have been an appalling mishandling of affairs, both locally and centrally.
The British Medical Association are, of course, very properly concerned, mainly about the doctors being ignored and being overridden by laymen. I feel sure that this House will not only support the doctors in their attitude but will be even more concerned about the effect on the patients and anxious to ensure that this kind of thing is not allowed to occur elsewhere.
The Minister must know in his heart that the facts in this case are shocking. I feel sorry for him, because constitutionally he has to accept responsibility for what occurred. Indeed, at a recent public meeting in Darwen, when the Minister was challenged by some of the doctors concerned, he went so far as to admit—I quote from a report in the local newspaper:
It might be that the decision to close was taken too hurriedly.
He went on to say:
It may be that it was not handled with as much tact as it might have been at all levels.
That is going fairly far, and no doubt the Parliamentary Secretary will give some kind of repetition of those admissions in the House. But what the House would be entitled to ask from the Parliamentary Secretary is an assurance that, whatever may have happened in this case—though


it is very regrettable and cannot be put right—and whatever has transpired since, steps will be taken by the Ministry, through the National Health Service, to ensure at any rate that this kind of thing will not occur again elsewhere.

7.8 a.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): I know that this case has given rise to considerable local feeling and that there have been representations from the hon. Member for Accrington (Mr. H. Hynd) and also from my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, West (Mr. Assheton), in whose constituency the home is situated; it is not in the constituency of the hon. Member for Blackburn, East (Mrs. Castle). Therefore, I know that hon. Members are very closely concerned, and I am grateful to both the hon. Member and my right hon. Friend for having stayed through the long hours to hear the case on this problem.
First, let me deal with the major point which the hon. Member for Accrington mentioned in opening the debate. It was a suggestion that there had been a change of policy and that deliberate cuts were being made by my right hon. Friend in the available maternity accommodation. I say straight away that the basic policy upon which maternity accommodation is provided still rests on the Circular issued in August, 1951, by the previous Government, which said:
It is not possible to lay down a proportion of births for which hospital or maternity home beds should be provided in all areas. But in general, hospital provision is required on medical or social grounds for about half the confinements. This proportion, however, may be exceeded in areas where social conditions require it or where the proportion of abnormal midwifery is high. The advice of the local health authority should always be obtained as to the increase in the number of beds, especially on social grounds, in any particular case.
My right hon. Friend has made no alteration whatever of that provision. What has happened is that the percentage of intake into maternity accommodation has in some areas been very high. Cases have been adequately provided for, not only on medical grounds but on social grounds, on top of which it has been virtually possible in this area to provide accommodation for anyone, regardless of

any particular need, who wanted to go into a home.
Responsibility for allocating the accommodation in the regional hospital board's area devolves on the board, in consultation with the hospital management committee. There are often conflicting priorities. In this area, without question, there was a considerable number of beds available for maternity purposes. In fact, in the last returns we were told that the available beds had been used only to the extent of 69 per cent. On the other hand, there is a waiting list and a severe shortage of accommodation for the chronic sick and old people; and this unit has not 'been lost or put out of use in the health service. It has been transferred from a service in which there was adequate provision to one in which there is a vital priority need, namely, to look after the chronic sick and old people. The home is already in full occupation, and there are 30 patients there at present.
Regarding the criticism of the hospital management committee, I cannot accept the glib statement that no doctor was consulted at any time. There are five doctors on the Blackburn and District Hospital Management Committee—three consultants, a medical officer of health and the chairman of the Lancashire Local Medical Committee. They knew all along of the policy in regard to the Springfield Maternity Home. Before reaching its decision, the hospital management committee considered a report from a special sub-committee appointed to review maternity provision. That subcommittee was assisted by the medical officer of health, a Lancashire County Council divisional medical officer of health and a representative of the Blackburn Local Medical Committee.
This sub-committee recommended that the beds should be cut to 85, but the full hospital management committee, after considering the report, suggested that they should be cut to 100. Recognising the general practitioner interest, the hospital management committee appointed a representative of the Blackburn Local Medical Committee to the subcommittee, and invited the Blackburn and Lancashire Local Medical Committees to send representatives to the full meeting on 4th May and to submit in writing a statement of their views. Neither medical committee took the


opportunity to do so. I feel that had they raised objections, then there might have been more co-operation on all sides regarding this particular removal.
The hon. Member asked why we could not stop reservations at Springfield and increase them at Bull Hill. It was due to the fact that we had a limited specialist staff for maternity work, and it was not possible fully to staff both units at once. There was a period when Bull Hill had to close because of an outbreak of infection; but, again, the hospital management committee took special pains to consider the matter, and the regional hospital board insisted on the special consideration of whether Springfield or Bull Hill should be a maternity unit. As the hon. Member knows, Bull Hill has newly-built wings, it is well equipped with better labour wards and has new sterilising and much more modern sanitary fitments than Springfield for the purpose of maternity work.
The proposals were put to the regional hospital board, which deliberately held over its decision to a meeting on 12th October because it understood that the matter was to be considered between the hospital management committee representatives, the local health authority and the executive council. Here I must confess that the hospital management committee took too much for granted. It did not issue formal invitations to those bodies to send representatives but relied on dual representation on the part of some of its members on that committee. The chairman of the local health committee and the chairman of the Blackburn Executive Council had in fact, dual membership of both bodies and were aware of what was going on. It did not—and I think that here it made a mistake—issue formal invitations to the various bodies to send specific representatives.
The hospital management committee knew that Dr. Campbell was on the committee, and was the chairman of the Lancashire Local Medical Committee. He knew that the committee had agreed to reduce from 124 to 104 the beds available for maternity cases in this district.
If I may, I will now deal with the question of the removal of the Springfield residents to Bull Hill. It was not possible to do as the hon. Member suggested and merely let the reservations run down in

one hospital as they were built up in the other, because there was not an adequate rota of staff to look after the two sets of patients. The chairman of the hospital management committee, when it was found there was the smallest number of inmates that there had been in Springfield for a very long time, called together the senior consultant obstetrician, a consultant surgeon member of the hospital management committee and the group secretary. The position was explained to the patients when their husbands were present, and there were 11 of the husbands present among the 12 patients when the position was explained to them on the evening of 7th January. No objection was raised by either patients or husbands.
The patients were asked to inform the matron next morning whether they wished to go home or be transferred to Bull Hill. Here my information is in conflict with the hon. Member's, because I am informed that the group secretary spoke to seven of the general practitioners, none of whom raised objection to their going home. If the hon. Gentleman still challenges it, it must be a matter of division between us.

Mr. H. Hynd: Not raising an objection is a different thing from agreeing to it. They were informed that this move had taken place, but that is not the same thing as saying that they were consulted and agreed.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: If the group secretary rang up and said that he proposed to move a patient, if the doctor had any objection and thought that it would be dangerous on health grounds he would obviously raise some objection. But the hon. Member and I do not agree, and so we will agree to differ.
Of the five patients going to Bull Hill, it is a matter for regret that it was possible to contact only one of the five general practitioners concerned with those five patients. There have been one or two widely publicised allegations made against the hospital management committee, which I think it fair to answer. There was wide publicity for a story that one of the patients had given birth to a child on a stretcher in transit from Springfield to Bull Hill. That is quite untrue. An emergency case coming direct from the patient's home, in fact, arrived at Bull Hill Hospital and the baby was


born on the ambulance stretcher in the labour ward, but it had no connection with any patients being moved from Springfield and I am sure that the hon. Member wishes to refute that widely publicised and false story.

Mr. Hynd: Hear, hear.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: It was alleged that the whole ambulance service was put out of operation. In fact, it took one Blackburn ambulance one journey and one Darwen ambulance two journeys to convey patients from Springfield to Bull Hill, and I have said already that to suggest it was only a move by laymen ignores the fact that there are five qualified and experienced doctors on the Blackburn and District Hospital Management Committee.
In conclusion, therefore, may I say that my right hon. Friend feels that there might have been more co-operation over the actual removal but, on the other hand, an opportunity to co-operate was offered to the local medical committee in the early days of the plans to change this hospital. I can appreciate that feeling ran high, as it always does when a general practitioner unit is being transferred to other uses, and that co-operation was not forthcoming. It is to be regretted but, in principle, my right hon. Friend feels that the decision made by the hospital management committee to transfer this unit was correct, in view of the fact that the maternity bed accommodation was used only up to 69 per cent, of its availability and that there is an urgent waiting list of 172 chronic sick, even having used the 30 units in Springfield, whom we urgently require to get into accommodation.
We feel that, in general principle, the regional hospital board acted wisely and rightly in transferring this accommodation to its other priority use. I hope that now that the move has been made, the unfortunate circumstances and the feeling

which has run so high in Blackburn will be mitigated, and that all sides of the Health Service, whether lay or otherwise, will work together under the programme of the local hospital management committee.

7.22 a.m.

Mr. Ralph Assheton: As the Parliamentary Secretary has told the House, this hospital at Springfield is in my constituency and, therefore, naturally I have been extremely interested from the beginning in all that has been going on. As the hon. Lady knows, I communicated with the Minister the first moment I heard of what was proposed.
There is one thing which I am sure the people in Blackburn and the district surrounding it who were served by this hospital management committee will be glad of, and that is to know that these matters can be raised and discussed on the Floor of the House of Commons when occasion arises. That will be a satisfaction not only to them but to people in other parts of the country, because there are certain affairs which many hon. Members would like to raise in connection, for instance, with the nationalised industries which cannot be raised on the Floor of this House. Therefore, it is a satisfaction that in the case of the Health Service every matter can be fully discussed here.
It is now 24 minutes past 7 o'Clock in the morning, and the Parliamentary Secretary has been here all night waiting to reply to the Motion. There is no time for me to add anything more to the debate, but I am sure it will be a matter of satisfaction to my constituents to know that it has been possible to debate the matter in the House of Commons.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-four Minutes past Seven o'Clock a.m.